

Introduction

Although the Egyptian army is considered the oldest army in the world as the first regular army

The Egyptian army is the oldest army in the world as the first regular army known to history, and despite the glories it has recorded on the battlefields throughout history.

In recent times, it has not had the opportunity to prove its greatness, courage and authenticity

and show the splendor of his performance and valor, until it was realized for the first time in the Tenth of Ramadan War

1393 AH corresponding to October 6, 1973 AD.

There were four wars between the Arabs and Israel during the quarter century that followed the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel on May 15, 1948

on May 15, 1948, due to an international policy that favored Egypt, a bad domestic situation

and gross military mistakes made by uninformed leaders, the Egyptian army was unable to prove its

the first three wars it fought, the Egyptian army was unable to prove its worth and regain its glories and victories in the first three wars it fought, as it did not have the opportunity it had hoped for.

The Egyptian army was unable to prove its worth and regain its glories and victories in the first three Kharoub battles, as it did not have the opportunity it had hoped for.

His enemy face to face under a military command that is aware of the fundamentals of the art of war.

The Palestine War of May 15, 1948 was an old-fashioned war in most of its stages, although

It took place in modern times, and despite the many parties that participated in it, it was not

what could be called a modern army. Because of the British occupation, which was still in control of the Arab countries whose armies played key roles in this war.

Arab forces entered Palestine without adequate training, armaments, or preparation

The British policy of complicity with Zionism, which was supported by most of the Western powers at the time, especially the United States.

Western powers, especially the United States, played an important role in inflicting defeat on the Arabs. No sooner

No sooner had the Arab armies approached Tel Aviv, despite all the obstacles and conspiracies they encountered

until the then-colonized Arab governments were pressured to agree to a halt to the fighting and accept the first armistice

and accept the first truce on June 11 and then the second truce on July 18, 01948

Under the guise of the truce, weapons, equipment, military supplies and material assistance flowed in.

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to Israel, while the Arabs were deprived of any supplies or foreign aid outside. Under the ceasefire, Israel - as it has subsequently done in all of its wars - violated the truce, surprised Arab forces by attacking, and treacherously managed to

occupy most of the Palestinian territories. It turned out that Israel had established its state

on an area of land that far exceeds the area allocated to the Jewish state, according to the

Partition Resolution issued by the United Nations on November 29, 1947, increasing from 5.56 percent of the total area of Palestine to 4.77 percent.

of the total area of Palestine to 4,77, leaving the Arabs after the end of the war only the lands of the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip. West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza Strip.

The second war broke out on October 29, 1956, under the British-French collusion with Israel

in response to the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser's decision to nationalize the Suez Canal Company on July 26, 1956.

On July 26, 1956, there were no large-scale battles with Israel on the Sinai. There were no large-scale battles with Israel on Sinai, as orders were issued before the outbreak of the war to withdraw the main Egyptian forces from the Sinai Peninsula

the main Egyptian forces from the Sinai Peninsula in anticipation of the expected British-French invasion at either Alexandria or Port Said.

Alexandria or Port Said, and only eight infantry battalions remained in Sinai, seven of which were deployed

to the triangle of Abar Ajila, Rafah, and Al-Arish, and the eighth battalion was stationed in Sharm el-Sheikh.

When the Israeli attack began with the downing of a battalion of paratroopers at 5:00 p.m. on October 29

near the eastern entrance to the Matla Pass, 65 kilometers from the Suez Canal

The next day, October 30, Egypt received a British-French ultimatum requesting the withdrawal of Egyptian forces ten miles west of the Suez Canal.

to withdraw Egyptian forces ten miles west of the Suez Canal, and to accept temporary occupation of

of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, in order to separate the two warring parties and ensure the free passage of ships through the canal in accordance with the provisions of international law.

The political leadership ordered the general withdrawal of all Egyptian forces in Sinai to the west of the canal.

to the west of the canal to spoil the plan to cut off the line of retreat for these forces.

in preparation for their extermination.

In the third war, which began on June 5, 1967, the Egyptian forces did not have a chance to fight

They were mobilized in Sinai in a superficial manner and far from any warfare principles.

The Egyptian forces were mobilized in Sinai in a superficial manner and far from any warfare principles.

A plan that violates all tactical principles and principles.

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As a result of the confusion and nerves of the Muskarian leadership in the wake of the Israeli air strike

on the morning of June 5, the withdrawal order was issued on the evening of June 6 without any plan or organization

organization of the withdrawal, which transformed the withdrawal from a military operation into a state of

chaos and confusion, ending with the evacuation of Sinai and the loss of the Malasian Armed Forces

80 percent of their weapons and equipment. On June 8, Israeli forces reached the eastern bank of the Suez Canal

On June 8, Israeli forces reached the east bank of the Suez Canal, and the dear land of Sinai fell into the hands of the invaders.

Israel's lightning victory in the June 1967 war had a devastating effect on both the Arabs and the Israelis.

both Arabs and Israelis. Although this victory was primarily due to

mistakes made by some of the Arab muskrat leadership rather than the ability and ingenuity of the Israeli army

Israel was so intoxicated with victory that its army was able to defeat three

Arab armies in six days
three Arab armies in six days and annexed more than three times as much Arab land
its area. This is why Israthil became arrogant and arrogant, and believed in illusions that soon became
the myth of Israel's qualitative superiority over the Arabs and its unstoppable army
over the Arabs and its invincible army. The myth of Israel's qualitative superiority over the Arabs and its invincible army
Arabs anywhere, no matter how far away they are, in addition to what she used to say about the wide civilizational gap between her and the Arabs.
that separates it from the Arabs and that it takes several centuries for the Arabs
approach them .

As a result of the annexation of the vast Arab territories, Israel believed in a theory that it tried to convince the
the world at the time, which is the theory of Israeli security, which is based on basing its forces
behind natural habitats and retaining occupied territories that provide it with strategic depth.
The theaters of operations are far from the heart of Israel and its densely populated areas.
It provides its forces with mobility, freedom of action and maneuver, and threatens the depth of neighboring Arab countries.

Despite Arab and international efforts to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict in a peaceful manner
Israel has stubbornly and persistently rejected any peaceful settlement and refused to abide by Security Council Resolution
Security Council Resolution No. 242 issued on November 22, 1967, which stipulates withdrawal
from the Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war, as it was certain that the Arabs were militarily incapable of moving against it.
that the Arabs were militarily unable to act against it, and was fully confident that Egypt, the main
the main war front of the confrontation countries, would be unable to carry out any comprehensive attack against it.

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Any Egyptian attempt to cross the canal to gain even a foothold on its eastern bank would be
would be wiped out by its forces in a matter of hours, and its leaders were convinced of the impossibility of coordinating any Arab attack against it on more than one front.
an Arab attack against it on more than one front, due to the inability of Arab military commanders to plan
planning, and the weakness of the Arab forces and their inability to face Israel's invincible army.

As a result of this fatal breach, Israeli leaders believed that they had complete superiority, and that
Arabs have no choice but to surrender to Israel's terms and remain silent about claiming
their territories occupied in the June 1967 war.

But Egypt, contrary to Israel's expectations, did not succumb to despair, and there was not a single
one Egyptian who accepted that part of the Sinai would remain under Israeli occupation.
abominable Israeli occupation. Egypt immediately began rebuilding its armed forces with the help of the Soviet Union
Soviet Union, which provided it with weapons and equipment to replace what it had lost in the June 1967 war

as well as providing it with Soviet experts and advisors.

The Egyptian front did not calm down militarily as Israel had expected, as the defenses were no sooner
defenses along the Suez Canal front until the War of Attrition began in September

68, which lasted for two years. During this war, Egyptian artillery firepower came to the fore.

Israel suffered great losses in lives, weapons, and equipment, prompting it to establish a line of defenses, fortifications, and harbors
of defenses, fortifications, obstacles, and high earthen berms, which it called the Bar-Lev Line

Bar-Lev. Israel spent about 500 million dollars on its defense system in Sinai 500 million dollars, of which \$200 million was spent on the Bar-Lev Line fortifications alone.

Egypt was certain that the recovery of its stolen land could only be accomplished through a full-scale war of liberation with Israel.
an all-out war of liberation with Israel, but a grand strategy had to be devised.

The policy of entente between the two superpowers, which called for a relaxed was not conducive to the outbreak of a new war in the Middle East, and the international situation required a special approach.

The international situation required a special approach in managing the arms conflict in the region.

In view of these facts, the October War was planned as a limited war in which only conventional weapons would be used.

in which only conventional weapons would be used, and would have decisive strategic objectives that would
undermine the theory of Israel's secure borders and destroy the foundations of Israel's existing strategy

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based on military superiority and first-strike superiority to gain the initiative as a means of achieving strategic surprise, a strategy that calls for an abortive strike against any Arab offensive preparations, and that the war should be short and decisive
and decisive, moving the battle into Arab territory as soon as any clashes begin.

To circumvent this Israeli strategy required challenging Israel's security doctrine

through military action aimed at inflicting the greatest losses on Israel and convincing it that its continued occupation of Egyptian territory
that its continued occupation of Egyptian territories imposes a heavy price that it cannot afford, provided that this military action extends for a long period of time.

This military action should be extended for a long period of time, thus causing Israel material and moral losses that it is unable to bear

and, at the same time, provide an opportunity for other Arab energies to intervene and impose
influence the outcome of the war.

When the war began at two o'clock in the afternoon on October 6, 1973, Israel Israel still appeared to the world as an impenetrable military fortress. And the clumsy

Israelis believed that this war was only the seventh day of the previous Six-Day War

the previous one. From the Sokolov House auditorium, where press conferences on the news of Israel's

of Israel's impressive victories in the June '67 war, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan announced on the evening of

October 6 in a press conference 6The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will defeat the

Egyptians with a heavy blow
in the Sinai, and the fighting will end with our victory in the coming days.

General David Eliezer, Chief of Staff, told a press conference on October 8 amid
applause
to applause from the audience, that the IDF will continue to beat the enemy and
break its bones.

But these Israeli illusions were soon shattered in the first hours of the
fighting.
Egyptian forces stormed the Suez Canal, overran the Bar-Lev fortresses, and
began
to establish the bridgeheads according to the plan on the eastern bank of the
canal, and were able to destroy three armored brigades
three Israeli armored brigades were almost completely destroyed. On the Syrian
front
On the Syrian front, Syrian forces succeeded in crossing the artificial trench
built by Israel.
and rushed like a torrent through the Jakhoulán Heights from east to west on
three main axes
on three main axes.

Thus, Israel's security theory collapsed in all its foundations and components,
and its reputation was undermined.

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The Israeli army, which was famous for being invincible, was hit with a violent
shock that was described by some as
The Israeli people were violently shocked, with some analysts describing the
famous phrase
"An earthquake in Israel?"

The October War was undoubtedly a unique event, a turning point in the course of
the Arab-Israeli conflict.
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel as a state was subjected to a complete
strategic surprise that made Israelis lose their confidence in their army and
its apparatus.
Israelis lost confidence in their army and their intelligence apparatus, which
claimed to be the most capable intelligence apparatus in the world
intelligence service in the world with expertise in Middle Eastern affairs.
Israeli forces on the Sinai and Golan fronts
on the Sinai and Golan fronts suffered a tactical surprise that threw their
personnel off balance and forced them to
withdraw from their outposts. What surprised the world was the success of Egypt
and Syria
in achieving surprise at both the strategic and tactical levels, despite the
enormous development of modern reconnaissance
and their ability to deceive the Israeli and U.S. intelligence services at the
same time.
at the same time.

The Egyptian forces managed to undermine the foundations of the combat doctrine
of the Israeli forces
during the October War, and thus lost its main advantages, the most important of
which are agility, maneuverability, and achieving air supremacy on the
battlefield
Maneuverability and achieving air sovereignty over the battlefield. The
capabilities and effectiveness of the tanks
when faced with Egyptian anti-tank missiles and missile launchers
Israeli aircraft were forced to avoid approaching the Suez Canal, so as not to
fall prey to the Egyptian missile network
to avoid falling prey to the Egyptian surface-to-air missile network deployed
west of the Suez Canal. In view of

the intensity of Egyptian missiles and their effectiveness against both aircraft and tanks, the two main Israel's two main threats to its ability to wage short-range blitzkrieg in the past in the past, its military plans were confused, its offensive doctrine was frozen, and it was unable to the superiority it had always gained in previous wars with the Arabs, while at the same time the Arabs regained their dignity and confidence. At the same time, the Arabs regained their dignity, self-confidence, and reputation in front of the world, and the Arab soldier regained. The Arab soldier regained his confidence in himself, his weapon and his leadership, and the best expression of what happened was that the Arabs the Arabs had overcome defeat.

The strong defense lines and fortifications on the Sinai and Golan fronts at the beginning of the war did not provide the at the beginning of the war did not provide the protection that Israel sought from their construction, as the fortresses of the Bar-Lev in a matter of hours, and Arab forces were able to storm these
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on both fronts, proving that natural and man-made barriers and defenses proved that natural and artificial barriers and defenses cannot stand in the way of modern armies, with their equipment, weapons, and Especially if they have the will and determination to fight.

There is no doubt that the October War turned the balance of power in the Middle East upside down. After the June '67 war, Israel had been focusing on the qualitative superiority of the individual and its ability to use modern technology, which greatly minimizes the advantage of Arab numerical superiority. Arab numerical superiority.

The October War came, and one of its most prominent features was the emergence of the efficiency of the Arab fighter and the extent of his high level of quality and his ability to absorb and his ability to assimilate and use modern and complex weapons, including electronic weapons. Electronic . The Arab planner, commander and fighter have proven their real competence and capabilities on the battlefield. Therefore, by adding Arab quality over quantity, the Arabs will have the Arabs will have the upper hand in any future conflict in the Middle East.

The October War produced many lessons learned that had a major impact on reassessing the strategic and political aspects of the Middle East. the world to recalculate its position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The theater of operations in the Middle East in the October War witnessed the largest mobilization of armies in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, both in terms of the size of the forces and in terms of weapons, equipment and ammunition that were used. The results of the clashes proved that the war is expensive and costly, and it is impossible for a small country to continue fighting for a long time without receiving supplies for a long time without receiving supplies from a superpower. Without American supplies supplied by the United States to Israel via sea and air bridges, and without the Soviet supplies that the Soviet Union supplied to Syria and Egypt via sea and air bridges both sides would not have been able to continue this war for as long as it did, as consumption rates were extremely high. Consumption rates were extremely high. There would have been no way to minimize

the influence of the
The superpower that supplies arms and equipment to the smaller state, and
therefore controls the
the imposition of ceasefires at the time that suits its interests, except by
resorting to a policy of diversifying
sources of weapons and working on the availability of self-capacity for military
industrialization.

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One of the useful lessons of the war was Israel's strategy of
The scramble to acquire the latest aircraft and tanks
The scramble to acquire only the latest aircraft and tanks caused a serious
imbalance with regard to the balance
as the infantry and artillery weapons were neglected, which led to Israeli
armored units suffering losses.
Israeli armored units suffered heavy losses on the Sinai and Golan fronts in the
first phase of the war
in the first phase of the war. This was at a time when the Combined Arms Battle
was a great success at the tactical level, and the cooperation of all branches
of the Armed Forces
and the cooperation of all branches of the Armed Forces at the strategic level.

The battles of the October War raised many questions about the future of some of
the
in future wars. The October War battles raised many questions about the future
of some key weapons in future wars.
Will it maintain the high position it occupies in the offensive battlefield? The
Egyptian infantry succeeded
Egyptian infantry, unarmored and at short ranges, managed to repel the most
powerful type of tank
Centurion 48 8609 and inflicted heavy losses on them, especially in the first
phase of the war.
in the first phase of the war, using RPG-7 anti-tank missiles
and wire-guided Malotka (SAGER) missiles. There is no doubt that the conflict
between the tank
will continue indefinitely, as more and more missiles are developed and
optimized in the future.
the future of anti-tank missile guidance, it will be matched by
on the other hand, will be matched by improvements in the anti-missile
countermeasures that the tank will be equipped with
in the future. Despite the heavy losses of tanks in the October War, both on the
Egyptian and Israeli sides due to anti-tank missiles
on both the Egyptian and Israeli sides due to anti-tank missiles, armored
formations will undoubtedly remain
armored formations will undoubtedly remain the main offensive element in the
combined arms battle.

Egyptian air defense proved its effectiveness in limiting Israeli air
superiority on the battlefield
The SAM 2 and SAM 3 missiles, which proved their effectiveness during the war of
attrition, were
In addition to SAM 6 mobile missiles and 23mm four-barrel guns (Shilka)
A large number of SAM 7 shoulder-fired missiles were the main means by which
this was achieved
defended. Thanks to the air defense network composed mainly of SAMs, Israeli
aircraft were unable to destroy the bridges.
Israeli aircraft were unable to destroy the bridges built by Egyptian forces on
the Suez Canal
the Suez Canal, thereby securing the flow of troops and supplies throughout the
war to Palestine

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Eastern Front. The results achieved by the Egyptian air defense forces forced the Western military circles to reconsider their air defense systems with regard to the balance between fighter planes and anti-aircraft missiles between fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles. The lessons learned from the October War showed how important the role of anti-aircraft missiles is. If we consider fighter jets are the main element of air defense, then anti-aircraft missiles should be Anti-aircraft missiles should be the backbone of this defense. It was The October '73 war was the first electronic war in history, as this war witnessed the use of The Egyptian Air Defense Forces faced the most advanced technology in this field. The Egyptian air defense forces faced the latest equipment produced by the American arsenal of equipment and the art of electronic disability In all its forms and forms.

The results achieved by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces in the Achnobar War testify that The results achieved by the Egyptian Air Defense Forces in the Achnobar War attest to the fact that electronic disruption was not as effective as they had hoped it would be. The Egyptian Air Defense Forces were able to realize the principle that : "Any radar device must be neutralized, and any obstruction must be 4. The lessons learned from the Egyptian Air Force's operations in the October War were that the realization of the mobilization principle in the October War was that the realization of the mobilization principle, which is one of the most important principles of warfare, led to the success of the A concentrated air strike that knocked the enemy off balance from the first moments of the fighting. Also, the The success of this strike in paralyzing the enemy's centers of disability and air control allowed the to operate freely, especially during the first phase of the war. The effective cooperation with the air defense means has achieved the security and protection of the forces and vital state objectives.

The pilots' self-confidence and high morale made them outperform record high rates. Finally, it has been proven that developing countries that do not have an industrial base to have a sufficient stockpile of weapons to continue the battle so that the major powers cannot control the decision to continue the fight. The major powers cannot control the decision to continue fighting.

Regarding the strategic results of the war, it can be emphasized that one of the most important results is the realization of the main goal The main goal that the late President Anwar Sadat sought, which is to end the state of no-peace and no war, the continuation of which meant only the collapse of Egypt and its exposure to certain destruction. After all The two superpowers were forced to intervene directly to try to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict

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and to exert their strong influence to end the stalemate that had prevailed in the political situation since the end of the the end of the June 1967 war, with the aim of achieving peace in the Middle East.

The war also clearly demonstrated the importance of Arab solidarity in the face

of the Israeli threat.

Arab countries took practical steps to support Egypt and Syria, with nine countries

Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Kuwait and Tunisia

Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Kuwait and Tunisia. The Gulf states and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia decided to provide financial support to them, so Saudi Arabia provided two hundred million dollars and the UAE provided fifty million dollars for Egypt and fifty million dollars for Syria, and Qatar contributed fifteen million dollars

dollars and in-kind aid of medicines and wheat, and Algerian President Boumedienne, during his visit to the Soviet Union, put

During his visit to the Soviet Union, Algerian President Boumedienne put 100 million dollars at the disposal of Egypt and Syria with the Soviet government to the Soviet government to arrange any armaments that the two countries might need.

On the economic front, the Arab oil-producing countries took a decision to reduce their production

and then announced the implementation of a complete ban on their exports to the United States, thus confirming the role of petroleum as an effective weapon. The role of petroleum as an effective weapon to achieve Arab political goals was confirmed, as it was linked before the world

The petroleum embargo had an effective impact on the countries of Western Europe and Japan.

the countries of Western Europe and Japan, which made them strongly pressurize the United States to respond to the Arab right

Arab right. On the political level, the scope of the battle has expanded to unexpected heights.

The Atlantic Alliance has suffered a major rift as members were angered by the United States' authoritarian stance toward them.

It was a great shock to these countries when the United States asked them to provide their airplanes with landing facilities

to provide their aircraft with landing and refueling facilities at their airports and air bases.

to enable them to establish a long air bridge to transport supplies, weapons and ammunition from US air bases to Israel.

US air bases to Israel. Some of these countries have apologized for not being able to provide these facilities

Some of these countries have apologized for not being able to provide these facilities, and others have flatly and explicitly refused, in order not to incite the Arabs against them

Arabs against them, fear of refusing to supply them with oil on the one hand, and because most of them believe in the justice of the Arab cause

Arabs on the other hand. American airplanes were able to use only one airport on Portugal's Azores Islands in the Atlantic Ocean. On the other hand, the administration was furious

with the attitude of its European allies, and considered their opposition to the landing of U.S. airlift planes at their airports

American airlift planes to land at their airports as an act of ingratitude and ingratitude, considering that its umbrella

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nuclear umbrella in Western Europe that protects these countries from the Soviet nuclear threat. On the

At the African level, twenty-two countries cut their diplomatic relations with Israel, in addition to

as well as eight other countries that had already severed ties with Israel following the June 1967 war.

The move was a major success for Zionist policy toward the African continent and, in effect

a new addition to Israel's political isolation and an undoubted support for Arab

policy.

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Every war in history, whatever its outcome, is bound to have many strengths and weaknesses.

Therefore, it is the duty of every country after any war to order studies, research, and fact-finding in order to know to conduct studies, research, and fact-finding to know the elements of superiority and strength that emerged. at the same time to discover the shortcomings and weaknesses and identify the mistakes that occurred in this war Because war experiences are the only ones for which armies pay the price in blood

And countries pay the most expensive human and economic wealth. Therefore, it is based on the experiences and lessons learned so that the lives of officers and soldiers and the wealth of the country are not wasted in vain, and so that Leaders at all levels and soldiers learn from their experiences and the experiences of their predecessors that they acquired in the battlefields with their sweat and blood, which then avoids the pitfalls of mistakes, weaknesses, and weaknesses the pitfalls of mistakes, weaknesses and shortcomings that occurred before.

One of the biggest mistakes made by the Egyptian leadership after the triple aggression against Egypt in 1956, covering up the grave military mistakes made by some of the major military commands and a thick veil of secrecy and secrecy over what happened during the war. that led to the destruction of most Egyptian airplanes in their airfields while they were on the ground as well as the withdrawal of some military units in Sinai in a disorganized and chaotic manner disorganized, characterized by chaos, confusion, and violation of all tactical principles as well as the collapses of some commanders as a result of their weakness and inability and their inability to defend themselves from the critical situations they were facing.

Instead of conducting a thorough investigation and study to discover the causes of the failures and weaknesses. to identify the leaders responsible for these mistakes and hold them accountable, or at least remove them from their positions to be replaced by other leaders recognized for their competence, experience, and courage.

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The power struggle that existed at the time between President Gamal Abdel Nasser between President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Field Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer led to Field Marshal Amer's insistence on holding on to these commanders, considering them as his men and supporters against his opponents as his men and supporters against his opponents and opponents, and so they all remained in their commands and positions despite the will of Abdel Nasser, the head of state. Nasser's will as head of state.

No efforts were made to study the strategic and tactical plans followed by Israel in its offensive operations in the Sinai Israel's offensive operations in the Sinai, or analyzing the war battles that took place between the forces of the two warring parties. to come up with lessons learned from the war, and thus know Israel's strategic doctrine and discover its tactical methods

Israel's strategic doctrine, discovering its tactical methods of attack to develop counter-plans and train officers and soldiers on how to confront them, and prepare the necessary weapons to eliminate them. The Hakharb was then conducted as part of the preparatory phase for the October 1973 war.

Instead of bringing in Israeli and foreign military references and books on the of the 1956 Tripartite War of Aggression to translate and distribute them to commanders and specialized officers. to learn the truth about what happened in the war from the Israeli point of view, and to familiarize themselves with some as a kind of education and to gain more experience and education in the military field. The policy that was followed was to prevent the entry of these books of all kinds and prohibit their circulation in Egypt. circulation in Egypt. After the war, all media outlets were involved in drumming and cheering and broadcasting songs and anthems to praise fictitious military victories and boast of unfounded glories. This led to the deception of the people, and to the fact that those in charge of these hollow propaganda in the end believe themselves.

When Israel launched its aggression against Egypt on June 5, 67, it had no difficulty in to repeat the main aspect of its previous plan â€œKadesh 4â€ that its forces had implemented when it launched the attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956. attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956 without any change.

Since the major military commands that faced the Israeli attack were the same in both wars So, just as Israel repeated its plans and methods without change, these commanders repeated the same their previous mistakes without correction or development. But it was Egypt that paid the price in June '67 the price, and it was a heavy price paid by Egypt and its armed forces from its dignity, pride and reputation.

I found it necessary after the brilliant victory achieved by our armed forces in the glorious the glorious October 1973 war, with which Egypt regained its dignity, honor and reputation at 18

to record this outstanding war epic in an honest manner, free from bias and exaggeration, and to do an artistic analysis of all the events and situations of this war. to analyze all the events and situations of this war with frankness and honesty. It was I am as interested in highlighting the weaknesses and mistakes that were made as I am in praising the strengths and superiority that emerged. the strengths and superiority that emerged, because highlighting both aspects is the right way to benefit from the lessons and experiences of the war without falsifying them. the lessons and experiences of the war without falsity or deception.

I have made sure that my explanation and technical analysis of the battles is easy and simple. I have attached some appropriate maps and charts that can be used to understand the situations In this way, both military and civilians of this generation and future generations, God willing, will have the opportunity to benefit from it.

to benefit from the fruit of this long and painstaking study, in which I spent five full years of my life, during which I worked to familiarize myself with everything I could get my hands on Arabic and foreign books and references. I was also very interested in learning about the Israeli side's view of the war operations the Israeli side's view of the war operations that took place on the Egyptian front, and I selected for this purpose I selected for this purpose a set of useful Israeli books that are as far away as possible from bias and exaggeration. through which I was able to complete the correct picture of the most important battles that took place during this war war.

In addition, I had the opportunity to conduct personal interviews and lengthy discussions on maps with some of the leaders of the October War, about the facts and operations that took place in their sectors or in which their formations participated. I had the opportunity to have personal meetings and lengthy discussions on maps with a selection of October War commanders about the facts and operations that took place in their sectors or in which their formations and units participated. my study.

In order to complete the manual aspects of the study and apply strategic views and tactical theories to the and tactical theories on the ground, it was necessary to take a closer look at the theater where the most important on which the most important military operations took place during this war. During the course of this study a field visit to the ground, where I witnessed first-hand the most important landmarks, governing bodies, and fortified positions on the eastern side of the Suez Canal on the eastern side of the Suez Canal, including one of the Bar-Lev Line forts. I was I was very interested in examining the Dufreswar area through which Israeli forces crossed to the West Bank of the Canal. I also carefully tracked the axis of advance of these forces after they crossed the canal.

After I completed my study of the epic October 1973 war, with God's help, I wanted to bring it out in a book that could be circulated to readers, I found it impossible to publish it in one book due to the excessive

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so I divided it into two books, each of which is suitable as a standalone book. The first The first book was published in 1988 under the title "From Sinai to Golan," which includes the most important military and political events of the important period of more than six years between between the June 1967 War and the October 1973 War, including all the events and facts of the October War The book is 621 pages long and includes Ten full chapters with photos and two appendices.

The book was published in 1989 under the title "Battles on the Egyptian Front" . It is a meticulous analytical explanation of the battles, incidents, events, and situations of the October War on all battlefields. I have provided it with the necessary maps and charts to enable readers to follow the explanation. explanation. The book includes 14 chapters and seven appendices, all of which

are illustrated with rare photographs of the leaders of the war and the weapons used on both sides of the war, the weapons that were used on both sides, and some of the important situations that could be recorded during the war. recorded during the war.

With the publication of these two books, God Almighty has enabled us to produce the "Encyclopedia of the The October 1973 War in an appropriate and honorable manner.

I hope that with this modest effort, I have repaid a small part of the debt that I owe to the Armed Forces. that I owe to the Armed Forces, in whose service I spent the best years of my life, and that I have fulfilled I have fulfilled my pledge to her and to my dear homeland. (Al-Fath: 0210

Believe in God's greatness

Kaz

Ramadan 10, 1409 AH
April 16, 1989

President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak
President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

and commander of the Air Force during the 1973 October War.

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In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Akeld Bemia Nasser Muskaria Almelia
Melia War College

88/6100/612: Al-Qayyed

1) : Naqat
. T 1988/73/11: Al-Dhareekh

To Mr. Mr. Jal Hannad

The Supreme War Department of the Adyat Taser Muskia Nilia
To invite your Excellency to obtain a reference product from Sinaulmi.
which is part of the study program of the Tanzanian Ministry of Defense.
Hare at the Al-Kharb Al-Malaya College on Saturday, July 16, 1991, 8 pm.
Seth, 900 - Yom Tov 1400 on the same day 0

The Tikrit towers with the presence of the mourners are being folded 0
Mahavir Greetings

â ¤Tâ :
Alwa3 Mohayed Mohayed Mohayed Ahin Ahin
War College Religion A

Chapter 1A
How the October War of 19723 was planned

After the June 5 defeat and the seizure of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza

Strip by Israeli forces, the

The main duty of the General Command of the Armed Forces and the Chief of Staff was to reorganize, rearm and train the Egyptian Armed Forces.

and training the Egyptian Armed Forces, which had collapsed during the war, on sound foundations

of organization, planning and discipline.

Since July '67, the Military Operations Authority began developing a military plan for the liberation of the occupied territories

the occupied territories based on the directives of the General Command of the Armed Forces. The plans for

have changed several times, both in their interim and final objectives.

until it was finally decided to adopt the "modified Granite Plan 2," under which cooperation between the two commands was organized

cooperation between the two commands: Egyptian and Syrian on June 7, '73, at the headquarters of the Egyptian General Command in Nasr City.

Nasr City. This is the plan that was codenamed in September '73 as Plan 1 Badr. He served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from June 11, '67 until the

blood

October '73 war (about six years and four months) three commanders. It is interesting to note

to note is that they all held the position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces before being assigned the position of Commander-in-Chief

in the order in which they held their positions:

General Mohamed Fawzi: He served as Chief of Staff before the June '67 war

He then served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from June 11, '67 until he resigned on May 13, '71

May 71, so he had been in office for about four years.

General Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq: He assumed the position of Chief of Staff as of September 10

69 and after spending about twenty months in this position, he was entrusted with the position of Commander-in-Chief

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of the Armed Forces on May 13, '71, following the events known as the May 15 Movement.

in office for about a year and a half until Sadat removed him on October 26, '72.

General Ahmed Ismail Ali: He assumed the position of Chief of Staff on March 10 '69 following the martyrdom of Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riad.

Nasser ordered his removal on September 10, '69, following the

Israeli amphibious raid on Zafarana on the Gulf of Suez the day before.

However, the late President Sadat appointed him Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on

on October 26, '72, following the removal of General Mohamed Sadek, a year before the outbreak of the October War.

one year before the October War.

The position of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was held by four commanders during this period

commanders, of whom we mentioned two, namely: Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail and Gen.

Sadiq. There are two others who held this position:

Lieutenant General Abdel Muta'im Riad: He assumed the position of Chief of Staff on June 12, '67 and held it for 21 months until he was martyred on March 9, '69 during the War of Attrition.

for 21 months until he was martyred on March 9, '69 during the War of Attrition.

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly: He assumed the position of Chief of Staff on May 16, '71, following the

The well-known events of May 15, about two and a half years before the outbreak of the October War.

These five commanders were undoubtedly responsible for the entire period between the two wars (June 67

and October '73, in the order in which they took office, were responsible for laying the foundations and directives for the

to prepare plans for offensive operations to liberate the stolen land in all its

forms and stages

and its phases, taking into account The extent of the capabilities and capacities of the Armed Forces to implement them. They were discussed these plans at the military level with the Operations Authority, the directors of the branches and weapons, and the commanders of the branches, weapons and field army commanders. And at the political level with the presidents of the republic

The late: Nasser and Sadat. Since only three of these commanders published their views on the operational plans: General Nahmid Fawzi, General Mohamed Sadek and General Saad al-Shazly, we will present each of their views on the plan

The discussion and analysis of these plans will reveal the true picture of what was going on

The discussion and analysis of these plans will show us the true picture of the discussions and differences in viewpoints, whether between the military leaders and each other, or between them and the political leadership in that dangerous period of Egypt's history.

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What did General Fawzi say about the plan to liberate Sinai?

Lt. Gen. Fawzi stated that based on the directives of the late President Abdel Nasser issued to him in

July 67 in the wake of the defeat, the strategy of the Egyptian Armed Forces was to liberate the occupied land in Sinai by force, bring the Egyptian forces to the Egyptian-Palestinian border

the Egyptian-Palestinian border and secure it, then exploit the success

politically to restore the rights of the Palestinian people

Palestinian people . The time period Nasser set for achieving this goal was three years

years . As a result of the study of the military committees formed within the General Command, headed by Lt. Gen.

Abdel Moneim Riad, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, which lasted for a month, a

A general plan for the liberation of the land was called Plan 200, and from Plan 200, intermediate plans and qualitative plans were implemented.

Interim and qualitative plans, and these plans were implemented in the form of joint operations projects.

This phase ended with the development of Plan Granite 4, which was the realization of the first wave of the plan

200 plan. This clearly means that the General Command has been given a comprehensive offensive plan

Plan 200 to reach the international borders, and that this plan was to be implemented in two phases

in two stages: The first phase, called Granite, consisted of crossing the Suez Canal

the Suez Canal, break through the Bar-Lev line and reach the strategic mountain fjords area.

And the second stage : It consisted of advancing from the Gorges in an offensive operation to reach the international border.

the international border, thus realizing the final purpose according to the plan.200

Lieutenant General Fawzi then explained that three years after the defeat of June 67

The Egyptian Armed Forces had reached a high level of military capability and morale.

hand formations and all branches of the General Command have been tested on their operational duties, so that

that these forces could start the liberation battle as soon as they were ordered to do so.

In late August '70, at a small meeting called by Nasser to present the political

and military situation

The political and military situation after the war of attrition was halted on August 7, 70, following the Rogers Initiative

Rogers' initiative, the first of which stipulated that both sides would cease firing on the ground and in the air across the cease-fire line for a period of three

General Fawzi stated that he had expressed to the late President Abdel Nasser the readiness of the armed forces to start

Abdel Nasser the readiness of the armed forces to start the liberation battle as soon as the temporary ceasefire expires.

General Fawzi confirmed in his memoirs that in the first week of September 70

He received verbal confirmation from Nasser while on a trip with him to Marsa Matrouh

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to implement Plan 200, with the understanding that he would focus on implementing Plan Granite first, which is to reach the area of the Straits Straits, and that this would be implemented as soon as the ceasefire expired.

Lt. Gen. Fawzi explained

why he received verbal authorization from Nasser to implement Plan 200 without discussing or debating

the detailed decisions he carried with him regarding the comprehensive Plan 200 and the Granite Plan

was due to unforeseen circumstances, as Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi, along with two of his colleagues, suddenly arrived

Gaddafi and two of his colleagues suddenly arrived in Marsa Matrouh and Nasser was too busy with them to

General Mohamed Fawzi was unable to be alone with him during the four days he spent there, and then the escalation of the situation in Amman

then the escalation of the situation in Amman following the clash between King Hussein and the Palestinians.

Finally, Nasser's death on September 28, '70, which, as Lt. Gen. Fawzi

mentioned, was an event with

serious strategic implications, prevented the continuation of the timeline for the start of the liberation battle.

Despite what Lt. Gen. Fawzi mentioned in his memoirs regarding the 200th offensive plan and its first phase

âGraniteâ, there are several important facts that make us doubt the validity of what Lt. Gen. Fawzi recorded.

both in terms of the offensive plan he developed and in terms of the Armed Forces completing their preparations

to launch the attack on the date he specified. These facts are summarized as follows:

First, it is not plausible that Nasser, who was known for his commitment and appreciation of

the fateful decision on which the fate of his country, and indeed the fate of Nasser himself and his regime, depended

Nasser himself and his regime with such unparalleled lightness and disregard.

He was distracted from the commander-in-chief, who was carrying in his briefcase the most serious and secretive decisions of the war

for four full days, due to the arrival of Gaddafi with some guests from Libya guests from Libya, and then he was so preoccupied with his commander-in-chief that he gave

Lt. Gen. Fawzi to verbally authorize the implementation of Plan 200, but to focus on the implementation of Plan

Plan Granite first, after the end of the temporary ceasefire on November 7 70 without any discussion, study, or access to maps of the situation

Second, while General Fawzi recorded in his memoirs that measuring the capabilities of

of our forces with the enemy forces in late 70 and early 71 was in favor of

of our forces in terms of numbers, armaments and efficiency in all branches of the armed forces, and that the timing of the

the timing of the liberation battle at the end of 270 and the implementation of the plan

Plan Granite and complemented by Plan 200.

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The timing was planned and sound, and that the balance of power was on Egypt's side.

We find that Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly records in his memoirs that when he started his work

after his appointment as Chief of Staff on May 16, 71, by studying the potential of the

and comparing them with the available information about the enemy, it became clear to him as a result of this

that it was not possible to carry out a large-scale attack aimed at to destroy enemy forces and force them to withdraw from Sinai and the Gaza Strip, and that

the actual capabilities of the Egyptian Armed Forces may enable them, if they are well equipped and organized

to carry out a limited offensive operation aimed at crossing the Suez Canal and destroying the

Suez Canal and destroy the Bar-Lev line, and then switch to defense. There is no doubt

There is no doubt that the result of the study conducted by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly is fundamentally contradictory

fundamentally contradicts Lt. Gen. Mohamed Fawzi's statement that the capabilities of our forces

and that the balance of power was on Egypt's side

Especially since the time period the two commanders were talking about was the same period of time

the same period of time, namely mid-1971.

The course of events following Nasser's death and Sadat's assumption of responsibility

does not indicate that the Egyptian Armed Forces were fully prepared for battle prepared for battle,¹ and that General Fawzi was ready to start the war of liberation as soon as the temporary ceasefire expired.

liberation war as soon as the temporary ceasefire expired on November 7, 1970.

Nasser's death on September 28 could not have been a plausible excuse to prevent the

the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces from the honor of starting the war of liberation for which he had

his preparations and plans to retrieve a precious piece of the nation's land.

Moreover

Moreover, the completion of the renewal of the ceasefire period for another three months

that ended on February 7, 71 and then renewed it again for a month that ended on March 7, 71

71 is a clear indication that the armed forces at the time were not prepared to fight the battle

Especially since Sadat, in his book "Searching for Self" complained

that General Mohamed Fawzi and his group, whom he called the centers of power, were

during his meetings with them in the Supreme Executive Committee when discussing the issue of

the dissipation of the ceasefire period to implicate him by not renewing it

and the resumption of the war of attrition. Sadat opposed their opinion, fearing that the

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to Israeli raids because the Soviet Union had not sent the missiles it had

promised to send the missiles it had promised to send. It is clear from this that the most General Fawzi demanded after the end of the ceasefire was to be allowed to resume the war of attrition. He never asked the president to authorize him to implement Plan 200 or even the Granite Interim Plan, even though that Nasser had already given him verbal authorization to implement it in the first week of September 70. Moreover, when the last ceasefire renewal period expired on March 7, '71 and Sadat declared that that Egypt was not committed to the ceasefire, General Fawzi did not lift a finger and did not to launch the war of attrition that Sadat had been demanding during his meetings with him during his meetings with him to authorize him to resume it. Is this behavior consistent with a leader who was determined in early September 70 to start the war of liberation immediately the end of the ceasefire period on November 7, 70?

Fourth, General Fawzi published that Sadat issued him on April 29 and May 9, 71 at his home in Giza the final directives for the operations to liberate Sinai, as well as the day on which the battle would begin, and that he and Lt. Gen. Mohamed Sadek the Chief of Staff at the time, wrote the document for the liberation of the land, but Sadat refused to sign it when he presented it to him on May 11, and that he tried all day on May 12 to persuade him to change his refusal, but he was adamant, and that this was the real reason for his resignation on May 12. However, Lt. Gen. Muhammad Sadiq, however, denied any involvement in the writing of any document on the battle with General Fawzi. Moreover, the document that Lieutenant General Fawzi asserted included the implementation of Plan Granite, i.e., reaching the straits, when we found it, it turned out that it only involved limited operations starting in the first week of June '71 that were very similar to the operations that were phased in at the end of the War of Attrition before it was halted on August 8, '70 following the Rogers Initiative. Rogers Initiative, i.e., nowhere in this document is there any reference to land, the Granite Plan, or access to the Straits region.

Fifth - Lt. Gen. Saad Al-Shazly recorded in his memoirs what demolishes the statements of Lt. Gen. Mohamed Fawzi from its foundation, as he mentioned in the introduction of the second chapter of the first section. The first chapter states the following verbatim: "When I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Survey Forces on May 16, 71 (after after General Mohamed Fawzi resigned and was arrested in the events of May 15), there was no offensive plan. We had a defensive plan called Plan 0200 and there was also another expeditionary plan that included some raids on enemy positions in the Sinai, but it was not at a level to call it an offensive plan, and it was called Granite. It is worth noting it is interesting to note that Sadat endorsed Lt. Gen. Saad al-Shazly's in his memoirs regarding Plan 200. On page 248, the following is quoted verbatim: "One month before Nasser died he invited me and we went together to the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces in Nasr City. Nasr City, where he gathered the Serbian commanders, Soviet experts, and Mohamed Fawzi, the Minister of War at the time. The Soviet experts and commanders

for 7 hours in front of Nasser and me explaining the defense plan 200, which was approved by all. This was the military situation I received from Nasser: A sound defense plan.¹⁰⁵ But no offensive plan. Offensive plan⁴ . I wonder what General Fawzi thought after the testimonies of Sadat and Shazly in his 200th plan, which he claimed was offensive, and that it would have ensured the liberation of Sinai and reach the international border in 12 days?

What did General Mohamed Sadek say about the offensive plan? General Mohamed Sadek published an article in November '84 in which he stated that thinking about a comprehensive war to liberate all the occupied territories in Sinai was not on the table when he was commander-in-chief as long as the balance of power at the time was in Israel's favor, and as long as Egypt's ability to obtain the needs required for such a war was subject to the policies of the Soviet Union. It is no secret that Soviet leaders were against the idea of a new war between

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Arabs and Israel . As a result, General Sadek's conceptualization of the operations that Egypt should undertake Egypt against Israel was based on the following principles: First, the side that initiates the war should take into account that it should capitalize on the success it to reach a line of defense based on natural positions to harass the enemy from behind and to be able to continue the war until ceasefire is achieved. Behind this line, he prepares all his military and civilian forces and civilian forces to withstand the muskrat pressure of constant counterattacks to penetrate and destroy the bridgeheads he has succeeded in creating, and strikes against his civilian targets to achieve losses that could generate pressure influencing political and military decisions. Secondly, for Egypt, the implementation of the plan to break through the waterway and the Bar-Lev line After the construction of the bridgeheads, it was necessary to continue the rapid advance of some armored and infantry units some armored and infantry units to occupy the area of the governing straits in the Sinai Sinai, as these straits are the first and main line of defense for the Canal. All operational plans included the appropriate method to achieve this objective to achieve this objective, and it is necessary to drop units of paratroopers and thunderbolt soldiers at the fjords to occupy them as a primary duty, while at the same time preventing the enemy's tactical reserves in depth from interfering with our forces' operations until The crossing is complete. If the Caliphs had paused after their success in establishing a bridgehead in Normandy and contented themselves with publicizing their success, the opportunity would have for Field Marshal Rundstedt, the German commander, to counterattack and throw them into the sea with ease. Therefore, by merely establishing a headland area bridges and standing before the straits will not enable our troops to establish a strong line of defense. The enemy can mobilize its forces, break through our defenses, cross the Suez Canal to the west and encircle our forces that crossed to the eastern shore.

Fourth, Sadat's idea was for Egyptian forces to cross the canal and take over even one meter of the eastern bank.

one meter of the east bank, and then we would seek a solution

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political solution. His idea then evolved to the need to stop after the construction of the bridgeheads

east of the canal and politically complicate the issue. Lt. Gen. Sadek, however, stated that he was

opposed to these ideas and that he explained to Sadat his plan, which was based on the following steps

the following steps :

1 Crossing the Suez Canal, and all the difficulties that

The crossing process can be easily overcome.

2 Attacking the strong points of the Bar-Lev line is limited to those that affect the breakthrough plan and the flanks of the crossing forces.

3- Dropping paratroopers, thunderbolts and airborne assault forces over the straits

to hold them until the arrival of armored and infantry forces to support them, while at the same time preventing the enemy's tactical reserve

at the same time preventing the enemy's tactical reserves in depth from intervene in the battle

4 Groups of armored forces and mechanized infantry set out for the three straits to join and reinforce the forces that have been landed at the straits.

5 The bridgeheads will rest on the canal and take cover behind the defensive line

based on the straits.

6-Air defense missile batteries are being moved to the east of the canal to protect

ground forces from any hostile air attacks in addition to the self-propelled air defense units, taking into account that all forces will be under the umbrella of the Air Force.

7-A hundred long-range fighter-bombers are sufficient to protect our forces until

reaching the straits.

However, Lt. Gen. Saad al-Shazly reported in his memoirs what contradicts what Lt. Gen.

Sadek's idea of an offensive operation when he discussed it with him after he was appointed

was to destroy all enemy forces in Sinai and advance quickly to liberate it and the Sinai Strip.

Sinai and rapidly advance to liberate it and the Gaza Strip in one continuous operation. He explained

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Shazly explained to him that there were no means to do so, either in the present or in the near future

in the near future. Even assuming that the Soviets will supply us with the offensive weapons we are asking for

we are asking for, we need several sixty to get them and train to use them. And when

convinced of the impossibility of implementing his plan, General Sadek, while vehemently opposing

General Shazly's plan to conduct a limited mass operation due to the plan's serious flaws and loopholes

A compromise was reached to prepare two plans, one aimed at capturing the Ladakh of the Straits, and another aimed at capturing only the Bar-Lev line. The implementation of the

was contingent on the extent to which the Soviet Union would provide us with Weapons and equipment, which were cataloged in agreement with the Soviet

consultants, who always accused us of exaggerating

who always accused us of exaggerating our demands. Sadat traveled to Moscow in October '71

and General Sadek traveled to Moscow in October '71, where an arms deal was agreed upon that was considered the largest arms deal with the Soviets until that time. Despite the enormity of this deal, it did not not all the weapons needed to implement the plan to reach the straits. This issue was discussed this issue, as mentioned by Lieutenant General Shazly in the small meeting that took place on June 6, '72 at the President's Rest House in Qantar al-Khairiya, which was attended by the small circle of members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces. In this meeting, Major General Abdel Ghani El-Gamsi, head of the Armed Forces Supreme Council, read a Operations read a report on the position of the armed forces, and also referred to a report prepared by General Ahmed Ismail, head of General Intelligence, who emphasized that the Armed Forces are not in a position to carry out an offensive operation.

It was clear during the meeting that Sadat was in favor of General Mohamed Sadek's opinion not to to start the battle only if Egypt has a deterrent force, i.e. we have an air force that can strike deep into the enemy's territory. the depth of the enemy. At the same time, he wondered what to do if the political situation forced us to to start the battle before the deterrent force is finalized.

At this meeting, General Shazly explained that this issue could be overcome if the idea he had expressed earlier, namely that a limited offensive battle should be planned against the backdrop of in the face of hostile air superiority. He stated that in challenging Israeli air superiority during that battle on anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs). Al-Fiziq Al-Shazly emphasized in 36 8

in his memoirs that General Al-Messiri, who attended this meeting as a representative of the Air Force, fully supported his opinion his opinion completely .

Why did the Soviets invite Mohamed Sadek to visit Moscow?

Relations between the late President Sadat and General Mohamed Ahmed Sadek remained strong since he stood by his side in the events of Mapo 15 in '71, and their views on most as we saw in the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on June 6, '72 at the Qanater al-Khairiya rest house. on June 6, '72 at the Qanater al-Khairiya rest house regarding the necessity of not launching a large-scale military campaign against Israel until after the formation of a response force against Israel until a deterrent force has been established, i.e., we have aviation that can to strike deep into the enemy. Sadat's confidence in Gen. that he sometimes delegated him to represent him personally in some important meetings, whether with Arab presidents or Soviet leaders with Soviet leaders. When Sadat once traveled to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Faisal King Faisal, he carried with him a letter from Sadat to King Faisal in which he said 1Lt. Gen. Sadek is the object of my full confidence, anything he says or promises is in my name, and you can You can talk and deal with him as if you were dealing with me2 .

Sadat traveled to the Soviet Union on February 1, 1972, and in his first meeting

with Soviet leaders

He asked the Soviet leaders who was responsible for delaying the arms deal they had promised him when he visited Moscow on October 11, '71.

Brezhnev replied: "It's the Sithole, because of the bureaucratic and routine . Sadat replied: "I'm not convinced of this, and if it happens again

I will take a decision. He then repeated the same things he had said on his previous visit

especially the two main points, namely that Egypt does not want a Soviet soldier to fight its battle

and that Egypt's policy does not aim to create a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

United States. They ended the discussion by reaffirming their commitment to the October '71 arms supply agreement and the establishment of military industries

In addition, they promised to supply the following weapons to Egypt during '72:

.26262 tanks 2005.

.26722) 22 TU205 aircraft

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to be delivered immediately as a gift, 17 MiG-25s.

Strengthening and increasing Egypt's electronic warfare capability.

To implement this agreement, Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan, Deputy Minister of War, traveled at the head of a military committee traveled on March 10, 72 to Moscow to sign it according to the items that were agreed upon

between Sadat and the Soviet leadership the previous month. Lt. Gen. Hassan returned on March 18

March 18 without signing the two items related to tanks 62 and aircraft 66122, as

the Soviet leaders requested that Egypt pay for them and their ammunition in hard currency and at full price

full price. The method of payment between Egypt and the Soviet Union regarding the price of weapons and equipment

and equipment since the days of Nasser was based on the basis that the Soviet Union would sell us the weapons

for half the price and waive the second half; the half that we paid was paid in in Egyptian pounds. The Soviet Union would lend Egypt a loan that exceeded the price of the weapons it

(i.e. 1L05 that Egypt would have to pay), and this loan would be paid back in installments

annual installments for 10-15 years at interest.2 The first installment begins after a long grace period. And it was

This meant that the price Egypt paid for the Soviet weapon was equivalent to 25 percent of its price on the international market.

on the world market. The Soviet Union's request to Lt. Gen. Abdel Qader Hassan meant that

the 62022 aircraft would cost 6.5 million dollars, and the 662 tank would cost a quarter of a million dollars

dollars. These prices, while still about 50 percent of their Western

counterparts, were

were considered by Egypt to be almost hostile.

On May 15, '72, Marshal Grishko, the Soviet Minister of Defense, arrived in Cairo for a five-day visit

for a five-day visit after completing his tour of Iraq and Syria. General Muhammad Sadek held two meetings with Marshal Grishko

held two meetings with Marshal Grishko at the Ministry of War, and the first important point

was the issue of the arms deal that had been agreed upon by Sadat and the Soviet leaders

agreed upon by Sadat and Soviet leaders during his visit to Moscow in February '72

which the secret committee headed by Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan that traveled to Moscow on March 10 and returned on March 18 on March 10 and returned on March 18 to sign the two clauses related to TU-22 aircraft and T-62 tanks.

and T-62 tanks. The real reason for not signing for the TU-22s was the Muskrat Committee's refusal to purchase them.

The Muskarian committee refused to buy it, as it discovered that its defects were no less than those of the TU-16 that had arrived in Egypt three months earlier, and Egyptian pilots were outraged by the

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Egyptian pilots complained that it could not be used successfully in combat operations due to its heavy weight

and its lack of speed relative to Israeli fighter-bombers. As for the T 62, the committee refrained from signing because of the Soviet side's insistence that the price of the

in hard currency, as we have already mentioned, which would have made the price of one tank up to a quarter of a million dollars

a quarter of a million dollars. During his talks with Grishko, Gen.

was able to resolve this dispute. The Soviet side waived their demand for hard currency

for the T-62 tank, and the tank deal was signed on the same terms as before.

During his talks with General Mohammed Sadiq, Marshal Grishko raised a number of complaints about the poor treatment of advisors, experts and members of Soviet units by some Egyptian authorities.

At the forefront of these complaints was the incident that took place at the Cairo airport on May 8 when

that occurred at Cairo airport on May 8, when customs officers insisted on searching Soviet officers and soldiers

Soviet officers and soldiers returning home after their tour of duty in Egypt. Grishko complained that

that the Moral Guidance Department of the Egyptian Armed Forces is adopting anti-Soviet activity, as well as

the behavior of some senior commanders of the armed forces who openly attacked the Soviet Union in front of officers and soldiers

the Soviet Union in front of officers and soldiers as they pass by units or during public conferences

public conferences. Grishko concluded that all of these actions and behaviors have created a strong anti-Soviet

a strong anti-Soviet undercurrent in the Malayan armed forces. The comments were and allusions that Grishko made in his talk left no doubt that the Soviet commanders

were certain that General Sadek was personally behind all the anti-Soviet campaigns in the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Egyptian Armed Forces. Grishko emphasized that General Sadek's speech at the held in the Central Zone on January 24, 72 and attended by several thousand officers of all ranks

which attacked the Soviet Union in a vehement manner, and other similar behaviors

could not serve relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union.

During Grishko's visit to Egypt, the invitation was extended to Gen.

Sadek to visit Moscow. The Soviet leaders were eager to receive him as he was responsible for

for creating this anti-Soviet current in the armed forces and for refusing to grant them military bases in Marsa Matrouh and Bern

military bases in Marsa Matrouh and Bernice. They were confident that the popularity he had gained

within the armed forces was due to his reputation for standing up to the Soviets and refusing to

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their demands. For this reason, the Soviet authorities, as a means of improving their relations with Gen.

Sadek was received in Moscow on June 8, 72, the kind of reception reserved for heads of state, not war ministers

Lt. Gen. Sadek carried with him a letter from President Sadat to President Brezhnev.

in which Sadat reiterated his belief that a political solution could only be found through

that a political solution can only be found through sustained pressure on the United States and Israel, and when Israel is convinced that the balance of power is not in its favor

that the balance of power is not in its favor. At the end of his letter, he stressed the need for a quick completion of the program

The first summit meeting between Soviet President Brezhnev and U.S. President between Soviet President Brezhnev and US President Nixon took place on May 20, 72

at the Kremlin in Moscow, about two weeks before Sadek's visit, and then a consensus statement was issued

between Moscow and Washington calling for military relaxation in the Middle East.

Sadat expressed his feelings after the release of this statement, stating that it was a violent shock to us because we were

twenty steps behind Israel militarily, and the meaning of military relaxation in this situation is

our surrender to Israel.

On June 2, a week after General Sadek's return from Moscow, he called for a small conference attended by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, the Chief of Staff, the commanders of the Air Force, Navy air defense, the commanders of the second and third armies, and the director of military intelligence.

Sadek explained the details of his visit to the Soviet Union and stated that Marshal Grishko's view of the situation

The armed forces, the state and the people must be prepared for a long battle.

The situation in the Middle East is extremely complex, and Israel is offering solutions that cannot be accepted by either Egypt or the Soviet Union.

to be accepted by either Egypt or the Soviet Union.

The Soviets believe, as we do, that what is taken by force can only be returned by force.

Action must be taken in the international arena based on Security Council Resolution 242.

Maintaining Soviet advisors in Egypt is an international necessity.

The Soviet Union will not enter into an agreement with America at the expense of Egypt.

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The liberation of the land requires first building a defensive army to prevent the enemy from expanding the territory it occupies

to prevent the enemy from expanding the territory it occupies, and then build the offensive army that liberates the land.

Lieutenant General Sadek then went on to mention his personal impressions of the visit, which were

1 The Soviets are very interested in the home front, and have even asked for the removal of people

whose policies conflict with the Soviet Union.

2- No change in Soviet policy after the Brezhnev-Nixon summit.

3- The Soviets want to calm the situation in the region until Nixon succeeds in

the elections in November 72
elections in November '72, and after his success, it is expected that they will
stall us in supplying us with weapons
weapons to dilute the issue in the hope of reaching a peaceful solution.
Surprisingly, General Sadek, who was seen as the number one enemy of the Soviets
in Egypt
of the Soviets in Egypt, had a complete change of heart after his friendly visit
to Moscow and the
and the warm reception he received from Soviet leaders, to the extent that he
believed that Sadat
had imagined that a secret agreement had been made in Moscow behind his back
between Sadek and Brezhnev, which led Sadat to
Sadat to hasten his decision to expel the Soviet experts.
Lt. Gen. Sadek explained this belief by saying: When Sadat saw the minutes of
the
of the talks between Brezhnev and Sadek, during which Brezhnev pledged to
resolve the
the Middle East peacefully within three months after Nixon's success in the
election or else
that he would supply the Egyptian armed forces with the weapons they needed,
Sadat revolted.
âIt can't be done,â he said, âand the Soviets have deceived you. Sadek said
he immediately understood - because he knows Sadat's mindset so well - that it
could not be done.
Sadat, knowing Sadat's way of thinking, that he had imagined that a deal had
been struck between him and the
Soviet side. Sadat's belief may have had some truth to it
but it was not the main reason for Sadat's decision to end the Soviet military
presence in Egypt
Soviet military presence in Egypt, a decision he made on July 8, '72, after
Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov informed him of Brezhnev's letter
Vinogradov informed him of Brezhnev's letter to him in response to the urgent
letter he had sent to Brezhnev
Brezhnev, in which he outlined his proposed plan to mobilize the situation
militarily.

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the most important points of which were to ask the Soviets to accelerate the
implementation of the previously agreed upon programs of sending weapons to
Egypt
previously agreed upon. When three weeks passed without any response from
Moscow, Dr. Aziz
Sedki, then prime minister, summoned the Soviet ambassador in Cairo, where he
expressed to him what this silence meant
Soviet silence was an insult that Egypt would not accept, and Egyptian Foreign
Minister Dr. Murad Ghaleb summoned the Soviet ambassador to convey his protest.
the Soviet ambassador to convey Egypt's protest at the delay in responding to
the president's letter. And when
the expected letter arrived after it had been rushed in this unfortunate manner
and Sadat found that
that the letter contained nothing new except procrastination and delay, he
informed the Soviet ambassador when he met with him on July 8, 72
on July 8, 72 that he rejects this letter in form and substance and rejects this
method of dealing.
and that he had decided to dispense with all Soviet sugar experts (about 28,000)
and that they should return to the
Soviet Union within a week from that day.

So Sadat changed the commander-in-chief before the battle

October 24, '72 was a day of fast-paced events. Gen.
Mohamed Sadek requested a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces at
twelve o'clock in the afternoon.
The purpose of this meeting was to listen to the opinion of the commanders about

the military situation, before they attended another meeting at eight o'clock. before attending another meeting at 8:30 p.m. on the same day at the home of the late President Al-Shadat in Giza.

in Giza. At the meeting convened by General Sadek, each member of the each member of the council spoke about the position of his forces and the troubles and issues he still faced. At the end of

Lt. Gen. Sadek commented: "All I want is for each of you to give a true picture of

"I want each of you to give a true picture of the situation of your troops to the president. "The president thinks I'm exaggerating

He wants to hear it from you personally." Everyone replied that they would and that what they said in front of the minister they would say in front of the president.

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces convened at President Sadat's home at 9:00 p.m. on October 24, '72

on the evening of October 24, '72, and the meeting lasted until midnight. It is not possible for us at this time to record everything that took place in this critical meeting, which lasted more than three hours, as this would require dozens of pages. Although Mr. Moussa Sabri took minutes of this meeting

95 pages (from page 35 to page 90 in his book The October War Document.

Lt. Gen. Mohamed Sadek told me that the secret minutes of the meeting published in this book

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The secret minutes of the meeting published in this book 42 have been greatly distorted. What we can confirm

is that the late President Sadat began the meeting with a lengthy speech in which he reviewed the relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt since his assumption of the presidency, and how

how the Soviet leaders had exhausted his patience because of their procrastination and procrastination in sending arms deals

including weapons that were agreed upon during his visits to Moscow, using various pretexts and excuses.

To make matters worse, they mistreated him and neglected to respond to his letters to them, forcing him to

his decision to expel the Soviet experts and advisors on July 8, 1972.

Sadat stated that he had informed the Soviet leadership in Earl '72 that the issue would not move politically unless it could be moved militarily unless it could be mobilized militarily, and he supported their view of working to re-elect Nixon in the upcoming U.S. presidential election.

Nixon in the upcoming U.S. presidential election in November '72, as he would be better

than a new president who comes to power and whose actions are governed by his desire to stay in power for a second term.

When Marshal Grishko arrived in May '72, Sadat sent a letter with him to the Soviet political leadership

in which he requested that Egypt be provided with MiG-25s and electronic warfare equipment and devices.

He told them explicitly that he would not accept the stay of any Soviet units that were not under Malasian command.

President Sadat explained that after informing the Soviet ambassador on July 8 of his decision to terminate

the work of Soviet advisors and units in Egypt, he sent Dr. Aziz Sedky Prime Minister to Moscow on July 17, '72, before the decision was officially announced.

to explain the situation to the Soviet leaders and offer to issue a joint statement on the matter

However, they did not agree and said that Sadat made this decision unilaterally. so the announcement should also be unilateral. They thought Sadat did not

but Aziz Sedki assured them that he meant it.

Sadat then went on to explain the U.S. role and the many contacts that had taken place between the U.S. and Egypt regarding a peaceful solution, and finally emphasized that a peaceful solution in the U.S. and that the two camps, East and West, our friend and foe, have lost confidence in the possibility of a peaceful solution. and our enemy have lost confidence in the possibility of any movement on our part, and all the offers we receive now come from one logic, which is that we have thrown that we have laid down our arms and must be prepared to accept anything that is offered to us.

Sadat explained to the leaders present that he had told General Sadiq since last summer that he

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that the issue must move militarily before we enter the second round with Israel after the US elections and that this was a decision he was communicating to the leaders, not asking for their opinion, as the situation was a test for the armed forces. a test for the armed forces. If no military action is taken before the end of this year, the The issue will be over and the Egyptians and Arabs will lose confidence in themselves.

Although after Sadat's speech, some commanders engaged in discussions with him discussions with him, the president was clearly uncomfortable with the dialog that three three commanders, Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan, Deputy Minister of War, General Ali Abdel Khabir, Commander of the Central Region and General Mahmoud Fahmy, commander of the naval forces. between President Sadat and Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan, the last part of which we mention below:

Lieutenant General Abdel Qader: We may start with a limited battle, but it may develop into a full-scale war. We may succeed in the early stages of the battle, but we will eventually shift to a defensive posture defense. Israel will remain in Sharm el-Sheikh and most of Sinai and will be in a better position than it is now than its current position, and this may lead it to claim rights to those territories that are still in its grasp. We must take into account the enemy's ability to hit our depth and that of Syria even more. We should not push ourselves into a situation where we may have to cry out for help from the Soviet Union again and say from the Soviet Union again and say "Woe is me" 2.

The President (angrily): Abdelkader, this is the second time you've made a mistake in front of me, and I won't allow it. You are not the one who cares about the independence of this country. Are you the one who made the decisions?

Lieutenant General Abdel Qader: No, Mr. President.

President: I will never allow this. I'm responsible for the country's independence, and I know what I'm carrying I don't like you interfering in someone else's business. This is the second time you've made a mistake. The third time you've made a mistake. I know I did what I did when I stood up to the Soviet Union to hold it accountable until the battle was over. But I don't

I don't need you to tell me what to do, Abdelkader. Because this time you made a mistake.

The first one was in the airplane and I thought I'd kill you. Shame, stay calm.

Lieutenant General Abdelkader: I'm very sorry.

President: You're a military person, but you're not Sebasî, support! You want to direct me to Wajji, DSM

What? What are you talking about?

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Lieutenant General Abdelkader: I apologize.

I asked Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan to reveal to us the secret of the first mistake he made in the airplane that President Sadat referred to during his discussion with him.

in the airplane that President Sadat referred to during his discussion with him, and what he meant by that we should not push ourselves into a situation where we might have to scream for help from the

Lt. Gen. Abdel Qader replied that when he returned from the Soviet Union on Soviet Union on March 18, '72 after refusing to sign the deal to buy the 3622 aircraft

and 60 tanks because the Soviets demanded that Egypt pay for them fully and in hard currency, contrary to previous agreements.

Unlike previous agreements, he happened to travel with President Sadat to Libya as part of an Egyptian delegation

to offer condolences to Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi on the death of Muhammad al-Malgaryaf, the head of the Libyan Revolutionary Council

of the Libyan Revolutionary Council. On the plane, Sadat summoned Lt. Gen. Sadat asked him about the results of his talks in the Soviet Union, and he explained the Soviet position that

that forced him not to sign the arms deal, at which point they informed him that their demand that Egypt pay for the arms deal in hard currency

to pay for the arms deal in hard currency either as a result of an agreement between them and President Sadat

Lt. Gen. Abdel Qader explained that he did not know that President Sadat considered this

that this well-intentioned conversation on the airplane was a mistake until President Sadat reminded him of it in front of the conference

As for the word "fondness," which was included in the phrase that was recorded at the conference

that was recorded at the conference, he denied that it was ever uttered by him, because the word has no meaning and is not in line with the context of his speech

and does not fit with the context of his speech. It seems that the person who recorded the minutes of the conference wrote the phrase

in a poor handwriting, which made it read as a handwriting and that the correct phrase that he mentioned in the conference

is that we should not push ourselves into a situation where we might have to cry out to the

the Soviet Union and say, "We want support units."

(The support units are the squadrons of Soviet U-21s with their pilots and that arrived in Egypt in the early '70s in response to Nasser's request to Soviet President Brezhnev to

Soviet President Brezhnev to counter the Mamak raids that were being carried out by

during the war of attrition. They were dispensed with by Sadat in a decision he announced to the Soviet ambassador on

announced to the Soviet ambassador on July 8, 72 to dispense with Soviet advisors and units.

Although Lt. Gen. Mohamed Sadek stated that during the Supreme Council meeting he did not offer an opinion and did not speak at all, and let the leaders speak so that the president could listen to them without interference

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and even though he told the president at the end of the meeting: He is the supreme commander of the armed forces and that everyone is obligated to carry out any order he gives and will carry it out as a soldier, and that everything that was said in the meeting was just a presentation of opinions and views.

was merely a presentation of opinions and views, and that the decision in the end was up to the president.

It is clear from the course of events that Sadat was determined to remove Lt. Gen. Sadek

and the three commanders he was unhappy with the way they discussed him during the meeting, viz:

Lieutenant General Abdel Qader Hassan, General Ali Abdel Khabir, and General Mahmoud Fahmy. Sadat believed

believed they were forming a ring against him. General Sadek recalled that after the meeting, Sadat invited him

to have a cup of coffee with him in his office, and Sadat reproached him for his outburst against the leaders who had discussed

Sadat asked him to refer the three commanders who had questioned him to Sadat's office.

Sadat asked him to retire the three leaders who opposed him at the meeting, and he apologized

Sadat apologized because he was not convinced that they were wrong, and offered his resignation to Sadat, but he refused and asked him to travel the next day to Syria to carry a message

the next day to Syria to carry a message to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. Lt. Gen.

Sadek assured me that he was not fooled by this request, which was nothing more than a form of nerve anesthesia because he was

that Sadat had decided to remove him, and that traveling to Syria was nothing more than a ploy by Sadat to reassure himself.

Sadat to reassure himself until a new commander-in-chief was appointed, lest he think of launching a campaign against him.

to mount a campaign against him. Since he was certain of Sadat's intentions toward him, he apologized for traveling to Syria

to Syria and begged him to entrust the message to someone else because he had important work that required his presence in Cairo

his presence in Cairo.

On October 25, Sadat summoned General Ahmed

Ismail, then Director of General Intelligence, and asked him to come the next day to take the oath of office

as Minister of War. On the same day, Sadat sent his private secretary, Fawzi Abdel Hafez to General Mohamed Sadiq in the afternoon (before iftar, as it was the month of

Ramadan) to inform him that his resignation (which had not been submitted) had been accepted. He gave orders to Lt. Gen.

Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, to assume command until General Ahmed Ismail was sworn in

oath. Sadat, he said, could not afford to leave any vacuum in the armed forces no matter how small, even for a moment.

Sadat explained the reasons for his decision to remove General Mohamed Sadek from his position

on pages 245 to 249 of his book The Search for Self⁴, and summarized that

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Sadat summoned the Minister of War in the summer of '72 in Alexandria and told

him to gather the
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and inform him that he had decided that
the armed forces would be ready to fight
as of November 15, '72, and the Minister of War was supposed to report to him on
the plan
Lieutenant General Sadek returned two days later and told him that he had
assembled the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
of the Armed Forces and delivered his message, and that the Armed Forces would
be ready not on November 15
72-as he had requested-but that they would be ready on November 1, 072.
when the SCAF met at his home on November 24, 72, that the Minister of War
did not inform some members of the council of his message, which confirmed his
suspicion that he did not want to fight because he
and that this was the reason he was stepping down from his post.

Objectives of the High Minarets Plan

It is clear to us from our study that the operational plans that we have heard
so much about
code names since General Mohamed Fawzi took over the General Command of the
Armed Forces on June 11, '67 until the outbreak of the war.
June 11, '67 until the outbreak of the October '73 war were tactical projects
without soldiers
The purpose was to train members of the General Command of the Armed Forces in
its various branches
Air Force, Navy, Air Defense Forces, Air Force, and Army commands
on the role of each of them in the offensive plan. Among the most prominent of
these projects was the
The tactical project directed by General Mohamed Fawzi, which he called â€œthe
last practical exercise to implement the Sinai evacuation plan.
The implementation of the Sinai evacuation plan⁴, which took 12 continuous days
(from March 14 to 25)
The project not only liberated Sinai, but also captured the areas of
Al-Awja and Eilat (inside the Israeli borders). It cannot, of course, be
considered an exercise
It cannot be considered an exercise based on a real plan, because where did they
get the forces, weapons, and equipment at the beginning of '71?
We have already analyzed in our book â€œFrom Sinam to Golan
to the Golan,â€ we objectively analyzed this project, in which we proved with
conclusive evidence that Lt. Gen.

General Fawzi used his imagination too much, both in developing this project and
in managing it.

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, former Chief of Staff, confirmed in his
memoirs that the first offensive plan developed in the Egyptian Armed Forces was
offensive plan developed in the Egyptian Armed Forces was a plan for high
minarets, and that all that was developed before
was nothing but educational projects that assumed the presence of troops,
weapons, and equipment that did not
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we don't have, and are only mentioned in the projects for training purposes. Of
course, there is a big difference between such
between such educational projects and operational plans that are based on forces
and weapons
which are placed in the vault of the War Operations Authority after being signed
by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War.
signed by the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War, and are ready to be
implemented as soon as the political decision is issued.

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly described how he called the offensive plan
â€œHigh Minarets.â€ He said that after the documents for this plan were
finalized, it was supposed to be given a codename.
When the head of the operations organization at the time, Major General Madouh

Touhami, came to him to ask him about the proposed name, they heard the sound of the muezzin calling for Al-Masr prayer. In the midst of this they came up with the name "High Minarets" for the plan, and the ultimate goal of the was to cross the Suez Canal, break the Bar-Lev line, and create a zone of bridgeheads bridges at a depth of 12-10 km east of the canal. Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly defended the the offensive plan to this modest military objective by stating: "If Egypt had the to rush into the straits and occupy them immediately after crossing the Suez Canal and we did not we would have made a grave military mistake. But the question arises is: Did we have the capabilities? Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly answers the question by saying: We did not We did not have the capabilities at the time that would allow us to rush into the straits for the following reasons:

- 1 The weakness of our air force and its inability to protect our ground forces as they advance eastward toward the towards the Straits region.
- 2 The unavailability of missile air defense units, SAM 6, that can accompany the ground forces as they advance eastward to repel hostile air attacks attacking our forces at medium and high altitudes. medium and high altitudes
- 3- The lack of tracked vehicles available to the ground forces in sufficient numbers to allow our forces not to not to be restricted to paved roads while moving east.

Advantages of the High Minarets Plan

The High Minarets Plan was intended to force Israel to fight a war in a manner not of its own choosing but of ours, a style for which it is not suited and for which it has not prepared itself militarily, politically or psychologically militarily, politically or psychologically. This plan had the following advantages:

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- 1 If the enemy attacked our positions east of the canal after we had constructed the bridgeheads) we would have the opportunity to inflict heavy losses on his ground forces attacking us and the the air force that supports them, after we have prepared ourselves for this and waiting for it with a dense forest of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft missiles that were unknown in previous wars. Failure was the certain outcome of such an attack such an attack .
- 2- If the enemy realizes that these counterattacks are costing him losses that he cannot bear in men, and refrained from continuing his attacks against our forces, the survival of our forces east of the east of the Canal will be a source of constant threat and anxiety for him. In all its previous wars with the Arabs in all its previous wars with the Arabs, the enemy has resolved the battle in a short time, using the method of blitzkrieg, which relies on the speed of maneuvering with armored vehicles and airplanes, thus not having to mobilize its forces for more than a few weeks. It was The High Minarets Plan was intended to prolong the war

It was not the capture of territory that was the goal, but rather the imposition of the enemy with two bitter choices: Either to fight and suffer losses under conditions that are not favorable to him or to refrain from fighting while continuing to mobilize his forces without the danger of our forces east of the canal. Since general mobilization in Israel means calling up 15 percent of the Jewish population, prolonged mobilization is the poison that weakens Israel's resistance day by day. The Israeli soldier who is called up for is the same worker and engineer in the factory, the same student and professor, the same who performs all other activities in the state, so how can this state survive if the war lasts only six months? survive if the war extends for only six months while it is fully mobilized?

3- Egypt's people, army and leadership needed a victory to raise its morale and prove to enemies and friends our ability to perform and friends our ability to perform, so that enemies fear us and friends trust us. It is no secret that Many Arab leaders believed that we were not serious in our determination to fight. For this reason, they were reluctant to provide material and financial assistance. It is no secret that The Soviet Union was also very distrustful of the merits of political leadership and was skeptical of our the ability of our armed forces to cross the Suez Canal, and was therefore reluctant to provide us with

the offensive weapons required for a war whose goal was the complete liberation of Sinai.

It is no secret that Israel believed that the Egyptian army could not cross the Suez Canal

In one of his meetings with commanders, Moshe Dayan quipped: "For the Egyptians to cross to cross the Suez Canal, they need the Soviet and American Corps of Engineers to help them do it." 4.

Moreover, the Egyptian people were tired of the long wait in the period of no peace

four years in the trenches, and the soldiers' four years in the trenches had killed the wind in their sails.

offense, and for them defense had become the combat doctrine of the Egyptian Armed Forces.

The mobilization of university-educated intellectuals in the armed forces for a long time was beginning to raise on both a public and private level.

Something had to be done to change the situation. The high minarets plan was the only solution to overcome all these issues at once.

Disadvantages of the current minaret plan

Despite the great advantages that the high minarets plan had, this plan was not able to achieve the goals it envisioned.

has not been able to achieve the goals that Egypt aspires to, either politically or militarily

military for the following reasons:

I. Politically: The realization of the plan did not ensure the mobilization of the issue of the Arab territories

Arab territories occupied by Israel during the June '67 war politically, or to raise it on a large scale at the international level, due to the following factors

on a large scale at the international level, due to the following factors:

1 There was no significant change in the strategic situation in the region.
The liberation of a narrow strip of land 160 kilometers long along the canal and
12 kilometers deep
kilometers east of it will not change the strategic status of Sinai, which will
remain more than 90
of its territory will remain in the hands of Israel:
2- All areas with oil wells on the eastern shore of the Gulf of
(Abu Rudeis, Abu Znaima and Sidr) will remain in Israeli hands.
33-The Suez Canal, Egypt's most important political card at the time, will
remain closed to international navigation
international navigation as it was before the implementation of the plan. So it
would remain impossible to
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for Egypt to carry out any cleansing to prepare it for navigation or to declare
it open to international navigation
as long as the canal continues to fall within the range of Israeli field guns.

4 - Control of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba will remain in the hands of
Israel
for its continued control over Sharm el-Sheikh and the Straits of Tiran.

5 The great psychological impact that will occur as a result of the Egyptian
army's crossing of the
of the Suez Canal and the breaking of the Bar-Lev line will gradually fade away
once the world realizes
the world realizes that all this amazing initial victory has been reduced to the
creation of a defense line
defense line 12 kilometers east of the canal, and that the military situation
was otherwise
We didn't make any other substantial changes.

Second, from a military point of view: The establishment of defensive positions
on a stretch of about 160 km
and a depth of 12-10 km east of the canal in the open desert while enemy
forces
controlling these positions from the highlands in the east is militarily risky
in view of the following factors:

1- Our forces resorting to defense after a successful offensive operation during
which the Suez Canal was stormed and the Bar-Lev line was broken
Suez Canal and breaking the Bar-Lev line means handing over the advantage of the
initiative to the enemy
voluntarily and willingly, so that he can then organize plans that ensure that
he achieves his goals
to eliminate our forces that managed to cross the Suez Canal.

2 - The nature of the Sinai land in the area between the Suez Canal and the
fjords area rises
gradually rises from west to east, which means that the defensive positions
will be in the lowland while the Israeli positions overlook it from the east
from the east.

3- Establishing a defense line in the open desert that is not based on
natural or artificial barriers means that this defense line is exposed to one of
two possibilities : Either penetration by the enemy's concentration of superior
force against any
weakest part of it, or to make a flanking move
with the purpose of encircling it from one or both sides.
It became clear after the war and after knowing the Israeli plans that were in
place at the time

that the enemy was not willing to follow the method on which the plan was based high minarets, and would have refrained from attacking the Egyptian defense line when he realized that his counterattacks on this line would cost him heavy losses.

which would force him to keep his forces stationary to the east of our defensive positions while

while continuing the process of mobilizing his reserve forces, which is costing him dearly.

Undoubtedly, it is a grave mistake to make a war plan based on the assumption that

that the Mido will be strategically and tactically wrong.

and tactical . It has been proven that the Israeli leadership was not willing to leave

Egyptian forces inside the area of the bridgeheads to lure Israeli forces to counterattack in order to exhaust them, so the Israeli leadership was thinking

to follow one of two methods: Either encircle the right flank of the line by crossing the Gulf of Suez from the north and making an amphibious landing on the western shore of the Gulf in the same manner as the previous Israeli amphibious raid

the previous Israeli amphibious raid on Zafarana in September '69

which ended with the late President Abdel Nasser suffering a severe heart attack and the referral of

General Ahmed Ismail, then Chief of Staff, to retirement. It would have followed the landing on the western shore of the Gulf would have been followed by the advance of Israeli forces

northward to complete the encirclement of the Egyptian canals that had crossed the canal and had taken up defensive positions on its eastern shore.

defenses on the eastern shore of the Canal and isolate them from their administrative structures and bases

West of the canal

The second plan was based on penetrating the Egyptian defense positions east of the canal in its weakest part, which is the area of Al Dawla between the Second and Third Armies at Al Dafraswar north of the lake.

between the Second and Third Armies at Dafraswar, north of the Great Bitter Lake.

The breakthrough plan, which was actually carried out during the October War in this premise, was not a

the Israeli leadership's thinking as the fighting intensified and the battles intensified.

It was a pre-plan that Israeli commanders in Sinai - at all levels - had been trained to carry out.

at all levels to carry it out, and a training maneuver was carried out by the forces

when General Ariel Sharon was the commander of the Southern Command. And he

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It turned out that this plan had the code name "Braveheart" and a detailed file

that was kept at the Southern Command. Sharon even

precisely marked the area he had chosen to cross the canal north of the Bitter Lake

and marked it with red stones to distinguish it

red stones, and deliberately thinned the berm in this area by making it thinner than any of its parts along the honorary shore of the Suez Canal.

4Tactically, the construction of these bridgeheads cannot be

a war in itself, so that the forces can stop once it has been realized, since the

The purpose of the bridgehead area is to serve as a solid base from which

5KB from which the armored and mechanized forces assigned to it will be able to

rush to the
the final goal. Perhaps the best example of this is what the Allied armies did
in
World War II, following their success in establishing a bridgehead area on the
Normandy beach in northwestern France.
Normandy Beach in northwestern France on June 6, 44, the British, American and
Canadian armies rushed
The British, American, and Canadian armies rushed from the bridgeheads, and did
not stop until they invaded Germany.
after invading Germany, ending with the Allies winning the war and Germany
surrendering.
Had the Caliphate's forces contented themselves with establishing the
bridgeheads in Normandy
without following it up with an immediate advance to occupy Germany, German
commander von
von Rundstedt could have easily tossed the Allied forces into the sea.

5- It has not been proven in warfare or history that there is an impenetrable or
impenetrable line of defense
encirclement, no matter how fortified or immune it is. Examples of this are
endless
such as the Maginot Line in eastern France, the Siegfried Line in western
Germany.
and the Bar-Lev line on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal. And even the wall
the Atlantic Wall, which the Germans have perfected in fortifying and spent
billions of pounds on it, has not succeeded in repelling the Allied forces and
preventing them from
succeeded in repelling the Allied forces and preventing them from landing their
troops in Normandy

6- If we reflect on the previous Arab-Israeli transitions and review the
military operations
that took place during the '56 and '67 wars on the Egyptian front, we will find
that
all the Egyptian defense lines in North Sinai that were erected and great
efforts and money were spent to
great efforts and money spent to fortify them and increase their immunity:
either

breached or were encircled by Israeli forces and the forces that were defending
them were forced to withdraw
that were defending them were forced to withdraw. The biggest example of this is
the
at Jarada on the Al-Arish-Rafah road, the Birlefen position southeast of Al-
Arish
(Abu Ajila) and Umm Qutf.

7- Lessons learned from the battles of the Western Desert War that took place
between British forces and German and Italian forces in 1942 proved that
Defense lines erected in the desert without resting on natural barriers
especially in the flanks, can be easily encircled by
detours. The biggest example is the British defense line in Libya, which
stretched from Ghazala on the Mediterranean Sea
that stretched from Ghazala on the Mediterranean Sea in the north to Bir Hakim
in the south.
Desert Fox Field Marshal Rommel was able to make a
a large-scale movement from the south around this line with German armored bazar
forces
and encircle it, forcing the British commander, General Ritchie, to abandon this
and the British Eighth Army withdrew in disarray and disintegration
in the direction of the Egyptian border, after suffering heavy losses in tanks.
tanks.

On the contrary, when the British Eighth Army hastily established a defense line

at Alamein
with its right flank resting on the Mediterranean Sea and its left flank on the Qatara depression, Rommel failed to penetrate the defense line or
Rommel was unable to break through the defense line or make a flanking move
around one of its flanks due to the
on two natural obstacles.

How Plan Granite II was developed (in blood)

Following the appointment of Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on October 26, 1972
October 1972, Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, presented the plan to him for discussion.
with him. Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail had previously submitted a report on the military situation that included
when he was Director of General Intelligence in the first half of 1972.
In this report, he stated that Egypt was not ready for an offensive war, and warned that if
Egypt were to launch a war under these circumstances, it would be a disaster.
The report

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at the mini-meeting that took place on June 6, 72 at the President's Rest House in Qantar al-Khairiya.
which was attended by the small circle of SCAF members. It was presented
Major General Abdel Ghani al-Gamsi, head of the Operations Authority, presented a comprehensive report on the
the position of the Armed Forces

When Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, presented to Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, the new Commander-in-Chief
Plan 1 Granite 2, which aimed to reach the straits, and the plan for high minarets
which was aimed at merely establishing a bridgehead area at a depth of 12-10 kilometers east of the canal.
Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail was convinced that the Egyptian Armed Forces would not be able to execute
Plan Granite II and decided to focus on the High Minarets Plan, and set the spring of
73 as a possible date for the attack.

On January 10, 73, a decision was issued by the Council of the Union of Arab Republics to appoint Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail as Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Forces. Immediately after his appointment and the appointment of Maj. Gen.
as head of the Federal Command's operations staff, this command began its work in planning an offensive operation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts
an offensive operation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts at the same time, and yesterday established close cooperation
between them in the different stages of the battle, and how best to utilize the armed forces of the two countries in one coordinated operation.
the two countries in a single coordinated operation, and linking the Egyptian and Syrian fronts by close and continuous means
and continuous .

As a result of the study of the strategic situation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, a major change occurred
in Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail's thinking regarding the Egyptian plan
âHigh Minaretsâ . He found it necessary to
It is necessary to amend this plan to include the seizure of the line of strategic straits in Sinai

Sinai (55 (54) kilometers east of the Suez Canal).

The circumstances of the Syrian front, both geographically and strategically, dictated that the purpose of the Syrian offensive was to liberate the Golan Heights. The purpose of the Syrian offensive was to liberate the entire Golan Heights, and for Syrian forces to reach the line : The Jordan River and the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, given that the depth of the Golan Heights in its widest parts does not exceed 25 kilometers with no natural obstacles, which makes the battlefield on this front with Israel continuous. The battle on this front with Israel is continuous. Thus, it becomes difficult to stop the Syrian forces due to the geographical nature of the Syrian plateau.

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The success of the Syrian offensive in overrunning the Jahalan Heights meant that Syrian armored vehicles to the Jordan River, which is separated from the Israeli ports of Kibbarbi in the north, Ha'amaka and Haifa, a distance of only 50 kilometers, which the armored vehicles could cover in a few hours. Israel's densely populated north, which includes many villages, cities and strategic targets such as Ramat David Airport, Metulla, Safed, Tiberias, the Jordan River Diversion Project, and the and the Rotenberg hydroelectric project are at the mercy of Syrian artillery and long-range missiles.

Since the strategic situation on the Egyptian front did not pose an immediate threat to Israel's densely populated centers immediate danger to the densely populated centers in the south, due to the existence of a natural barrier of the Sinai desert (about 225,000 kilometers), it was expected that once the devastation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts began on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts simultaneously, it was expected that Israel would focus the main effort of its forces on the Syrian front. on the Syrian front, which would have meant an opportunity for Egyptian forces to develop the offensive eastward and reach the Straits Line on the one hand. On the other hand, it was not possible to convince the Syrian leadership when organizing cooperation between the Egyptian and Syrian armies before the battle

While the Syrian plan aims to reach the Jordan River line on the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias of Lake Tiberias, about 25 kilometers from the line of attack, the final goal of the Egyptian plan of the Egyptian plan was this modest goal⁴, i.e. merely establishing a bridgehead area 12-10 kilometers east of the line of attack at a depth of 12-10 km east of the Suez Canal. It was to be expected that this situation would raise the objection of the the Syrian leadership, as the concentration of Israel's main effort against the Syrian front, as was without a corresponding concentrated pressure by Egyptian forces on the Israeli forces facing them would have meant an opportunity for the Israeli leadership to stabilize Egyptian forces in the south while throwing its full weight Egyptian forces in the south while throwing its full weight against the advancing Syrian forces in the Golan Heights in the north Golan Heights in the north. Despite the objections made by Lt. Gen. Saad al-Din al-Shazly, the chief of staff to General Ahmed Ismail not to make any changes to the High Muezzin plan as the capabilities and capacities of the Egyptian Armed Forces have not changed since the

The strategic situation on the two fronts led to the determination of Lt. Gen.

Ismail insisted that the Egyptian plan should be modified to match the Syrian plan.

Accordingly, the Egyptian Military Operations Authority, headed at the time by Maj. Gen.

Muhammad Abdel Ghani al-Gamsi, began preparing another plan of operations other than the plan for the high minarets, including

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developing the majoum eastward after the crossing to reach the line of the straits. Since the new plan was exactly the same as Granite 2 with some modifications, so this plan was dubbed

as "Granite II Extended" but was then renamed in September 733, a month before the attack, to "Granite II Extended

a month before the attack was launched, it was renamed "Plan Badr".

Consequently, the crossing plan became known as

the plan to build bridges was called "Phase 1," while the plan to develop to reach the straits was called Phase II. To create a break between the two phases, it was said when

the phrase "after a mobilization pause" was used to transition from the first to the second phase.

to develop the attack eastward.

On 7 Buner 73, at the General Headquarters in Nasr City, the cooperative organization of the

of the joint offensive plan between Egyptian and Syrian forces, which was attended by Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, commander of the

Federal Command, Lieutenant General Saad Shazly, Chief of Staff, Major General Bahieddine Nawfal, Chief of Operations of the Federal Command, and a number of Egyptian and Syrian commanders.

and a number of Egyptian and Syrian commanders, where the objectives of the plan were determined

The plan on the two islands, and the goal was for the Syrian forces to reach the Dhar-Jordan line

the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias, and Malasian forces to reach the strategic straits line east of the Suez Canal.

east of the Suez Canal. The commander of the Second Army, Major General Saad Maamoun, and the commander of the Third Army

General Abdel Moneim Wasel then assigned tasks to the commanders of the five infantry divisions that were to cross the Suez Canal

to cross the Suez Canal as the first coordination of the two armies and the plan, namely the 19th and 7th divisions

of the Third Army, and the 16th, 2nd and 18th Divisions of the Second Army. Also allocated

the 4th and 21st Armored Divisions and the mechanized infantry brigades supporting the two divisions

of the two divisions, which were to be in the second echelon of the two armies, to be pushed through the heads of the

bridges to push eastward into the fjords, the commanders of the infantry divisions of the first column and the commanders of the armored and mechanized infantry divisions

armored and mechanized infantry divisions of the second echelon all carried out reconnaissance work for Operation

Al Habour and the implementation of the first phase, as well as the development of the Sharma offensive, reaching the

the Narrows and the completion of the second phase, laid out their plans, and organized cooperation within each

army. The only thing worth noting is that the first phase of the plan was scattered

during the process of organizing cooperation on all levels in all its minute details, while the

the second phase was skimmed over. Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of

Staff, justified this phenomenon in his memoirs that he himself had never expected to ask Egyptian forces to carry out the second phase, and that this was the same feeling of the commanders of the Second and Third Armies.

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Political and military guidance for the October War

The preparation for the October War of '73 witnessed a major change in the strategic concept of the political leadership. In all previous Arab-Israeli rounds, there had never been a comprehensive strategy for Egypt to achieve coordination and balance. A comprehensive strategy for Egypt to achieve coordination and balance between the state's political objective and its military capabilities. Military .

In previous rounds, the Egyptian Armed Forces were ordered to mobilize in Sinai Sinai without specifying the specific objective to be achieved. In the past, the actions of the Muskarian leadership were completely disconnected from the actions of the political leadership Especially as in the June '67 war, in which the armed forces were one of the victims It was never the cause of the country's disastrous defeat. But before the war October '73, a comprehensive strategy was developed for the state to prepare it for war, in which the Armed Forces the Armed Forces played the main role with the help and support of all other political, economic and media forces in the country. and media in the country.

On October 1, 73, the late President Sadat, in his capacity as President of the Republic, sent a directive political and military directive to General Ahmed Ismail, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces It consisted of four main paragraphs: First - about the general situation. Second, about the enemy's strategy. Third - about Egypt's strategy at this stage. Fourth - about the timing. In this study, we will deal with each of these paragraphs separately by analyzing and explaining them With the exception of the first paragraph, which we will only summarize as a semi-historical paragraph and has nothing to do with the strategic planning of the war. â On the general situation. In his explanation of this paragraph, the late President Sadat focused on several points The first point was the attempts by Israel, with the support of the United States, to impose its will on us to impose its will on us and to end the Middle East crisis in a way that achieves almost absolute control.

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Sadat recorded that Egypt had tried by all means to find a solution to the crisis the crisis, beginning with the acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, '67 and ending with with the initiative it directly proposed for a solution in which the opening of the Suez Canal would be a prelude to phases of a comprehensive withdrawal in accordance with the Security Council resolution (Sadat's peace initiative, which he announced on February 4, '71 in a speech announced on February 4, 71 in a speech to the People's Assembly), but all these efforts either failed or stalled, or our enemies tried to derail them. He stated that Egypt carried out military operations of a limited nature (meaning the War of

Attrition) in

'68, '96, and '07, and provided significant support to Palestinian resistance forces to initiate operations but all these operations, despite the results they achieved, did not reach the necessary level of pressure on the enemy on the enemy to the extent necessary. Sadat also recorded the heavy material and moral burdens borne by the Egyptian people and moral burdens that were more than his opponents and friends alike could have imagined because of his belief in his freedom. belief in his freedom. As for the Arab position, Sadat noted that significant improvements had taken place which clearly affected our armament situation, in addition to what we get from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, we have made available to us from other sources types of weapons that were not available to us. Sadat ended his explanation of the general situation by emphasizing that The enemy has become almost isolated after Egypt's successful efforts in the international arena.

Israeli strategy

In his guidance on this paragraph, Sadat stated the following:

âThe Israeli enemy, as we can see, has adopted for itself a policy based on intimidation and claiming a superiority that the Arabs cannot challenge. This is the basis of the Israeli security theory, which is based on psychological, political and military deterrence. The main point of the Israeli security theory is to convince Egypt and the Arab nation that there is no point in challenging Israel, and therefore there is no There is no escape from submitting to its conditions, even if these conditions include concessions on national sovereignty. 4. Sadat's directive ended.

Until before the June '67 war, Israel's security doctrine was based on the ability to strike a decisive blow and transfer the war to Arab territories due to Israel's geographical disadvantage due to its long common borders with the Arab confrontation countries.

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while its width in the area of Tulkarm and Qalqilya in the West Bank of Jordan was no more than 15 kilometers was no more than 15 kilometers wide. As a result of Israel's overwhelming victory in the June '67 war and after the lines on which its forces stood now passed over impenetrable natural barriers represented by the Syrian plateau to the east and the Jordan River gully to the west and the Jordan River canyon to the east, the Gulfs of Aqaba and Suez to the south, the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal Israel's security doctrine has changed, as any future war will be fought away from Israel's densely populated areas. densely populated areas of Israel, thus giving the army time and room to maneuver to maneuver against an Arab attack without damaging the home front. According to the new security theory, strategic thinking emphasized the need to retain the Arab territories occupied in the the Arab territories occupied in the June '67 war as Israel's secure borders. The new Israeli strategy is based on the following bases: First - the ability to deter: Israel should be the most powerful state in the

Middle East

Israel should be the most powerful state in the Middle East, and its power should be equal to the combined powers of the Arab countries. It is based on

The ability to deter is based on the following elements:

1 - Precedence in striking the abortion blow. Getting ahead of the game means thwarting any Arab preparations for an attack and relying on A superior air force of the most modern, powerful and long-range airplanes to be the main tool of deterrence and its long arm to reach the depths of the Arab countries while relying on a modern, lightly armored army equipped with sufficient armored forces and a high degree of combat efficiency to be able to destroy any Arab army in a swift and quick manner and destroy any Arab attack in a few hours, as was done An Arab attack in a few hours, as happened in the wars of 01967 1956

2- The need to retain the occupied Arab territories. The Israeli defense lines Israeli defense lines based on the Suez Canal, the Jordan River and the Golan Heights Golan Heights are the most suitable and strongest types of defenses for Israel, as they It is based on water barriers (the Suez Canal and the Jordan River) and a large mountainous barrier (the Golan Heights) (Golan Heights), which facilitates the task of Israeli forces in defense and makes the task of attacking Arab forces difficult and complicated. Moreover, these secure borders fulfill one of Israel's

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principle of warfare (economy of force), as it needs fewer forces to defend, observe, and stop an Arab attack. for defense, surveillance, and stopping the Arab attack for as long as possible until the reserves are mobilized. the reserves are mobilized and the combat formations are moved from the foolishness to the positions specified in the plan. The second is the need to maintain the advantage of the initiative in all circumstances and conditions. According to the theories of warfare, initiative is the primary means of obtaining Surprise, which, according to the definition of famous commanders and philosophers of war, is the most important principle the most important principles of warfare and the greatest impact in achieving victory. Third, the presence of a capable intelligence apparatus to collect, sort and analyze information very quickly to detect any offensive intentions against Israel well in advance This would allow Mogwat to prepare for combat and occupy the positions designated for it in the plan, while at the same time carrying out a full or partial mobilization reserve forces. Fourth, ensuring the support of a major power as a reliable ally at all times, and this was manifested by Israel's reliance on Britain This was evidenced by Israel's reliance on Britain and France during the Tripartite Aggression On October 29, 1956, Israel did not acquit itself of starting war operations against Egypt Egypt on October 29 only after making sure that Britain and France would participate in the war with it in the war, and it also secured guaranteed French air protection over the Egyptian cities and the Sinai battlefield, despite the fact that the Egyptian army had not yet internalized the

had not yet fully absorbed the Czech arms deal it had received in late 1955 in late 1955. Following the 1956 Suez War its reliance on Britain and France and placed the responsibility to the United States, which has since supplied it with with state-of-the-art weapons and equipment, cutting-edge technology, generous financial aid generous financial aid and its constant support in international forums despite all its aggressions aggression and using the US veto to prevent the Security Council from issuing any decisions to condemn them.

Egyptian strategy

The late President Sadat stated in his directive on this paragraph as follows:

The strategic objective that I bear political responsibility for giving to the Egyptian armed forces
On the basis of all that I have heard and known about the state of readiness, it is summarized as follows:

Challenging the Israeli security theory, through military action according to the capabilities of the of the Armed Forces to inflict maximum losses on the enemy and convince it that its continued occupation of our territories its occupation of our territories imposes a price it cannot pay, and therefore its theory of security based on psychological, political and military intimidation based on psychological, political and military intimidation - is not a steel shield to protect it now or in the future. in the future. If we can successfully challenge Israel's security theory, it will lead to in the short term and in the long term.

In the near term: Challenging Israel's security doctrine can lead to that will make it possible to reach an honorable solution to the Middle East crisis.

In the long term, challenging Israel's security doctrine could create variables that cumulatively lead to a fundamental change in the enemy's ideology, ruthlessness, and aggressive tendencies. Done.
Sadat's directive

The Egyptian strategy for the October War was built on a purely Egyptian foundation that was not imported

from the East or from the West, and the reliance was based on following and utilizing scientific and technological progress in the military field

scientific and technological progress in the military field, and the lessons learned from

the bitter experiences witnessed by the armed forces during the 1956 and 1967 wars.

The Egyptian strategy was based on the following principles:

First, to undermine the Israeli security theory: In order for Egypt to challenge Israel's security theory

Israel's security theory in real terms, it was necessary to gain the advantage of initiative

which meant a practical challenge to improved deterrence, and it was essential to

a full-scale attack along the canal front, not just on certain sectors of it, was essential

in order to undermine physical deterrence. It was

planning to break through the Suez Canal and destroy the Bar-Lev line with its impregnable bastions meant

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If successful, the theory of relying on natural barriers as secure borders was nothing more than a false illusion and a mirage.

Anissa Sakha's strategic deception: This plan, conceived and executed by the Egyptian General Command

The Egyptian General Command, in cooperation with the state's top agencies, was a complete success. It was coordinated

The Egyptian and Syrian plans for secrecy, security and deception were coordinated at the strategic and political levels

strategic and political levels, and the two leaderships actually succeeded in cooperation with some civilian agencies such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information

civilian agencies such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Information to keep the attack secret

and the methods by which they were able to deceive Israeli and American intelligence

and American intelligence services, which are undoubtedly some of the world's most cunning and cautious

the most cunning and cautious.

Forcing the Israeli army to fight on two major fronts at the same time (the Egyptian front and the Syrian front), which are separated by about 500 km apart, to disperse its efforts and scatter its forces between the two fronts, and to prevent Israel from

practice its traditional plan of stabilizing one front and focusing its main effort

against the other front, and when it is eliminated, the main effort shifts to the

to the stabilized front to eliminate it as well, a tactic it used successfully during the June War.

successfully used during the June 1967 war.

Fourth, closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait: After the June 1967 war, Israel publicly announced its intention to stay in Sharm el-Sheikh to maintain control of the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba

The entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba to keep the route from the port of Eilat to Africa and Asia

and vice versa open to its commercial ships. The Egyptian strategy was aimed at The Egyptian strategy aimed to cut off that silky drink for Israel and prove that Sharm el-Sheikh is not a key to Eilat.

is not a key to Eilat, as the key went down to the far south based on an Arab strategy for the Red Sea

Arab strategy for the Red Sea, which included closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait to Israeli ships

Israeli ships just before the outbreak of the war.

Khasa Neutralize and neutralize the IDF's Qara elements according to the following methods:

1 Depriving the enemy of the advantages of the first strike, and that the Egyptian

The Egyptian and Syrian armies should start the first strike at the same time to take advantage of its advantages.

2- Paralyzing the effectiveness of the superior Israeli Air Force and weakening its power by

An integrated air defense network that was considered one of the strongest in the world

defense networks in the world, in cooperation with the air force.

3- The ineffectiveness of the Israeli armored forces, which Israel focused its attention on

after its overwhelming success in the 1956 and 1967 wars and limiting its impact by providing the infantry crossing the Suez Canal with the largest number of weapons

and anti-tank missiles, supported by heavy artillery firepower in the critical early stages.

in the critical early stages, with the fight being a combined arms battle for the duration of the war.

Note : As a result of the declining effectiveness of the Israeli air force due to the network of

SAM missiles west of the Suez Canal and the ineffectiveness of the armored forces

due to the abundant supply of Egyptian infantry with a large number of weapons and anti-tank missiles, Israel was unable to use

blitzkrieg tactics that it had used in all its previous wars.

as aviation and armored vehicles are the main weapons in the blitzkrieg

the blitzkrieg that Israel used to wage.

4 Blocking the arrival of Israeli reserve forces from the depths. Since

The Israeli reserve mobilization system is one of the best systems in the world in the world, it achieves the best advantages and provides the opportunity to mobilize three hundred thousand

fighters at the time of war to push them to the battlefield, so the Egyptian strategy aimed to interfere with the arrival of the reserve forces

Egyptian strategy aimed to interfere with the arrival of reserve forces

to the Sinai front by planning to land entire units of

by helicopter deep into the Sinai, and landing

by sea on the Mediterranean coast

parallel to the Arish-Ramana road. The purpose was to create panic.

on the enemy's lines of communication, dispersing his efforts and hindering the arrival of his reserves on the battlefield.

reserves to the battlefield.

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Timing

The late President Sadat stated in his directive on this paragraph as follows:

âœThe time is now, from a political point of view, very favorable for such action as I

I referred to in the third part of this directive (meaning Egypt's strategy at this stage). The conditions of the

The conditions of the internal front and the conditions of the general Arab front, including close coordination with the

(the Syrian front) and the conditions of the international theater give us a suitable opportunity to start.

With the international isolation of the enemy, . And with the atmosphere that prevails in him with the tendencies of party elections

and personality conflicts, the possibilities of a favorable opportunity become better for us. Ended

Sadat's directive.

The political situation in the international arena was already unfavorable to Israel.

It was suffering from the bitterness of political isolation as a result of its constant defiance of the international community and United Nations resolutions. The Soviet Union, one of the two superpowers, was continuing its policy of in supporting Arab causes and providing the Arabs, especially the Egyptian and Suezian armies, with huge quantities of of the latest weapons, airplanes, advanced equipment and sophisticated electronic devices, and Arab oil was pressuring the European market countries Arab oil was pressuring the European Common Market countries, Britain and Japan, which are the major industrialized countries to move away from the Israeli line and produce a more pro-Arab policy.

In May 1973, the African Unity Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, adopted a resolution condemning Israel, and most African countries severed diplomatic relations with it with it. At the emergency session of the Security Council held in June 1973, the council voted on July 21 July 21 on a resolution upholding its previous resolution 242 of November 22, '67, calling on Israel to withdraw from the territories it conquered Israel to withdraw from the territories it occupied in the June 1967 war. The resolution received a majority of 14 votes out of 15, with the exception of a US veto. And in September 1973, the Non-Aligned Countries, which gathered at the summit conference in Algiers, expressed their full support for the Arab cause, and characterized Israel's policy as a threat to world peace and security. World peace and security.

After the Arab support for the Arab cause in all fields has reached such a high degree that there is no room for a new addition except one made by the Egyptian and Syrian forces by force of arms; thinking began to elect the most appropriate timing for the day and hour of the attack.

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Regarding the determination of the 15th of July as the day of the attack, General Ahmed Ismail stated in an interview that the search was to find a night with the following characteristics:

A moonlit night in which the moon would rise with us in the critical hours¹

. A night in which the current of the canal is suitable for crossing in terms of speed ²

3. A night when our work would be beyond the expectations of the enemy.

. A night when the enemy is not ready for action.

It is these features that determined October 6 many months before it arrived.

For the following reasons:

1- Astronomical calculations indicated that the moon on that night would grow at the beginning of the night and then at the end of the night.

2-Armed Forces scientists after studying the reports of the Suez Canal Authority for many years

in order to calculate the speed of Atbadat's journey on all days of the year, they found that October 6 was the most suitable. the most favorable.

3-The enemy does not expect us to work during Ramadan.

4 -The enemy is busy with various events, including its general elections, which attracts everyone's attention.

It was the month of Ramadan that inspired the commander-in-chief to change the code name of the attack

1Modified Plan Granite 2. He chose the new codename Badra in honor of the Khazwa of Badr.

From his political point of view, Sadat called it Operation Spark.

As for the timing of the 1C2 attack, General Ahmed Ismail

in his talk that until before the start of the fighting, the date remained a subject of discussion between the Malasian and Syrian leaderships

and Syrian. The Syrians, for a number of reasons, including the direction of the sun with them and against Haddo

preferred to operate at first light at dawn, and the Egyptians, for a variety of reasons, including the direction of the

the direction of the sun and the necessity of crossing, erecting bridges and opening the way for the entry of heavy equipment

such as tanks and cannons in the darkness preferred to work at the last light of the evening, and Gen.

Ahmed Ismail, as commander-in-chief of the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, sent the Syrians on Sept.

September 30 with the warning signal that an operation was possible at any time, and he himself traveled on 2

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October 2, he himself traveled to Damascus and had several discussions with the Syrian commanders about the timing of the attack.

After detailed consideration, it was agreed that 2:00 p.m. would be the time of the attack.

6AS2, and President Hafez al-Assad approved it. The choice of this time was strange.

It was neither expected nor familiar in Hakhroub, as this date is a time of noon, lunch and rest.

It coincided with the day of Yom Kippur in Israthil, a holiday from work, food and rest. And it is

in warfare that air strikes and the start of the general offensive should be before first light or before last light

In the middle of the day, this was not uncommon. Israel has always prided itself on

that it starts the war and ends it, as it did in the 1956 and 1967 wars, but in the 1973 war we

In the 1973 war, we snatched the initiative from her, and she found herself, for the first time, on the defensive.

Sadat's strategic direction in October

On the 9th of Ramadan, corresponding to October 5, 1973, the late President Sadat sent

as President of the Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces sent a strategic directive to Gen.

Ahmed Ismail, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces:

1973 Based on the political and military directive issued to you by me on October 1, 1973

Based on the circumstances surrounding the political and strategic situation, I have decided to assign

: The Armed Forces to carry out the following strategic tasks

1 - Breaking the Haskalah-Haskalah stalemate by breaking the ceasefire as of October 6

October 6, 1973

b. To inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy in terms of personnel, weapons and equipment.

c. Work to clear the occupied territory in successive stages according to the growth and development of the capabilities of the Armed Forces.

2- These tasks are carried out by the Egyptian Armed Forces individually or in cooperation with the Syrian Armed Forces
Syrian Armed Forces . Sadat's directive ended.

From this strategic directive, it is clear to us that the political objective that President Sadat was aiming to achieve from the Muskarian offensive was not the recovery of the territories occupied by

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Israel occupied in the June 1967 war (the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip), nor was it

destroying the Israeli army and inflicting a crushing defeat on it, because Egypt's military capabilities at the time

at the time did not allow it to achieve either of these goals. Therefore, the option

for the Egyptian General Command to implement the president's directive to end the military stalemate

and breaking the ceasefire was one of the following two possibilities:

1- Return to the war of attrition. But it was clear that this war had

exhausted its purposes in the period in which it was tried (in the years 1969, 196918

1970) and Israel would not accept a return to it to avoid the losses it would suffer

in personnel, weapons and equipment. Therefore, any attempt by Egypt to return

to this war was expected to be met with a strong and violent response from Israel. The experiences of the war of attrition

The experiences of the war of attrition proved that when the Israeli leadership was fed up with this

with this style of warfare, the Israeli leadership decided to introduce Israeli aviation into the battle as of July 20

1969, and the war of attrition then moved into a dangerous phase, which the Israelis called

the Israelis called it the Counter Attrition War. The most serious consequence of the introduction of Israeli aviation

was the expansion of the war of attrition to encompass the entire Egyptian territory instead of

- instead of just the Canal Zone, as was the case at first, and the Egyptian deep

Egypt's depths suffered heavy losses from Israeli Phantom and Skyhawk raids, forcing the late President Abdel Nasser

forcing the late President Nasser to make his famous secret trip to Moscow on January 22, 1970

January 22, 1970, where he agreed with Kremlin leaders, after threatening to resign from office

to supply Egypt with a full air defense division of Soviet divisions with their crews

Soviet crews, SAM-3 missiles and equipment, as well as three full air brigades (with their

MiG-21s and Soviet crews) to take over the defense of the Egyptian rear. President Sadat

Sadat issued his decision to dispense with the Soviet experts and advisors as well as

Soviet units on July 8, 1972, and all returned to their countries.

Therefore, the resumption of the war of attrition was too risky.

Moreover, the war of attrition was itself a military operation of a limited nature

limited and futile in terms of moving the issue politically, as experience has proven

The expected reaction from the enemy was far greater than its political or military value

This is what called for the exclusion of the war of attrition from consideration.

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2- Conducting a major war operation consistent with our military capabilities, i.e. broader in scope than the war of attrition and at the same time less ambitious

and at the same time less ambitious in terms of the goal of liberating the entire occupied territories

In this case, the expected enemy reaction will be commensurate with the size and strength of our strike.

our strike . The only type of operation in which Egypt can retain the initiative for as long as possible

for as long as possible while continuing to inflict maximum casualties on Israeli forces

personnel, weapons, and equipment, is to create a cohesive zone of triangulated bridgeheads on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal to threaten

on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal to constantly threaten Israeli forces and inflict maximum losses by repelling their counterattacks.

The enemy had four main advantages: its air superiority, its high technological capability, the high level of training of its forces, and finally its reliance on urgent aid from the U.S.

from the United States, which guarantees a continuous stream of weapons and equipment

to compensate for what it loses on the battlefield, while suffering from four major weaknesses

four major weaknesses: The length of its lines of communication and their extension on multiple fronts that are difficult to defend

its human condition, which does not allow it to bear large losses, and its economic conditions, which prevent it from accepting a long-term war

and, finally, its arrogance and arrogance following its overwhelming success in the June 1967 war.

in the June 1967 war-so the Egyptian General Command based its plan on neutralizing the enemy's points of advantage while at the same time exploiting its weaknesses. This was aided by the fact that the success of Egyptian military planning because the President's strategic directive did not stipulate any specific mission to retrieve the occupied territories; this was left to the growth and development of the

and capabilities of the Armed Forces

It was very wise of the Egyptian General Command to plan for a to attack with five infantry divisions along the Suez Canal front on a line extending about 160 kilometers from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south. From Port Said in the north to Suez in the south, this achieved the following advantages:

1 - Forcing the enemy to distribute its counter-air strikes on our forces, whether during the construction or when constructing bridgeheads.

2- Due to the breadth of the confrontation, the enemy will be forced to scatter and disperse its armored forces when tactical counterattacks.

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3- Due to the breadth of the confrontation and the strength of the bridgeheads, the enemy will not be able to detect the direction of the main effort of our forces, which will make its reaction to the counterattack delayed

Both at the tactical and strategic level.

The planning called for a tactical pause after the completion of the crossing operation and after securing the bridgeheads east of the Suez Canal. the bridgeheads east of the Suez Canal. The purpose of this tactical pause was to reassess

the situation and prepare for the second phase of Plan Badra, which is to develop the offensive eastward to reach the

the strategic fjords area. The tactical pause was not planned to be a period of but a period of acceptance of enemy counterattacks at the tactical and tactical level

and tactical level, with the aim of destroying them and inflicting the greatest possible losses on the enemy, while at the same time making the necessary preparations and precautions so that the Egyptian forces can start the second phase of the plan of the plan.

Preparing the Theater of Operations

Egyptian and Israeli forces began implementing the plan to prepare the theater of operations

in the aftermath of the June 1967 war after Israel lost its long-held hope that Egypt would accept a treaty

that Egypt would accept a peace treaty with Israel, especially after the crushing defeat of its armed forces

its armed forces, and after Israeli forces reached the eastern shore of the Suez Canal

Suez Canal

The two sides implemented their plans in stages, beginning with the preparation and equipping of sites and defense zones near the canal and in the deep defenses near the canal and in depth, then evolved into preparations for offensive operations.

These actions continued until the first spark of the October 1973 war.

Egyptian preparations

The Egyptian Armed Forces concentrated their efforts and energies, utilizing the energies of civilian companies from the public and private sectors

The Egyptian Armed Forces concentrated their efforts and energies utilizing the energies of civilian companies from the public and private sectors. What the state spent on these works amounted to hundreds of millions of pounds, in addition to the

the sweat and blood of its military and civilian personnel.

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These structural works included the construction of fortifications to protect personnel, weapons, equipment and ammunition, digging trenches, main, interchangeable, temporary and structural artillery firing positions. Preparing the main and interchangeable command and control centers at all levels and erecting and raising earthen berms west of the canal to provide Earthen berms west of the canal to protect our forces from enemy surveillance and fire and to enable our forces to observe the enemy. Our forces can simultaneously monitor the enemy and control his positions, and establish governing bodies on the earthen berms west of the canal to berms west of the canal to be occupied by tanks and anti-tank weapons, and strong points in directions of particular importance. The establishment of bases for the missile network. The establishment of the anti-aircraft missile network bases, which was accomplished under intense pressure from the enemy air force, was one of the was one of the largest works carried out by the Egyptian Armed Forces and the civilian sector.

To facilitate the maneuvering of the troops, an improved network of longitudinal and transverse roads and paths was created. In the front area alone, it amounted to about 2,000 kilometers, and earthen berms were erected on the sides and in front of these roads and tracks. on the flanks and in front of these roads and tracks to conceal the movement of our forces on them, and dozens of dozens of fords on the Ismailia and Suez canals to facilitate crossing the two canals in the event that enemy aircraft succeeded in destroying the bridges built on them. In order to make it easier for our forces to build bridges on the canal at equal distances along the confrontation from Suez to north of Kantara, drop points for bridge units were prepared on the west bank of the canal, as well as houses necessary for the use of equipment.

In order to avoid a repetition of the first surprise strike, and to ensure that our air forces continue to provide the necessary efforts and support to secure our skies, as well as to secure the theater of operations of our land forces. D. to secure the theater of operations of our land forces and work to inflict crushing and continuous blows on the enemy forces during the course of operations. During the course of operations, a huge plan was implemented to create reinforced concrete bunkers and shelters for aircraft and technical equipment at air bases and technical equipment at air bases and airfields, equipped with steel doors, as well as the development of the airfields and airports with the construction of 20 new bases and airports. Engineering units have been formed engineering units have been formed at each airport to maintain and quickly repair its facilities once they are bombed by airplane bombs so that to restore the airport's efficiency in the shortest possible time. The engineers' work also included equipping naval bases naval bases, coastal artillery command centers, and concrete breakwaters in harbors and marinas in the Mediterranean and Red Seas. In order to secure the crossing of the Suez

Canal, many experiments and studies were conducted
experiments and studies to reach the most appropriate and fastest method to open
the gaps in the berm
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that the enemy had constructed on the eastern edge of the canal. These
experiments ranged from
from attempts to blow up the berm with explosives, to the use of artillery and
rocket fire, to the use of dredging
and rockets, to the use of water dredging using a powerful water pump capable of
pumping 500 cubic meters per hour
500 cubic meters per hour. Finally, the use of lightweight water pumps
lightweight, fuel-powered, high-capacity water pumps that can be carried by
personnel or boats.
Sufficient quantities of crossing equipment and equipment have been prepared,
and engineering units have been trained
on the construction and operation of bridges, ferries and amphibious transports,
as well as training troops on the use of boats and crossing
the use of boats and crossing by different means of crossing.

The Operations Authority, in conjunction with the Survey Department, the
Engineering Department
and the Vehicles Department conducted studies and practical experiments to
develop traffic maps on a scale of
100,000/100,000 scale traffic map sets have already been reprinted 10010000/1
for the North and South Sinai regions after clarifying and adding new
information about the land
roads, roads, pistils and important targets. These studies and experiments have
been of great benefit
in providing information as much as possible to the commanders on the ground and
in the theater of operations during
During the execution of combat missions in the October 1973 war, it was also
possible to overcome the issue of the inability of
the inability of some wheeled vehicles to travel in difficult terrain by making
some
modifications to their tires and air pressures.

Israeli equipment

After the Israeli forces succeeded in raising the berm on the eastern bank of
the canal
until it reached about 25 meters and shifted it westward until it reached the
eastern edge of the canal at a steep angle of about 45 degrees.
at a steep angle of about 45 degrees, they set up tank terraces at distances of
100 to
400 meters apart, so that tanks could climb up them while hidden behind the berm
until they reached a height at which the tower and gun were visible
to a height from which only the turret and cannon are visible, thus engaging
with their flanks unharmed
and cooperate with each other.

The Israeli forces set up several strong points in the interior of the berm,
mainly centered
on the main axes of approach of our forces across the canal. The total number of
fortified positions amounted to 22
sites that included 35 defensive points, each with an area of 4,000 square
meters.

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Each strongpoint consisted of several floors, and each floor consisted of
several bunkers made of

reinforced concrete reinforced with railroad ties and steel plates, and each floor is separated from each floor is separated from the other by a layer of bars, reinforced concrete, dirt, and stones. This layer is two meters thick two meters thick and is surrounded by dense coils of concertina wire and wire boxes packed with staples and stones to protect against direct-fire weapons. Each bunker has three to six shelters ammunition and fuel stores, bunkers, mortar and surface-to-surface missile emplacements, and trenches Steel-paneled transportation, grills, and ammunition boxes. The shelter had more than one entrance and branching out from more than one covered trench, all of which were covered with lame sheet metal with iron corners DThey had all the comforts and means of ventilation, lighting, heating, and cellular communication. These fortifications and engineering works These fortifications and various engineering works provided protection for the strong points against heavy bombs up to 1,100 pounds or more, and each strongpoint was surrounded on all sides by two barbed wire fences barbed wire between them with an anti-tank minefield and some anti-personnel mines, and in front of the point In front of the point is a dense, irregular wire barrier that is difficult to open a gap or cross by infantry.

The Israeli forces established between the first line on the canal (the Bar-Lev line) and the line of the fjords The second and third lines of defense are the second and third lines of defense. The second line of defense is 30 0 to 500 meters from the first line, centered in the most favorable direction for crossing the canal and advancing our forces east of the canal, and it is mainly equipped to be occupied by armored elements stationed in the rear. What danger The third is at a distance of 3 to 5 kilometers from the first line on some important directions and on the flanks of the main roads leading to the rear.

To overcome the nature of the terrain available east of the canal, Israeli forces erected a series of artificial hills and berms at different depths up to the line of the straits, and equipped them to be occupied by tanks to repel hostile attacks with tanks to repel hostile attacks or as opening lines for counterattacks. They were equipped Armored reserve areas at various depths, and armored reserves are stationed in these areas The armored reserves of the Sinai armored forces as well as weapons, anti-aircraft missiles anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles.

A large number of main and alternate firing positions are equipped with medium and long-range field artillery and long-range artillery, numbering about 240 equipped sites.

The Israeli forces established a huge network of longitudinal and transverse roads and checkpoints

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east of the canal to facilitate the movement of troops in any direction and maneuver them according to the development of the fighting. The most important of these roads was the road that the Israelis called âLexikonâ and the Egyptians called it (Transverse Road No. 1), a road that runs parallel to the Suez Canal from north to south from north to south and about 8 to 10 kilometers east of the canal. Parallel to the Lexikon Road is a

a paved road from north to south called the Artillery Road or (Transverse Road No. 022 and 30 to 35 kilometers east of the canal was the main road, which was known as (Transverse Road No. 3), which ran from Balwaza north to Tassa, where it intersected with the Ismailia Abu Ajila road, then extending south to the west of the Al-Geddy and Matla corridors.

Providing pedestrians with specialized units and demolition yards
The circumstances created by the crossing of the Suez Canal forced the Egyptian General Command to
The necessity to create a field intensity that can accommodate all the loads of the infantry soldier in a good way.
After it was proven that the field intensity (bul) that was in use in the armed forces at the time
had become unsuitable for the new conditions. The Mission Directorate conducted several experiments on
on this subject until the required samples were found, and before the end of October 1972, 50,000 of these
50,000 of these new types had been put into service. The Mission Directorate also changed the
(Zamzam) water bottles carried by the crossing soldiers to be 2.5 liters instead of the old ones that held 3/4 of a liter of water.
which held 3/4 of a liter of water, so that the soldier would have enough bah to last him a whole day. Due to the
the heavy loads that the crossing soldier was required to carry, the infantry was provided with hand carts that could be towed up to
that can be towed 5 km by two horses after being loaded with about 150 km of ammunition and military equipment across unpaved terrain.
and military equipment across unpaved terrain. Moreover, the infantry soldier is equipped with a lot of
modern equipment. By mid-1972, all infantry units were equipped with
were equipped with night vision devices (some were infrared, others were the theory of enhancing and magnifying starlight. In addition to these modern devices
there were simple primitive devices and equipment such as black opaque glasses that were made from thick opaque glass from Noah's Ark.
thick, opaque Noah's Ark glass used by oxygen welders, so that soldiers could wear them when the enemy used oxygen rays.
The soldiers wore them when the enemy used extremely powerful gamma rays to blind them. The enemy
used the flashing light on their tanks to blind our soldiers, so the response was to
the soldier wears these glasses and then directs his shell to the light source and destroys it.

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One of these simple devices is the rope ladder, which is similar to the ladders used in naval units.
Its wings are made of rope, but its steps are made of wood, which is easy to fold and carry
and then spread it on the berm, so that the infantryman can climb the berm without
with his feet in the dirt, and by placing two ladders next to each other, we can drag our guns (the
B10 recoilless cannon, B11 recoilless cannon, Malotka rocket, RPG
Strela anti-aircraft missile (SAM 1), 62.7m medium machine gun and heavy machine gun 7.12m, as well as traction vehicles that accompany the infantry and can drive over this berm
the berm without their wheels sinking into the sand.

After the infantry soldier, as we saw, was equipped with the best weapons and

equipment, and after he was loaded and loaded to the limit, it was only natural that his fighting ability would increase. He became a formidable opponent to the tank and the airplane. But the issue facing the was how infantry units that were planned to cross in 12 waves over a three-hour period over a three-hour period, could challenge an enemy force consisting of three armored brigades and an infantry brigade infantry brigades entrenched inside the Bar-Lev Line's strongpoints, with the Suez Canal in front of them. And if we may imagine that they are able to cross and reach the honorary shore of the canal? the honorary shore of the canal, will they then be able to repel the great counterattack that the expected to be launched by the enemy?

The situation was reassuring in terms of repelling the enemy's tactical counterattacks in which he was expected to use three armored brigades if our infantry fought stubbornly. But the morale had to change if the enemy pushed its tactical reserve, which was less than three armored divisions 24 hours after the start of the attack, so certain measures had to be taken. The first measure was to provide fire support to our forces that crossed to the eastern shore of the canal the eastern shore of the canal with all heavy weapons west of the canal. The second measure The second was to impose severe restrictions on the speed of the infantry's advance, to ensure that that they are always in close fire support range of the west bank, and that their defense lines are shortened their defensive lines, thereby increasing their ability to repel counter-tank attacks.

Accordingly, it was planned that the bridgehead of each infantry division would gradually reach a a depth of 5 km and a base of 8 km within four hours of the start of the attack. Upon reaching this
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the infantry would have to halt until the support weapons crossing on ferries and bridges, which were and bridges, which were expected to begin arriving ten hours after the start of the fighting. Following the arrival of the support weapons and reorganization, it was planned that the infantry divisions were to resume their advance, bringing the division's bridgehead to 8 km in depth and 16 km at the base within within 18 hours of the start of the attack. These tactics were meticulously executed during the battle. At 8 a.m. on October 7, 18 hours later, the five infantry divisions The five infantry divisions that crossed the Suez Canal, reinforced by tanks and other support weapons, pushed the bridgeheads to a depth of 8 kilometers east of the Suez Canal.

Photo AppendixChapter I
All commanders hold the title of General Staff

Chapter Two

The Great Crossing and the Breaking of the Bar-Lev Line

Breaking through a mathematical barrier such as the Serris Canal against an enemy positioned in strong, well-fortified points on the other side is one of the most difficult and complex military operations, especially

The crossing of the water barrier was to be done by five infantry divisions over a 16-kilometer front.

It was planned that the first wave of the crossing forces would consist of the of the 1st Corps battalions along the canal, and they were to cross the canal in their rubber and wooden boats

and wooden boats under the cover of a canopy of artillery shells at points far from Israeli strongpoints

They would then climb the soft sand berm on the eastern shore of the canal and drop

ladders to the other side to make it easier for the following waves of infantry cross the berm.

The specific mission of the first wave was to rush toward the second line of the Israeli defense, ignoring the

the second line of Israeli defenses, ignoring the Bar-Lev fortresses on the on the eastern shore of the canal. In order for the Egyptian forces to succeed in this mission.

certain elements, called tank-hunting groups, were assigned to confront the Israeli tanks

in the defenses of the second echelon, which were supposed to rush towards the Suez Canal

as soon as the crossing began. Each of these groups consisted of about ten armed with RPG 7 (7-8.6%) (similar to a bazooka, shoulder-fired RPGs)

capable of blowing out the turret of any Centurion or Patton tank), as well as Malotka guided missiles, known in NATO as Sager missiles. .

The planning called for the second wave of infantry, after crossing the canal, to move to the

to the right and to the left in the direction of the Bar-Lev Line's strongest points to encircle and storm them. Given the

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because it needed to be assisted by explosive shells for the fortifications from the direct-fire guns.

it was arranged in the artillery plan that the direct-fire guns from their terraces

on the western shore of the canal to assist the infantry in storming these strongpoints.

In view of the expectation that the enemy would ignite the surface of the canal water with liquid napalm from the

set up inside the Bar-Lev Line fortifications, groups of thunderbolts

and engineers were sent on October 5 to cut the hoses that were supposed, according to the enemy's plan

that were supposed to be attached to the hoses to ignite the flame when the enemy's plan was realized.

start the crossing.

After receiving instructions from the Chief of Staff on the evening of October 5, 1973, General Gonen, commander of the Southern Command

October 5, 1973, to raise the IDF's readiness to the maximum level C2.

had instructed his chief engineer to prepare two flaming installations in the canal at Fardan and Deverswar (the only

the only two operational flare installations) to be ready as of the following day. And on

morning of October 6, 1973, a group of engineers led by Lieutenant Shimon Tal arrived at the

the line of forward fortifications, and first went to the strong point at Fardan, where the

The officer explained to the soldiers how to operate the ignition system. Since the electrical control system inside the fort was damaged, the only means of operation, as the engineer officer explained was for a few people to come out of the fort, run a few hundred meters down the canal, and then open the liquid napalm hoses by hand. When the liquid started flowing into the canal water, the soldiers had to throw a phosphorus grenade to ignite the liquid napalm, turning the canal water into a large piece of fire and flame, enough to prevent the Egyptians from crossing this terrible barrier.

After the engineer officer completed his mission at Fort Ahezayoun 5818klz in the Fardan area, he resumed his journey towards the Fardan area, he resumed his journey towards the south, and when he reached the strong point Amtsamik 236D%236D%Ni in the Dinarswar area, he discovered that one of the hoses outside the fort was broken and needed to be repaired, so he immediately set about repairing it. While he was doing his work, he came under heavy bombardment from Egyptian artillery fire, as it was 2:05 p.m. and five minutes in the afternoon, and the Egyptian artillery had begun at that moment to make the largest artillery preparation ever seen in the Middle East. Lieutenant Shimon Tal was forced to take cover was forced to stick to the ground, and when he tried to get up after the artillery cloud moved in, he was surprised

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Egyptian commandos stood over his head and took him prisoner on the western shore of the canal to the western shore of the canal. As a result, the Israelis were unable to operate any flaming equipment in the waters of the Suez Canal flames in the waters of the Suez Canal, and thus the Malasian forces avoided encountering this terrible barrier while crossing the canal.

How did the most spectacular crossing in history take place?

Since the strategic directive issued on October 5, 1973 stipulated the liberation of the liberation of the occupied territories in successive stages according to the growth and development of the armed forces' capabilities, the The military objectives were left flexible to allow for change and alteration in the light of the military situation. The Badr 4 military plan was based on the following principles:

The immediate mission: Breaking into the Suez Canal, destroying the Bar-Lev line, and establishing a bridgehead area on the eastern shore of the canal. bridges on the eastern shore of the canal at a depth of 12-10 kilometers, and repel and destroy the enemy's counterattacks counterattacks launched by the enemy.

Secondary mission : After a mobilization pause or without a mobilization pause, develop the attack to the east to seize the line of strategic mountain fjords, namely from north to south (Al-Khatmia Al-Jidi Matla-Ras Sidr).

To implement the Badr offensive plan, Egyptian forces were mobilized according to the following modes:

First, the first formation: It consisted of the Red Sea Military District and the Third and Second Field Armies.
and the Second Field Army.

The Red Sea Military District:

Under the command of Major General Ibrahim Kamel, it consisted of a first and reserve corps. First Coordinate
It consisted of two independent infantry brigades (except for a battalion), and the reserve consisted of the infantry battalion.

% Third Field Army:

Under the command of Major General Abdel Moneim Wassel, it consisted of two coordinates and a reserve.

First echelon: On the right is the 019th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Youssef Afifi, with the brigade

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22 Armored Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division). On the left is the 7th Infantry Division led by Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi with the independent 25th Armored Brigade.

Second echelon: 4th Armored Division under the command of Brigadier General Mohamed Abdelhaziz Qabil and 6th Infantry Division
Mechanized Infantry Division (excluding a brigade) under the command of Brigadier General Mohamed Abul Fath Muharram.

Reserves: A thunderbolt group, a regional brigade, a border vehicle regiment and a thunderbolt brigade.

Second Field Army:

Under the command of Major General Saad Maamoun, it consisted of two coordinates and a reserve.

First Formation: On the right is the 16th Infantry Division under the command of Brigadier General Abdul Rab al-Nabi Hafez, along with
14th Armored Brigade (from the 21st Armored Division). In the center is the 2nd Infantry Division led by Brigadier General Hassan
Abu Saada with the 24th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division). On the left is the 18th Division
Infantry under the command of Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali with the independent 15th Armored Brigade.

Port Said area:

First echelon: 2 independent infantry brigades under the command of Major General Omar Khaled.

Second echelon: 21st Armored Division (excluding a brigade) under the command of Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi.

Reserve: 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division (excluding a brigade) under the command of Brigadier General Ahmed Abboud al-Zumer.

and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division in the Cairo headquarters reserve)
General Headquarters in Cairo)

Second, the General Headquarters Reserve:

It consisted of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division (excluding a mechanized brigade) under the command of Brig. Gen. Nagaty Farhat, two independent armored brigades, one parachute brigade, and two air assault brigades (except for battalion) and a thunderbolt group.

At 2:00 a.m., more than 200 Egyptian fighters and fighter-bombers MiG-21, MiG-17 and Sukhoi 7 bombers crossed the Senwis Canal in its eastern direction at low altitude, having taken off from 20 air bases to carry out the mission set by

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Air Force Commander General Pilot Mohamed Hosni Mubarak in the first concentrated strike deep in the Sinai Sinai, which included the enemy's command center in Um Marjam, the obstruction and jamming center in Najbel Um Khashib, the airfields of Al-Maliz and Bir Tamada, enemy reserve areas, and the location of Hawk anti-aircraft missile batteries. Hawk anti-aircraft missile batteries, radar stations, enemy long-range artillery some administrative areas and the Budapest Fortress (one of the forts of the Bar-Lev line) located on the sandbank east of Port Fouad. The air strike was successful. The planes returned at 2:20 pm after performing their mission through specific air corridors that were agreed upon between specific air corridors that were agreed upon between the Air Force Command and the Air Defense Command in terms of time and altitude in terms of time and altitude. The losses of the concentrated air strike were five planes.

At 2:05 p.m., 2,000 artillery and mortar pieces and a tactical ground-to-ground missile brigade Tactical Surface-to-Surface Missile Brigade, one of the largest pre-fire operations in history. It was planned by Major General Mohamed Said al-Mahi, commander of the artillery, and involved 135 artillery battalions and several instances of direct fire artillery, under the command of Brig. Gen. Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh, commander of the Second Army's artillery, and Brigadier General Munir Shash, commander of the Third Army's artillery Third Army. The preliminary fire along the enemy front line was carried out in four bombardments. It lasted 53 minutes by direct and indirect fire on enemy strong points nearby reserves, artillery emplacements and command centers. The artillery poured 30,100 tons of ammunition, and the number of artillery shells in the first minute was 10,500, an average of 175 every second. The direct-fire artillery occupied tank terraces and berms on the western shore of the canal during the first bombardment of the to prevent the enemy from occupying the earthen berms and tank terraces on the eastern shore of the canal, to paralyze the movement of Israeli strongpoints, and to provide our forces while storming the canal and attacking the fortified points to provide direct assistance by removing barbed wire and minefields and destroying and minefields, and destroy pillboxes, bunkers, and observation towers in the strong points. As for the artillery The medium artillery of 130 mm guns and 152 mm self-propelled howitzers was intended to to deal with Israeli batteries stationed in depth.

As the preliminary fire began, tank-hunting groups began crossing the Suez Canal by rubber boats, with the mission of destroying enemy tanks and preventing them from interfering with the

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the crossings of the main forces and prevent them from embedding their terraces in the berm on the eastern bank of the canal.
on the east bank of the canal.

The facts of the fighting proved that the enemy, in addition to the strategic surprise was also a tactical surprise, as it was unable to raise the readiness of its forces to a state of maximum readiness at the time of the attack at the time of the attack, and its tanks in the second echelon did not occupy their assigned positions to reinforce the fortifications of the Bar-Lev line and close the gaps between its strong points. When these tanks began to advance in the direction of the canal at 2:20 p.m., following the end of the first bombardment and the artillery moved its fire into the depths, they were intercepted by the Tank sniping groups that had previously occupied some of the terraces assigned to them near the first line of defense which led to the destruction of large numbers of tanks by these groups, in addition to the artillery shells from the tank guns, anti-tank guns and Malotka missiles that were occupying the terraces and berms that occupied the terraces and berms on the western shore of the canal.

The enemy was surprised by the intensity of the Egyptian artillery fire, and its air force was surprised by the Egyptian airplanes
The enemy was surprised by the intensity of the Egyptian artillery fire, and its air force was surprised by Egyptian planes attacking Israeli positions deep in the Sinai.
in the air. Five minutes after the Egyptian planes attacked their targets, the enemy reacted quickly.
Egyptian planes attacked their targets, with swarms of Israeli planes that were on standby at airports in Sinai and southern Israel
on standby at airports in Sinai and southern Israel to try to repel the Egyptian air strikes.

At 2:20 p.m., the Maldonian artillery had completed the first volley of the of the 15-minute preliminary fire, which focused on all hostile targets on the eastern shore of the canal to a depth of
on the eastern shore of the canal to a depth of between one kilometer and one and a half kilometers in an easterly direction.
east. At the moment the artillery fire was lifted to begin the second 22-minute bombardment of
hostile targets to a depth of between 3 1 5 kilometers from the eastern shore of the canal.
At this moment (Sun+15), the first waves of the 1st Corps companies of the 1st Corps' clerical
infantry in wooden and rubber boats, in the gaps between the fortified points of the
Bar-Lev line. The first waves consisted mainly of infantry elements with observation posts
combined arms, and were supported by light anti-tank RPG-7 weapons and projectiles
shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, SAM 7 Strela and La5ta, and were equipped with rope ladders
to enable personnel to climb the berms, as well as the Perlun ropes and traction ropes, which had a significant impact.

in assisting the infantry in towing the Aztadab 1 and B11 anti-tank guns. the Malotka missile, the RPG, the SAM 7 missile, the 62m medium machine gun and the heavy machine gun 7 12mm, all of which successfully climbed the berm.

At the same time, elements of the Thunderbolt Battalions under the command of the field armies began began crossing the canal to operate against the enemy's command and control centers and artillery emplacements in order to to lose control of his forces, and to lay ambushes and mines on the enemy's approach and movement routes to prevent tanks moving from the rear from interfering in the ongoing battles to capture the Bar-Lev line. from intervening in the ongoing battles to capture the forts and strongpoints.

With the influx of the first waves of infantry, two divisions of the 130th Brigade Independent Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade, each consisting of a reinforced mechanized battalion. across the Lesser Bitter Lake to push eastward and seize the entrance to the Gedi Strait and Matla Strait in cooperation with the airborne landing force to be dropped by helicopters behind enemy lines.

At 2:35 p.m., the vanguard of the forces that crossed the canal raised the flags of the Arab Republic of Egypt raised the flags of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the eastern shore of the canal, announcing the beginning of stripping the land The waves continued to flow across the canal regularly, with an interval of about 15 minutes between each wave until the fourth wave, when the flow rate began to decrease due to the exhaustion of the crews crews assigned to row the boats, as well as boat malfunctions and water leaks. The irregularity of the transit flow led to flexibility and a lack of sequence The priority was given to the crossing of personnel, anti-tank weapons and equipment that with the use of some 61.Ka amphibious tankers (3 tons) to transport mines. mines. The ammunition was loaded into wheelbarrows equipped with Kawchuk wheels, and after the these carts are loaded into the boats and unloaded as soon as they reach the eastern shore The empty trolleys were crossed across the berm to be reloaded with ammunition again, where they This method was adopted after the failure of the method of transporting ammunition ammunition in free carts across the berm using rope ladders due to the sagging of the berm and the fall of a number of and a number of these vehicles fell into the canal. Tractor-trailers played their part in the transportation of ammunition, as well as in the supply of water and appointments in the following stages.

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As of 4:30 p.m., eight waves of infantry had crossed and we had five bridgeheads on the eastern shore of the canal, each about 6 kilometers long and 2 kilometers deep. Two kilometers, and the pressure of Egyptian infantry on the Bar-Lev line's fortresses and strong points intensified. strong points. The fort at kilometer marker 19, south of Port Said, was the Lahtzanit Fort It was the first of the forts to fall, and that was at 3:30 p.m. After that, forts continued to fall into the hands of our forces, as well as silencing the fire of some

strong points. From this time on, the main burden of repelling the enemy's counter-attacks shifted of the enemy's tanks from the 2nd Corps' line of defense shifted to the infantry and sniper groups of the tanks that had crossed over, rather than the anti-tank weapons that were still on the western shore of the canal.

The planning by General Gamal Ali, commander of the Corps of Engineers, was based on Allocating 603 crossings along the Suez Canal front, which required making six holes in the Each crossing was assigned a platoon of military engineers supported by 5 wooden boats with a capacity of 1.5 tons. wooden boats of 1 5 tons, 5 water pumps and a dredging machine: The plan was to set up 12 passages in the sector of each of the five infantry divisions that crossed in the following way:

70-ton heavy assault bridges (tanks and heavy artillery), and 25-ton light assault bridge (for vehicles of all types, light artillery and infantry).

A structural bridge (for crossing some light vehicles, so that the enemy thinks it is a real bridge).

Two 70-ton ferries (for transporting tanks), 5 amphibious tankers 61.Ka, and two corridors reserve. With the first wave of infantry, elements of the engineers crossed to the eastern shore

Hana to secure the passage of the infantry through the minefields, followed immediately by other elements of the engineers to determine where the gaps in the berm would be located, where the boats carrying the pumps, and preparing the location of the necessary shoulders to be anchored according to the characteristics of the crossing for which the corridor is to be allocated corridor (bridges, ferries, or amphibious vehicles). Five minutes after these groups crossed a minutes, the groups in charge of operating the pumps began to cross, and as soon as they reached the eastern shore of the canal on the eastern shore of the canal, the pumps were placed on the terraces that had been prepared.

At half past three o'clock, the pumps began to operate, and the water rushed out of the bashabirs like a torrent.

and the first breach in the Second Army's sector was opened in a time of 93

In a record time of less than an hour, the gaps were opened along the enemy's front. At the same time

At the same time, hundreds of huge vehicles loaded with bridges and launches rushed from their concealed positions on the western shore from their hiding places on the western shore to the designated drop zones on the canal, and through through the prefabricated houses, the vehicles approached the water surface and dropped their cargo of of barrels and launches into the water, where the bridge units began their installation.

The bridges began to be erected in front of the gaps that had been opened in the berm. Within a period of 6 to 9 hours, all of the heavy, light and structural bridges, amphibious transports and ferries of the Second Army had been erected according to the plan, and tanks, tracked vehicles, and tanks, tracked vehicles and heavy equipment to the eastern shore of the canal.

In the Third Army

Third Army, the process of opening gaps in the berm and establishing crossings was hampered by several factors

especially the height and thickness of the berm and the hardness of the soil, which contains calcareous elements, which made dredging an arduous process. These constraints made dredging a laborious process, and led to the need to equip only in order to save time and allow tanks and tracked vehicles, which were urgently needed in the early hours of the morning of October 7, after which the use of dredging machines to ease the steepness of the slopes in the various corridors. The bridges of the The bridges of the 7th Infantry Division of the Third Army were only constructed in about 16 hours, seven hours later than planned. The division's tanks, tracked vehicles, and heavy equipment and heavy equipment to the eastern shore of the canal. Since the crossings of the 19th Division's Infantry Division's crossings could not be operated until that time due to technical difficulties and enemy countermeasures. the commander of the 3rd Field Army decided to push the 19th Infantry Division's tank battalions and the battalions of the 22nd Armored Brigade under its command from the crossings of the 7th Infantry Division on its left.

At about 5:30 p.m., just before sunset, four were dropped by low-flying helicopters deep into the enemy's territory in various places inside the Sinai, and since these planes were out of range of the Egyptian missile umbrella west of the canal, the enemy was able to shoot them down. The enemy was able to shoot down a number of them with their human cargo.

Throughout the night, tanks and heavy weapons joined infantry units and formations infantry in the area of the bridgeheads. This was an arduous process, as thousands of tanks, vehicles, and guns were required to join thousands of tanks, vehicles, and guns during the hours of darkness to join their units that had crossed from
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before. The Muskrat police did their best to guide them by marking roads and the different-colored markers of the fighting formations. And it worked. The Egyptian forces practiced this campaign for many months before the battle until they mastered it

until they mastered it.
What made the air strike successful

The preparation for the concentrated air strike undoubtedly began immediately after the June 5, 67 defeat. It was inevitable to rebuild the air force from scratch after the destruction of most of its aircraft and facilities that fateful morning. All members of the Air Force dreamed of a day of remarkable vengeance. the shame that was unjustly attached to their weapon to hide the responsibility and mistakes of those who caused Egypt's defeat in the June '67 war. The first opportunity for the pilots to regain their self-confidence came just 40 days after the defeat. After the defeat, on July 15, 1967, the General Command was ordered to bomb the Israhelli hordes east of the canal east of the canal and to blow up the huge ammunition stockpiles that the enemy had managed to collect from Egyptian positions in Sinai. Egyptian positions in the Sinai. Egyptian pilots swooped suicidally on the Israeli concentrations with ferocity and violence, as if to vent the bitterness and sense of injustice they were harboring at the time bitterness and a sense of injustice. The concentrated aerial bombardment led to the dispersal of enemy forces and retreating eastward, as well as horrific explosions in ammunition

stockpiles, and the Israelis were forced to enlist the help of UN observers for a cease-fire. The planning in rebuilding the air force was based on an organized scientific method, namely the proper preparation of the three elements that make up the basic structure

The three elements that make up the basic structure of the air force, namely pilots, airplanes and airfields

Pilots, airplanes and airports, and the first element, the preparation of pilots, was the most difficult of these elements

Training an individual to be a competent fighter pilot is an arduous task and needs continuous training for a period of four to five years.

for a period of four to five years.

The second element, the possession by the air force of airplanes that ensure its air superiority over Israeli aviation, was not

air superiority over Israeli aviation was not something that Egypt alone could achieve, as the Soviet Union

Before the October War, the Soviet Union was the only source of supplying Egypt with weapons, and this process was subject to

was subject to very complex political circumstances, as it was linked to

Egyptian-Soviet relations on the one hand, and to the policy and strategy of the Soviet Union as one of

and the Soviet Union's strategy as one of the two superpowers on the other. In addition to

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US airplanes that the United States was supplying to Israel in large quantities were clearly superior in terms of characteristics, armament, and equipment to the Soviet aircraft

aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union to Egypt. These factors, of course, led to Israeli aviation achieving

in terms of quantity and quality over Egyptian aviation, which is why the

The plan for the exploitation of the Malassian air force was based on the unavoidable fact that

that they would operate under conditions of Israeli air superiority.

The third element, the airports, were developed in line with the development of modern air operations

The development plan included the establishment of a network of new airports in desert and agricultural lands

and agricultural lands, and increasing the number of runways at some important air bases.

To avoid destroying planes while they were on the ground, as happened on June 5, 1967

Fortified bunkers have been constructed at airports to protect aircraft from aerial bombardment, as well as

shelters to protect advanced technical units. To ensure that airports are maintained and quickly repaired in the event that they are hit

special units were formed for this purpose to prevent the disruption of any airport as a result of air strikes.

air strikes. These arrangements proved their efficiency during the devastation, despite the bombs and missiles dropped by the enemy

bombs and air-to-surface missiles, only one airplane hangar was partially hit was partially hit and not a single airplane was destroyed on the ground. When

the bombers succeeded in

hit Mansoura Airport, maintenance units were able to repair it in a few hours.

The Istizaf War was a valuable opportunity for Egyptian pilots to prove their worth.

The war was a valuable opportunity for Egyptian pilots to prove their worth, and to train for face-to-face engagements with Israeli planes, and to master the art of maneuvering and swooping

It also gave them the opportunity to strike Israeli targets deep in the Sinai

During the preparatory phase that immediately preceded the October War, General

Hosni Mubarak, commander of the Air Force at the time, was the possibility of Israel discovering Egypt's offensive preparations on the West Bank of the Gaza Strip
Egypt's offensive preparations on the west bank of the canal, which might motivate it to consider an abortive strike
abortive strike similar to the one on June 5, 1967.

The Egyptian air chief's fears were justified. It turned out that the Israeli military leadership
had requested from the political leadership that the IAF conduct an abortive strike
abortive strike at 1:00 p.m. on October 6, with the aim of aborting the offensive preparations
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Serbian offensive preparations and force Egypt and Sorba to halt the expected attack, but the political leadership in Israel
refused to take this risk for military and political reasons at the time. To counteract
this possibility, General Pilot Hosni Mubarak had asked all monitoring and warning centers
to record all flights of Israeli aircraft in Sinai and inside Israel on a daily basis. At the same time
At the same time, an Egyptian air umbrella was deployed in the Egyptian skies and kept an eye out for any possible
of Israeli airplane movements toward Egypt. If the Israelis had launched a counterstrike

would have turned into a deadly trap for their planes.
Although Israeli aviation had been on high alert since noon on Friday, October 5, based on the order issued by General David Eliezer, Chief of the General Staff
to General Bani Peled, the commander of the Israeli Air Force, and despite the fact that Israeli warning and radar centers in Sinai
and radar centers in Sinai monitored all Egyptian flights on October 6 at noon, thanks to their
with their sophisticated electronic equipment, they were completely taken by surprise by the deception tactics successfully planned by the
of deception successfully planned by the Jakhawi Garrat Command, the most brilliant of which was undisputedly the raising of the
and declaring a state of alert at all left-handed airports and air bases from September 23 to 25.
September 23-25. During this period, sorties from airports in the Delta and Upper Egypt
and Upper Egypt airports continuously, which caused the Israelis the greatest confusion and disorientation.
They had to launch their planes into the air whenever an airplane took off from any Egyptian airport.
When there were no Egyptian air attacks as they had expected, they became calm and reassured
and reassured, as they realized that the Egyptian flights were just for training. When
they observed Egyptian planes leaving air bases and airfields on the afternoon of October 6, they thought
as usual, they thought they were just training sorties, so they fell into the trap. During the
the last critical hours before the attack, General Pilot Hosni Mubarak added another
another means of camouflage. He made meticulous arrangements in Cairo and urgent contacts with
Tripoli on the afternoon of Friday, October 5, to prepare for a visit that he told those around him
to Libya with some of his senior officers on an urgent 24-hour mission. When he was

was approaching the plane's departure time, which was initially set for 6:00 p.m. on October 5
was approaching, General Hosni Mubarak repeatedly postponed the date until it was finally set for
at 8:00 p.m. on October 6, the same time the war was set to begin.
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At 9:30 a.m. on October 6, General Hosni Mubarak called the commanders of the Air Force
to an urgent meeting at his headquarters and gave them the final indoctrination of the air force's mission.
and asked them to go to the main operations center to take their respective places there
in preparation for the anticipated air strike, the success of which would mean the success of the Malassian surprise plan
and the start of the liberation battle. At 2 p.m. on October 6, more than 200 Egyptian jets took off from 20 airports and air bases across the country.
Through
careful arrangements and calculations made by the Air Force Command, this huge number of aircraft
a huge number of aircraft crossed the front line on the Canal in a single moment at very low altitudes
very low. Squadrons of fighter-bombers and medium bombers were flying under the protection of
fighter squadrons. The strike, centered on Israeli targets, utilized
vital targets deep in the Sinai with MiG-17s, MiG-21s, Sukhoi 7s and Sukhoi 20s. At 22:20, the Egyptian aircraft returned after performing their mission during
specific air patrols that were agreed upon by the command of the Egyptian forces
specific air patrols that were agreed upon between the Air Force Command and the Air Defense Command in terms of time and altitude
time and altitude.

The air strike succeeded in achieving its objectives by about 90% and the losses did not exceed
no more than 5 Egyptian planes. The results of the strike, according to credible references, were
Paralyzing three main corridors at the airports of Al-Maleez and Bir Tamada, in addition to three secondary corridors
Silencing about 10 Hawk surface-to-air missile battery sites and two artillery positions
The destruction of the main command center in Um Marjam and the obstruction and jamming center in Um Khashib
Destroying and silencing a number of key transmission centers and radar sites.

Some L-28 tactical bombers took part in the air strike, focusing their bombing on
on the Israeli Fort Budapest (one of the forts of the Bar-Lev line, located on the sandbank
east of Port Boufouad). A second air strike against the enemy was scheduled for October 6 before sunset
but due to the success of the first strike in accomplishing all the tasks assigned to the air force
the General Command decided to cancel the second strike.

The Israeli Southern Command in Sinai was forced to use the rear command center after the main center in Umm Marjam was hit, and the obstruction and jamming center in Al-Arish became the only remaining Israeli center in Sinai.
became Israel's only remaining center in the Sinai after the destruction of the Umm Marjam IEDC.
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Khashib, which allowed Egyptian aircraft to operate freely in the skies and receive navigational guidance
navigational guidance with complete efficiency and accuracy

Israel's strategic naval blockade

In the period leading up to the June 1967 war, the Egyptian Navy was tasked with the implementation of the political decision issued by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser on May 18

to end the presence of international emergency forces on Egyptian soil and close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.

Therefore, the Navy's attention at the time focused on assembling a balanced naval force in this area to control navigation at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

in this region to control navigation at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, especially after it was reported that some maritime states had decided to send that some maritime states had decided to send some of their fleet to forcibly occupy the Gulf of Aqaba and defy the decision announced by the Egyptian president

announced by the Egyptian president. The Egyptian navy was able to carry out this difficult mission

with high efficiency, and actually took control of the waters overlooking the Gulf of Aqaba. The organs of

After the June 67 war, Israeli propaganda tried to promote that Israel had managed, through a cunning plan of deception

to lure Egyptian naval units to the Red Sea to keep them away from the Mediterranean.

Although, after the end of the war and the closure of the Suez Canal were unable to return to their bases in the Mediterranean, this situation led to a

a radical change in the balance of power in the Red Sea in favor of the Egyptian navy, and it also had a great deal to do with

in assembling a naval force that, after about six years, was able to impose a strategic blockade

on Israel in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba. On October 21, 1967, less than five months after the end of the June 1967 war

less than five months after the end of the June 1967 war, the Israeli destroyer Eilat was sunk

was sunk by Egyptian missile launchers. The sinking of the Eilat in Port Said waters was not just a battle between Egyptian and Israeli naval units.

was not just a battle between Egyptian and Israeli naval units; it was an important naval event that shook the naval community, globally

It was an important naval event that shook the naval community globally. It proved that surface-to-surface missiles had

have become an effective weapon with a serious impact on the outcome of naval battles, and that they pose a clear threat against the largest naval vessels against the largest naval vessels. During the war of attrition. The naval forces Malassian human frogmen raided the port of Eilat four times

Eilat four times, inflicting the Israeli port with heavy losses in ships and personnel, and

Egyptian destroyers bombed some vital targets on the enemy's coast.

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Planning for the operation to close the Bab al-Mandab did not come about suddenly in the run-up to the war.

In fact, planning for this major strategic operation actually began in October '71, two years before the outbreak of the war

Two years before the outbreak of the war, a group of Egyptian naval experts were dispatched to the

to the southern Red Sea to prepare detailed studies of the naval and air positions in this area.

in this area. In May 1973, a detailed plan was drawn up and coordinated among the high command.

In order to deceive Israthil about Egypt's true intentions, Egyptian naval vessels were sent on

on various visits to some Arab and foreign ports so that Israel could get used to the movements of these naval vessels

in order for Israel to become accustomed to the movements of these naval vessels towards the south, and so that their movement when the scheduled date was approaching would not arouse suspicion and skepticism
Israthil's suspicions and doubts.

On the order of Rear Admiral Fouad Abu Zekri, Commander of the Naval Forces, a naval convoy was sent out consisting of some destroyers, submarines, and missile launchers on October 1, 1973 from their from its berths in the Red Sea to the open sea with the announcement that its destination was Pakistan to perform Umrah and to repair some vital devices and equipment. The departure of this naval force to take up combat positions in Bab al-Nadab and prepare to carry out the tasks assigned to it according to the indoctrination its commanders, meant that the war had begun for this force since October 1, as it was
For security and secrecy purposes, these naval vessels were required to maintain radio silence for the duration of their sailing so that the enemy would not pick up the radio signals exchanged between them and their command. There was no way to communicate with these naval vessels until after the start of the actual operations on October 6 and the breaking of the actual operations on October 6 and the radio silence was broken. To emphasize this fact to the General Command Rear Admiral Fouad Abu Zekri contacted the General Command before the naval force left on October 1 on October 1 to inform them that after the naval force sailed, he would have no way of contacting them to make any adjustments to the timing.

When the war broke out at 2 p.m. on October 6, the that had reached the waters of Bab al-Mandab was informed by code word by radio by radio to proceed with their assigned missions. In doing so, the Lasserian navy dealt a major strategic blow to Israthil a major strategic blow to Israthil that was unthinkable, as Egyptian naval vessels took control of the Bab al-Mandab Strait Egyptian naval vessels controlled the Bab al-Mandab Strait (the southern entrance to the Red Sea), and suddenly destroyers, submarines, and missile launches appeared destroyers, submarines, and missile launches to exercise the right to inspect and intercept merchant ships flying
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Israeli flag as well as other ships of various nationalities heading to Israel, a right guaranteed by international law.
a right guaranteed by international law.

With this blockade, the Egyptian navy has cut off Israel's vital artery linking it to Africa and Asia, which it used in the 1956 and 1967 wars as a pretext to prevent Egypt's control of the Straits of Tiran Egypt's control of the Straits of Tiran and Sharm el-Sheikh at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba so as not to cut off Egypt's access to the port of Eilat. the road to the port of Eilat.

The strategic depth of the Arab world has benefited the Israeli navy and provided it with excellent capabilities in terms of stationing in friendly ports and supplying all their needs in terms of fuel, food and water The choice of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which controls the southern entrance to the Red Sea, to impose a naval blockade on Israel to impose a naval blockade on Israel and expose its maritime transportation lines was a strategic act The choice of the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which controls the southern entrance to

the Red Sea, to impose a naval blockade on Israel and attack its maritime transportation lines was a strategic act. to reach this strait, which is more than 6,500 kilometers away from it, to carry out the unblocking operation. The impact This violent shock affected the Israeli leadership to such an extent that Defense Minister Moshe Dayan Defense Minister Moshe Dayan ordered a ban on publishing any news about this Egyptian naval blockade in any of the Israeli media Israeli media .

While the Israeli navy was unable to jeopardize the security and safety of freedom of navigation to major Egyptian ports navigation to the main Egyptian ports, especially Alexandria on the Mediterranean Sea and Safaga on the Red Sea. and Safaga on the Red Sea, these ports continued to operate in their normal state and in the same capacity as usual . The results of the closure of the Bab al-Mandab Strait were to completely cut off supplies to the port of Eilat The success rate of the Malassian Navy's operations in the Red Sea reached 100 percent. In the Mediterranean, as a result of the deployment and opening of submarines destroyers and mines, it was able to achieve the task of cutting the lines of communication to the Israeli ports located in this sea Israeli ports located on this sea by more than 80 percent, which is considered a great success for the Egyptian naval forces. Egyptian Navy .

In addition, the Egyptian navy participated in the artillery fire preparation operation that began at 2:05 p.m. on At 2:05 p.m. on October 6, the coastal artillery in Port Said shelled Port Said's coastal artillery bombarded the enemy's fertile point east of Port Boufouad, which the Israelis called Fortress

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Budapest) as well as the fortified point at kilometer 10 south of Port Boufouad in the Ras al-Ash area (the Israelis called it Fort Orkal), and the coastal artillery in Suez shelled The coastal artillery in Suez bombarded hostile targets facing the Third Army sector. The coastal artillery in Suez shelled hostile targets facing the Third Army sector. rocket launchers directed their missiles against enemy concentrations in Rummana and Ras Birun on the Mediterranean coast on the Mediterranean coast. On the Gulf of Suez, missile launches directed their missiles at vital enemy targets Ras Masla and Ras Sidr, and human frogmen attacked the oil area in Bala'im, and managed to disable its huge drilling rig. At the entrance to the Tiran Strait Aqaba, launches directed their missiles against enemy targets in Sharm el-Sheikh and Ras Mohammed. Mine-laying units blocked the entrance to the Gulf of Suez with mines to prevent the enemy from transporting oil from the Gulf of Suez fields to Eilat. The sinking of the of the Israeli destroyer Eilat on October 21, 1967, had a major impact on changing naval strategic thinking at the high level. maritime strategic thinking at the high level. In Israthil, the thinking shifted away from the acquisition of large naval vessels large naval vessels, and began to build its naval power on the basis that small, fast boats armed with surface-to-surface missiles armed with surface-to-surface missiles are the basis of the Israeli Navy's strike force. She For this purpose, it purchased 12 SR-class boats from France, and began in early 1973

1973 to build a new type of speedboat in the naval arsenal in Haifa harbor called Rashef Ata'a, and all of these boats were armed with surface-to-surface missiles with locally manufactured Jabrable surface-to-surface missiles. There were several clashes between Egyptian and Israeli near Port Said, Abu Qir and northern Damietta, ending with the sinking of a number of boats on both sides ended with the sinking of a number of boats on both sides.

The role of military engineers in the epic crossing

The great crossing that took place on October 6, 1973, with which the Arabs crossed from the humiliation of defeat to the pinnacle of victory from defeat to victory was in its first stage a purely engineering operation, and had it not been for the opening of gaps in the berm on the east bank, the installation of heavy and light bridges for crossing armored vehicles and vehicles, the construction of bridges for infantry crossings, the preparation and operation of ferries to transport tanks and accepted weapons, and the operation of thousands of bridges tanks and heavy weapons, and the operation of thousands of boats that carried tens of thousands of infantrymen to the eastern shore of the canal if it were not for all these tasks that the engineers carried out almost simultaneously and sculpting a torrential torrent of enemy fire, shells and missiles from land and air, the epic would not have been possible.

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crossing would not have taken place, and it would not have been possible to storm the Suez Canal, the most difficult water barrier in the world, within a few hours

The force of five infantry divisions consisting of about 80,000 soldiers with all their equipment and weapons

thousand soldiers with all their equipment, weapons and vehicles in 12 consecutive waves, using

the crossings and installations prepared by the engineers for them to cross the canal, reinforcing their positions on the eastern shore of the canal as soon as they arrived

on the eastern shore of the canal as soon as they arrived. Those who made it possible for the Egyptian forces to achieve this were the officers and soldiers of 35 engineer battalions from various specialties who performed a miraculous

miraculous, almost miraculous, feats

After the development of combat weapons and the introduction of tanks and amphibious vehicles into the organization of land formations

Rivers and canals are no longer a major obstacle for modern armies as they were in the past

Armored and mechanized formations can now break through water barriers by attacking

by pushing amphibious detachments in front of them, crossing the barrier and constructing light and heavy bridgeheads on which the main forces cross as soon as they reach the waterway.

to the waterway. The process of installing modern, sophisticated bridges nowadays does not take more than

takes no more than an hour and a half at the most, making the storming of water barriers in modern armies

in modern armies is a normal and uncomplicated process. But the situation for the

west of the Suez Canal was very different and extremely difficult

The canal itself was considered a unique water barrier in its nature and was unlike any other water barrier in the world, such as the

In addition, the sophisticated amphibious bridges found in modern armies did not

exist.

The Egyptian engineering units did not have them, but only old-fashioned bridges of the type used in the war of the type used in the Second World War, thus making it difficult for Egyptian troops to cross the

of the massive water barrier facing them is almost impossible, both from the point of view of friends and foes

enemies. Moshe Dayan, Israel's defense minister during the October War, in a discussions at the Israeli Chief of Staff about the possibility of the Egyptians crossing the Canal.

He arrogantly and arrogantly said: 5For the Egyptians to cross the Suez Canal, they need the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Soviet Army Corps of Engineers combined.

and the Soviet Corps of Engineers combined to help them with this.² As stated by Maj. Gen. Gamal

Ali, director of the Corps of Engineers during the October War, reported that the chief Soviet expert once told him -

before the Soviet experts left Egypt as they looked together at the enormous berm on the eastern shore of the canal

on the eastern shore of the canal: "You would need an atomic bomb to open a hole in this berm.

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But the Egyptian mind, with its inventiveness and creativity, was able to make all the necessary preparations and achievements

preparations and achievements, overcoming all difficulties and issues, and the Egyptian land forces were able to

Egyptian land forces were able to break through the canal without the need to detonate an atomic bomb or use American or Soviet

American or Soviet engineers.

The length of the Suez Canal from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south is about 160 kilometers

Its width varies between 180 and 002 meters, and its depth is about 18-14 meters.

It is not suitable for crossing in some areas with large forces, such as the northern region between Port Said

To the south of Ras al-Ash, due to the presence of salt marshes on the eastern shore that are not suitable

as well as the Bitter Lakes region due to its large water surface.

The most suitable areas for crossing large forces and securing their supply routes by building pontoon bridges

The most suitable areas for crossing large forces and securing their supply routes are between the city of Qantara in the north to the city of Ismailia in the south, and then

from the south of Lake Crocodile to the north of the Bitter Lakes, and finally from the south of the Bitter Lakes

to the city of Suez.

The canal is a difficult barrier because its wings are steeply sloped and covered with boulders and stones to prevent dirt and sand from falling to the bottom

dirt and sand collapse to the bottom, making it difficult for any amphibious vehicle to cross it unless

Unless the shoulders of the beach are blown up and a house and entrance are prepared that an amphibious vehicle can use to get in and out of the water.

to get in and out of the water. As for the soil and sand from the dredging work of the

that were used before the June 1967 war to clear and deepen the canal

to accommodate large-draft vessels, all of it was dumped on the eastern bank of the canal

As a barren and uninhabited desert, this sand formed a barrier between between 10 and 6 meters high, and Israeli engineers increased the height of this earthen berm

to about 25-20 meters in the places likely to be selected for play, and thus the berm became

The berm became an integral part of the series of fortified points erected during the war of attrition along the canal

The Israelis then worked to move the berm to the canal, known as the Bar-Lev Line.

the berm to the canal until its slope matched that of the canal's shoreline, thus eliminating

There was no visible shoulder or terrace on the eastern shore, and the slope of this

between 45 and 65 degrees, and on top of that there were other natural difficulties

The speed of the Suez Canal's current changes four times a day, and the tide

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tides create a difference in the height of the water surface ranging from half a meter to two meters, so the

The favorable time for crossing becomes relatively limited in terms of the availability of the right time in terms of the speed of the current and the state of the tide.

current and tidal condition

During the construction of the Bar-Lev Line fortifications, Israeli military engineers came up with

invented a system in which, by igniting liquid napalm, entire sections of the canal could be turned into a

of fire and flame. The idea was to terrorize the Egyptians on the western shore of the canal

Egyptians on the western shore of the canal to stop thinking about crossing the water barrier, which is now

which was expected to be topped by a more difficult and dangerous flame barrier that could lead to them being burned

by its fire . To implement this infernal idea, they built tanks with a capacity of 200 tons of liquid napalm

and connected these tanks with hoses extending from the tanks to the surface of the canal. Since

the density of napalm is less than the density of water, it floats on the surface, and if it is ignited electrically by

by a special device inside the forts along the Bar-Lev line or by dropping a phosphorus bomb

phosphorus bomb, the surface of the water turns into a piece of hell, and as the napalm continues to flow, the water remains

burning. The Southern Command of the Israeli forces was keen to conduct a practical experiment on February 28, 1971

on February 28, 1971, using the equipment installed at the strong point at Deverswar to create a

psychological effect on the Egyptian forces. The experiment, as the Israelis expected, drew the attention of the Egyptian units stationed in front of the strongpoint

the attention of Egyptian units stationed in front of the test site on the western shore of the canal.

The news quickly traveled up the chain of command and reached the General Headquarters in Cairo

Cairo. The General Command was preoccupied with this new and unforeseen issue, which

that threatened the crossing with grave dangers, and began to study the practical means by which it could be circumvented

overcome it.

This was the water barrier that the Egyptian Armed Forces had to break through and overcome

his intractable issues. Major General Gamal Ali, Director of the Corps of Engineers, and his

worked on these issues until, with courage, perseverance and patience, they were able to breach the barrier

For more than five years, Egyptian military engineers to find the right solutions to the difficult crossing issues. And it was said

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By October 6, 1973, all the issues had been resolved and all the difficulties had been overcome.

The most important and complex of these issues were the following:

First: Opening the gaps in the berm:

The engineers had to find a practical way to open the gaps in the berm that stretches along the eastern shore of the canal so that when the crossing begins, bridges and ferryboats can be built and operated bridges and ferry crossings, and so that combat vehicles such as tanks, vehicles, heavy tractors, artillery artillery and missiles would have vertical slopes that they could use to cross the berm. It has been

A part of the Damietta branch near Qanater al-Khairiya has been prepared and equipped to be exactly like the Suez Canal, in terms of specifications and with the same height of the embankment.

in terms of specifications and at the same height as the berm on the eastern bank of the canal. It was carried out

In order to reach the desired solution, various experiments were conducted, and various means and methods were developed

and methods that included : Blasting with explosives, using bulldozers, bombing by aircraft, artillery and rockets, but all these experiments failed to achieve the desired results

desired results. Groups of engineering officers, headed by the director of the corps, were busy

searching for another practical way to solve this intractable issue that was threatening to bring the Suez Canal operation to a standstill

the Suez Canal to a standstill. In June 1971, the Director of the Corps made a new proposal to the command.

to use water dredging with pumps to open gaps in the berm

The idea was simple and straightforward, and some Macri Mashamati engineers had already

had worked on the Aswan High Dam project, where Soviet engineers were able to move a sandy mountain of drilling debris that had a volume of about 5 million cubic meters from

to another place about five kilometers away, saving a lot of effort, money and time.

money and time. But the Soviet pumps were not suitable for use in the theater of operations

in the canal due to their large size, heavy weight, and the impossibility of transporting them to the other shore, so the idea of

to use lightweight, high-powered water pumps to feed the water cannons through the hoses connected to them

a system similar to a fire extinguishing system

The engineers conducted an experiment to test their new method, using using three English sooty water pumps, the experiment was a success. It was clear that

that the greater the water pressure, the greater the loosening of the sand and thus the speed of opening the loophole, and after the mayor of Tamarib, it became clear

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that every cubic meter of water displaces one cubic meter of sand, and that the ideal number of pumps per breach is

five pumps. Accordingly, it was decided in mid-1971 that the of the engineers to open the gaps in the berm would be the dredging method.) It was decided to purchase 300 English-made water pumps, which arrived during 1971. In mid-1972, it was decided to purchase another 150 German-made pumps from the German company Dobitz near Cologne, Germany, as they are more powerful than the English pump. By allocating three English and two German pumps to each breach, it proved 1500 cubic meters of dirt could be displaced in two hours with only 15-10 people between 15-10 people. This was considered a practical and easy solution, and it avoided all the disadvantages of the previous methods. Surprisingly, although dozens of experiments were conducted on the method of opening gaps in the berm by dredging, the Israelis did not realize that the Egyptian that Egyptian engineers had come up with this new method of opening the gaps, and they were completely surprised by it on October 6, 1973. The operating system was to place the pumps in boats with crews of engineers to accompany the infantry boats in the first waves of the assault, and upon arriving on shore, the engineers would prepare simple terraces on which to place the water cannons, and by turning on the pumps, the water rushes in with tremendous force to start making the openings. Accompanying special boats to carry the fuel needed to run the water cannons, and they would stand next to them for quick refueling through special hoses for this purpose.

Kanya: The sabotage of ferries and bridges:

After the June 1967 war, the Corps of Engineers had only a limited number of Soviet-made bridges. Soviet-made bridges, namely the heavy Type 233 bridges (for tanks, artillery tractors and missiles), and light bridges (for crossing light vehicles). These were both types of bridges were old-fashioned bridges that had been used in the Second World War and took at least five hours to install, and the Soviets did not try to supply the Corps of Engineers with modern amphibious bridges with modern amphibious bridges that took no more than an hour and a half to install. And it was not the amount of bridges in the possession of the Corps of Engineers was no more than half the amount needed to cross the forces of the Second and Third Armies. Second and Third Armies. However, its warehouses contained a number of English-made Bailey-type bridges that had been seized from the British base in the Suez Canal after the aggression

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They were designed for use in the rear lines, and it took a long time to install a single bridge. took 24 hours to assemble a single bridge, it was not tactically feasible to tactically impossible to use for crossing the canal. Following studies at the highest level of engineering thought, it was possible to convert the heavy English Bailey bridges into intrusion bridges that took no more than a few hours to install in just a few hours, using only their own hoses and dispensing with the rest of their parts the rest of their parts. In order to be able to use them as bridges, specialized to carry their hoses in the same way that Soviet hoses were loaded. And to complement the shortage in the number of bridges, a number of hoses (according to the Soviet design) were put into operation along with

with some other technical equipment manufactured locally in the factories and workshops of public sector companies under the supervision of the under the supervision of the Corps of Engineers, achieving the required increase in the number of bridges. As a result, the bridges owned by the Corps of Engineers consisted of one-third Soviet-made bridges, one-third English-made bridges English-made, while the other third were purely Egyptian-made.

The bridges were designed to move between the two beaches by being towed by boats. created by assembling a number of barrels. The ferries were intended to be used to transport some tanks and weapons. used to transport some tanks and heavy weapons to the eastern shore of the canal after the opening of the breach. the eastern shore of the canal after the gaps in the berm had been opened and two hours before the operation of the bridges. After the bridges were operational, the ferries were designed to be used as a auxiliary and interchangeable. The bridges consisted of a number of ferries, some of which were depending on the length of the bridge, and in case parts of the bridge were hit by Israeli planes the plan was that if parts of the bridge were hit by Israeli planes, the damaged ferries were immediately replaced by immediately replaced with spare ferries. In preparation for the erection of bridges on the canal, the for the bridges on the west bank of the canal, as well as the houses needed for the use of the ferries along the confrontation from north of Qantara to Suez at equal distances so that the enemy would not be able to identify equal distances so that the enemy could not identify the crossing sectors early and concentrate its efforts on them in such a way as to The sheep's lameness on the journey.

As for the sheep for the first trip from Al-Samaleh to secure the bridgeheads, it was The engineers were able to prepare this huge amount of boats thanks to the fact that half of them were manufactured locally in factories and workshops of public sector companies, and to help pedestrians climb the 108

the berm on the eastern shore of the canal, engineers devised rope ladders, similar to similar to the ladders used in naval units, as their wings are made of rope, but their steps are made of that can be easily folded and carried, and then spread out on the berm, so that an infantryman can climb the berm an infantryman can climb the berm without getting his feet stuck in the dirt, and by placing two ladders next to each other two adjoining ladders, the guns and carts that accompanied the infantry could be towed over the berm without their wheels sinking into the sand. Rope ladders and special slides were manufactured from sheet metal in the Corps of Engineers' workshops. Despite the simplicity of these tasks, they were a great success during the period from the start of the crossing until the bridges and ferries became operational, our forces were able to transport large numbers of light anti-tank weapons, medium machine guns, anti-aircraft machine guns anti-aircraft guns, boxes of ammunition and other weapons and supplies needed for the infantry in the first critical hours of the battle. in the first critical hours of the battle.

Third: Preparations to ignite the canal with napalm:

In June '71, just three months after the Israeli experiment in the to ignite the waters of the canal, Egyptian engineers conducted several experiments to find a a practical way to resist the flames, at the site designated for the experiments in Damietta . The method used to resist the islands of flames in the water was to hit them with palm fronds to divide it into several small islands, and the process was repeated several times until the flames disappeared from the canal. When this method proved unsuccessful, one of the engineers came up with a new suggestion boats approaching the flammable flames with amphibious vehicles, and replacing the palm fronds with palm fronds with chemicals that could extinguish the fire, but this method was not approved by the headquarters General. The solution approved by General Ahmed Ismail, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces The solution approved by General Ahmed Ismail, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, was to seal the hose nozzles pouring the inflammatory liquid into the canal before the start of operations and to hit the napalm tanks behind the Tiran berm with napalm during the incubation period. during the artillery preparation period preceding the attack. was to choose the crossing points so that they were above the current as the napalm burned by the current and rendered ineffective against any forces crossing over the current. And it was The Egyptian field armies spent nearly two years practicing this firing system with precision and regularity.

For this purpose, they sent dozens of reconnaissance patrols to the eastern shore of the canal.

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According to Israeli references and Egyptian intelligence reports, only two only two sets of these installations in the Bar-Lev Line fortifications, one of them in the strong point with the codename Hezayoun in the Fardan area, and the second in the strong point with the codename codenamed Mitsmid L20844 in the Dafraswar area, and the Israelis then stopped from establishing any new installations due to the discovery of the futility of this system and its weak effect in to prevent the Egyptians from crossing the canal due to the speed of the current, which would lead to the fiery parts would not remain in place, as the current would sweep them away, and this led the Israeli leadership to abandon the construction of the rest of the led the Israeli leadership to abandon the construction of the rest of the equipment in the Het Bar-Lev forts.

At twenty-two minutes past two o'clock on October 6, after the artillery had moved its bombardment deep into the enemy's defenses deep into the enemy's defenses, elements of the engineers crossed with the first wave to the eastern shore of the canal to secure the passage of the infantry through the hostile minefields, followed immediately by other elements of the engineers to locate gaps in the berm and prepare piers for ferries and bridges. and bridges. In the second wave, 80 engineering units crossed in their wooden boats loaded with with pumps, hoses, fuel, and all the equipment needed to open gaps in the berm.

As soon as they reached the eastern shore of the canal, the pumps rested on the terraces that had been prepared before. As soon as they arrived on the eastern shore of the canal, the pumps were fed on the previously prepared terraces. the sand, and the first breach was opened in a record time of less than an hour. After that, the gaps along the crossing front. At the same time, huge wagons loaded with bridges and launches rushed from their hiding places on the western shore to the and through the pre-prepared ramps, the vehicles approached Lamia's deck and dropped their cargo Lamia and dropped their loads of barrels and launches into the water, where the bridge units began began their installation. Within two hours of the start of the crossing, the size of the engineer forces that crossed with the infantry crossed with the infantry, working to open gaps in the berm, and installing bridges and ferries over the bridges and ferries over the canal surface exceeded fifteen thousand fighters from various engineering disciplines of various engineering specialties.

The bridges began to be erected in front of the gaps in the berm, and within a period of six to nine hours, all the bridges and ferries of the Second Army, which was commanded by Maj. Gen. Saad Maamoun had been erected according to plan. In the Third Army sector, which was commanded by

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commanded by Major General Abdel Matem Wasel, the process of opening gaps in the berm and constructing bridges were hampered by many factors, especially the hardness of the soil and its calcareous elements, which made the dredging process made the dredging process difficult. These obstacles led to the construction of the Third Army bridges were constructed in about 16 hours, seven hours later than planned, and the the vehicles of the 19th Division on the bridges and ferries of the 7th Division. Finally, the engineers succeeded in constructing ten heavy bridges, ten infantry bridges, a number of structural bridges and 31 ferries that were carried between the western and eastern shores of the canal. Tanks, vehicles and heavy weapons rushed over the bridges and ferries to the eastern shore of the canal. The enemy During these operations, the enemy concentrated its air attacks and artillery fire on the bridges to thwart the Almagour. During the hours of darkness, some enemy tanks managed to reach the Lamia line, and managed to disable two bridges and destroy some other means of crossing, but before morning, the tanks that had made it through the night were destroyed, and engineers repaired the bridges engineers repaired the bridges in record time and under enemy fire.

By 8 a.m. on Sunday, October 7, the various crossings that the to cross the world's most difficult water barrier had been crossed by about 100,000 officers soldiers, 808 tanks and more than 13,000 vehicles of various types within 18 hours a record that no other crossing in the history of mankind has ever achieved.

Most of the bridges were damaged and repaired more than five times, and Brig. Gen. Ahmed Hamdy, deputy director of the Corps of Engineers and commander of one of

the bridges brigades

Brig. Gen. Ahmed Hamdy, deputy director of the Corps of Engineers and commander of one of the bridges brigades, was martyred while he was participating in the repair process of a bridge.

The tunnel that currently connects the two beaches north of Suez is named after him in recognition of his heroism. This was not

The role of engineers was not limited to the construction of ferries and bridges.

in establishing and reinforcing the bridgehead areas on the eastern shore, and contributed to repelling enemy counterattacks by stacking bridges

repelling enemy counterattacks by laying anti-tank mines to block potential approach routes.

Through the massive engineering equipment that crossed to the east bank, the helped the troops that crossed to prepare their positions by digging infantry trenches, tank positions

artillery emplacements and the construction of berms and derricks. The number of mines laid by the

during the October '73 war amounted to more than one million mines of various types.

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Bar-Lev under siege

When General Ariel Sharon took command of the Southern Command in January of '70, he found himself in a

a situation that required him to strengthen and reinforce the front defense line, which became known as the Bar-Lev Line.

even though he had been a staunch opponent of its construction. He was the author of the theory of defense

Movement, which was opposed to the static defense theory of General Chaim Bar-Lev, the Chief of the General Staff.

Chief of the General Staff, on the basis of which the Bar-Lev Line forts were constructed. The weather at the beginning of

at the beginning of '72 was ripe for General Sharon to implement his earlier proposal to reduce the number of

forts. His stubborn opponent, General Bar-Lev, had retired and was succeeded by General

David Eliezer, and the war of attrition had come to a standstill since August 8, 70, following the Rogers Initiative.

Rogers' initiative, and Israeli commanders were under the impression that the Egyptian forces

did not have the military capability to launch a large-scale attack across the difficult water barrier

to reach the Israeli defenses on the eastern shore of the Canal.

was also in line with Israeli public opinion, which was burdened by economic burdens due to the massive expansion of the

economic burdens due to the massive expansion of the Defense Ministry's budget, and for these reasons, General Sharon's proposal to evacuate 14

General Sharon's proposal to evacuate 14 of the Bar-Lev Line forts and the Southern Command was limited to

Only 16 forts remained, selected in vital places that are located on the axes of advancement and important approach routes inside the Sinai.

important approaches inside the Sinai. With this compromise taken by General Sharon to reconcile the

fixed and mobile defense systems, the Bar-Lev line lost its balance, as it became too strong to be a warning device

stronger than a warning device and weaker than a defense line, and this dilution of its mission was the reason for the line's

the line's failure to fulfill its role and its complete inability to repel the overwhelming Egyptian onslaught

on the afternoon of October 6, 1973.

The Bar-Lev line consisted of 16 forts on the eastern shore of the canal, starting from Port Boufouad on the Mediterranean coast in the north to Port Tawfiq on the Gulf of Suez to the south, facing about 160 kilometers, with intervals of 10 to 12 kilometers. The forts, codenamed by the Israelis, were distributed in three sectors as follows:

The northern sector: It consisted of seven forts, four of which were located in the narrow area between the swamps to the east and the Suez Canal. between the marshes in the east and the Suez Canal in the west, from north to south: Orkal Ihaht
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Lahtzanit, Tansahtataha, Dura, Ketuba, and Tanaka, one of which was located on the seashore east of Porfua. on the seashore east of Port Boufouad (Budapest 285 m3NB), while two others were located east of Kantara: Milano 5lnA and Mevrikit freketink.

Middle sector: It included four forts: Hizayon, Purkan, Hizayon, Purkan Matsamid Mat and Lakikan Sahalaa.

Southern sector: It included five forts: Butzer 2eTBot, Litov AAtA Mafziah Mada'ale. Nissan 3580T. and Krai Lada (known as Port Tawfiq tongue).

At twenty-two minutes past two o'clock on October 6, 73, as soon as the Egyptian artillery preparations moved into the depths, the three Israeli tank battalions that were occupying the occupying the second echelon line rushed forward at full speed to occupy the positions assigned to them inside the Bar-Lev Line fortifications to reinforce them and to occupy the assigned positions in the gaps between them. to close the gaps in the first line of defense on the edge of the canal. It was clear from the delayed that the Israeli forces on the canal front, in addition to the strategic surprise was met with a tactical surprise, as it was assumed that after the The Southern Command had known since the morning that a major Egyptian attack would take place along the canal, prompting it to declare which prompted it to declare a short state of readiness among its forces, Plan Shuvach Yonim was supposed to be implemented. The front line infantry of the 1st Corps of the Jerusalem Brigade would occupy the front lines and be reinforced by the tanks of the 2nd Corps. Second Corps tanks, numbering about 100, so that the Egyptian crossing of the Canal would be met with a tremendous amount of fire and the Egyptian forces would suffer heavy losses. Caused The delay in the advance of the Israeli tanks from the time specified in the plan caused a complete change in the course of the of the movement. The Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal with no more than 280 casualties. The Israeli tanks were subjected to a forest of rocket shells and armor-piercing bombs as they advanced from the rear to the front and armor-piercing bombs. The picture in front of the three tank battalions was horrifying. The 3B RPGs that thousands of Egyptian infantrymen who had crossed the thousands of Egyptian infantrymen who had crossed the canal were carrying and aiming with determination at the tank turrets and tanks, which exploded At the same time, the Egyptian tanks on the top of the sand barrier on the and Malotka anti-tank missile units were hunting down Israeli tanks one after another as they approached the shore of the canal. The most severe

shocks were
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was when the Israeli tanks discovered that most of the previously prepared terraces along the line of forts that allowed them to take cover from the lethal fire they were exposed to. had already been occupied by Egyptian commandos, who rained down a barrage of B shells, causing them to scramble in every direction without order to escape this hell.

As a result of the colossal tactical error made by General Junin, the commander of the Southern Command by delaying in instructing the Second Corps tanks to occupy their positions on the line of forts before the start of the crossing thanks to the courage and determination of the Egyptian infantrymen and thunderbolts who stood up to the Israeli tanks. Thanks to the courage and determination of the Egyptian infantrymen and thunderbolts who confronted the Israeli tanks steadily, and due to the accuracy and intensity of the tank and anti-tank missile fire from the the Egyptian forces crushed and destroyed the three Israeli tank battalions. Israeli tanks, with only the 100 Patton and Centurian tanks escaping destruction. only a handful of the 100 Israeli Patton and Centurian tanks survived the destruction and then reached the Bar-Lev line's forts. forts. As the sun set on Saturday, October 6, the Israeli leadership was able to could take advantage of the opportunity of darkness to issue immediate instructions to evacuate these forts, which until then had been up until then had been easy, as the first waves of Malayan infantry, after crossing the crossed the canal through the gaps between the forts and made their way to Damascus to fulfill their immediate mission of establishing to fulfill their immediate task of establishing the bridgehead areas, paying little heed to the the forts it had left behind, as dealing with these forts and attempting to storm them was enough to to disrupt the advance to the rear, thus delaying the construction of the bridgeheads, so it was the duty of the of the next waves of infantry to move after crossing the canal towards these forts to encircle them and lay siege to them in preparation for their conquest. There were in fact no major duties that the personnel of these forts could remain in place to perform after the Egyptian forces succeeded in breaking through the canal and advancing break through the canal and advance inland. The grenadiers provided the necessary cover for their garrisons during the artillery bombardment during the pre-fire period, and performed their duties as observation points for the Israeli artillery and as observation points for the rear commands to inform them of Egyptian troop movements. However, the Israeli leadership missed a valuable opportunity that it could have capitalized on, namely the rapid evacuation of these forts due to arrogance and overconfidence, as none of the senior commanders dared to give the order to evacuate them, as this would mean withdrawal in their eyes. They were confident that the forts would be able to withstand the fighting, as each

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ammunition, food, and water for a week, and none of them thought that the that the Israeli army would be unable to shake the Egyptians and drive them back to the western shore before this week had passed

before that week had passed. In Greater Hezron there were enough doctors and ambulances, so the wounded were evacuated. the wounded evacuated from wounded Israeli tanks near the canal were transported to the outposts on the Bar-Lev line and not to the hospitals in the rear, as was overconfident that the forts were secure and that it would only be a matter of days before the Israeli forces that would drive the Egyptians back to the western shore would rejoin these forts and the situation would return to the way it was before.

In addition to the fatal arrogance that characterized Israeli leaders after their victory in the June 67 war, it turned out that there was no plan in place to evacuate Even the directives prepared by General Mandler, the commander of the Sinai Front at the beginning of the war, specified the function of the forts at the beginning of the war defined the function of the forts with two duties: The first was to act as a barrier to prevent the advance of the and, secondly, to act as a rear force in the rear of the Egyptian forces to disrupt their movement and isolate large sections of them.

However, the events of the fighting proved that the Hassoun could not fulfill either of these duties.

On the contrary, no sooner had the Second and Third Armies established themselves on the eastern shore of the canal

By the time the five infantry divisions that had crossed had established bridgehead areas.

the Bar-Lev Line fortifications had completely lost their defensive value, being surrounded by the Egyptians on all sides and cut off from the rest of the Canal and isolated from the rest of the Israeli forces in the Sinai. Instead of playing the role

assigned to it in the Israeli plan Shuvach Yonim, its main duty was to repel and prevent any Egyptian crossing of the Sobis and Homs Canal.

Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal and preventing any Egyptian forces from advancing deep into the Sinai.

these forces found themselves trapped in a Malasian siege, and the rescue of these forces became a serious issue that worried the Southern Command in Sinai. became a serious issue that worried the Southern Command in Sinai and even the General Staff in Tel Aviv.

How was the myth of the Bar-Lev Line ended?

In the twenty-four hours that followed the Egyptian forces' storming of the Suez Canal

Since 2:00 p.m. on Saturday, October 6, command of the three Israeli sectors on the Suez Canal front were assigned to the commanders of the armored brigades that were in reserve at

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in the fjords areas in the rear, with Colonel Gabi Ramha in command of the northern sector.

Colonel Amnon Mammasa commanded the Central Sector and Colonel Dan Sadd commanded the Southern Sector.

on a temporary basis until the arrival of the commanders of the three reserve divisions. Since each of these three

each of these three brigades had lost the armored battalion it had pushed to occupy the positions of the

while advancing from their positions to join the first line of defense according to the plan

after being bombarded with all kinds of artillery and anti-tank missiles from the eastern and western shores of the Canal.

from the eastern and western shores of the canal, so that only a few tanks were

able to reach the Hakhsoun positions

Each brigade consisted of only two armored battalions with a total of about 70 tanks.

of about 70 tanks.

If the Israeli Southern Command had thought logically and faced the situation the embarrassing situation in front of it with sound tactical behavior without the influence of emotion, it should have concentrated the tanks that were in its possession

Concentrate the tanks in its possession at the time, which numbered about 20,000 tanks

in front of the main crossing points of the Egyptian forces and engage them, with the aim of disrupting and slowing the rate of

the advance of these forces deep into the bridgehead areas until the arrival of the three reserve divisions

The three reserve divisions that were at the time advancing rapidly along several routes from the assembly center in

to the front line. What happened, however, was surprising.

Southern Command, which was headed at the time by two of Israel's most capable commanders

General Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern Command, and General Albert Mandler, commander of the Sinai Front, who

considered one of the most capable experts in tank warfare, used the three armored brigades

in the wrong way and were wiped out. This appears to have been due to two important factors:

First, they were forced to obey the orders issued to them by Chief of the General Staff Gen.

David Eliezer and their inability to disobey them, and the second was due to a humanitarian aspect

which has become a tradition in the IDF since the 1948 war.

1948, which is not to leave the dead and wounded in the enemy's ranks to his mercy, and throughout

Arab-Israeli wars, Israeli forces would launch fierce attacks to rescue a few or to retrieve a few bodies, while costing them a number of dead and wounded far in excess of those

dead and wounded far in excess of those they were attacking to rescue or retrieve

bodies. The commanders of the three brigades were thus ordered to perform two duties that were difficult to

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difficult to reconcile: The first was to ram their tanks into the Bar-Lev forts in their respective sectors

to reinforce them with tanks and evacuate the dead and wounded. The second duty was

The second was to carry out blocking campaigns and prevent the Egyptian forces that had crossed the canal from widening and deepening

bridgeheads. Throughout the nights of October 6 and 7, the armored groups brought out by the

brigade commanders were engaged in counterattacks against the Egyptian bridgeheads, as well as in

bitterly fierce operations to reach some of the Bar-Lev line's forts. They succeeded

some of these groups succeeded in rescue operations, but only after suffering heavy losses, and the garrisons of some of the forts

the garrisons of some of the forts managed to survive by their own efforts and reach Israeli positions.

Israeli positions, but some of the forts, under heavy Egyptian attacks, had no choice but to surrender

to surrender and fall into the hands of Egyptian forces. As a result of assigning

armored brigades to these two conflicting duties, each lost about two-thirds of

its tanks during the battles.

On the morning of Sunday, October 7, each brigade had no more than 30 tanks out of the 100 tanks with which the fighting had begun at 2 p.m. on October 6.

At noon on Sunday, October 7, there was a major change in the situation.

reserves arrived on the battlefield and the responsibility for defending the sectors fell to the armored divisions instead of the brigades.

In the northern sector, General Abraham Adan (Bern) assumed command

In the Central Sector, General Ariel Sharon took command, while General Albert Mandler, who had commanded the Sinai front before and during the first day of the war, moved from his headquarters

to assume command of the Southern Sector. As a result of the Egyptian teams' success in deepening the

bridges up to eight kilometers to the east, while with the help of the air force crushed the tactical counterattacks of the three armored brigades, as mentioned earlier

The situation of those trapped inside the forts became so dire that Moshe Dayan was forced to

When he arrived at the forward command post and learned the true picture of the situation, he had to

decided that the soldiers in the fortifications had to be abandoned, and that all those who were able to escape should do so.

and the rest, including the wounded, should remain in place inside the fortifications

until they were captured.

But General Sharon was completely preoccupied with rescuing the people trapped in the positions.

moral obligation, so he soon met with General David Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, at

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Sinai Forward Command headquarters, he presented him with his proposed plan to rescue the personnel in the bunkers. The Chief of Staff rejected

The Chief of Staff rejected his proposal, telling him that his proposed rescue plan would cost the IDF

fifty tanks. The Chief of Staff was in effect adopting the view of Gethral Gonen, the commander of the Southern Command, who had decided to abandon the rescue of the

Southern Command, who decided to abandon the rescue of the garrisons after the three armored brigades suffered

armored brigades had suffered heavy losses the night before, so that efforts could be concentrated in preparation for future

and at the same time prepare for the major counterattack scheduled to be carried out by General Abraham Adan's division

General Abraham Adan on the morning of October 8 in the north, facing the Second Army.

with the aim of destroying the Egyptian forces that had crossed over and capturing three major Egyptian

Fardan for Israhelli tanks to cross over to the western shore of the Canal.

General Sharon would then launch a counterattack in the south at Suez as soon as General Adan had succeeded in his mission.

General Adan succeeds in his mission.

Members of the Budapest Fortress, located on the Mediterranean coast southeast of Port Boufouad, recorded a rare story of heroism

This fort was built with great effort due to the difficulty of construction in this area between the Mediterranean Sea and Suez.

in this confined area between the sea and the marshes.

After eight days of bloody battles, Egyptian forces lifted the siege of the fort Budapest and became the only fortress that did not fall from the Bar-Lev line throughout the war.

The war .

The end of the Bar-Lev story came just a week after the fighting began.

It was the southernmost fortress on the Port Tawfiq tongue at the southern entrance to the canal

Canal. It was an impregnable fortress surrounded by water on three sides, with only a narrow road leading to it

leading to it. When the artillery bombardment ended on October 6, four Israeli tanks

four Israeli tanks managed to reach the fort's yard, but three of them were wounded and most of the wounded were

The wounded were mainly men from these tanks, and gradually they were added to the wounded among the soldiers of the fort.

The fortress was subjected to thousands of shells and rockets that landed on top of it, and Egyptian soldiers reached its walls.

Egyptian soldiers reached its walls and threw dozens of grenades into its vaults.

Captain Shlomo Ardienst realized from the first night that the fortress was surrounded and isolated from all sides

But he had no doubt that IDF troops would quickly come to his aid and lift the

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the Egyptian siege. After a few days, however, the situation inside the fort became critical.

ammunition was running low, morphine, serums and bandages were running out, and the wounded were writhing in pain

the wounded began to writhe in pain. Dr. Nahum Verbin, the fort's doctor, began treating the wounded and performing operations without anesthesia.

On the fifth day, the fort received a radio message from the command that if within 24 hours we cannot send you reinforcements, you can surrender.

There were 42 soldiers inside the fort, including 5 dead and 02 wounded, one of whom was seriously wounded seriously wounded.

On the morning of Saturday, October 13, Red Cross representatives appeared on the Egyptian side of the canal

On the morning of Saturday, October 13, Red Cross representatives appeared on the Egyptian side of the canal.

The following conversation took place:

Command: Can you hold out?

Fortress Commander : I'm afraid I can't, our situation is very difficult. I want to surrender.

Command : If you decide to hold out, we will help you as much as we can.

Horse Commander : This is not enough.

Here are the conditions we have presented to the Red Cross. Al-Amriod

Here they are.

Fortress Commander: I'm afraid I can't hold out. I will surrender on the terms you

you set. We will have to part ways. I hope to see you soon.
To the house.

Driving : Do you want something?
Horseshoe Commander : Go home.
Is our situation known to you?
Fortress Commander : Never.

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Command : We're in good shape. You've done it because until we can get to you. it will be too late.

Fortress Commander : We accepted everything in good spirit, otherwise there would have been a second Masada here (Masada is a famous Jewish fortress a famous Jewish fortress in ancient Jewish history in which all the warriors committed suicide The siege resulted in the Masada complex in the Jewish character)

Leadership : We will see you on the screen with your heads held high. Give instructions to be. heads up and smile. Do you have anything to add?

Commander of the fortress : Inform the families and console the parents. They are transporting the wounded and the dead, and they have promised to act in accordance with the Geneva Convention. With the surrender of San Portoviq, the legend of the of the Bar-Lev line for good.

What Israel delayed in launching its main counterattack

By 8 a.m. on Sunday, October 7, Egyptian forces had achieved a decisive victory in the Battle of the Canal, having conquered the world's most difficult water barrier. The myth of the Bar-Lev Line had been shattered as most of its fortifications and strong points fell into their hands. This was accomplished in less than 18 hours from the start of the (Hour X) and with losses that the most optimistic planners could not have imagined, as they amounted to 280 martyrs, e Airplanes and 02 tanks, and it was estimated that the crossing operation would cost our forces 30,000 officers and soldiers Ten thousand of them were killed. On the other hand, the enemy lost 30 planes in the battles of October 6 and 7 about 200 tanks and several hundred dead and wounded.

On the morning of October 7, it became clear that the Egyptian forces had carried out Plan Badr to perfection The five infantry divisions succeeded in crossing to the eastern shore with all their heavy weapons The five infantry divisions successfully crossed to the eastern shore with all their heavy weapons and about 800 tanks, while the Israeli forces The Israeli forces prepared to repel the Egyptian attack, namely the 116th Infantry Brigade â€œJerusalemâ€ and three armored brigades and three armored brigades were almost completely destroyed.

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The enemy's inability to carry out its granular counterattacks throughout October 6 and 7 against Melesian forces that had established five bridgeheads on the eastern shore of the canal was a clear indication of the extent of the strategic surprise the extent of the enemy's strategic surprise that delayed the arrival of its reserve forces on the battlefield. its reserves to the battlefield for so long. The branches of the Egyptian General Command had differed in their estimates prior to the battle as to when the main Israeli forces, which were the

represented by the reserves, would launch their main counterattack on the Egyptian bridgeheads. While the War Operations Authority estimated that this date would be no later than 24 hours after the start of the battle, on the basis that the enemy, despite all the deceptive measures that had been taken, would undoubtedly discover the final Egyptian preparations at least three days before the start of the battle, an overly cautious Military Intelligence Department estimated that the enemy would inevitably discover Egypt's offensive intentions as soon as the countdown phase began, 15 days before the hour of attack. This would give him the opportunity to call up his reserve forces and complete their mobilization on the battlefield without any interference or pressure. According to this estimate, it was expected that the enemy would be able to carry out its main counterattack within 8 hours at the latest from the start of the Malayan offensive. 0

However, the reality proved to be contrary to all Egyptian estimates, despite the fact that Israeli outposts monitored and recorded the arrival of heavy crossing equipment the arrival of Egyptian heavy and light crossing equipment and boats to the vicinity of the water line and immediately reported this to its headquarters preparations, which, along with other galactic preparations on the Sinai and Golan fronts, were incontrovertible and Golan fronts were a clear indication that Egypt and Syria would launch a joint attack that Egypt and Syria would launch a joint attack on Israel in the near future. underestimated the extent of the muskrat's resourcefulness and failed to properly assess the evidence of reconnaissance of the reconnaissance and information reports it received, and contributed to misleading officials in the two political leaderships and misleading officials in the political and military leadership, which caused Israel to be surprised by the war and almost and almost exposed it to an imminent disaster. Had it not been for that subtle rooting, Israeli intelligence would have been informed at 4:00 a.m. on October 6, which was relayed to the political and military leaderships in Israel before the outbreak of the war ten hours before the outbreak of the war, the Arab strike on the Sinai and Golan fronts would have been The Arab strike on the Sinai and Golan fronts would have been overwhelming and the surprise would have been stunning.

As a result of the Hadar's inability to carry out its main counterattack, it waited all day on October 6 and 7.

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October and limited its attacks against the bridgeheads to tactical counterattacks during the nights of October 7 and 8 and October 8, involving the three armored brigades under the command of General Albert Mandler. during which most of their tanks were crushed, the Egyptian forces that crossed the bridgehead took advantage of this situation to accomplish a number of important actions the situation to accomplish a number of important tasks. After the tanks, heavy weapons and tracked vehicles completed their crossing, the five infantry divisions widened the bridgeheads and closing gaps between themselves and neighboring divisions within each army, and by the morning of Monday, October 8 October 8, the bridgeheads of the five divisions had merged into the bridgeheads of two armies. The The Second Army's bridgehead stretched from Kantara in the north to Deverswar in

the south, and Deverswar was within the Second Army's area of responsibility. The Third Army's bridgehead stretched from Bitter Lakes in the north to Port Tawfiq in the south. Each army's bridgehead was 8 to 10 kilometers deep. As a result of this situation, there was a gap between the between the Second Army's bridgehead and the Third Army's bridgehead was about 35 kilometers long and encompassed most of the water body of the Bitter Lakes, and the responsibility for its protection was divided between the Second and Third Armies and the Third Army without clearly defining the extent of this responsibility. The Third Army, with the forces under its command to extend the boundaries of its responsibility to cover such a vast area of the lake's surface As he is responsible, according to tactical principles, for protecting his contact points with his left neighbor (the Second Army) Second Army). This situation may have arisen from the fact that the Bitter Lakes are a natural obstacle for the enemy to cross There is no need to allocate specific forces to protect it, but natural obstacles According to sound tactical principles, natural obstacles are worthless if no specific forces are allocated to protect them and cover them with a network to protect them, cover them with a network of oxen, and reinforce their defense with artificial obstacles such as minefields and barbed wire.

and barbed wire.

The Egyptian forces later paid a heavy price for having this gap between the heads of the second and third bridges between the bridgeheads of the Second and Third Armies without adequate security. An Israeli reconnaissance company from General Sharon's Central Sector Force on the afternoon of October 9 discovered that the of Egyptian troops in the Great Bitter Lake area, and was able to reach the water line and spend overnight on the shore of the lake. According to the account of Yitzhak Agam, a platoon commander of this company, which was commanded by Rafi Bar-Lev, according to the Israhellian references That night, the company was able to discover the boundaries of the Southern Second Army's control. and that it advanced on the sand until it reached the Great Bitter Lake. In his account after

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It was this reconnaissance company that, just one week later, led the Israeli forces that crossed at Deverswar and established Ras Kobri west of the Suez Canal.

What happened on October 6 on the Israeli front?

When war broke out on October 6, 1973, Gen. commanded the Southern District at its headquarters in the city of Bithor al-Sai'a, and the Southern District included The southern sector of Israthil, the Negev Desert and the Sinai Peninsula. The Negev is essentially a desolate sandy desert with some settlements, especially around Beersheba and at the port of Eilat on the Red Sea. on the Red Sea. General Gonen took charge of the Southern Command on July 15, 1973 on July 15, 1973, about three months before the start of the war, succeeding General Ariel Sharon, who had He had spent more than three and a half years as commander of this command, then

retired from military service to work as a farmer.
to work as a farmer, and became involved in politics after joining the Likud party.

General Gonen, known for his toughness and violence, was a Jerusalem-born member of the Sabra generation (the generation born in Israel). He spent his early years in a yeshiva. He spent his early years in a religious institute. In the June 1967 war, he commanded the 7th Armored Brigade Armored Brigade, and participated in a series of operations across the Sinai that made him one of the leading commanders in the Israeli forces. He was known for his strict discipline, to the extent that he at times, but the confidence he instilled in his officers led them to of his imposters caused them to follow him into battle. The soldiers knew him by his original name and treated him with a mixture of hatred and respect.

During the confrontation on the Suez Canal, General Abraham Mandler, known as â€œAlbertâ€ was in command. He was a charismatic and likeable figure, and was known as one of the most disciplined and balanced commanders in the army. most disciplined and balanced commander in the IDF. He was a tall, red-faced man with with piercing blue eyes, about forty-five years old, had previously commanded the of the 1st Armored Brigade that broke through the Syrian defenses of the Jahalan Heights in the 1967 war. Since he had been ordered to be appointed commander-in-chief of the armored corps, it was He was to be replaced in his Sinai command by General Kalman Magen on Sunday, October 7. General Magen had recently arrived in Israel after a study tour in Britain.

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The Israeli front on the Suez Canal, which stretched over a front of about 160 kilometers was divided into three sectors, representing the main axes of advance, and its strength consisted of the Operations (Ogda) under the command of General Albert Mandler with an infantry brigade and three armored brigades under his command. The Israeli plan, Shuvach Yonim (Pigeon Tower), was based on the armored brigades taking over. The armored brigades are responsible for temporarily defending the three main axes in Sinai until the arrival of the reserve divisions in the following manner:
Colonel Gabi's brigade is responsible for the defense of the Qantara-Al-Arish axis.
Colonel Amnon's brigade is responsible for the defense of the Ismailia-Abu Ajila axis.
Colonel Dan's brigade is responsible for the defense of the Suez axis - the two mountain passes Metla and El Gedi .
The defense was carried out in two coordinates in front and a reserve in the rear, as follows:
First echelon: Bar-Lev Line, occupied by the 116th Jerusalem Brigade. It is a reserve brigade. It was poorly trained and most of its members were citizens of the city of Jerusalem and numbered about 500 fighters.
Second echelon: At a distance of 5-33 kilometers from the first echelon, it is positioned on important approach roads and the main axes leading to the rear and the main axes leading to the rear, occupied by three battalions inserted forward from the three armored brigades.

of the three armored brigades in reserve. When the resupply is raised to receive the tanks, totaling about 100 tanks, rush forward to occupy the positions previously prepared in the second line of the first echelon (approximately 500300 meters behind the Bar-Lev) to close the gaps between the forts, and to reinforce the forts themselves with some tanks into them in previously prepared positions.

Reserve: West of the mountain passes area, about 30-52 kilometers east of the canal

It consists of 3 armored brigades (excluding 3 armored battalions pushed forward in the second line).

The total number of tanks is about 200 tanks, and when the readiness is raised, the

1 The three armored brigades in reserve rush forward to occupy the positions of the second echelon in preparation for tactical counterattacks on Egyptian forces that succeed in crossing the crossing the canal 0

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On the morning of October 6, following a series of meetings held by General David Alpazar, Chief of Staff, with the political leadership and the General Staff in Tel Aviv, arrived in Tel Aviv.

General Gonen, summoned from his headquarters in the south, attended a meeting at the General Staff headquarters in which he received General Eliezer's instructions, which were to prepare Israeli forces in the Sinai

1 Israeli forces in the Sinai in preparation for the expected Egyptian attack at 6:00 p.m.

The troops were to be prepared to absorb the bombardment and carry out a repulsion operation. After the counterattack and the Egyptian attack was broken, the Israeli forces would cross the Suez Canal to the west and establish Ras Kobri in accordance with the plans.

From the General Staff headquarters in Tel Aviv, General Gonen telephoned Gen. Albert Mandler at his headquarters in Sinai, informing him that orders had been given to mobilize the reserves, and that an Arab attack on the Canal and Golan fronts would begin at 6:00 p.m. Junin's instructions to Mandler were

Junin's instructions to Mandler were to quickly inform all units and positions to prepare to absorb the strike to absorb the blow, and that the tanks would not move to their outposts until 5:00 p.m.

so that the Egyptians behind their cover would not see the movement of the tanks, giving them an opportunity to reposition their artillery to change the positions of their artillery fire, so that they do not have a warning that the Israeli forces have while being careful not to escalate the situation, as the Egyptians may not intend to fight

Egyptians do not intend to fight. Mandler objected to delaying the movement of the tanks until 5 p.m.

The defense plan called for at least two hours.

Gonen was persuaded, and agreed that the tanks would move forward at 4:00 p.m. to occupy the positions designated according to the plan to occupy the designated positions according to the plan.

In accordance with the orders issued by General Mandler at 1 p.m. to his troops in the Sinai

Sinai, the forces inside the Bar-Lev fortifications prepared to absorb the blow. This meant sending non-combat personnel to the rear and having them put on

and hard helmets, evacuating excess gear from open ground, and preparing to take the bombs inside shelters, as had been the case during the war of attrition.

At the same time, armored forces in the second echelon and in reserve prepared to move at 4:00 p.m. to occupy their forward positions to participate in repelling the expected Egyptian attack of the expected Egyptian attack and to carry out local counterattacks. But the movement of tanks forward did not take place

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executed at the scheduled time. At 2 p.m., General Mandler and the officers of his suddenly heard the roar of airplanes, and when they looked up, they saw Egyptian MiBs and Sukhois Egyptian fighter jets attacking Melliz airfield, and realized that the war had begun four hours earlier than they had been notified they had been notified.

By the time General Mandler entered the bunker at his headquarters in the Bir Jafjava area

General Gonen had arrived at his office at his headquarters in Beersheba, and had not yet realized

that war had broken out, but out of an abundance of caution he telephoned General Mandler to modify his

his previous order. "Albert . . . The tanks should be moved forward now and not wait until four o'clock in the evening. Mandler replied sarcastically: "Yes.

They should be bombing the Melliz airfield now. Mandler immediately radioed the commanders of the three

of the three tank brigades to hurry up and move their tanks forward to face the Egyptian crossing of the canal.

Post-war investigations to determine responsibility for the shortcomings on the Sinai front found that

that the orders issued to the fortifications of the Bar-Lev line to warn of the attack and absorb the blow did not reach everyone

and absorb the blow did not reach everyone. Members of some forts confirmed that they did not receive these orders

They continued their normal daily behavior and were completely surprised by the Malasian attack.

so much so that an Israeli engineer, Eshimon Tal², who was sent to repair the was surprised by artillery shelling and then by Egyptian commandos standing over his head, where he was captured

over his head, where he was captured, and the soldiers of some of the bunkers were outside wearing

in swimsuits when the Egyptian artillery bombardment began.

The biggest mistake on the Israeli side on October 6 was this

General Gonen's order to General Mandler not to move the tanks until two hours before the expected attack

This order was based on the assumption that there was no possibility of any doubt that the attack would begin

of doubt that the attack would begin at the exact hour according to the information received from Israeli intelligence.

from Israeli intelligence, and hence all preparatory measures were linked to 6:00 p.m.

in the evening, and none of Israel's leaders at any level attempted to suggest that this time

might be incorrect or intended to mislead and deceive. This was done by Gonen despite the fact that the Israeli army had already conducted a maneuver in 1969 at the level of the Chief of Staff

in which it was estimated that the best date for the Egyptians to begin the crossing was

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between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m., as this is the most favorable time for this

operation

because it leaves the Egyptians several hours before sunset, and at the same time does not expose them for a long time to Israeli air raids.

As a result of this fatal tactical mistake, about 100 tanks, each armed with a 105 mm cannon and two heavy machine guns, which were occupying the second line, did not join the strength of the 116th Brigade

The under-strength and under-equipped reserve brigade, which occupied the Bar-Lev line's forts and faced

In the final critical hour of the crossing phase, the brigade was subjected to the most intense preliminary fire that lasted 15 minutes.

that lasted for 15 minutes, while simultaneously receiving the heaviest artillery fire

The artillery had no sooner transferred its shelling to the western shore of the canal, and no sooner had the artillery

no sooner had the artillery moved its shelling deep into the canal than the fortresses were surprised by a series of assault boats transporting Egyptian infantry across the canal to its eastern shore.

Egyptian infantry across the canal to the eastern shore of the canal, and the Israeli fortresses found themselves

in the midst of a flood of Egyptian crossing waves, and the lack of movement of Israeli tanks

to their forward positions in the first and second echelons according to the plan was an important factor

in the brilliant and rapid success of the crossing on October 6, and in minimizing

Malassian losses to an extent that no one could have imagined, and the failure to move the tanks

was directly due to the strict orders issued by General Junin, the commander of the Southern Command, from his command center in Beirut.

Southern Command from his command center in Beersheba to General Albert Mandler in Sinai that the tanks were not to move before 4:00 p.m. on October 6.

tanks before 4 p.m. on October 6.

The fact-finding commission set up by the Israeli government after the cessation of hostilities

headed by Justice Shimon Egranat, President of the Supreme Court, held General Gonen responsible for the dereliction of duty

and recommended that he be relieved of his post and not be given any command position in the IDF.

The committee's report stated that during the war and in the days leading up to it

in the days leading up to the war, he did not fulfill his job properly and bears a great deal of responsibility for the

for the serious trauma that Israeli forces faced in the war on Yom Kippur when the Egyptian enemy attacked

the Egyptian enemy attacked Israel's positions.

When General Bani Peled, commander of the Israeli Air Force, at 2:30 p.m.

ordered his planes to try to prevent the Egyptians from crossing the Suez Canal at all costs.

Kesher's planes, which were loaded with missiles in preparation for a strike, were forced to

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to abort the Egyptian and Syrian offensive preparations as soon as the orders were given, had to

had to dump their ammunition into the sea in order to be able to carry out the new interceptor mission that had been assigned to them

on its shoulders. The task was a difficult one, as Egyptian soldiers were interspersed among the Israeli positions and it became

difficult to distinguish between the two teams. In just two hours, some 200 sorties were flown

to the Miswis Canal and to Adabiya and Zafarana on the Gulf of Suez. Since the attention of the was focused on disrupting the crossing, the planes did not attempt to deal with the SAM 2 and SAM 3 missile batteries deployed on the western side of the canal, and their raids were limited to the five Egyptian infantry divisions on the five Egyptian infantry divisions whose formations and units were continuing to cross the canal . In a persistent and non-stop attack, the Israeli air force lost five Skyhawks and one Phantom.
Hawk and one Phantom.

Despite its successive attacks, its planes were unable to destroy any of the crossings, which Egyptian engineers Egyptian engineers have been busy constructing them with rare courage.

The role of air defense in the storming of the canal
The air defense forces played a key role in preventing Israeli aircraft from detecting the massive Egyptian offensive preparations on the western side of the canal before the start of the offensive on October 6 October 733, and the shooting down on September 17, 71, of the most expensive surface-to-air missile (SAM) Strato-Crusoe electronic reconnaissance aircraft in Sinai and the death of all its passengers, a group of elite scientists. of its passengers, an elite group of scientists and electronic warfare specialists, were killed. In addition, ambushes by missile batteries during the hours of darkness on the western shore of the Canal ambushes during the hours of darkness on the western shore of the canal, which succeeded in shooting down a large number of Israeli jets, the air defense forces were able to extend their control of the airspace to the east of the canal east of the canal, depriving Israel of aerial reconnaissance operations, which is the best source of information and helped deter Israel from considering an abortive strike against the Egyptian preparations for the attack. Egyptian preparations for the attack. However, the biggest challenge faced by the Egyptian air defense at the start of the crossing on October 6 was to prevent Israeli aircraft from destroying the bridges bridges and crossings that military engineer units had been constructing across the canal in the sectors for the five infantry divisions with their tanks, vehicles and heavy weapons to cross from the west to the east.
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east. Destroying them would have meant the failure of the entire operation. It was certain that the enemy would to concentrate most of its air effort in the first hours of the battle to prevent the construction of these bridges and destroying them. In addition to the integrated air defense system that the Air Defense Command Air Defense Command had set up to provide the necessary air defense for vital targets throughout Egypt. which included the construction of the famous missile network on the Suez Canal front. Major General Mohamed Ali Fahmy, commander of the Air Defense Forces, developed a separate special plan to protect the crossing and to cover the construction of bridges and crossings along the Suez Canal. And when General Bani Peled, commander of the Israeli Air Force, at 2:30 p.m. on October 6 ordered his planes to try to prevent the Egyptians from crossing the Suez Canal

at all costs.

Israeli planes came in at the timing expected by the TAMA Air Defense Command. Banished

At 2:40 p.m., enemy Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft were taken prisoner in successive regiments began to launch attacks at medium and low altitudes against the units of engineers constructing crossings along the canal and against Egyptian forces that had crossed to or were on their way to the or on their way to the eastern shore, and the air defense forces immediately intercepted

with surface-to-air missiles SAM 2, SAM 3 (self-propelled), SAM 6 (self-propelled) and SAM 6 (self-propelled).

SAM 6 (self-propelled) and SAM 7 (Strela) shoulder-fired missiles as well as anti-aircraft artillery fire

(Shilka), which forced the Israeli planes to withdraw to the east.

Israeli planes were forced to retreat to the east after suffering losses without being able to

to achieve its objective, which was to prevent or hinder the crossing of the Suez Canal by Egyptian forces. At about

5 p.m., Egyptian listening devices picked up an open radio signal in which carried orders from General Peled, the commander of the Israeli forces, to his pilots to avoid approaching the canal approaching the canal less than 15 kilometers to the east.

The influx of reserves into Sitaa

At around 2:30 p.m. on October 6, sirens sounded in Tel Aviv and the Israeli people knew for sure that war had broken out. At around 3 p.m.

3 p.m., an Israeli military spokesman broadcast the following statement to the public: Starting at

1400 hours, Egyptian and Syrian forces are attacking Sinai and the Golan Heights on land and air, and after

After a series of air raids on our positions and camps, the dismounted forces began at

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ground attack, Egyptian troops have crossed the Suez Canal in several places, and Syrian troops have begun

armored and infantry assaults along the line in the Golan Heights. The Israel Defense Forces

are working against the attackers, and air and ground battles are taking place in both areas. 4. Israeli citizens were not dismayed by the news of the war

Israeli citizens were not alarmed by the news of the war, as everyone was expecting an easy military victory over the Arabs within a few days against the Arabs within a few days, as had been the case in all their previous wars. And at

At 4 p.m., Defense Minister Moshe Dayan met with journalists and told them: "Tomorrow evening .

The reserves will reach the line. The real war will begin, and we will turn the area into a great graveyard

for them. From the Sokolov House auditorium, where the news of Israel's of Israel's brilliant victories in the June '67 war, Dayan announced on the evening of October 6, '73 in a press conference

press conference: The Israel Defense Forces will defeat the Egyptians in Sinai with a heavy blow.

The fighting will end with our victory in the coming days. From the moment Egyptian forces began crossing the

it became clear that the IDF was severely deficient in artillery

More than half of the artillery batteries were located east of the straits line deep in the Sinai.

the forward batteries were unable to cover the many targets they faced. The shortage of

of artillery and mortars increased the burden on Israeli forces

the task of repelling this massive flood of Egyptian infantry, which was
A few of them focused on attacking the forts and laying siege to them.
while the rest rushed through the gaps between them into the Sinai to fulfill
their immediate task of establishing
the immediate task of establishing bridgehead areas.

The shortage of artillery that cost the Israeli forces dearly, especially in the
early stages of the fighting
in the early stages of the fighting was due to the wrong policy adopted by
Israel after its easy victories in the 56 and 67 wars
in the '56 and '67 wars thanks to its air force and armored forces. Attention
was focused on these two weapons
to the point of neglecting other weapons. Since the end of the June '67 war,
Israel's
Israel's insistence on the United States to acquire the latest and fastest types
of airplanes and tanks
aircraft and tanks, and a large part of local production has been devoted to
improving the armored units
and airplanes, while the Israelis have shown little interest in
in artillery and almost completely neglected the role of infantry.

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No sooner had the Egyptian forces crossed the canal and the Israeli tanks
received General Mandler's order
to move forward, the tanks rushed across the canal at a confident speed, their
crews
crews were confident, based on their experiences in previous wars, that their
tanks would sweep the Egyptian infantry
the Egyptian infantry with ease, scattering them and forcing them to flee, and
that they would harvest them
with their machine guns. To their surprise, the Egyptian infantry held their
positions without being terrorized by the tanks
terrorized by tanks as in the past, and on the contrary, they started firing at
short distances at Israeli tanks
Israeli tanks with RPG-7 bazooka shells at short distances and at longer
distances with
Sajer (Malotka) rockets, whose unit consists of two soldiers, one of whom
stabilizes the rockets
wires and connects the ugsaP fuses, and the second, who is a short distance
away, directs the missile to its target with the help of a guidance device.
These missiles have inflicted heavy losses on Israeli tanks.
Israeli tanks with heavy losses. Israeli tanks faced many difficulties in
fighting Egyptian infantry
Egyptian infantry due to a serious shortage of cannons and mortars. Moreover,
the
tanks' machine guns were ineffective when engaging Egyptian infantrymen who were
firing
Malotka rockets at the tanks from long distances. Israeli tanks were not
equipped with
high-explosive propellants that could be fired against Egyptian infantry,
especially against
tank-hunting groups in order to silence them. Their ammunition was limited to
armor-piercing rounds
Fiercing ammunition intended for armored combat, and it was, of course,
extremely wasteful
to use them against infantrymen, and their effect on them was not feasible from
a practical point of view
in practice. In response to the massive losses of Israeli tanks, General Gonen
issued orders before sunset on October 6
sundown on October 6 to the commanders of the tank units to avoid approaching
the Egyptian infantry, and that
to fire their machine guns at them from long distances. The delay in advancing

tanks from their positions in the rear to Al-Asam due to General Junin's orders, as we have already
Instead of entering as a concentrated force and as a fist, which is the correct way to use the tanks
hand, which is the correct way to use tanks, the force was spread out, used in small groups and entered the battle in company formations, which helped them to be quickly destroyed
and crushed, primarily by the tank-hunting groups that crossed to the eastern shore as soon as the
artillery fire, and occupied some of the terraces originally intended for the Israeli tanks.
and rained rockets on them to prevent them from interfering with the Egyptian crossing, or by the
from Egyptian tanks, artillery, and anti-tank missiles.
Egyptian tanks on top of the berm on the west bank of the canal.

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After confirming that the communications network between his forward and main commands
was functioning efficiently, he moved from his main command center in Bithr al-Saba to his advanced command center in the
Umm Marjam area near Melliz Airport at midnight on October 7/6. As soon as the five infantry divisions that had crossed had established bridgehead areas, the fortifications of the
Bar-Lev had completely lost their defensive value.

Throughout the night of 6/7 October, the armored groups evacuated by the brigade commanders were busy
local counterattacks against the Egyptian bridgeheads, as well as in
to reach some of the Bar-Lev Line's fortresses. Some of these
rescue operations, but only after suffering heavy losses, and the garrisons of some of the forts
the garrisons of some of the forts survived by their own efforts and reached the Israeli positions
Israelis. However, some of the forts, under heavy Egyptian attacks, found it impossible to surrender
to surrender and their personnel fell into the hands of the Egyptian forces. In the southern sector, Col.
Dan, commander of the armored brigade, organized a joint evacuation of the Litov fortress on the southern end of the Little Bitter Lake.
tanks and artillery, and the men of the post were supposed to break through the siege under this cover.
were supposed to break through the siege under this cover, but the men of the fort got lost, and instead of heading to the place where the
where the Israeli armored rescue unit was waiting for them, they went in the opposite direction

They ran into an Egyptian armored unit and were all captured.
The commanders of the armored brigades were very unhappy about being assigned to two conflicting duties
They repeatedly contacted their commander, General Albert Mandler
"Either we defend the forts or we repel the Egyptian attack.
We can't do both. Albert replied that there was no way to do both
and that it was not in his power to order the evacuation of the forts. None of the
senior Israeli commanders dared to order the evacuation of the forts, as this would have meant
retreating and leaving the dead and wounded in the enemy's ranks and at their mercy, which contradicts the customs and traditions of the Israeli army
the customs and traditions of the Israeli army that have been practiced since the 1948 war.
each of the three armored brigades lost about two-thirds of their tanks during

the battles. On the morning of
On the morning of Sunday, October 7, each brigade had no more than 30 tanks out of a total of
100 tanks with which the fighting began at 2 p.m. on October 6. Moreover, the
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Egyptian forces crushed the 5Jerusalem 116th Brigade, which was defending the Bar-Lev Line
completely crushed.

Before noon on Sunday, October 7, the commanders of the reserve armored divisions arrived from Israel
arrived at the Southern Front headquarters in Sinai. On the instructions of General Shmuel Gonen
the three sectors on the front line were transformed from brigade to divisional sectors, with
General Abraham Adan commanded the Northern Sector and General R. Yael Sharon commanded the Central Sector
General Albert Mandler, who had been in overall command of the Sinai forces prior to the sabotage and on
commanded the southern sector. General Mandler had been ordered just before the war
just before the war, he had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armored Corps. General Kalman Magen came to Sinai
to take over from him on October 7, as if Mandler was predicting his own fate when he expressed his pessimism
âThis is a farewell party, but I know I'm not going to be able to do it again,â he told the officers of his armored division at a ceremony honoring him on October 4.
This is a farewell party, but I know I'm not leaving Sinai. There will be a war."4
The war broke out just one day before he handed over his command to General Magen.
He did not leave Sinai except as a corpse, as he was struck by an Egyptian shell on the morning of October 13
He was hit by an Egyptian shell on the morning of October 13 while riding in his armored command vehicle and conducting reconnaissance near an observation post in
. front line of his sector. Surprisingly, General Magen, who had come before the war to replace him
to replace him in command of the Sinai forces and was ordered to join the command of the Northern Sector as soon as the war broke out.
was the one who succeeded Mandler after his death as commander of the southern sector.

Although the reserve division commanders had arrived at the front, the reserve divisions themselves
were still advancing on all major roads toward the Sinai front, and their arrival took a few days
Their arrival took a few days due to the long distance between the assembly centers of the reserve units in the Negev
Negev and the Suez Canal, which was about 250 kilometers. Given the seriousness of the
Murtagh on the Canal front in relation to the overwhelming success of the Egyptian success in storming the Canal and overrunning the
Bar-Lev line, General Gonen was forced to work to speed up the arrival of the reserve forces to the front
the front. When he learned that some reserve armored units had been held up in Beersheba for lack of
he ordered them to be moved to the front on the tracks of tanks, wasting hours wasting hours on their engines, consuming their tanks and needing large amounts of
fuel. Naturally, there were some breakdowns along the way, and some tanks came

to a halt

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and other tanks' tracks fell off, blocking advancement axes and delaying the arrival of some units on the battlefield

The influx of reserves continued on the Egyptian front for several days and the roads in North Sinai were full

The roads in North Sinai were filled with thousands of vehicles, tanks and armored personnel carriers.

as well as administrative convoys carrying fuel, ammunition and supplies.

If the Egyptian leadership had planned ahead to strike these military vehicles and administrative convoys

Israeli military vehicles and administrative convoys as they traverse the long desert roads exposed by

Egyptian aircraft as they entered the range of their work, they would have inflicted heavy losses on them, especially

since most of these vehicles were obliged to travel on paved roads and could not to deploy outside these roads to minimize losses when facing air attacks due to the soft

The sand is soft and loose in most areas of North Sinai. If this planning had been done, it would have prevented

the arrival of reserve armored units, supply convoys, and supplies to the Israeli front in Sinai

Sinai, which would have undoubtedly affected the progress of the battles. There was no Egyptian intervention

to obstruct the arrival of the Israeli reserve forces to the front, except by Egyptian thunderbolts

who were transported deep into the Sinai by helicopter. Among the

was a company from the 183rd Thunderbolt Battalion, which set up an ambush on the northern road coming from

an ambush on the northern road coming from Al-Arish on the outskirts of Rummana, about 30 kilometers from the Suez Canal

about 30 kilometers from the Suez Canal as the place where tanks are unloaded from the tankers, from which the tanks would be driven on their tracks to their designated positions at the front.

At 7 a.m. on October 7, when the armored brigade led by Col.

Nitka Hald. of the reserve armored division commanded by General Adan, arrived at Rummana.

and the Israeli soldiers began unloading the tanks from the tankers, they were suddenly bombarded with

RPG-7 bazookas and Malotka rockets from behind bushes on both sides of the road from

Malassian ambush personnel. According to the Israhelli literature, two tanks and an armored vehicle were hit

six soldiers were killed and 14 were wounded.14 Lieutenant Colonel Assaf

Yagouri's armored battalion attacked the

Egyptian commandos and engaged them in heavy fighting for more than an hour in the surrounding hills

the area. Tanks ran over many of them with their tanks. The operation succeeded suicide bombing, which cost the thunderbolts 75 martyrs and many wounded,

succeeded in stalling the advance of the Israeli reserve forces for a few hours.

the advance of the Israeli reserve forces for a few hours.

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The arrival of the Israeli reserve forces to the Sinai front took place in stages and in a gradual manner

Sinai because of the many circumstances in Tel Aviv that led to the disruption of the process of summoning the reserves

on the one hand, and due to the Chief of the General Staff's decision to direct the first reserve units of the

armored forces to the Golan front in the north immediately, due to the

seriousness of the situation on the Syrian front due to its close proximity to densely populated centers. The Israeli strategy was built on the basis that regular army units would take over the operation of repelling to stop the enemy's advance until the arrival of the reserve forces, which are the main force in the Israeli army. the main force of the Israeli army. As soon as the reserve armored forces arrive, the front command immediately to launch its counterattacks at the tactical level and then at the strategic level if the situation the situation requires, according to the plans that have already been drawn up. However, this strategic policy could not be implemented in the first phase could not be implemented in the first phase of the October War. The only regular forces that attempted to repel and stop the Malassian advance, namely the Gabi, Amnon, and Dan armored brigades and Dan armored brigades under the command of General Mandler, suffered heavy losses, and the reserve units were late in arriving at the front and arrived in stages and in a gradual manner. forcing General Junin to delay his tactical counterattack, which the which the Egyptian leadership expected to occur before noon on October 7 at the latest, and as a result of the embarrassing situation on the Egyptian front, General embarrassing situation on the Egyptian front, General Junin was forced to involve some of the reserve armored brigades reserves that had arrived at the front to engage in repulsion operations alongside the regular forces instead of mobilizing them behind their assigned lines of defense. instead of completing their mobilization behind their designated lines of defense to launch their main counterattacks, which had a serious impact on the fiasco had a serious impact on the abject failure of all the counterattacks that were hastily launched hastily launched against the Egyptian bridgeheads in the first phase of the war.

Despite the remarkable success of the Egyptian crossing and the overrun of the Bar-Lev line, neither the commanders in the rear and the Israeli government were not aware of the grave historical significance of the Egyptian incursion east of the Suez Canal of the Egyptian incursion east of the Suez Canal and the heavy losses of Israeli armor, and there were ministers who believed that the Egyptian forces would be overrun and pushed beyond the canal.

Amphibious damage through Lake Crocodile and the Bitter Lakes

Part of the planning for the drawings to break into the Suez Canal was to push several detachments of to cross Lake Crocodile and the Lesser Bitter Lakes to ensure the appearance of 0136

tracked armored elements on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal shortly after the the crossing to support the infantry units that had crossed on the one hand and as a kind of surprise to the enemy on the other No tanks were expected to appear, either from the five infantry divisions or from the armored brigades that joined them on the eastern shore of the canal seven hours before before the start of the crossing due to the time needed by engineer units to open gaps in the the berm and to build the heavy bridges on which the tanks would cross. In the sector allocated to the Second Army, two forward detachments, consisting of two squadrons reinforced infantry transported in amphibious armored vehicles (one from the 16th Infantry Division's

B through the southern end of Crocodile Lake, and the other from the 2nd Infantry Division KaB across the northern end of the lake). The landing of the two detachments across the lake began as soon as the They reached the eastern shore within half an hour, and their Their appearance at this early time was a major surprise to the enemy, prompting him in the 2nd Infantry Division's sector to evacuate the to evacuate the strong point on the tongue of Lake Crocodile and join its personnel to the strength of the strong point that was located at which was located at Nimra 6 (the Israelis called it Fort Borkan).

In the sector allocated to the Third Army, planning was based on the 130th Mechanized Infantry Brigade crossing the 130 Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade would cross the Lesser Bitter Lake about 2 kilometers south of Kabrit 4. This brigade is a special brigade whose establishment was decreed in January 1972 and consists of two infantry battalions (Battalion 602 and Battalion 603) and was equipped with 80 amphibious armored vehicles (Topaz) designed to transport mechanized infantry both on land and across bodies of water. It was The brigade's strike force consisted of 20 T-76 tanks and a number of Malotka missile companies, some of which were Fahd's, mounted on Topaz armored vehicles with and the Nimr type mounted on Bardam armored vehicles with the Couch wheel. The mission assigned to the 130th Amphibious Brigade was for two of its detachments (two battalions reinforced) the Lesser Bitter Lake at X hours, and once they reached the eastern shore of the canal one detachment would advance on the road leading to the Gedi Strait and the other would advance on the Shatt road Matla Strait to seize the western entrance to both straits, with each defendant sending After securing the straits, each accused will send a dismounted infantry force (outside the straits) to attack both the enemy's obstruction and interference center at Jabal Umm Umm

the enemy's obstruction and jamming center at Jabal Umm Khashib and some vital targets at Tamada Airport.

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The primary objective of pushing these two detachments into the Gedi and Matla Straits was to to delay the arrival of the enemy's tactical reserve until the morning of October 7, i.e., after ensuring that the that the Egyptian engineers had built the bridges on the canal, the armored brigades attached to the infantry divisions had crossed to the east, and the five infantry divisions were ready and the five infantry divisions, reinforced with tanks, are ready to repel any possible enemy counterattack of the enemy. However, the characteristics, armament, and combat potential of this amphibious brigade did not allow it to fulfill the the opportunity to fulfill the campaign duty assigned to it. This can be clearly seen when looking at in his published memoirs of the October War, which was published by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, who was the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces at the time Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces at the time of the devastation, and moreover, he was overseeing direct personal supervision of this amphibious brigade, to the extent that he himself stayed with the elements of this brigade brigade all night in the training project he conducted on the night of July 19/18, 1973 to test the brigade's

the efficiency of this brigade in the Ahmam area west of Alexandria, in which the brigade crossed a body of water in the Mediterranean Sea for a distance of 30 kilometers.

in the Mediterranean Sea for a distance of 30 kilometers. He stated the following with dementia: "The tanks of the 130th Brigade Amphibious Brigade was the T-76 tank, which constituted a great firepower against enemy forces, command centers, and but its light armor and the small caliber of its cannon made it no match for the enemy's medium tanks of all types.

which were armed with the 105mm2 cannon, but its light armor and small caliber made it no match for the enemy's medium tanks.

This fact, which Lt. Gen. Saad Al-Shazly clearly explained in his memoirs, makes us wonder

why the two battalions of the Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade were assigned to this mission according to the

when its combat capabilities were completely inadequate to carry out the mission. Both

battalions as they moved eastward on the road to the Gedi Gorge and the Matla Gorge were inevitably

Based on the information available prior to the start of operations about the enemy's plan, it was inevitably expected

"Shuvach Yonim to run into an Israeli armored battalion (35 to 40 tanks) while advancing."

It was known that the armored brigades in reserve and stationed near the Straits area

would rush at full speed as soon as the Egyptian forces began crossing the canal to the west to carry out tactical counterattacks on Egyptian units that had succeeded in establishing themselves on the eastern shore.

It was known that there was an Israeli armored brigade stationed in the southern sector

(commanded by Colonel Dan) and has no way to reach the eastern shore of the canal other than the

Canal except for the Jahdi-Canal road and the Metalla road. Shatt .

A side-by-side comparison of forces shows that on each route it was bound to encounter

an Egyptian mechanized infantry battalion with only 10 lightly armored tanks armed with Daza

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76mm small caliber Israeli armored force consisting of more than 35 heavily armored Israeli tanks

and armed with the 105mm cannon, which is considered a large-caliber cannon. The Malotka anti-tank missiles equipped with each battalion were not as effective against the Israeli tanks as

in the fighting between Egyptian infantry and Israeli tanks east of the canal, in which

infantrymen were able to surprise Israeli tanks at close range and from from behind their cover, in addition to the help they received from

tank guns and direct-fire artillery from their terraces on the western shore of the canal. In a

in a mobile, open-air battle, Malotka missiles mounted on armored vehicles had armored vehicles had only a limited ability to fight tanks with guns that were many times farther away.

All the factors for failure came together before the battle even began, and in addition, the 602nd Mechanized Battalion lost

602nd Mechanized Battalion, which had crossed the lake first, unfortunately lost a significant part of its strength.

Some T-76 tanks, Topaz armored vehicles and many armored vehicles

Bardam reconnaissance vehicles, some of which carried the

(Malotka) anti-tank missiles, once drowned in the lake: During the crossing, it turned out to be shallow

shallow and gelatinous soil, which meant that armored vehicles had to be driven

on their tracks across the lake except for the Suez Canal's original shipping lane in the center of the lake. A group of Muskarian engineers opened a breach in the minefield discovered on the eastern shore of the lake. Following a firefight with the enemy from the end of Fort Sulphur East, the 6102nd Battalion advanced to The battalion advanced to the beginning of the Jedi Road according to the plan and had barely traveled 15 kilometers of the road and the last light had come until it collided with an Israeli Patton 448 tank battalion. A fierce A fierce battle took place in the darkness, in which the Israeli tanks used the beams of light to dazzle and the fire of their 105mm cannons. Despite the extreme bravery of the Malassian infantrymen of course, the 76mm amphibious tank guns and the hard-to-guide Lemalutka rockets were unable to and difficult-to-guide La Malotka rockets in the dark were no match for the huge number of Israeli tanks Israeli tanks, whose guns had a longer range and were more effective. The battle ended as expected The battalion's tanks and vehicles were destroyed after many of its members were martyred and wounded, and the The Israeli armor battalion continued its advance towards the Suez Canal, while the battalion members who had escaped the battle returned on foot and in batches to returned from the battle on foot and in batches to where they joined the 7th Division's bridgehead.

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Infantry. The reorganized 602nd Mechanized Battalion was ordered to position itself at the Sulphur airfield west of the canal to defend it against any enemy infiltration.

The second battalion of the amphibious brigade, the 603rd, had a different fate Fortunately, it did not have the opportunity to advance along the Shatt Road and the Matla Strait as planned. as planned. No sooner had it crossed the Lesser Bitter Lake and reached its eastern shore at around 4:00 p.m. and regrouped outside the minefield, a fierce battle broke out between it and an Israeli tank company that was advancing from the direction of Kabrit East, but an anti-tank missile group from the 7th Infantry Division from the 7th Infantry Division was assigned to help repel the tank attack, and the armored company was forced to The Israeli armored company was forced to retreat to the east, having lost two tanks and three vehicles rocket vehicles. The amphibious detachment, whose original mission of advancing to the The amphibious detachment was assigned the new task of capturing the Israeli strongpoint at Kabrit Sharq (Fort Butzer, as the Israelis called it) in cooperation with a tank company from the independent 25th Armored Brigade Independent Brigade (attached to the 7th Infantry Division). The Mechanized Battalion succeeded in accomplishing its mission and completed the occupation and clearance of the Israeli fortified position on October 9. The command of the 130th Amphibious Brigade joined the Mechanized Battalion, which was stationed at Fort Sulphur East.

Following the success of the Israeli forces in the penetration between the Second and Third Armies at Dafraswar on the night of October 16 and crossed to the west of the canal, Israeli forces east of the canal surrounded the

the position of the 603rd Mechanized Battalion in Kabrit Sharq, and the Egyptian position became like a small island in a sea.
in a sea of Israeli forces surrounding it on all sides. The Egyptian position became a small island in a sea of Israeli forces surrounding it on all sides. rare courage and heroism in the face of relentless Israeli attacks using tanks, artillery, rockets, and a barrage of concentrated aerial bombardment.
Wounded

During the 114-day siege, the brigade commander was wounded, and the brigade's chief of operations, head of signal, and battalion commander were martyred. The brigade commander, the head of the brigade's operations, the head of signal, and the commander of the mechanized battalion were martyred. Despite the total lack of water, food, fuel, and food, fuel, and ammunition, the Egyptian position was able to overcome all these difficulties and the siege ended.
The siege ended without surrendering, and the story of the 603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion remains a symbol of the steadfastness and struggle of the Egyptian soldier.
the steadfastness and struggle of the Egyptian soldier.

This is the story of the 130th Mechanized Amphibious Infantry Brigade, which was unfortunately tasked with a mission that far exceeded its combat capabilities. and survived in the face of the difficult circumstances that confronted it with courage and heroism.

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Surprisingly, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, who is supposed to be the most knowledgeable commander by virtue of his position as Chief of Staff during the October War on the battlefield, recorded on page 237 of his memoirs, which he published abroad
A fictitious story that has no basis in reality about the operations of the 130th Amphibious Infantry Brigade, including the following
The following verbatim:

1 During the day of October 7, our special forces operating in the enemy's rear carried out several active actions that had a great impact in confusing the enemy leadership and disrupting the movement of its reserves towards the front.
Elements of the 130th Fleet Infantry Brigade (Amphibious) advanced through Matla Pass and Al-Jadi Pass, where they attacked the headquarters of the Southern Sector.
They attacked the southern sector headquarters, radar stations and camps. One of the brigade's
One of the brigade's companies advanced through the Capricorn Pass until it entered Tamada Airport, located about 80 kilometers east of the canal.
about 80 kilometers east of the canal.

Discussing the situation in Sinai at the Israeli General Staff

The remaining tanks from the three Sinai brigades that fought the battles of October 6 and 7 which had carried out the tactical counterattacks on the Malassian positions had retreated from the front line and deployed on the artillery road (crossroad No. 2, located 8 10 kilometers east of the canal, created during the war of attrition along the canal to prevent opportunity for artillery batteries to move quickly from one position to another. At noon on October 7 October 7, the command group at the General Staff in Tel Aviv held an urgent discussion about halting the deterioration on the Egyptian front, after the Israelis had worked hard during the night to create a

a solid zone of bridgeheads east of the Suez Canal, and after all local Israeli counterattacks had failed to penetrate them.
local Israeli counterattacks had failed to penetrate it and reach the Bar-Lev Line fortifications on both shores of the canal.
Canal. None of the commanders present dared to utter the word withdrawal.
to mean something else: a new reorganization along the
which runs from Baluza in the north to Tassa in the south, parallel to the
artillery road and 0.2 kilometers east of the canal.
2.0 kilometers east of the canal (the Egyptians called it Sick Road No. 3).
General Gonen's complaints were intensified by the absence of Israeli airplanes from the skies over the front
Egyptian . On the morning of October 7, Israeli aircraft had attempted to overcome
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the Egyptian radar network and surprise Egyptian airports in the center and north of the Delta by approaching at low altitudes over the Mediterranean Sea.
at low altitudes over the Mediterranean Sea, similar to what happened in the air strike on June 5, 1967
June 1967, but the Israeli pilots were surprised to find MIGA interceptors 21 waiting for them. When the planes tried to sneak up on their targets at different altitudes
were met with a thick blanket of SAM surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft artillery fire, and five of the planes were shot down
five of the planes were shot down and the rest fled. As a result of this failure and the
Israeli forces on the Jahalan front needed air support, General Peled informed the commander of the
Air Force General Gonen that he would not be able to provide any further support to his forces due to the precarious
âIf you don't come, I don't have anything to repel the attack,â he replied anxiously.
attack. On the afternoon of October 7, in response to General Gonen's urgent plea for Air Force assistance to save the situation on the Egyptian front, General Gonen
to save the situation on the Egyptian front, General Peled ordered several squadrons to be diverted from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front
from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front, with the planes to concentrate their efforts against
bridges and crossings on the Suez Canal. These bridges were not easy targets to hit
as the Egyptians were making it difficult for Israeli pilots by putting up smoke screens near the bridges
smoke screens near the bridges, in addition to the many structural bridges they had erected, which
The Egyptians made it difficult for Israeli pilots to hit the bridges by creating smoke screens near the bridges. The members of the
Serbian engineers would take advantage of the pauses between air raids and drop new ferries into the water to replace parts that had been lost
to replace parts of the bridges that had been damaged by aerial bombardment. And they
to minimize casualties on the bridges during periods when
the crossing of Egyptian troops and equipment over the bridges by cutting large sections of the bridges
bridges and connecting them parallel to the eastern side of the canal, making the task of locating the bridges
for Israeli pilots to hit them, especially since this behavior was forcing Israeli planes to begin their assault from the western side of the canal, which is densely populated with hundreds of
surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns in order to hit the parts of the bridges
on the eastern side of the canal, causing them to suffer heavy losses in vain.
to no avail, as Egyptian engineers would quickly repair and refloat the bridges as soon as

and refloat them as soon as the Israeli air strikes ended.

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In Tel Aviv, Israel's official military spokesperson did not make a statement on October 7

on October 7 about the defeat of Israeli forces on the Suez Canal front, either deliberately
the news in vague terms, saying:

“Our defending forces have formed new lines of defense against the Egyptian bridgeheads. D.V.

Sinai, Albert Mandler's order tried to raise the morale of his troops by mentioning the possibilities of victory
by mentioning the prospect of future victories: “Soldiers. You have stopped the main

Our first mission has been accomplished and the enemy has been stopped from advancing.

The front line took the first blow, absorbed it and held strong, and before a day passes, the greatness of the Israel Defense Forces will be shown.
the greatness of the Israel Defense Forces will be on full display.”

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Chapter Three E

Erecting the bridgeheads and preventing Israeli counterattacks

As a result of the aerial reconnaissance flights carried out by Israeli reconnaissance aircraft on the morning of Sunday, February 7, 1973, the enemy discovered that the main effort of the Egyptian forces that crossed

to the eastern shore of the canal is located in the Second Army sector in the area between Deverswar to the south and Verdun to the north.

to the south and Verdun to the north, where the largest concentration of Egyptian tanks and armored vehicles was located.

Therefore, the Israeli leadership decided to concentrate the main effort of its counterattacks against Egyptian forces in this area.

in this area. The three divisions of the Second Field Army, namely the 16, 24 and 18 Infantry Divisions, had completed their immediate mission by the end of October 6.

to establish a bridgehead on the eastern shore of the canal, about 5 kilometers deep, and immediately

immediately carried out engineering preparations, reinforced acquired lines, and coordinated fire plans

of various types.

On the night of 7/6 October, the three armored brigades attached to the infantry divisions of the

The three armored brigades attached to the infantry divisions of the 2nd Gehisheesh sector began crossing with their tanks and tracked vehicles on their assigned heavy rams

to join the divisional bridgeheads east of the canal, at around 7:00 a.m.

On October 7, the armored brigades were able to complete the crossing, with the 14th Armored Brigade (from the

21st Armored Division) joined the 16th Infantry Division on the right, and the 244th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd

Mechanized Infantry) to the 2nd Infantry Division in the center, and the independent 15th Armored Brigade to the 18th Infantry Division

Infantry on the left. On the morning of October Day, the Second Army commander instructed that the

the three divisions, taking advantage of their successes, to develop an eastward offensive to achieve their next mission.

The divisions were to be ready to repel and destroy any enemy counterattacks.

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Throughout the night of October 7/6, Israeli armored forces made strenuous efforts under General Gonen's instructions to engage the Bar-Lev garrisons along the canal. In Colonel Gabi sent several armored companies to contact Fort Mefriket (north of Balah Island) and Fort Milan. Balah Island) and Fort Milan (Kantara East). After bloody battles with Egyptian forces throughout the night night, and in view of the heavy Israeli losses, the order was given on the morning of October 7 to evacuate Fort Mavriket . As for Fort Milan, the 40 officers and soldiers garrisoning the fort secretly evacuated the fort at midnight on October 7 secretly evacuated the fort at midnight, and made a remarkable adventure worth recording, as they took advantage of the darkness They took advantage of the darkness and entered the city of Kantara East, which a force from the 18th Infantry Division had previously occupied They hoped that the Egyptians would not recognize them amidst the chaos of tanks and vehicles and vehicles in the city and in the darkness of the streets. The Israelis encountered as they advanced into Kantara East several times, the Israelis encountered Egyptian forces and ambushes without reacting. On one occasion, however, an Israeli soldier who knew Arabic was forced to respond to an Egyptian patrol to an Egyptian patrol that encountered them to let them pass, but his non-Egyptian accent They were immediately fired upon, killing some of them, while the rest fled fled. After gathering in an empty house, they were able to locate by radio a meeting point with the Israeli rescue force a rendezvous point with the Israeli rescue force to the east. The surviving members of the succeeded in sneaking out of Kantara East, and at dawn they were met by the waiting for them, the Patton Tank Company of Colonel Gabi's brigade.

In the central sector, Colonel Amnon made desperate attempts to contact the Hezayoun position (El Fardan) and Fort Port Cane (Namira 6, east of Ismailia), and a tank company was sent to each After bloody all-night battles with troops from the 2nd Infantry Division, the two Israeli armored companies were The two Israeli armored companies were pushed back and the fortresses of Hizayoun and Bor Kan were surrounded.

What did Moshe Dayan propose to withdraw to the Straits Line⁹

Following a visit to the Golan front in the north at dawn on October 7, Moshe Dayan flew by helicopter helicopter to the Sinai, accompanied by Hamid Zeevi, an assistant chief of staff. Before the helicopter landed next to the Southern Command's outpost in Umm Marjam, Gen. Gonen, the commander of the command, radioed him and advised him to turn back. News had arrived that there were

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in the area, 162 Malassian Thunderbolts were hiding in the heights overlooking the command center. Moshe Dayan decided to take off anyway and landed his plane at 11:40 a.m. before noon, suffering from a severe crisis of pessimism as a result of the worsening situation on the Syrian front. Syrian front.

In the operations room of the Forward Command Center, after reviewing the situation on the Canal Front. Moshe Dayan said to General Gonen: "This is a difficult war, not a border

clash.

withdraw to a second line to the mountains and barricade there.â He pointed to the line of corridors on the operational map on which the positions of the two sides' forces were marked. Following this, a phone call was made between Moshe Dayan and General David Eliezer, Chief of Staff in Tel Aviv, and Dayan asked him:

âWhat can you offer to Gonen?â 4 He meant, of course, air support, and Dayan was shocked

When he received the Chief of Staff's reply, he replied that there was no possibility at that time to increase

air support for the front as the planes are needed more in the north.

spoke to Gonen again about withdrawing and holding other lines, saying: âThe the Alleah line and move to the satisfactory road (meaning crossroad No. 3, located about 30 km east of the canal).

about 30 km east of the canal), with the remaining armor and the reserve armored formations in order to hit the Egyptians. There is nothing we can offer

for the outposts, the healthy must try to cross the lines, and the wounded have no choice

have no choice but to stay and be captured.â Dayan emphasized to Gen. Gonen that what he said was advice

at a ministerial level, but that things should be coordinated with the Chief of Staff

But General Gonen did not agree with the defense minister's opinion that we should withdraw to the

He was determined not to continue retreating and to stick to the artillery route (the âsick routeâ).

to hold on to the artillery route (Satisfactory Route 2, about 10 kilometers east of the canal).

He was still hopeful that his forces could return to the water line, and on the advice of Moshe

On the advice of Moshe Dayan, Gonen issued orders to the three sector commanders to leave the wounded in the fortifications of the

Bar-Lev, and the evacuated garrisons of the forts were to join the Israeli forces

east. He explained to the sector commanders that they were unlikely to receive any aid from the air force due to the

the poor situation on the Jakhoulán front and that they would have to hold out without air support.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan returned from Sinai directly to the General Staff headquarters in Tel Aviv

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Tel Aviv, which, once the war began, became the headquarters of the Supreme Command. He arrived at around 2:30 p.m.

2:30 p.m. In the Situation Room, Dayan proposed to the Chief of Staff

In light of his trip, he proposed the withdrawal of the troops: Israel to take up a line of entrenchment

on the western entrances to the fjords (4535 kilometers east of the canal), and to reduce

defense lines by withdrawing from the Gulf of Suez and leaving only a force in Sharm el-Sheikh to hold

it.

The Chief of Staff asked: 2Even if we have to prepare in a second line, why should we evacuate the Gulf of Suez?

2. The Chief of Staff explained his opinion that we should hold a line of defense in front of Ras Sidr (on the defense in front of Ras Sidr (on the Gulf of Suez) and not in Sharm el-Sheikh.

Dayan replied:

âThere may not be an evacuation, but we have to run a disruptive battle there.â The defense minister was certainly in an acute state of pessimism after back-to-back visits to the Golan and Sinai fronts, but General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, was even more stoic, so he did not issue any orders to the Israeli forces in Sinai to withdraw. Israeli forces in Sinai to withdraw, following Moshe Dayan's advice.

The defense minister and chief of staff attended a meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir in the afternoon. The meeting, held in her office at the Prime Minister's Office, was attended by her deputy Yigal Allon, Israel Galili Zerdula. Moshe Dayan presented his view of withdrawing from the canal line and maintaining a new defensive pressure a new defense at a distance to the east from which to wage war, and that the forts should be evacuated outposts. Moshe urged Golda Mather to make every effort to obtain airplanes and tanks from the United States. airplanes and tanks from the United States as soon as possible because the Arabs are outnumbered and outgunned and weapons. Moshe Dayan explained in his memoir, âThe Story of Habati,â which he published after the war. He mentioned that the prime minister and ministers Alon and Djalili were shocked by the truth. Djalili were shocked by the painful truth that he explained, which is that the Israeli forces cannot. They were influenced by the reports they had already received about the destruction of Israeli planes of Israeli planes destroying Egyptian bridges over the canal, giving them the illusion that Egyptian forces east of the canal were isolated from their bases west of the canal. He explained to them Moshe Dayan explained to them that these bridges were not a monolithic structure but a series of connected that could be repaired or replaced during the night.

The Chief of Staff disagreed with Moshe Dayan's estimates, although he agreed: âPrepare a line

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a second line instead of the canal line, he expressed the opinion that the counterattack should begin immediately. He suggested that he fly to the Southern Forward Command that night to study the situation. He asked the Minister of Defense Defense Minister whether it would be his decision to counterattack the Egyptian forces on the eastern bank of the Canal. The defense minister replied in the affirmative. The prime minister and the ministers were relieved. They could not, as Dayan said, bear the thought of Israel's lack of power to push the enemy back

the enemy back to where they had been 30 hours earlier.

Israel's counterattack plan for the Second Army sector

At 8 p.m. on October 7, General David Eliezer, Chief of Staff arrived at the outpost of the Southern Command in Am Marjam by helicopter, accompanied by Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of the General Staff in the June War of '06 and later President and Prime Minister of Israel. Following their arrival, a meeting was held at the forward headquarters attended by General Junin, commander of the Southern Command, and three commanders, General Albert Mandler, Abraham

Adan (Bern) and Kalman Magen. General Sharon was delayed for two hours due to a malfunction of the helicopter sent to pick him up. During the meeting, Gen. Eliezer outlined the plan for the counterattack, which was scheduled to begin on the morning of Monday, October 8 on the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the canal. The plan was summarized as follows:

General Abraham Adan's armored division in the northern sector will begin the attack on the army sector from Kantara to the south in the direction of Dafraswar and the Bitter Lakes, and at the same time General Sharon's division is stationed in its sector (the Central Sector) to repel enemy attacks and halt eastward advance and at the same time serve as a reserve for Adan's division.

While Adan's offensive continues in the north, Sharon's armored division attacks the Third Army from Dafraswar to the south in the direction of Suez and the southern end of the Canal.

If Adan's attack failed, Sharon's division would have to reinforce the attack, so the Chief of Staff ordered Sharon's division was not to be relieved from its sector without his authorization.

Albert Mantler's armored division remains in its sector here in the south to stop Haddo's eastward advance. and at the same time to serve as a reserve for Sharon's division in case he attacks the army.

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Third Army. The Chief of Staff left the determination of the "X" hour to General Gonen, and warned him of the approaching of the earthen hills east of the canal as they are occupied by large concentrations of of Malassian infantry armed with bazookas, RPGs, and Sager (Malotka) rockets.

General Gonen asked the Chief of Staff for permission to cross to the west bank of the canal if the the attack. The Chief of Staff was reluctant to accept or reject the idea, as the Esrathilian crossing gear was unlimited, and it was only possible, according to Gonen's proposal, to cross the canal on Egyptian bridges the Egyptian bridges, so the Chief of Staff replied to Gonen: "To get to the bridges first: "Get to the bridges first. Then we will see. I don't want a whole army to cross on one bridge, and if we occupy several bridges We move platoons of tanks to them. In any case, let the canal be crossed only on my order. Sharon does not move unless authorized by me2 .

When the Chief of Staff was on his way to board the helicopter, he met General Sharon who had just arrived. Eliezer, whom they called "Dadi," explained to Sharon the basics of the counterattack plan the next day. Sharon tried to convince the Chief of Staff to allow to allow him to cross into the West Bank in the morning, but Dado restrained him, telling him that he must first hit the Egyptian bridgeheads before thinking about crossing. The topic was rescuing people trapped in the Bar-Lev Line fortifications was General Sharon's

main concern

as an urgent humanitarian duty. He had already developed a plan to rescue the personnel of the

The three fortresses in the Rhi sector, Mitzmaid (Deverswar), La Kikan (Tel Salam) and Potzer

(Sulphur East), two of which he himself had radioed to the commanders.

The officers were killed, and Sharon had no one to contact in the fort except a signalman from the reserves

who had worked as a bellhop in Jerusalem before the ruin.

Sharon presented his plan to the Chief of Staff to rescue the trapped personnel, but the Chief of Staff

suggested that he discuss the matter with General Gonen, and that it should be postponed pending the outcome of the

the outcome of the Zionist offensive. Sharon tried to discuss the matter again with Gen.

Gonen, but the conversation did not change his mind, as Gonen explained to Sharon the danger of

that his plan to save the fortified area would cost the IDF at least 50 tanks at least 50 tanks, but he hoped that some of the bunkers could be reached during the counterattack the following day the following day.

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At around midnight, Moshe Dayan and General Eliezer, having returned to Tel Aviv Tel Aviv to the operations room at the Chief of Staff's headquarters. The Chief of Staff was in high spirits

and explained to the staff officers in the presence of the Minister of Defense the basics of the plan for the next day's counterattack

The next day's counterattack, which he hoped would be the turning point of the war, was

to crush the Egyptian armored forces that had crossed the canal and taken up positions along the eastern bank of the canal

the east bank. The Israeli leadership had high hopes for the success of the counteroffensive.

sent huge tank reinforcements to the southern front, and the next day was destined to be

the next day would be a day of clashing armor.

At the Israeli headquarters in Sinai, at midnight, General Gonen drew up his detailed plan for the counterattack

for the counterattack, in which he assigned precise tasks to the armored divisions that would

attack. General Abraham Adan (Bern) criticized in the book he published after the war in Hebrew

In the book he published after the war in Hebrew, called On the Banks of the Suez Canal⁴, he criticized the plan drawn up by General Gonen, stating that it It was completely contrary to the Chief of Staff's plan, in addition to its ambiguity and lack of clarity. For example

The armored division under Adan's command was tasked with clearing the canal line in the

between the artillery road in the east and the water line in the west, and to rescue and liberate

the troops inside the Bar-Lev fortifications in this area, pull out the tanks that had broken down

and prepare to cross to the west bank of the canal. Adan explained that Gonen's plan included two things

that were not approved by the Azkan chief: The first was to clear land up to the water line (despite his warning that the

that the attacking tanks should not approach the earthen hills east of the canal). The second was to

Preparing to cross to the West Bank without creating the right conditions.

General Adan criticized

that the plan did not specify the line at which Israeli forces would stop after

crossing into the West Bank
West Bank, as well as the lack of mention of the boundaries separating the
armored divisions from each other

In addition, General Adan stated that Gonen violated the Chief of Staff's order
not to delay the attack until the arrival of the armored divisions
not to delay the attack until the arrival of the reserve armored forces, whose
number of tanks would have
would increase the number of tanks on the front to about 700, as Gonen decided
to start the attack in the morning
The number of tanks in the three reserve armored divisions did not exceed
about 500 tanks, which would have given the Egyptian tanks on the east bank of
the canal a significant advantage in numbers
superiority in numbers.

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Despite the fact that Junin's plan was contrary to the Chief of Staff's original
plan, Gen.

General Liphazar, upon arriving at his headquarters in Tel Aviv at 5:30 a.m. on
October 8, when the chief of staff

on October 8, when the Chief of Staff's Chief of Operations presented him with
the counterattack plan

that he had received from General Gonen, he approved it and informed Gonen of
his endorsement. This led to

that he was severely criticized after the failure of the counterattack, as will
become clear

Although it is proven that during his contact with Junin, he repeatedly warned
him not to approach the Suez Canal with his forces

the Suez Canal, and expressed his pessimism about the possibility of crossing on
Egyptian bridges to the western bank of the canal

western bank of the canal. General Gonen preferred to communicate the
counterattack plan to his

its details to the division commanders by radio contact, and he was criticized
for using this method

for his use of this method, as if he had gone to the outposts of the divisional
commanders to discuss the details of the plan with their commanders

to discuss the details of the plan with their commanders, he would have been
able to familiarize himself with the conditions of each division on the ground,
and he would have

He would have realized the unreality of his plan and the extent to which he
underestimated the strength of the Egyptians, which made him pay a heavy price
for this

for this later on.

General Adan was radioed the duty of his division, which according to the plan
was to attack the

Second Army. Its mission was to advance from Kantara south and destroy the
Egyptian forces

Egyptian forces to Dafraswar, and from there to cross to the west bank of the
Canal.

During its attack, the division was to rescue soldiers trapped in the forts of
Hezayoun (Fardan) and Burkat

(No. 6, east of Ismailia) and Mtsamid (Deverswar). Gonen outlined Sharon's
mission to advance

southward with his division from Deverswar toward Suez and from the position of
Fort Nissan, east of Suez.)

cross to the West Bank and occupy the city of Suez, then push westward to a
distance of 20 kilometers

from the western shore of the canal.

It is clear from this plan by Gonen, which was based on the two divisions of
Adan and Sharon crossing the Suez Canal

and Sharon crossing the Suez Canal and establishing an Israeli bridgehead on the western bank of the canal to a depth of 20 km, the extent of his ignorance of the reality of the military situation of the Egyptian forces, as well as the extent of the misunderstanding within the Israeli camp misunderstandings within the Israeli camp, as understanding was almost non-existent between the Chief of Staff and the front command, and it suffered the worst between the Southern Command and the commanders of the three armored divisions. The three armored divisions.
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Advantages of crossing to the west from the Kerdan Strip

The mission assigned to General Abraham Adan (Bern), commander of the Northern Sector, was to attack in the morning with his armored division from north to south near the eastern shore of the Canal east of the Canal, with the aim of destroying the Egyptian forces in the sector between Kantara in the north and Deverswar in the south and use the success to cross to the west bank of the Canal on the captured Egyptian bridges. During the attack, the division would rescue Israeli garrisons trapped in fortresses: Hezayoun (Fardan), Borkan (No. 06, Ismailia East) and Metsamid (Dufreswar)

The success of the Israeli forces in penetrating the defensive positions on the eastern shore of the Canal in this sector would bring Israel several military gains as well as political and propaganda advantages. In military terms, the flanks of Israeli forces that succeed in reaching the west bank of the canal will be to reach the west bank of the canal will be secured by natural barriers via Lake Manzala in the north and the Ismailia Tributary in the south. Lake Manzala in the north and the Ismailia Tributary in the south. This sector also does not require large forces to hold on to it, as it is only 45 kilometers in front of it, while it is difficult for Egyptian forces to launch counterattacks to retake it, given the presence of some agricultural land and trees within it, and it contains many waterways, drains, and canals. Moreover there are two important air bases in the sector, Salhiya and Abu Sawir, as well as the airport in Ismailia . Politically, Israel's seizure of three important cities in the Gaza Strip in the Gaza Strip, namely: Ismailia, Qantara, and Salhiya would have been a political victory for Israel. It also makes it easier to isolate the city of Port Said from the south and besiege it in preparation for its capture, while controlling the entrance to two important roads to reach Cairo, namely the Ismailia road two important roads to reach Cairo, namely the Ismailia-Cairo Agricultural Road (Treaty Road) and the Ismailia-Cairo Desert Road.

General Abraham Adan's plan for his counterattack against the Second Army's front on the morning of October 8 was to on the morning of October 8 was to stabilize the 18th Infantry Division's forces in the Kantara sector by making some secondary attacks on the division's front in preparation for the main strike on the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Fardan sector and the left flank of the 16th Infantry Division in the

Ismailia East.

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Adan's operational group in the northern sector consisted of three armored brigades.

namely: Colonel Gabi's brigade, a regular army brigade that had previously operated in the northern sector

It engaged Second Army forces throughout October 6 and 7 in repulsion battles and in

attempts to engage the Bar-Lev Line fortifications, which greatly reduced its combat capability. And the brigade of Col.

Nitka, a reserve armored brigade that came from Beersheba on the Al-Arish Rummana coastal road

carried on tank carriers, and we have already mentioned that it was attacked on the morning of October 7

by a force of Egyptian commandos at Rummana as the tanks were being unloaded from their

from the tankers to move on their tracks to the battlefield and suffered some losses. As for the brigade

Colonel Ariba is also an officer brigade that arrived on October 7 from the reserve unit assembly center

in Beersheba. Once General Adan had succeeded in mobilizing most of the forces of his operational group

in the northern sector, he deployed his three armored brigades on Highway 3.

According to his book "On the Banks of the Suez Canal," published after the war, he expected that the Egyptian forces

would use their success on October 6 and 7 to continue to advance eastward to reach the

to continue advancing eastward to reach Transverse Road No. 3, which extends from Balouza in the north to Tassa in the south.

The road ahead of them was paved for that purpose, which prompted him to said in his book: "Woe betide us if they do." 2

When General Adan discovered that the Egyptian forces that had crossed the canal had confined their efforts to

to the construction and reinforcement of the bridgehead areas, he was encouraged and ordered his three brigades

three brigades to advance westward toward Cross Road No. 2 in preparation for a counterattack

counterattack. The armored forces in the central and southern sectors followed suit after their

their commanders to advance westward to approach the Egyptian bridgeheads. In addition to

the northern marshy area, which was a strong natural obstacle on the right flank of General Adan's division

General Adan, an armored regiment under the command of General Kalman Magen, consisting of two armored dunes and a tank company, was assigned to secure the right flank.

two armored divisions and a tank company to secure the right flank of the counterattack, while the left flank was

was secured by General Sharon's division in the central sector.

The main effort of the Israeli counterattack was directed towards the sector of the 2nd Infantry Division

This task was assigned to the armored brigade commanded by Colonel Gabi.

which had been reorganized and reinforced after the bitter battles of October 6 and 7, and to divert

the attention of the Egyptians from the direction of the main effort, General Adan assigned Colonel Nitka and Colonel Alagi

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Arippe to carry out secondary attacks in the north against the 18th Infantry Division at Qantara, and in the south against the 16th Infantry Division at in the south against the 16th Infantry Division in its sector between Deverswar and Ismailia East

At 9 a.m. on October 8, an armored force from the Netka Brigade in the north estimated to be about a tank battalion supported by mechanized infantry attacked the front flank of the 18th Division.

Shah, but the commander of the division's right brigade pushed the brigade's antitank reserve into the direction of the attack. The commander of the independent 15th Armored Brigade, under orders from the commander of the 18th Infantry Division, pushed two companies of tanks to support the division's left brigade against which the attack was launched. After fierce fighting, the Israeli counterattack was repulsed the Israeli counterattack was repulsed and a number of enemy Patton 48.39 tanks were destroyed. The Israeli armored force was forced to retreat east.

At around the same time, an armored force from the Arbeh Brigade in the south, estimated to be a battalion armored mechanized infantry from the direction of Tassa attacked the forward defenses along the 16th Infantry Division's facing the 16th Infantry Division, and after heavy fighting, 10 tanks and 6 armored vehicles were destroyed.
Type 113 0%

Did Adan's armored forces succeed in crossing to the west of the canal?

General Junin, commander of Southern Command, instructed General Adan to accelerate to move his forces south in the direction of Al-Defreswar, and to try to capture an intact Egyptian bridge

at Fardan to cross with an armored force from his division to the west bank of the canal. Adan replied that his force was too small for such a mission, but that he was willing to carry it out provided air and artillery support. In an early morning shout, General Adan authorized Colonel Gabi to advance his armored brigade from north to south as close to the canal as possible to make the the main attack on the Fardan-Ismailiya sector with the aim of liberating the Hezayoun (Fardan) and Borkan (Ismaili No. 6) positions and Borkan (No. 6 Ismailia East). Colonel Nitka also ordered his armored brigade to remain in front of the Kantara sector to serve as the division's reserve and to reorganize his forces in preparation for a southward advance as soon as he is ordered to do so as soon as he was ordered to do so. At 7:30 a.m. on October 8, the armored groups of Gabi's brigade began to appear in front of the left flank of the 2nd Infantry Division and
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maneuvering in front of the port to try to discover the most suitable direction to reach the strong point at Fardan. The commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, Brigadier General Hassan Abu Saada, discovered the enemy's intentions. He took his decision to repel and destroy the attacking enemy tanks, with the resources of the division's left brigade the division's left brigade, the anti-tank reserve of Al-Qarqa, and the assistance of the 24th Armored Brigade (attached to the 2nd Division from the 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division in the Second Army's reserve west of the canal).

The division commander asked the Second Army commander, Major General Saad Maamoun, to be supported by the fire of the Second Army Artillery and Army Anti-Tank Reserve No. 1. The Second Army's artillery was commanded by Brigadier General Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazaleh. The Second Army commander ratified the decision of the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, that the 24th Armored Brigade would be used only in the event of a breakthrough and that the armored brigade would not go outside the bridgehead without his authorization. The Second Army commander instructed that the counterattack against the enemy in the event that the 2nd Infantry Division and the 16th Infantry Division break through the point of contact between the 2nd Infantry Division and the 16th Infantry Division between the 24th Armored Brigade (attached to the 2nd Infantry Division) and the 14th Armored Brigade (attached to the 16 Infantry Division) on his own orders. At 9:00 a.m., Gabi's brigade began the attack in focusing on the left brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, which was engaged by two companies of tanks from the 24th Armored Brigade tanks from the 24th Armored Brigade and the anti-tank reserve of both the brigade and the division. Enemy tanks managed to hostile tanks managed to penetrate the division's forward defense line toward Fort Fardan, but were destroyed by the Hussam and B. Genie anti-tank grenades,⁴³ and the rest of the Israeli tanks retreated at around 4:30 p.m. The rest of the Israeli tanks retreated at around 11:00 p.m. Before noon General Uri Ben-Ari, deputy commander of the Southern Command, called General Aan and informed him of an important that there was evidence that the Egyptian forces were beginning to withdraw, and that he should hurry with his troops to the Jakhnob and to engage the Egyptian forces before they could escape and then quickly over the Egyptian bridge at Fardan to the west bank of the canal. So he asked General Adan asked for an armored battalion from General Sharon's division to reinforce Gabi's brigade. Ben-Ari promised to fulfill his request. When General Adan was asked to cross quickly from Verdun to the West Bank and occupy positions there, he thought to the West Bank and occupy positions there, General Adan believed that a modification of the plan at this stage would have to be based on important surprise factors, and as a result of confirmed information received from the Intelligence Division.

During the exchange of radio messages that conveyed the crossing order to General Adan on
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At the Egyptian bridge in Fardan, a sergeant in the Operations Division of the General Staff in Tel Aviv was Sergeant in the Operations Division of the General Staff in Tel Aviv was listening to the radio network and realized from the signals exchanged that General Adan's forces were about to cross General Adan's forces were about to cross over the Verdun Bridge to the West Bank of the Canal. Through him through this sergeant, the report quickly traveled from one person to another in the General Staff Headquarters until it reached to Brigadier General Ze'evi, Assistant Chief of Staff, who quickly telephoned General David Chief of Staff Eliezer, who was attending a Cabinet meeting in his meeting room at the 1 Kiryah in Tel Aviv, while Israel Lenor, secretary to Prime Minister Nolda Meir

conveyed the news to Prime Minister Nolda Meir, creating a sense of jubilation among those present at the cabinet meeting. Fortunately for the Israeli authorities, the news was not broadcast through the Israeli military spokesperson, but the news reached Brigadier General Gur, the military attaché to Brig. Gen. Gur, the Israeli military attaché in Washington, who passed it on to some officials at the Pentagon, and one journalist, a reporter for the French newspaper Le Figaro, succeeded in leaking the news outside the country. He leaked the news outside the country, which made him publish it in Paris until it turned out to be unfounded. that it was unfounded. After the Cabinet meeting was over, it became clear to the Chief of Staff and other officials in that not only had General Adan not crossed with his troops, but that he had been hit hard by Egyptian forces. When Loza Gabi tried to reinforce his attack before noon with a counterattack by an armored battalion on the right flank of the 2nd Infantry Division. using artillery fire, direct hit weapons and anti-tank missiles, were able to repel the Israeli armored forces at the front line of the defenses, and began to destroy the tanks. One by one, the battalion commander was wounded in the arm, so he decided to withdraw, leaving the wreckage of his tanks and the remains of his crews. of his tanks and the remains of their crews, while the rest of the crews fled, leaving him with only 7 tanks, and 20 of his men were killed. Although General Sharon was ordered to send an armored battalion from his division to rescue Gabi's brigade, which had suffered heavy losses, Sharon refused to send the battalion on the pretext that the division would soon be ordered to move south as planned. The division would need the battalion. Indeed, it was not long before General Nguyen, under the influence of his belief that his plan was being successfully implemented, issued an order to General Sharon

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- with his division in the central sector to move from north to south toward Suez to carry out the task assigned to him, a counterattack on the Third Army. He committed General Sharon made several tactical mistakes in moving his division toward Al-Jahnoub: He left his sector without leaving behind any troops from his division to protect the central sector, and did not ask the Southern Command Southern Command to send any other units to fill the vacuum created by his move south, despite the fact that the Egyptian forces in front of him were Egyptian forces in front of him were in a state of constant activity.

When General Adan realized the extent of the failure of Gabi's brigade during its attack on the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division

the Egyptian 2nd Infantry Division, he ordered Colonel Nitka to leave an armored battalion of his brigade in front of the sector of the of the 18th Infantry Division at Kantara to hold it and move the other two battalions south to the sector Fardan to reinforce Gabi's brigade, in preparation for a joint attack by the two brigades in the direction of the Fardan fortress (Hezayoun). Nitka moved immediately with his two battalions to the south, where his His armor, along with Colonel Gabi's armor, was massed on the artillery road (crossroad No. 2). As soon as Nitka arrived, he met with his colleague Gabi under a heavy barrage

of Egyptian artillery fire.
and briefed him on the latest developments. Gabi complained to him about the severe lack of support from Israeli artillery
Israeli artillery support for his troops and the apparent lack of air support.
Colonel Nitka was
was a short, slow-moving man, and when he was in command of an armored battalion in the war of
June 627, he was severely wounded in both legs when his tank was hit by a cannonball while attacking an Egyptian position
an Egyptian position in the Umm Qutf (Abu Ajila) area. He underwent several operations
and a large part of one of his legs became prosthetic, yet these injuries did not break his morale.
did not break his morale, and he exerted pressure on his commanders until they agreed to return him to a fighter command
despite the obstacles he faced. He needed the help of one of his men to get on or off the tank
to get on and off the tank, but the strength of his morale became the talk of the whole army, and he became known as
human bulldog. At 12:00 p.m., Nitka's force (an armored brigade except for the the battalion that was left in front of Kantara), and made the paved road that branched off
from Transverse Road No. 3 to Fardan (the Egyptians called it the Aram Road). The remaining armor of Gabi's brigade, which had not increased after the battle with the
with the Allen Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division was only 25 tanks, and the main counterattack forces
lacked mechanized infantry and adequate artillery and air support.

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Battle of the 2nd Infantry Division

A reconnaissance group of the 2nd Infantry Division succeeded in discovering that an estimated
about 75 tanks assembled east of the Ajramiya Dune, northeast of the division's bridgehead. And at
At 12:10 p.m., the division picked up a radio signal in Hebrew
sent by Colonel Nitka to his command stating that he was ready to start the attack at full speed in 20 minutes in the direction of Fardan
in the direction of Fardan. Given the lack of time, Brigadier General Hassan Ayo Saada, commander of the 2nd Division, made a decision
on his own to counter the expected enemy attack, which he estimated would be directed against the
the point of contact between the two brigades of the division's 1st Corps, as this direction is the closest route
to reach the fortified point of Fardan (Hizayoun), which was still resisting at that time.
A successful attack in this direction was expected to cut the division's bridgehead
into two parts, each of which could be easily destroyed separately. The 2nd Division commander's decision
was a new method of destroying the enemy, which was to draw his armored forces into a killing ground inside the division's bridgehead
the division's bridgehead and allow them to break through the forward defense position and advance to a distance of
3.km from the canal. The plan was to destroy the armored forces that would inside the bridgehead by confronting them with the division's 2nd Coordination Brigade (Mechanized Infantry Brigade
mechanized brigade) and the division's reserve 24th Armored Brigade, as well as the division's anti-tank reserve
and Army Anti-Tank Reserve No. 2, while maneuvering the reserves of the 1st Corps brigades
anti-tank brigades to occupy the side lines of the area chosen in the center of the division's bridgehead.

to be the killing ground where the enemy tanks would be crushed.

At the same time, planning was underway to surround the enemy in the killing ground by closing the line of
by the right battalion, which will be penetrated by the 1st Corps Brigade on the
on the division's left to prevent any tanks from exiting the bridgehead. The 2nd
Infantry Division commander's decision was
was dangerous, but it was surprisingly successful.

At 12:30 p.m., Nitka's brigade counterattacked and concentrated its attack
as expected, in the space between the contact points of the two 1st Corps
brigades. The attack took place
The Israeli attack took place in two successive formations, with the 1st Corps
battalion advancing at a high speed of about
40 kilometers per hour, and the right battalion of the left brigade, which bore
the brunt of the attack
The right battalion of the Left Brigade, which bore the brunt of the attack,
carried out its mission, accepting penetration into its forward positions and
drawing the enemy towards the killing ground.
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The right battalion of the Left Brigade, which bore the brunt of the attack,
carried out its mission. Once the Nitka Brigade tanks enter the
the previously prepared killing ground, under orders from the commander of the
2nd Infantry Division, the guns of the tanks of the
of the 24th Armored Brigade and all weapons and rockets from the anti-tank
reserves
of the brigade, division and army and from all directions towards the enemy
tanks that had made the breakthrough
breakthrough. The 1st Corps Left Brigade, in which the breakthrough occurred,
had destroyed all of its
tank sniping crews armed with RPGs and Malotka rockets behind the Israeli forces
that entered the bridgehead.
that had entered the bridgehead, turning Qantal's terrain into a kind of
hellhole.
Within 13 minutes, most of the enemy tanks were destroyed and eight Israeli
tanks were captured
8 Israeli tanks were captured intact, and Lieutenant Colonel Asnaf Yagouri,
commander of the 1st Netka Brigade's 1st Coordination Battalion, was captured by
A group from the Mechanized Infantry Brigade (the division's second echelon) led
by Captain Yusri Amara
and Lieutenant Fathi Bakhit after his tank was destroyed and he tried to flee on
foot in an eastern direction. When the
the clouds of smoke that covered the battlefield cleared, Nitka found that only
Only four tanks, including his own, remained intact from the force that started
the battle. Gabi's brigade was advancing
in front of Nitka's brigade, but stopped shortly after his tanks began to burn,
and urgently requested
his commander for urgent air support, but he was unable to get it despite
several requests.
In view of the heavy losses suffered by the Nitka and Gabi brigades and the
destruction of most of the brigades' tanks, General Adan was forced to certify
the brigade.
General Adan was forced to honor their request to immediately withdraw from the
battle and return to
to the east towards Sick Road No. 3 and occupy the prepared positions in the
rear. The battle ended
The battle ended at 2:00 p.m. Once the battle was over, the Chania Division
commander made the decision to develop the
the attack eastward to fulfill the division's next mission

Achieving the objectives of the first phase of Plan Badr
The results of the counterattack on October 8 were disappointing to the
Israelis. In

In Qatat al-Jahish II in the North, the 18 Infantry Division in the Kantara sector and the 16 Infantry Division in the in the Dafraswar-Ismailia East sector managed to repel the counter-attacks that their units had been subjected to since the morning of October 8. their units since the morning of October 8, inflicting heavy losses on the attackers. In the The 2nd Infantry Division managed to crush the armored brigade commanded by Col. Nitka, capturing the commander of one of his battalions, Colonel Assaf Yajouri, and inflicting losses of
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to the armored brigade commanded by Colonel Jabi. In view of the heavy losses suffered by the the Israeli armored division while conducting the main counterattack against the Egyptian infantry divisions in the Second Army sector, General Abraham Adan (Bern), the division commander, was forced to issue orders the commanders of his three armored brigades (Colonels Netka, Gabi and Aryeh) to withdraw east towards Sick Road No. 3 and occupy the prepared positions in the rear. The Second Army's artillery played such a prominent role in dispersing the Israeli counterattack units that General Adan's General Adan's command center for the advance was caught in a hail of Malasian artillery fire before the battle was over, killing one of his staff officers. One of his staff officers was killed, and General Adan was forced to jump out of his position and move his command center away from the artillery fire. General Adan's deputy General Adan personally evacuated the wounded from the command center to a rear ambulance station.

General Gonen, the commander of Israel's Southern Command, made serious tactical errors during the attack made serious tactical mistakes, most notably ordering General Sharon, who was stationed with his armored division armored division in the Aristotelian sector to move from his sector to Etbah Suez in the south to launch a counterattack counterattack on the Third Army according to the previously established plan, under the mistaken belief that his his plan was being successfully implemented. Had General Junin known the true status of his forces on the battlefield, as was his duty as commander-in-chief as was his duty as commander-in-chief of the Southern Front, he would not have issued this erroneous order. It was The situation required him to quickly move Sharon's division to the north, not to the south, to support General Adan's division, whose armored brigades were receiving the heaviest blows from the General Adan's division, whose armored brigades were receiving the heaviest blows from the Egyptian forces, was in dire need of a strong rescue to reinforce its counterattack, which soon failed at around 1:00 p.m. When Junin finally realized the seriousness of General Adan's position General Adan's position in the north, he realized his tactical mistake and issued a second order to General Sharon, who was still charging south, to halt his advance toward Suez back to his sector and join the attack on the Egyptian forces to try to shore up General Adan's deteriorating division in the north. General Adan's deteriorating division in the north. General Sharon replied that his division could no longer his division, after all the frivolous moves it had made and wasted, could no longer mount a counterattack against the Second Army's forces to rescue General Adan.

At a time when Israeli plans were failing and its
on its forces in the Sinai, Monday, October 8, was a successful day for the
forces
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Egyptian forces on all levels. After repelling Israeli counterattacks on
Egyptian bridgeheads in the northern sector of the
Egyptian bridges in the northern sector on the eastern bank of the Canal.
Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, ordered the commanders of the 16th, 2nd
and 18th Infantry Divisions to develop the attack to the east and expand the
the divisions' bridgeheads in coordination and cooperation with each other to
seize the general line 8-10 kilometers east of the canal.
8-10 kilometers east of the canal as the next mission according to the plan,
while destroying and liquidating
all enemy strong points in the sector of these divisions and prepare to repel
and destroy the enemy's main counterattack
the main enemy counterattack.

Based on these orders, the commander of each of the three infantry divisions
ordered the brigades of the
1st Infantry Coordination Brigade to expand the bridgehead and secure the 2nd
Infantry Coordination Brigade's (each division's
Mechanized Brigade of each division) with a 15-minute bombardment by the brigade
artillery groups
and the division's artillery group to allow the mechanized infantry brigade
under artillery cover to take its
in the vacant space between the two brigades of the first echelon, so that the
formation of each division as it advances
to the next mission line is three infantry brigades in the first echelon while
the armored brigade attached to the division becomes
becomes the division's second echelon.

In the 2nd Division's sector in Verdun, Division Commander Brigadier General
Hassan Abu Saada ordered
the division's formations and units to take advantage of the success and develop
the attack eastward according to the plan
to seize the next mission line in cooperation with the forces of the 16th
Infantry Division on the right flank of the division
with the rapid destruction of the two strong enemy points at Fardan (Hizayoun)
and Marra 6 Ismailia (Borkan)
East (Borkan).

At 4:00 p.m., 2nd Division forces began to advance eastward after a 15-minute
bombardment
15 minutes of concentrated fire, and the three 1st Corps brigades were able to
hit some of the
Israeli tank companies left by the enemy to protect the withdrawal of its troops
after the failure of the counterattack
This led to the destruction of a number of these tanks and forced the rest of
them to withdraw
east. The division's right brigade succeeded in surprising the enemy and
storming one of its command centers
and seized it with all its documents, weapons and equipment, which the Israelis
called
The Israelis called it (Hamutal site) Ams. Due to the height of this position
and its control of the entrance to the Middle Road (Ismailia, east of Tassa) and
its control over the entire area
around it, the Israeli leadership considered its fall in the hands of the
Muammaris to be a tactical loss.

tactical loss. At around 9 p.m., the division's three brigades succeeded in to capture the general line of Tubbat al-Shajara, 8 km east of the canal, thus achieving the division's next mission the division's next mission. During the battle for the next mission line, a battalion from the of the 2nd Division's left brigade succeeded in storming the enemy strongpoint at Fardan (Hizayoun Fortress) in and raised the Egyptian flag at 5:00 p.m. The losses of the fort's garrison were characterized by fierce and violent fighting The losses of the fort's garrison amounted to 15 dead, including an officer, nine prisoners, and a large amount of weapons and equipment A large amount of weapons and equipment. On the night of October 8/9, a mechanized infantry force from the Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade cleared and cleared the strong point of Al-Do, Nura 6, Ismailia East (Fort Borkan) Under the supervision of the head of the division's operations and seized weapons, equipment and documents .

The 2nd Division Commander ordered his units to reinforce the next mission line and make the necessary engineering engineering and coordination of fire plans in preparation to repel the expected enemy counterattack, and in the 16th Infantry Division's The 16th Infantry Division's sector extending from Dafraswar to Ismailia East and following the repulsion of the on the morning of October 8, the commander of the division, Brigadier General Eid Rab al-Nabi Hafez Brig. Gen. Eid Rabnabi Hafez ordered at around 2:00 p.m. to develop an attack to the east to fulfill the division's mechanized mission. east to fulfill the division's mechanized mission, attacking the enemy's strong point at Deverswar (Fort Mutsamid) which had been under siege since October 6. At 1:30 p.m. (1:30 p.m.), the 16th Infantry Division began advancing eastward after a For 15 minutes, the Karka formations pushed the tank-hunting groups forward ahead of the attack to hunt enemy tanks, as well as reconnaissance patrols to follow the movements of and reconnaissance patrols to follow the retreating forces to the east. Before sunset, the division's three brigades reached the general line the general line of the Abu Waqfa horse dune, reinforced their defensive positions, coordinated the plans of the bulls, and prepared to repel and destroy the counterattack. and prepared to repel and destroy the expected enemy counterattack in cooperation with the 2nd Infantry Division on the division's left flank. on the left flank of the division. . As the 16th Infantry Division developed its eastward attack, it discovered discovered Point 57, a strong enemy position located southwest of the Daliyah position and 8 kilometers east of the canal.

The enemy had succeeded in concealing and camouflaging it so well that reconnaissance elements from the division's forward formations were unable to detect it, and it did not appear at all in the
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aerial photographs taken of the area. This strong point remained hidden from the eyes of the Egyptian forces from the start of the crossing on October 6 until the 16th Infantry Division began developing its attack on the afternoon of October 8, when its garrison opened fire on the two battalions of the 1st Battalion of the Middle Brigade of the (Mechanized Infantry Brigade) after the two battalions overtook them in order to thwart the attack but the Mechanized Infantry Battalion, which was acting as the brigade's second

echelon

immediately engaged the Israeli force, and one of its companies succeeded in stormed the fortified point and captured it after destroying two tanks, three lorries, and two armored vehicles. A search of the post revealed important maps and documents, a large night vision device and a large number of weapons and equipment, as well as huge stacks of ammunition, supplies, and enough water for the garrison to fight for two weeks. Given the importance of this point and its control over all the launches surrounding it, the enemy tried to retake it. To recapture it by various means, which prompted him to five consecutive counterattacks on October 8 and 9. But they were all repulsed after The enemy suffered heavy losses.

In the process of developing the attack, a battalion of the I Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division. attacked on the strong point at Dafraswar (Fort Mtsmeda, a heavily fortified point that is not only of its vital importance as it is located at the confluence of the Suez Canal and the Great Bitter Lake. It consists of two fortified positions separated by a distance of about 500 meters, with a between them is a point belonging to the Zaqaba International Authority. The infantry battalion's attack began at 8:00 p.m. evening. When the attack failed, the Egyptian battalion attacked again after midnight After heavy fighting, the Egyptian battalion managed to capture the position to the north and, using the the fallen position as a base of fire, the battalion attacked the southern position and captured it before dawn, seizing all the weapons, equipment, documents, and supplies inside the fortress. The battalion captured 5 officers, 32 ranks and soldiers, and three members of the International Supervisory Board. and found 20 dead inside.

Outside the head of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead and to the south east of the strong point that was captured, on the eastern end of the Great Bitter Lake was a strong point called The Egyptians called Tel Salam (Lakikan Fortress), a strong point on the eastern end of the Great Bitter Lake. According to Israeli references, the fort was evacuated by its garrison on October 8, and all 181

on the only half-track vehicle they had, and within an hour they were able to reach the Israeli army's lines to the IDF lines. The fort remained empty after its garrison abandoned it It was not the responsibility of the 16th Infantry Division to occupy this position, which was located about 5 kilometers east of the division's bridgehead. While the 2 and 16 Infantry Divisions developed their attacks to the east, the 18th Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Fouad Aziz Ghaly in its sector in the far north (North El Balah El Kantara El Kab area) developed its attack eastward after pushing the 2nd Coordination Brigade under intense artillery bombardment for 15 minutes. Since it did not encounter any enemy forces during its advance, it succeeded on the evening of October 8 to reach the line set for its final mission about 10 kilometers east of the

canal without stopping
on the next mission plan, and began to organize the defense of the division's
bridgehead in preparation to repel
and destroy the enemy's tactical reserves that were expected to counterstrike.

In the Third Army's sector in the south, Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel,
commander of the Third Army, issued orders on October 8
orders on October 8 to the commanders of the 19th and 7th Infantry Divisions
after repelling the enemy's tactical attacks on their divisions
the enemy's tactical attacks on their divisions to develop their attack eastward
to reach the next mission line.
Since no major enemy counterattacks were launched on the morning of October 8 at
the head of the bridgehead of the
of the 19th Infantry Division, Brigadier General Youssef Afifi, the division
commander, ordered his division's formations
to advance eastward to fulfill the next mission. Groups of enemy tanks attempted
to
tried to hinder the advance of the division's forces by launching counterattacks
on the communication points between the brigades of the
but they all failed due to heavy artillery fire and Egyptian airplanes attacking
attacking the enemy's long-range 175m artillery emplacements. The Israeli strong
point east of the
The Israeli strong point was east of the Kobri bridge. A force from the left
brigade of the
Left Brigade of the 19th Infantry Division since the crossing began on Oct. 6.
Although the Lebanese force
attacked it twice, it was unable to storm it, and the main reason for the
failure of the attack was
the Egyptian attacking force came under accurate Israeli long-range artillery
and aviation fire
which led the commander of the division's left brigade to conclude that there
was undoubtedly a village observation post
from which enemy artillery and aviation were being operated. Given the presence
of an international observation post south of the
200 meters south of the Israthili fortress, the brigade commander assigned an
infantry battalion to send a group to inspect the
the checkpoint. Upon entering the post, the group discovered the presence of an
officer

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Israeli lieutenant with the rank of lieutenant and was equipped with a radio
transmitter and directing artillery fire.

The force captured him and all his equipment. From that moment on, the
The enemy's long-range artillery and aviation fire ceased, and it became
possible for our forces to storm Fort Mafzieh

Accordingly, a force from the left brigade of the 19th Infantry Division
attacked the Israeli fort for the third time
for the third time and succeeded in storming and capturing it at 3:00 pm on
October 8, and the enemy's losses amounted to

The enemy losses amounted to 38 killed and 15 prisoners, including an officer,
and a huge amount of weapons and equipment were seized.

On the afternoon of October 9, the 2nd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, led by Col.
Al-Faiha Karim, was able to occupy Jabal al-Murr, which controls the area. The
19th Infantry Division

19 Infantry Division launched its attack to the east and seized the general
line: Jabal Abu Ghulam, Jabal al-Murr, and the Strait of
8 km east of the canal, achieving the division's next mission. It reinforced the
defense, coordinate fire plans, and prepare to repel the expected enemy tactical
counterattack

and cooperate with the left flank of the 7th Infantry Division in preparation
for achieving the final mission and entering the head of the
Army Bridge. In the 7th Infantry Division's sector, the enemy, which was
occupying a line of fire in front of the

In front of the division's left brigade at first light on October 8. At 11:00 a.m. noon, the mechanized infantry brigade was pushed between the two brigades of the 1st Corps after a concentrated fire artillery in preparation for the development of the attack to the east to fulfill the division's next mission. In order to secure the the intersection of the Shatt Road and the Gedi Strait, the area from which Al Mido had used to launch his counterattacks on the division's left flank due to the trial nature of the area, the commander of the Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi ordered the commander of the 25th Independent Armored Brigade attached to the division

to push a tank company to occupy the intersection and act as a flank guard for the division.

At 4 p.m., the commander of the 7th Infantry Division ordered the division's brigades to begin advancing to develop the attack honorably, but the enemy soon launched strong counterattacks on the division's left flank the division's left flank, which delayed the attack until 7:30 p.m. The division commander therefore ordered the division commander ordered a reconnaissance patrol behind enemy lines to the area of Jawz al-Jazzad, north of the to report on the situation and activity of the enemy in front of the division. He also ordered a a tank company with a mechanized infantry platoon to join the 603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the of the 130th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which stopped south of Kabzeit Sharq after crossing the lagoon on the afternoon of October 6, and was then unable to carry out the mission for which it

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task assigned to it, which was to advance along the Shatt Road, the Mitla Strait, to seize its Kharbi entrance. The division commander's purpose in mobilizing this force was to direct it to reinforce the tank company that had been which had been sent to act as a flank guard at the intersection of the Shatt al-Jadidi road, with the intention of occupying the position before last light on October 8. the position before last light on October 8. At 7:30 p.m., the The infantry rushed forward on foot, and 200 meters behind them, the tanks advanced, followed by the armored personnel carriers. Tanks advanced, followed by armored personnel carriers. The division's security brigade was able to fulfill its mission and reached the division's bridgehead line 8 kilometers east of the canal after midnight. But the mechanized infantry brigade, which was in the first line and in the center of the division's formation its flank was repeatedly subjected to strong counterattacks from enemy tanks, disrupting its progress to the next mission line and the advance of the division's left brigade was also hampered by enemy counterattacks. The division commander, Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi, issued an order to the commander of the independent 25th Brigade to push a tank battalion to go around the enemy's left flank and destroy it, but due to the armored battalion was unable to reach its assigned line due to poor visibility and lack of knowledge of the terrain. However, it succeeded in turning into a line of fire in front of the enemy's front and forced the enemy with its artillery fire. to retreat eastward at 6:30 a.m. on October 9.

At 1:15 p.m., the armored brigade's tank company, supported by a mechanical

infantry platoon

Mechanized Infantry, in cooperation with the 603rd Battalion of the 130th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade captured the enemy strongpoint east of Sulphur (Fort Butzer) without a fight, as it turned out that the enemy had vacated it on the evening of October 8. The enemy evacuated it on the evening of October 8.

At 9:00 p.m. on October 9, the brigades of the 7th Infantry Division took up their final positions

The brigades of the 7th Infantry Division occupied their final positions at the head of the Farfa Bridge and realized the next mission.

reinforcing the acquired lines and laying mines in front of the front line. The division commander, under instructions from the

Third Army Commander to push a detachment on the division's left flank

consisting of an infantry battalion supported by a

with a tank company to secure the left flank of the army and secure the forces that had occupied the Sulphur position

Following the arrival of the five infantry divisions in the Second and Third Army sectors to the mission line

The advanced command centers of the infantry brigades moved to their retreats behind the first piles.

The divisional and brigade headquarters also moved to their positions east of the canal, and at the same time

the remaining brigade and division artillery groups crossed over and took up positions east of the canal.

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On the night of October 8/9, administrative columns began crossing the Suez Canal on the bridges

carrying appointments, water and ammunition, especially ammunition for tanks, anti-tank weapons

and artillery, which were consumed. of which large quantities have been consumed. About 1,000 Lodi vehicles

assigned to the Second Army and about 70,000 lorries assigned to the Third Army flowed across the Suez Canal

Suez, loaded with heaps of provisions and supplies to replace what was consumed by the formations and units of the divisions

and divisional units. Before first light on October 9, the lorries returned before dawn to the

West Bank, having been loaded with Egyptian wounded, as well as enemy wounded and prisoners.

Factors in the failure of Israel's main counterattack

The Israeli counterattack on October 8 ended in total failure, as the armored forces were unable to penetrate the Egyptian positions in the northern sector.

were unable to penetrate the Egyptian positions in the northern sector of the front, where the Second Army is stationed.

The Israeli armored forces were unable to penetrate Egyptian positions in the northern sector of the front where the Second Army is stationed.

Egyptian bridges over the Suez Canal intact for his troops to cross to the west bank of the canal.

The Israeli leadership did not achieve any tactical or tactical objectives after the failed counterattack

while the Egyptian forces had not yet finalized all of their defenses defenses, and finished establishing themselves on the eastern shore of the Canal.

This failure was the natural result of a curse of factors and tactical mistakes that can be summarized as follows:

â When tanks were used in the attack on October 8, it was expected that the was expected to take advantage of its agility and freedom of maneuver to mass its tanks in

a sector of the front to deliver a concentrated strike on a narrow front, which

is the optimal use of tanks
of tanks to obtain decisive results, but on the contrary, it used its armored
divisions
armored divisions to deliver sporadic strikes on wide confrontations, resulting
in the failure of these
. If the counterattack had been concentrated on the divisions of Generals Adan
and Sharon
and supported by adequate artillery and aviation support, the likelihood would
have been
that the two divisions would have been able to break through the sector and
reach the water line.
Khathral Adan also violated the sound tactical principle of tank discipline,
pushing his three armored brigades
his three armored brigades to attack the second sackcloth sector while scattered
and dispersed instead of using them in one concentrated attack against the water
line.
instead of using them in one concentrated attack against the weakest part of the
sector.
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It became apparent to Israeli armored unit commanders during the battles that
the tank tactics
used successfully during the 1956 and 1966 wars, namely rushing at full speed
through
Melesian positions to cause panic in the ranks of their personnel and force them
to flee, failed this time
was a complete failure. The concepts that had crept into Israeli military
thinking were clearly wrong
as a result of the experiences of the previous two wars, which is the belief
that armored forces can operate freely
without the need for infantry or artillery support. Because of this mistake,
Israeli tanks paid
Israeli tanks paid a heavy price as they faced thousands of Lithuanian
infantrymen who stood
with astonishing courage behind their cover, showering Israeli tanks with a
barrage of RPG
G7 and Sager (Malotka) armor-piercing grenades and shovel-loaded anti-tank
grenades
Hussam and PG43 shovel grenades, inflicting heavy losses on the tanks.

The obvious shortage of Israeli artillery batteries was the reason for the small
amount of fire that fell on the Malasian positions
that fell on the Malasian positions to cover and support the Israeli attack.
Among the reasons for this were
the late arrival of the reserve artillery batteries from the reserve assembly
center in Bather
due to the general atmosphere of confusion that prevailed in the initial call-up
of the reserves
due to the impact of the strategic surprise that befell Israel, in addition to
the fact that the Israeli leadership
pushed most of the reserve forces in the first phase of the war to the Golan
front.
due to the seriousness of the situation on the northern front due to its close
proximity to Israeli population centers
densely populated Israeli centers. As a result of these factors, the artillery
batteries of
General Adan, forcing General Gonen to allocate only two batteries from Sharon's
division
to support him in Hagarmeh, which meant that the artillery support for the main
counterattack was
was extremely weak, and this was undoubtedly a factor in its failure.

âThe October War in its first phase was not a movement war, as was the case in

the June War

1967, and it was not a fight between tanks and each other, but rather it was a firefight and a fierce fight between Israeli armored vehicles between Israeli armor and Egyptian infantry, in which Israeli tanks were forced to had to rely on their own guns to defend themselves against the Egyptian infantry who proved to be their superiority with their deadly missiles and armor-piercing weapons. And if he had been Israeli tanks in the first phase of the war were accompanied by sufficient infantry units

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mechanized infantry, self-propelled guns and light and heavy mortars, the Egyptian infantry would have would have suffered heavy losses.

Air support for General Adan's forces during the counterattack was limited. Despite the persistent insistence of the brigade commanders in requesting air support, the Southern Command Southern Command was unable to provide it in the required volume, as the fiercest battles were raging on the Golan front at the time The fiercest battles were raging on the Golan front after the Syrians threw all their weight into it, and pushed their last reserve of armored forces into the battle. armored forces into the battle; the entire Syrian army came into combat contact with the Israeli army, whose formations were with the Israeli army, whose reserve formations were just arriving on the battlefield. The fierce battle was about to reach its decisive end, causing the the Israeli leadership rushed most of Israel's air effort to the Golan front.

Gutin and Adan trade accusations

There is an old saying: "Victory has many fathers, while defeat is an orphan." 4

after the failure of the Israeli counterattack on October 8 on the Second Field Army's sector.

General Gonen tried to place the blame for the failure on the shoulders of General Abraham Adan (Bern), whose armored division whose armored division led the counterattack, but the fact-finding committee ordered by the Israeli government in late November 1973 ordered by the Israeli government in late November 1973, headed by Judge Shimon Agranat, head of the Supreme Court.

to investigate the causes of the failures of the October War, in its report, it explicitly held General Gonen, the commander of the Southern Command, responsible

General Gonen, the commander of the Southern Command, was explicitly blamed for the October 8 defeat.

It stated in its report: "General Junin did not sell a detailed plan of operations, nor did he care to

to send the plan of operations to his division commanders, and did not ensure that his forces were properly assembled and prepared to carry out their missions.

required to carry out their missions. He did not bother to go to the theater of operations to see for himself

to see for himself what was happening there. He made critical decisions to move armored divisions from one sector

from one sector to another quickly, before he could ascertain by any means whether the tasks had been authorized as specified by the Chief of the General Staff

General Staff as a condition for moving these forces from one sector to another, and he changed the tasks of the armored divisions

He changed the tasks of the armored divisions several times, imposing other

tasks on them without making each division aware of the situation of its forces and the enemy's forces the enemy. He gradually diminished the objective and means assigned to him by the Chief of Staff. by his eagerness to cross quickly without creating the necessary conditions for such a dangerous operation.

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It has been proven that Gonen succeeded in getting General David Eliezer to endorse his his plans through the false reports he sent to him, which portrayed to the Chief of Staff a situation contrary to what was actually the case. The Chief of Staff was blamed for his denial of Gonen's authorizing his troops to cross the Suez Canal and occupy positions on the west bank of the canal, and his approval of the his order to General Sharon to move his division south on the Suez Canal to attack on the Third Army, when the situation called for it to move north to come to the aid of General Adan and support his his attack. The Chief of Staff justified this by stating that he had abandoned his duty because Gen. Junin was giving him the impression that everything was going well with his reports and statements. And he General Abraham Adan, in his book "On the Banks of the Suez Canal," published in Hebrew in in Hebrew, acknowledged the personal mistakes he made during his armored division's counterattack on Monday, October 8 of his armored division on Monday, October 8: "My biggest mistake was my attack in the vicinity of the canal. On October 8 I felt their pressure on me when it had not happened in previous wars. in previous wars, and I had no choice but to respond. I did not know that that the plan agreed upon the day before had been changed, and while I was in a state of indecision, the orders of Yordy Ben-Ari (Naleb Gonen) pushed me to bring my troops closer to the canal. I conditioned my attack that I must have air support, artillery assistance, and an armored battalion of a division armored battalion of a division. I do not shirk responsibility for the failure of the armored division I commanded The division's fighting style was underdeveloped, and the coordination and control on my part of my command was inadequate. My coordination and control on my part was inadequate, I did not succeed in reinforcing Nitka's brigade so that it would not attack the enemy on its own The commanders of my armored brigades were the same way, they had inadequate control of their forces was inadequate, and there was no justification for pushing us to attack close to the Canal when we should have been spreading south. It was an asnas:fasnal that we attacked with no infantry, no artillery and no air support. We had been promised with air support, but it turned out that air support was scattered and scattered everywhere. Of the dozens of sorties carried out by ground support planes, only only twenty-four sorties in the Fardan sector."

General Adan additionally recorded his own admission of his personal failings and the culpability of other divisional commanders in the defeat. in the defeat, focusing in particular on the role of General Sharon in the defeat of the 8th of

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October, he said: "Division commanders cannot shake off the dust of responsibility by claiming that they that they received orders. Sharon, for example, received an order from Gonen to leave his sector, but his behavior as a military commander is astonishing. He ordered his brigade commanders to move south to the south without leaving any forces to protect the sector he was occupying despite enemy activity against him, leaving his sector empty and vulnerable to occupation by the Malasrians. Before moving Sharon did not explain the reality of the situation to General Gonen. I cannot overlook an important fact that there is a critical element that can weaken or strengthen forces on the battlefield is that the force comes to the aid of neighboring forces. I harshly criticize Sharon for refusing to give up an armored battalion to reinforce my attacking forces in the Fardan sector. as well as his refusal, after receiving Junin's order to return to his sector, to accelerate the reinforcement of my offensive And for his refusal, after receiving Junin's order to return to his sector, to expedite the reinforcement of my attack and to join me with his division, which led me to Al-Fathnil. It is also I should also mention that the lack of control and coordination was observed at all levels of command, and was exemplified when Sharon's division returned from the south to the central sector it had left left behind. We didn't know that Sharon had returned, which caused units from the two divisions to

fired at each other, thinking they were shooting at the enemy." In his book, General Adan responded to General Gonen's harsh criticisms of him. accusing him of being the cause of the October 8 defeat: "He tried to pin the blame for the failure on me, claiming that his orders were logical and executable, and that if I had attacked in a concentrated manner from north to south instead of east to west, I would have broken the enemy's left flank. The attack was logical as long as we did not approaching the area of batteries and terraces west of the canal, but from the moment 2 Junin pressed me to move closer to the bottom of the canal and cross from east to west to occupy positions on the western bank of the canal. west of the canal, I had to attack, of course, from east to west, and attacking from north to south near the canal attacking from north to south near the canal meant jeopardizing the enemy's left flank, which had artillery batteries and terraces set up west of the canal for tanks to fire from, and for 1. from which to launch short- and long-range anti-tank missiles, at a time when the canal, being a water obstacle, is being prepared: The canal, as a huge water barrier, protects and protects the enemy from the threat of a swooping and attack on him. As for not mobilizing forces and concentrating the counterattack

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It was Herr himself who played the main role in making this mistake. When we discussed on the evening of the evening of October 7, we discussed the various possibilities for the counterattack to be carried out the next day, and Albert Maendler proposed a concentrated attack in a narrow sector with two armored divisions as a prelude to crossing into the West Bank to the West Bank was rejected. Since Junin had decided that the counterattack would be with only one division, why didn't he assign this task to Sharon's division?

in the Central Sector, and he had already planned and prepared for the operation, so why would he bring another division from a distance to do a job it had not prepared for?
 from a distance to do a job for which it was not prepared, and if the mission was still assigned to my division
 to my division, why did Junin order Sharon to move from Tata'ah to the south before I began my main attack, thereby exposing Qatami at a time when he had pressed
 Ali2 to urgently advance my forces to the south? In the face of all these errors, it was only natural that my division's attack ended in failure. naturally, my division's attack ended in total failure. We came away from October 8 with an important lesson
 that it was too early to think about counterattacking on the Canal and crossing to the West Bank. The objective of the attack was to quickly seize the initiative from the
 confuse and weaken their ranks, stop their advance, and recapture as much of the land we had evacuated as possible
 of the land we had evacuated. If we had known about the tactical pause in the Egyptian command's plan
 following the success of the Egyptian forces in establishing the area of the bridgeheads, we would undoubtedly have favored
 undoubtedly would have preferred to wait until the reserve forces were assembled, organized, and equipped with crossing equipment.
 Unfortunately, we did not know this2 .

In evaluating General Adan's book "On Both Banks of the Suez Canal" regarding his analysis of the reasons for the failure of the Israeli counterattack on October 8, we acknowledge that he analyzed this failure from the Israeli point of view in an objective manner, even if he went a bit too far
 in his harsh criticism of General Gonen, commander of the Southern Command, and General Sharon, commander of the central sector on the Sinai front
 Sharon, commander of the central sector on the Sinai front, but he overlooked the main reason for the failure of the
 the ability and fortitude of the Egyptian commanders and forces against which the attack was launched.
 However, we must commend General Adan's moral courage, as he frankly revealed his personal mistakes in commanding the battle
 and the mistakes of his subordinate brigade commanders, without trying to find This is something we wish other commanders of the October War, whether on the Arab or Israeli side, would have followed.
 Arab or Israeli side.

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Tahin Bar-Lev's personal representative to the Chief of Staff

The news of the counterattack on October 8 had a bad effect on Israeli officials in Tel Aviv
 in Tel Aviv, prompting Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Chief of Staff General Eliezer to
 by helicopter to the Southern Front's forward headquarters in Umm Marjam after midnight.
 to hold an urgent meeting with General Gonen and the command's senior officers, as well as the commanders of the three armored divisions
 Adan, Sharon and Mandler.

Gonen opened the discussion with the permission of the Minister of Defense. He began by recounting the events that had taken place
 trying to justify the mistakes he had made, but this time he openly admitted that

not to attack the canal again, not to approach the Bar-Lev line's still besieged fortresses

He decided that it was a mistake to think of crossing the Suez Canal on this trip.

He suggested that the crossing should be from somewhere else north of the Gulf of Suez, and the three divisional commanders

Albert Mandler, the commander of the southern sector and one of the most capable experts in tank warfare, reiterated his

reiterated his view that the attack should be concentrated in a narrow sector with large forces

and quickly to ensure success in reaching the canal and attempting to cross to the West Bank.

Sharon, the commander of the Central Sector, objected to basing offensive planning on the occupation of Egyptian bridges

Egyptian bridges due to the difficulties and issues surrounding this operation, and stated that the Israeli command should prepare

should prepare its own equipment for a crossing operation that relies on Israeli crossing equipment, while

General Adan (Bern) said that the crossing is associated with a difficult and dangerous penetration operation and should therefore

He emphasized the need for the next battle to be a battle of combined arms, i.e.

The next battle should be a battle of combined arms, meaning that the armored divisions should be joined by artillery, mechanized infantry, mechanized

infantry

and air force. Since the crossing equipment is heavy and the towing of any of its parts has not been tested from afar

General Adan suggested that it was necessary to experiment with dragging the equipment over sand

and train some units to do so.

After summarizing the views discussed at the meeting, the Chief of Staff finally outlined

the plan for future military operations: Are we not able to

to attack on two fronts at the same time, on the northern front in the Golan

Heights we will continue our offensive, while on the southern front in Sinai

on the northern front in the Golan, while on the southern front in the Sinai we will move to defense. Our problem in the Golan Heights

is to prevent the Egyptians from crushing us and making new achievements.

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We must not gather our forces in preparation for the transition to the offensive phase, and we must avoid clashing with the enemy

and avoid fighting new battles with him. If he tries to break through to the east, we should stop him with minimal losses

with minimal losses, provided that we do not enable him to reach the crossroad (Crossroad No. 3, about 30 kilometers east of the canal

3, about 30 kilometers east of the canal). We should rest as much as possible during this period.

reorganize and reinforce our forces in preparation for the attack, and repair as many tanks as possible

broken. The divisions of Adan and Maandler have been destroyed, but Sharon's division is the only one that survived and did not

They should prepare to cross the Canal in a few days.â

After the Chief of Staff finished speaking, Defense Minister Mordechai Dayan ended the meeting

made important remarks, namely that he was deeply concerned about the heavy losses suffered by

Israel, which will have a major impact on the course of the war, all that remains on the southern front

tanks on the southern front amounted to about 400 tanks, and Israel had no other sources of reinforcements

with which to reinforce its forces, so the decided policy of sparing and

repairing the army is of paramount importance

As soon as the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff returned to Tel Aviv, they held a meeting in the High Command. For the first time, Moshe Dayan discussed the idea of appointing a new commander

after recent events proved that commanding the front in Sinai was beyond the capabilities of

General Gonen, and that another commander should be appointed in his place.

The relationship between Gonen and Sharon was complicated from the beginning by the fact that Gonen had previously served

as a division commander under Sharon when he was commander of the Southern Command.

Gonen became the commander of Sharon, who had taken command of a reserve division after his retirement.

Thus, Sharon found himself subordinate to the man who had been his commander less than three months earlier. Given that

Sharon was known to everyone as a cantankerous and stubborn person, and senior commanders had been unable to

were unable to subdue and tame him, subduing Sharon became one of Junin's main issues

When Gonen learned that Sharon, after assuming command of the central sector, had disobeyed his orders

and that he was continuing to push units of his division toward the canal to save the garrisons of the outposts

he flew by helicopter to Sharon's command center, where he personally ordered him to stop

these attempts, which would only result in more losses. Although Chazorn indicated his willingness to comply with his instructions, Junin soon learned that Chaz³n continued to waste tanks in his brutal attacks to save

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In defiance of his orders, Gonen immediately called General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff and demanded that Sharon be removed from command.

In response to Gonen's inability to assume command responsibility with the competence required for this opportunity.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan nominated General Chaim Bar-Lev, former Chief of General Staff and Minister of Trade and Industry in the Israeli government.

Trade and Industry in the Israeli government at the time to take over the Southern Command from Gonen.

Following a meeting of the Israeli cabinet on Tuesday, October 9, the chief of staff invited

General Bar-Lev to visit the High Command, where he explained to him how bitter he was about the deteriorating situation in the south

the deteriorating situation in the south, and how the relationship between Gonen and Sharon had worsened

to the point of jeopardizing the situation there. He eventually offered to take charge of the

Southern Command. Bar-Lev agreed on the condition that satisfactory arrangements be made for Gonen, and that the

the approval of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense for his appointment. Bar-Lev then went to his home

to prepare his mascara and personal equipment, and was summoned from the bathroom to answer a call from

from Prime Minister Golda Meir, who congratulated him on his decision and told him that she would announce it at the

at the cabinet meeting scheduled for that night. A few minutes later, the defense minister called him and said

to him: "Go straight there and make whatever decisions you see fit."

When Bar-Lev returned to headquarters at 10 p.m., Eliezer Ann Gonen told him

was furious at the idea of appointing him to the Southern Command, considering it tantamount to removing him from his position and laying Bar-Lev replied that he was not willing to serve as a military advisor to Jehonen.

that he was not willing to serve as military advisor to Jehonen, and that he would not go to the Sinai until his position was clearly defined. Eliezer made the call to Jehonen and told him that while the leadership felt that he did not deserve to be publicly exposed by removing him from his command, it is in the public interest that General Bar-Lev take over Southern Command given the harsh military conditions in the Sinai. A new proposal was put forward that Bar-Lev be appointed as the Chief of Staff's personal representative in the Southern Command, with full full command authority. Bar-Lev agreed to this formula on the condition that it was made clear that he was his commander and not his military advisor. He went to sleep on a couch in the chief of staff's office. Eliezer woke him up a few hours later to tell him that General Gonen had agreed to this proposed solution.

On the morning of Wednesday, October 10, Bar-Lev arrived at the Israeli forward headquarters at

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Sinai. In the operations room, he gathered around him the command's senior officers and told them in the presence of Gonen in his slow, calm tone: "The Chief of Staff sent me here as his personal representative, and I am, as you know I am the oldest and highest-ranking officer among you and I have more experience than any of you, so from this moment on I am the one who gives the orders here. When Bar-Lev was alone with Gonen, he told him: "I have no intention of harming you. I have no intention of harming you. It doesn't bother me that Dado (the pet name for General Eliezer, the chief of staff Chief of Staff) who was my subordinate is now my commander, and I hope I don't bother you by being your commander. After these frank conversations, Bar-Lev and Gonen agreed on the modus operandi of the command.

that Bar-Lev would be the first in charge of the Southern Command and that Junin would not issue any orders that would affect operations on the front without consulting him. Junin commented on this bitterly: "In the war I will have a special chief of staff." 4 He then said to Bar-Lev in anguish: "I am afraid that this situation will hurt me after the war." 1

Israel's Counterattack on the 16th Infantry Division

It is a mistake to believe that a period of calm prevailed on the Sinai front in the five days following the failure of the counterattack in the five days following the failure of the tactical counterattack launched by Israeli forces on the Second Army sector on October 8, 1973, until the development phase of the eastward attack began with the formations of the The fighting during this period did not subside and did not stop along the line. Fighting during this period did not subside or stop along the front line. Although the two combatants engaged in in continuous battles throughout this period, each of them was aiming to achieve a completely different goal completely different from that of its opponent. On the Egyptian side, in the

southern sector, General Abdel Moneim Commander of the Third Army was aiming for the 19th and 7th Infantry Divisions to reach the final mission line assigned to them in the plan, and to enter together at the head of the Army Bridge. In the northern sector Major General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, was aiming for the 16th, 2nd, and 81st Infantry Divisions to reach the (12.10 kilometers east of the canal), with the 16th and 2nd Infantry Divisions and 2 Infantry Divisions at the head of Kobr al-Juhaysh Bridge, while the 18 Infantry Division in its sector extending from the north of Balah Island to Kab Al Balah Island to Al Kab, forming its own bridgehead about 5 km north of the second Al Khish bridgehead about 5 kilometers to the north. The successful formation of the unified bridgeheads of the two armies meant the completion of the first phase of the Badr offensive plan and preparation for the implementation of

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the second phase of the plan, which was to develop the attack eastward by pushing the second corps of the two armies in the direction of Cross Road No. 3 and the Gehbilyah Gorges.

On the Israeli side, the Southern Command was implementing the decision made by Gen. David Eliezer, the head of the General Staff, during an urgent meeting he held at the advanced command center in after midnight following the failure of the main counterattack on October 8, which was attended by the defense minister and the commander of the Southern Command. which was attended by the defense minister, the commander of the Southern Command and the commanders of the three armored divisions: Adan Sharon and Mandler, which called for Israeli forces on the Sinai front to go on the defensive. pending the liquidation of the Golan front in the north by defeating the Syrian forces Syria out of the war, and that arrangements would be made on the southern front to reorganize Israeli forces, replacing losses and repairing damaged equipment, especially tanks, after the harsh three-day battles. the harsh three-day battles, in preparation for the offensive phase. The most important part of the of the Chief of Staff's instructions to the Israeli command in Sinai was to stop the Egyptian forces' eastern advance and prevent them by all means from widening and deepening bridges bridges, and from reaching Satisfactory Road No. 3 (about 31 kilometers east of the canal). Canal). The Israeli leadership resorted to two highly effective means to obstruct the process of deepening the Egyptian bridges Egyptian forces to deepen their bridgeheads and develop their attack in the east:

The first was concentrated long-range artillery and aviation strikes on Egyptian positions Egyptian positions, and the creation of curtains of anti-tank missile-5s to halt the advance of Egyptian forces. Egyptian troops. The second method was for Israeli armored forces to launch counterattacks company and battalion level counterattacks on Egyptian positions in order to hold them in place and prevent them from from advancing eastward. But on Tuesday, October 9, there was one exception to this rule an entire Israeli armored brigade, the 600th Brigade, counterattacked the

positions of the 16th Infantry Division
positions of the 16th Infantry Division, then commanded by Brigadier General Abd Rab al-Nabi Hafez, whose sector
Its sector extended from Dafraswar in the south to east of Ismailia in the north (south of the Middle Road).
Megashra). The division was facing the general line at point 57, Khatib al-Khail Abou Wafaqa
(about 10 kilometers east of the canal). The line was occupied by three infantry brigades in the first echelon and the
14 Armored Brigade (attached from the 21st Armored Division) in the second echelon. Following the failure of the Israeli counterattack on October 8
on October 8, the enemy assembled the 6100th Armored Brigade in the areas of Dheeb al-Sakan and
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and Umm Bir Dahr, north of the Middle Road on Masana, about 16 km east of the Suez Canal.
pushed other armored and mechanized infantry units (a battalion from the 46th Armored Brigade 0 in the direction of the
Middle Road (Ismailia Road east of Tassa). Enemy hostilities on October 9
October 9 was mainly directed against the 16th Infantry Division, with the forces of the 2nd Infantry Division stabilized to prevent the two divisions from develop their attack to the east and prevent their forces from communicating with each other on the Middle Road.
Beginning at 6:30 a.m. on Tuesday, October 9, the enemy began to launch strong counterattacks against the 16th Infantry Division with an estimated strength of one armored battalion on the division's left brigade
on the division's left brigade and two armored battalions on the center brigade (3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade) to test the division's defenses and discover its weakest points.
the division's defenses and discover its weakest parts in preparation for his main counterattack in this direction
in this direction with the aim of breaking through the head of the Kobre al-Qarqa bridge and disrupting the left-handed defense system in the northern sector of the front.
in the northern sector of the front. Despite the heavy losses suffered by the enemy tanks
due to the solidity of the Egyptian defenses, he continued his counterattacks along the division's front
of the division until the number of counterattacks rose to four in just four hours
Fearing that the enemy would try to break through the Egyptian defenses at the point of contact between
as the weakest part of the defense line, Major General Saad Maamoun, commander of the
who was closely following the situation, issued his orders at 10:00 a.m. to Brigadier General Abd Rabbo, commander of the 16th Infantry Division, to move a tank battalion from the 14th Armored Brigade (the division's second echelon) of the division) to take a blocking line on the left of the division's formation (west of the Abu Waqqaqa area) to prevent any penetration
to prevent any enemy penetration from this direction. While repelling counterattacks on the mechanized infantry brigade in the
in the center of the division's front, Brigade Commander Hamid Shafiq Mitri Sidrak ordered the battalion commander of the
to develop the battalion's attack to the east to align with the division's general line.
As Brigadier General Shafiq moved forward in his armored command vehicle at around 10:00 a.m.
His vehicle was hit by a direct shell from the direction of Point 118, and the hero was martyred on the spot.
This was the second loss suffered by the commanders of the 16th Infantry Division's formations in less than 24 hours
On the previous day, October 8, while the division's left brigade was developing

its

The previous day, October 8, while the division's left brigade was developing its eastward migration to achieve the next mission and reach the general line of the horse dune Abu Waqfa, and

While the brigade commander, Col. H. Adel Yusri before sunset on top of Point 121 in the

to reconnoiter the enemy's position, he was hit by an armor-piercing shell.

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(Sapo) from an Israeli tank gun directly hit him, causing his right leg to be amputated on the spot.

He was evacuated to the rear where he was subsequently hospitalized.

The division's senior commanders set a great example of courage and leadership for their officers and soldiers.

At about 2:30 p.m., the enemy launched its main counterattack on the (3rd Mechanized Brigade) with an estimated force of two armored battalions (the first echelon of the Israeli armored brigade

After concentrated artillery and aerial bombardment on the areas of Point 57 and Taliyah.

Under the weight of its armored attack, the enemy managed to penetrate the defenses of the 1st Corps Battalion

right and captured the vital point 57 and tried to expand its penetration by pushing towards

Al-Taliyah, a vital point occupied by the brigade's 2nd Coordination Battalion.

In addition to the importance of this point in terms of the balance of the mechanized brigade's defensive position, it also housed the brigade's command center

was the brigade's command center, and to the west of it was the advanced command center of the 16th Division

Infantry. The actions taken to counter the Israeli penetration were decisive and swift.

The Mechanized Infantry Battalion (2nd Formation), which was occupying the defensive position at Taliyah, played a heroic role in repelling the penetration played a heroic role in repelling the penetration, with all of its B33 armored vehicles armed with

Malotka armor-piercing missiles, inflicting heavy losses on the attacking Israeli tanks

heavy losses. During the repulsion battle, the 16th Division commander ordered a battalion from the 14th Armored Brigade

(attached from the 21st Armored Division) and the division's tank battalion to participate in repelling the breakthrough while

while ordering the division's anti-tank reserve and the army's anti-tank reserve to open

Duqm1 on the flanks of the Israeli armored force that had succeeded in breaking through. The artillery of

3 Mechanized Brigade's artillery and the division's artillery simultaneously bombarded the breach through which the Israeli tanks had entered

through which the Israeli tanks had entered. Thus, the Israeli armored force fell

was hit by concentrated artillery and anti-tank missile fire, destroying 38 60 Patton 48 tanks and four 8113 armored vehicles.

from the direction of Taliyah, but managed to hold on to the vital position at Point 57, from which the forward battalion

from which the right forward battalion had withdrawn, threatening the 16th Division's defenses.

At 6:30 p.m., the enemy repeated its main counterattack for the second time with a force

An estimated 60 tanks (the remnants of the two battalions of the first coordination of the Israeli armored brigade 10 0 after

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The direction of the counterattack was dangerous, as it targeted the point of contact between the Mechanized Infantry Brigade between the mechanized infantry brigade in the center and the division's right brigade, at a time when An Israeli armored force was present at Point 57, giving the attacking tanks the opportunity to to make a wide penetration on the right flank of the division, about 3 kilometers deep. The commander of the of the 16th Infantry Division took several important and urgent measures to counter the most serious threat to the division since the start of the siege on October 6

The commander of the division's right brigade ordered the brigade's 2nd Brigade Coordination Battalion, which was that was occupying its positions in the area of Al-Jalaa village (the Israelis called it Al-Mazraa to close the gap that existed between the center brigade and the right brigade. The division commander ordered a strike force to repel the breach, which consisted of the second corps densities of the of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade (Armored Vehicle Battalion (B..5) and the Garga Tank Battalion (after adjusting their positions since the repulsion of the breakthrough).

positions they had been in since the first breakthrough was repulsed) With the opening of all anti-tank reserves of the center and right brigades, the division's reserve and the army's anti-tank reserve.

anti-tank reserves. The division commander asked the army commander to assist the division in repelling the Israeli breakthrough with the fire of the 2nd Army's 1st and 2nd Artillery Groups. brigade artillery groups and the division's artillery. The area of enemy penetration was quickly neutralized after quickly turned into a hellhole after the heavy artillery and anti-tank missile fire.

Israeli tanks were forced to retreat to the east after their losses amounted to about 20 tanks

The breach was closed after a fierce battle in which the Egyptian mechanized infantry brigade lost Infantry Brigade suffered heavy losses. In a silent night attack on the night of October 10/9, the infantry brigade With the help of the division, the mechanized infantry brigade recaptured Point 57 after Israeli tanks were forced to evacuate it

The bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division was restored to the position it was in before it was subjected to to the fierce Israeli counterattacks on October 9.

In the 2nd Infantry Division's sector, its commander, Brig. Gen. flank of his division to prevent any Israeli armored forces from penetrating the division's defenses through the the point of contact between the 2nd and 16th Infantry Divisions. His decision included pushing a mechanized infantry battalion to occupy a defensive position west of the tree hill facing south while opening up the division's reserve

2 Antitank Division's reserve in the same direction, as well as repositioning the tank battalion from the 24th Armored Brigade Armored Brigade (attached to the division) to share responsibility for securing the division's right flank. And increase

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security measures, the division commander ordered the division commander to quickly lay a minefield north of the center road between the between the Suez Canal and the tree hill to completely block this front.

During his attacks on the 16th Division, al-Adro attempted to stabilize the

forces of the 2nd Infantry Division (left flank). He launched three counterattacks with an armored company on the division's right brigade and two on its left brigade on the division's left brigade. They were all repulsed, and the enemy lost 14 tanks and one armored rocket vehicle anti-tank missiles. At 1:00 p.m., Brigadier General Hassan Abu Saada ordered his forces to develop taking advantage of the success of his formations in repelling the counter-attacks.

The development of the attack was carried out with the same combat formation as before (three infantry brigades in the and the 24th Armored Brigade in the second echelon). As the division's Allen Brigade under heavy fire from an Israeli tank group, it was forced to halt until at 4:00 p.m., but continued to advance with determination. and the division's left brigade came under heavy fire from anti-tank missiles. Tanks caused heavy losses in the Mechanized Brigade, especially in its organic tank battalion. Despite the enemy's desperate attempts to disrupt the development of the attack, the division's formations succeeded succeeded in capturing the final mission line at 11:00 p.m. Its greatest success was Focused on the safe flank facing the center road, the right brigade succeeded in capturing The right brigade succeeded in capturing Dune Abu Khedira and Triangle Point 100, which was the direction of the main effort of the Dharka while simultaneously securing the division's final mission of establishing Ra'man Kobri a unified army with the 16th Infantry Division.

Moshe Dayan's nerves were shaken. 9

On the evening of October 9, General Eliezer, Israel's Chief of the General Staff the general mood on the battlefield at a conference of the heads of the Hinat and branches of the Chief of Staff.

Chief of Staff Adadeh led Israel's plan on the Egyptian front after the failure of the Israel's plan aims to optimize the balance of power by inflicting the maximum losses in lives, weapons, and equipment, and after countering the Malassian which was expected to take place, there would then be the potential for an immediate counterattack to penetrate Egyptian positions and cross the Suez Canal to the West Bank.

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At 7 p.m. on October 9, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan met with the editors-in-chief of Israeli newspapers at the Defense Ministry Israeli newspapers at the Ministry of Defense, where he gave them his assessment of the situation, which reflected the extent of Moshe Dayan's acute crisis of pessimism following the failure of Israel's recent counterattacks on Egyptian forces. He told them the following: Our forces in Sinai are deployed defensively They are taking a line to contain the Egyptians until the situation in Gakhoulan changes within the next few days . The heavily fortified Bar-Lev line has been evacuated, sometimes orderly, sometimes not. There is no longer a line that can play any role, as we have lost contact with its fortresses and abandoned it, and this reveals to the whole world multiple truths: The first is that we are not stronger than the Egyptians, and the second is that if we cannot

the Egyptians will continue to mobilize their troops and tanks on the eastern side of the canal
east side of the canal. The big question now is: What happens next? If the Egyptians launch an attack from their
from their positions, we will have to find shorter, more favorable lines where we can hold our ground
These lines should be somewhere in the area between the Suez Canal and the mountain range
mountain range so that they cannot cross it. Since the way is open for the Egyptians to advance
south to Abu Rudeis toward Sharm el-Sheikh, we have to wonder what would happen if they
We can't rely on aviation alone to prevent an Egyptian attack heading south. Egyptian attacks to the south, and even if we set up new lines of defense, I doubt

that our troops will be able to hold these lines² .
When newspaper editors learned that Moshe Dayan would be announcing to the public
the facts of the military situation in a televised interview at 9:00 p.m. and the fall of the Bar-Lev line, the journalists were stunned. Gershom Shakin, editor-in-chief of
Haaretz newspaper to Moshe Dayan: "If you say what you just told us on television this evening
it would mean an earthquake for the people of Israel and an earthquake for the Jews
"4. Shortly after Dayan's meeting with the editors, Prime Minister Golda Meir received a report on what the defense minister had told reporters and what he intended to say to the nation
one of the editors phoned Golda and suggested that she prevent the speech talk. Golda asked Moshe Dayan not to appear that night on television
television. General Aharon Yariv, who had headed the Military Intelligence Department in
Israthil for nine years, during which time he had gained considerable notoriety, was called out of retirement in Yarmouth
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the second year of the war to take charge of military information when it became clear that the situation in the information apparatus was dire
information. On the evening of October 9, a large crowd of local and foreign journalists gathered at
to hear Aharon Yariv, who appeared on Israeli television in place of Moshe Sokolov, speak
on Israeli television in place of Moshe Dayan. The speech was immediately transmitted by
by satellite to major television stations around the world. Aharon Yariv presented
The situation on the two battlefronts in Sinai and Golan and the following
The situation is not easy and simple, and the war is likely to be prolonged. The army
The Israeli army is in a difficult situation and has been forced to withdraw from the cease-fire lines in the Golan and Sinai.
Golan and Sinai, yet we should not think in terms of danger for the people of Israel² .
This was the first time that the Israeli people received news of what was happening on the front without falsification
For the first time, the people heard a frank statement, realizing that this war is not a continuation of the Six-Day War and is not a continuation of the Six-Day War.
not a continuation of the Six-Day War and not a blitzkrieg. The masses remembered Moshe Dayan's
Moshe Dayan's hollow statements on the evening of October 6 when he met with journalists when he told them: "We will turn the region

into a great graveyard for them. They were also reminded of the televised press conference from Sokolov House on the evening of October 8, and recalled how the audience applauded General Eliezer, the Chief of the General Staff, enthusiastically declaring that the IDF would continue to beat the enemy and break its bones. The public felt that they had been deceived. Everyone realized that for the first time since its establishment, Israel was facing a fateful and fierce war. What puzzled Israeli leaders most during this period was the state in which Moshe Dayan had become since the outbreak of the war on October 6. The war broke out on October 6, which was completely different from his condition during the '67 war, during which he was at the height of his confidence and pride. He was at the height of his confidence and self-confidence, and at that time he was making the most dangerous military decisions without consulting anyone. military decisions without consulting anyone, to the point that he ordered Gethral David Eliezer, the commander of the Northern Command at the time, based on his own opinion to storm the Golan Heights without consulting Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, and despite the Security Council's decision to cease fire. In the '73 war, however, Moshe Dayan came across as a weak and indecisive man. It was noted that he avoided issuing any decisions or instructions at the military level, and was content to in all his visits to the frontline commanders, he was content to offer his advice to the commanders in the form of non-binding ministerial advice in the form of non-binding ministerial advice, i.e. not implemented until after referring to the Chief of General Staff.

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During the commanders' meetings at the front, Moshe Dayan was limited to the role of listener and observer and was careful not to voice his opinion. It is surprising that such a seasoned commander as Moshe Dayan, who had military fame, who had previously served as chief of the General Staff and then the Defense Ministry, shirked his responsibility in this way of his responsibility to present purely operational decisions to Prime Minister Golda Meir to make critical decisions about the course of the war. As a result of these actions by Moshe Dayan, Golda Mather no longer gives him final approval on proposals for 1 strategy and important military decisions that he presents to her only after consulting the two ministers who formed a quasi-permanent council with her to run the war, Deputy Prime Minister Egal Allon Israel Galili, Minister of State, and only after consulting in most cases with General Eliezer Chief of Staff, and with his representative on the southern front, General Chaim Bar-Lev.

Main axes of progress in the Sinai

During the press conference held at the Ministry of Defense in Tel Aviv at around 7:00 p.m. on Tuesday, October 9, '73, i.e. on Tuesday evening, October 9, 73, the fourth day of the war, when Moshe Dayan was explaining to the editors-in-chief of Israeli newspapers. As mentioned above, the military situation on the Egyptian front. After the failure of the Israeli counterattacks on October 8 and 9 on the Egyptian front Moshe Dayan drew attention for the first time to the danger to the southern Sinai from a possible Egyptian attack

of a possible Egyptian attack against it, saying that the way is open for the Egyptians to advance southward to Abu Rudeis in the direction of Sharm el-Sheikh south to Abu Rudeis in the direction of Sharm el-Sheikh. Remarkably, while Moshe Dayan was talking to newspaper editors about the threat of a possible Egyptian attack on South Sinai

South Sinai, an Egyptian mechanized force had already begun its advance at 10:00 a.m. the same morning

the same morning on the southern axis towards Sharm el-Sheikh, and Israeli forces, especially the air force

Israeli forces, especially the air force, began to deal with it. This took place several hours before the press conference.

This makes us believe that the Israeli Defense Minister undoubtedly knew the truth, but chose not to

until the situation on the battlefield was clear and to preserve the morale of the journalists

especially after the news of the failure of the recent Israeli counterattacks.

The bold attempt to advance on the southern axis prompts us to make a brief study of the

of the main axes of advance across the Sinai from west to east for the benefit of readers.

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before beginning to recount the facts concerning the movement of the left-handed mechanized force on the southern axis

South . Although the Sinai Peninsula is a natural barrier from the muskrat point of view

Since the dawn of history, it has been the natural crossing point for all invaders who came to Egypt from the east.

It was also a crossing point for all the military campaigns that left Egypt towards the east from the time of the pharaohs until modern times.

the time of the pharaohs until modern times

The main axes of advancement for any Egyptian forces traveling from the ruins to the east are limited to

Five main axes are as follows:

Coastal poplar: The coastal axis adjacent to the Mediterranean coast is characterized by the presence of the Tina Plain and Lake Bardawil, which are followed to the south by an area of sand dunes that gradually increase in height from west to east

This axis is pierced by an asphalt road that runs along the coast and connects between Qantara

Darfah, and its length from Qantara East to Al-Arish is 160 km and from Al-Arish to Rafah is 45 km.

It passes through Baluza, Rummana, Qatiya, Bather Al-Abd, Masfak, Al-Arish, and Sheikh Zuweid. There are

There are some wells, and the land in general is not suitable for most mechanical campaigns except on the asphalt road

on the asphalt road.

The central axis: It is considered the main axis of advancement from west to east, and it is a

A wide plateau covered with sandy furrows in most of its parts, and it is located between the coastal plain

to the north and the mountainous western wall of Sinai to the south. Although the land is open, its dense vegetation

makes it difficult to traverse except on the limited roads and valleys and only for tracked vehicles.

The axis of advance narrows after about 70 kilometers east of the canal, where the advance is confined between

Jebel Jadira in the north and Jebel Sahaba in the south, and about 30 kilometers east of this area

about 30 kilometers east of this area is the well-known Khatmiyah Gorge (about

100 kilometers east of the canal). The main road in Sinai known as the Middle Road

The main road in Sinai known as the Middle Road, an asphalt road connecting Ismailia East and the city of Al-Awja, passing through Al-Tassa, Bir Jaghgafa, and Rawd Salem. At

Kilometer 161, the intersection of the main road and the secondary road coming from El Mareesh and Bir Lahfen

and Bir Lahfen, the terrain opens up and is suitable for large tank campaigns and the movement of

mechanized. The road then proceeds to Abu Ajila before reaching Al Auja. The length of the

The length of the central road is about 225 kilometers.

Capricorn axis: The asphalt road on this axis starts east of the Lesser Bitter Lake.

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After traveling about 35 kilometers in the open land, it penetrates the mountainous western wall of Sinai through the the well-known mountain pass, and after exiting back into the open land for about 15 km, it meets the with the Bir Tamada Bir Jafjava crossroad.

Metla axis: The asphalt road on this axis begins at Al-Shat (east of Suez) and after about 35 kilometers in the open land, it penetrates the mountainous western edge of Sinai through the

It is a very narrow and rugged mountain pass, 31 kilometers long. When it reaches the

it branches off in two directions, north to Bir Tamada and from there to Al-Hasna

and Al-Qusayma, and south to Nakhl and from there to Al-Tamad and Ras Al-Naqab.

Sidr axis: The mountainous western wall of North Sinai is separated from the huge mountain mass

of South Sinai's Wadi Sidr, and this axis starts from Ras Sidr on the Gulf of Suez (43 kilometers

south of Shatt) After traveling about 30 kilometers in the open land of Wadi Sidr in the direction of

The road passes through a 30-kilometer-long corridor known as the Sidr Pass, which is located between two mountains, Jabal al-Raha in the north and Jabal al-Raha in the south.

between two mountains, Jabal al-Raha in the north and Jabal Sin Bishr in the south, and when it reaches the end of the pass at Ain Sidr

When it reaches the end of the corridor at Ain Sidr, the land opens up and several valleys and paved roads branch off from it, from which it is possible to reach

to the directions of Sadr Al-Hitan and Bir Tamada in the north and Nakhl in the east.

The importance of Ras Sidr, which was the first main objective of the mechanized force

The importance of Ras Sidr, which was the first main objective of the Egyptian mechanized force advancing on the southern axis, is due to the following reasons:

1 It is located at the beginning of one of the main axes of advancement from west to east, namely the road with the

Sidr mountain pass, which can be penetrated through the mountain mass to the open land in the east.

It can then be advanced northward and reach the eastern entrances to the Straits of Matla and Gedi or threaten to encircle them

threaten to encircle them if the attack is developed in this direction.

2 Two important tactical axes converge here: The first is Transverse Road No. 3, which is about 210 km long and about 32 km east of the canal, and it starts from Baluza in the north and cuts the middle road at Al-Tassa, then crosses the Al-Jidi and Matla roads near the western entrances of the two corridors and then veers west to Ras Sudr. There is no doubt that if there is an Egyptian force at the southern end of this road would have posed a serious threat to the left flank of Israeli forces that were using this road as the main axis for their movements northward.

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and south along the front, and at the same time a base for all their counterattacks from east to west on the bridgeheads. to the west on the Egyptian bridgeheads. The second tactical axis is the Shatt Road

Sharm el-Sheikh, also known as the Al-Tour Road, which runs along the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez

It is about 325 kilometers long, and the road passes before it reaches Ras Sidr It then passes after Ras Sidr through several cities, the most important of which are Abu Zenima, Abu Rudis, Al-Tur, and then Sharm El Sheikh. Abu Rudis, Al-Tur and Sharm El-Sheikh, and then Sharm El-Sheikh.

3 Ras Sidr's economic importance, as it has three groups of oil fields, namely Sidr, Assal and Matarama, in addition to being a large urban area, where there are residences playgrounds, a hospital, a power station, a pier, and several large oil storage tanks. huge oil storage tanks.

The operation of the First Mechanized Infantry Brigade towards Ras Sidr The 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was one of the brigades of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, which was commanded by

commanded by Brigadier General Muhammad Abul Fath Muharram, and the division was placed in the second echelon of the Third Field Army's sector in the south

Third Field Army in the south when the Egyptian forces took their final positions

in preparation for the start of the Badr offensive plan on October 6, 1973. The instructions received by the commander of the

received by the commander of the 1st Brigade, which outlined his mission according to the plan, included the following

Yes:

The 1st Mechanized Brigade will cross the Suez Canal on the night of October 7/6 at the crossings of the 19th Infantry Division To a forward waiting area east of the canal within the bridgehead of the 19th Infantry Division. As soon as the the 1st Mechanized Brigade crosses the canal, it comes out from under the command of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division and comes under the direct command of the Third Army Command.

The 1st Brigade is ready to push to engage from a push line inside the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead

As of 5:00 a.m. on October 7, by order of the Third Army Commander, with the aim of capturing the general line of Ras Maslah Jabal Um Jurdi 17 kilometers south of Al-Shat.

As of first light on October 8, the brigade pushes to engage from the area of Ras Masla Jebel Um Jurdi

As of this time, the brigade leaves the Third Army's command and becomes

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under the command of the Red Sea Military Zone (the command of this zone was located on the western shore of

the western shore of the Gulf of Siris, which has an average width in the north of about 35 kilometers).

After the second engagement push, the brigade's mission was to capture the Ras Sidr area (25

kilometers south of Ras Masla) The attack then develops according to the orders of the commander of the Red Sea Military District

depending on the situation at Abu Rudeis, 100 kilometers south of Ras Sedr.

The brigade commander's decision, which was approved by General Ibrahim Kamel, commander of the Red Sea (since most of the 1st Brigade's expected operations will be under his command) was that the brigade

The brigade and the support units from the combined arms that were placed under its command would be organized into three balanced groups, each consisting of one mechanized infantry battalion, and that the

The first group, which will serve as the brigade's forward detachment, will consist of a mechanized infantry battalion equipped with B...% armored vehicles (armed with Malotka armor-piercing rocket-propelled grenades) and their

support units. As well as the 1st Brigade Tank Battalion, whose axis of movement is

The coastal road (Shatt al-Tour), to be followed at a distance of 3 to 5 kilometers by the other two groups

The third group will be responsible for securing the left flank of the forward detachment

When developing the attack from Ras Suler towards Abu Rudis, the brigade will follow the same this formation.

But this plan, which the 1st Brigade's units were trained to execute before the war and communicated

to the sub-unit commanders and on the basis of which the organization of cooperation at various levels was carried out.

Circumstances prevented it from being implemented according to the specified timelines. As we have already

As we mentioned when explaining the October 6 Harbour operation, there was an unforeseen delay in establishing the Third Army's crossings especially for the 19th Infantry Division, due to the difficulty of opening passages in the berm east of the canal in this sector.

The engineers delayed the construction of the 19th Infantry Division's bridges to the point where Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Wasel to the extent that General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, ordered the crossing of the

Tanks of the 19th Infantry Division and the 22nd Armored Brigade (attached to the division) on the bridges of the 7th Infantry Division

(This disruption delayed the crossing of the 1st Brigade by about 48 hours. Instead of crossing on the night of October 6/7 as planned, the brigade was

unable to cross
until the night of October 9/8.
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After the 1st Brigade was assembled in its designated forward area east of the canal, it was secured to be pushed to engage from its designated line of defense inside the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead with fire from two artillery battalions. Field artillery from the division's artillery group in accordance with the plan at 10:00 a.m. on October 9. Not more than 75 minutes after the start of the movement, the forward detachment achieved its immediate mission and captured the general line of the Karantina Ayoun Moussa (10 kilometers south of 10 kilometers south of Shatt). It became clear that the Israeli garrison that was holed up in the Oyoum Moussa strongpoint did not attempt to offer any serious resistance and appeared to have fled, realizing the awkwardness of its position. It was aware of the criticality of its position as a result of being isolated in its position following the success of the Egyptian forces in crossing the canal crossing the canal and establishing bridgehead areas. She knew from her eavesdropping on Israel's the Israeli radio network, the Bar-Lev line had collapsed and some of its garrisons had fled and that the rest had fallen into the hands of the Egyptian forces, causing them to despair.

The Israeli strong point at Ayoun Moussa included six long-range 155mm howitzers that were mounted on concrete bases and carefully hidden inside fortified bunkers. It was a constant threat to the city of Suez and the oil refineries in Zaytiyah. participated in their destruction during the War of Attrition. The Egyptian detachment that found all the contents of this strong point, including guns, weapons, ammunition, equipment, supplies, provisions and personal gear intact, and the forward detachment then continued its advance in a southerly direction followed by the two rear battalions. At 1:00 p.m., it succeeded in expelling Haddu elements from At 3:00 p.m., the forward detachment succeeded in capturing the (17 km south of Al-Shat), thus achieving the next mission assigned to it under the command of the Third Army, and from that time on, it came under the command of the Red Sea Military Zone Red Sea Military District.

When the forward detachment resumed its advance on the coastal road in the southern direction At 4:30 p.m., it encountered an Israeli force estimated at about a company of tanks supported by 106 mm rocket launchers and an artillery battery that was occupying Jabal al-Marazza (2 km south of Jabal Am Jurdi). 2 kilometers south of Jabal Am Jurdi) The forward detachment was forced to halt due to the control of the The Israeli force controlled the axis of advance, and the forward detachment's attempts to dislodge the enemy force were unsuccessful. The attempts of the forward detachment to dislodge the enemy force from its position and clear the road in front of it due to the inability of armored vehicles 4.2%. unable to perform the maneuver

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and turning on the enemy's side due to the nature of the marshy terrain, in

addition to the interference of the enemy's air force enemy. In response to this situation, the brigade commander issued orders at 5:00 p.m. to the commander of the of the forward detachment, to reposition his force and occupy the side slopes of the Um Jurdi mountain east of the road facing the enemy, while ordering the two rear battalions to occupy temporary defensive positions on Kashib al-Aran (about 5 kilometers from the forward detachment) and instructed to push reconnaissance elements to the front and left flank to reconnoiter enemy positions.

First Brigade units to resume advancing southward at first light the next day (October 10) to reach Ras Sidr. October) to reach Ras Sidr.

According to the 1st Brigade commander's orders, the brigade's three groups were supposed to advance

in the same order as before at 6 a.m. on October 10 in the direction of Ras Sudr from which the forward detachment was only 25 kilometers away.

these groups remained in place without making any attempt to move forward for 48 hours, i.e. since the order was issued

for 48 hours, from the brigade commander's order to halt on the afternoon of October 9 until

until the brigade commander received new combat instructions from the Third Army Command on the afternoon of October 11

October 11, canceling the mission assigned to the 1st Brigade, as we shall see later.

During this period of time, the most important events that took place on the 1st Brigade's field of operations were

were summarized as follows:

The brigade's three groups were unable to move forward in the direction of Ras Sudr, due to

During this period, they were subjected to continuous air attacks from Israeli aircraft, which were

Air-to-surface missiles, both day and night, using flares.

Due to the large number of vehicles that carried the brigade's administrative and subsistence needs

for a long period of time as the brigade is an independent task force, the brigade commander ordered

to move most of the administrative vehicles back in the Jabasat area and to clear the area of trees

in Oyoum Moussa from all vehicles to protect them from air strikes.

The process of moving the administrative units back and moving some of the armored vehicles that

that were in the process of evacuating the wounded from the forward detachment to the field hospital in the

on the night of October 10/9, caused confusion and disorientation among the
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The movement of some of the armored vehicles evacuating the wounded from the forward detachment on the night of October 10, 9

flares were dropped from the air, which led to the loss of control of some rock units

But the brigade commander and battalion commanders were able to regain control of the groups

The brigade's situation returned to normal the next morning.

At 3:00 p.m. on October 10, Brig. Gen. H.

Ibrahim Rashid, the head of the Red Sea Operations Group, along with the group's operations officer.

In accordance with the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, General Ahmed Ismail,

carried by Col. H. Hassan

Zayat on the morning of October 10 to the Third Army Command, the 1st Infantry Brigade was placed

Mechanized Infantry Brigade was placed under the command of the Red Sea Operations Group, which was placed under the command of the Third Army until the brigade is pushed from the line south of Ras Sidr.

Note: The events that took place on this axis after the Red Sea Operations Group will be explained and analyzed in Chapter 12 on military operations in the Red Sea region
Warfare in the Red Sea Region.

Chapter 4a

How the decision was made to develop the eastward offensive 9

At midnight on October 9/10, the Israeli War Cabinet held a meeting in Prime Minister Golda Meir's office

Prime Minister Golda Meir's office, attended by her deputy, Egal Allon, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, and Minister of State Yisrael Galili.

and Minister of State Yisrael Galili, and was represented at the meeting by General David

Chief of the General Staff Eliezer and his deputy Jethral Tal, Chief of Military Intelligence Eliyahu Zaira

and Air Force Commander General Bani Peled. During the meeting, which lasted more than six hours

more than six hours, there were lively discussions on the topical issue for which the meeting was convened, namely

The choice of the front on which to focus the main effort of the Israeli forces in the next phase.

General Eliezer was of the opinion that the main effort should be focused on the Syrian front in order to capitalize on the

the initiative that the IDF was able to retrieve from the Syrians, to deal a fatal blow to the Syrian army

to deal a fatal blow to the Syrian army, thereby liquidating it as a fighting force, leading to forcing Syria to exit the war

to force Syria out of the war, especially after the losses and heavy blows that hit the Syrian forces in the Golan Heights battles.

The arrival of the vanguard of Iraqi forces that participated in the fighting that participated in the fighting makes it necessary to quickly control the situation on the Syrian front

before the arrival of the main Iraqi forces. General Eliezer emphasized that directing the main effort in this period

toward the Egyptian front cannot resolve the war, as the Egyptians are engaged within the area of the bridgeheads in fortified defensive positions, and all

tactical counterattacks against the bridgehead sector have been unsuccessful. The tactical counterattacks against the Second Army sector on October 8 and 9

were all unsuccessful.

that we should wait until the situation on the Syrian front is resolved, and then shift

the main effort to the Egyptian front in Sinai.

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General Eliezer stated that the attack deep in Syria was not aimed at gaining new territory

as much as to destroy the Syrian army, and Israel's long-range artillery would advance far enough north to enter the capital, Damascus

far enough north to bring the capital, Damascus, into range, forcing Syria to stop the war.

Focusing the attack on Syria served another important purpose for Israel: to warn King Hussein

so that he would not have thoughts of opening a third front on Jordan's long

border with Israel, as he did in the June 1967 war similar to what he did in the June 1967 war, and on the other hand not to succumb to the pressure of the Palestine Liberation Organization to send its fighters to carry out guerrilla operations across the Jordanian border.

(A PLO delegation consisting of Abu Daoud and Saleh Raafat had already visited Amman and met with Jordanian Prime Minister Zeid al-Rifai on October 9 to try to persuade the Jordanian authorities Jordanian authorities to allow Palestinian fedayeen to carry large groups against Israel through the Jordanian border. through the Jordanian border) 0

King Hussein did not really need such a warning, as his mind was already made up from the beginning of the war from the beginning of the war that he would not participate in it unless the Syrians succeeded in occupying the Golan Heights and the Egyptians were able to reach the line of mountain passes in Sinai at the same time.
Sinai

General Tal, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was on the opposite side of his boss's opinion.

He believed that the main effort should be concentrated on the Egyptian front because of its direct danger to Israel.

The Egyptians are capable of launching an attack, while the Syrian forces are defeated and cannot

to launch a new offensive. General Tal emphasized that although it would be difficult to move any Israeli ground forces from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front

Israeli ground forces from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front in order to increase their offensive capabilities, the

Southern Command, with the forces it has under its command and its conscious tactical moves, could

inflict a devastating blow on the Egyptian army and achieve a radical shift in the balance of the war. The meeting ended

The meeting ended with the Chief of the General Staff's opinion being enthusiastically endorsed by Moshe Dayan, Eyal

Alon and Golda Mather.

As a result of the War Cabinet's decision to focus the main effort against Syria, the Israeli Air Force began began striking strategic targets deep inside Syria. Phantom planes raided attacked vital targets inside Damascus, attacking the Ministry of Defense and the

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Air Force and the Syrian radio station. Some bombs fell on residential buildings adjacent to these targets, and some bombs hit the upscale neighborhood of Abu Rummana, where

embassies. Other groups of Israeli aircraft also launched concentrated attacks on

the main power plant in Homs and its oil refinery, and oil tanks in Tartus oil tanks in Tartus were similarly attacked. It was clear from these air attacks that Israel

aimed at inflicting the heaviest losses on the Syrian economy in an attempt to force Syria to submit and surrender

and surrender. Among the dramatic developments, six Israeli planes attacked the Lebanese radar station located on Jabal al-Barouk.

Lebanese radar station located on Jabal al-Barouk inside Lebanese territory. The planes managed to

severely damage the station, depriving Syria of the information it was providing. Lebanon complained

a complaint to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. On October 10, the main Syrian forces withdrew from the Golan Heights the main Syrian forces from the Golan Heights, and Israeli paratroopers entered Quneitra, the capital of the Golan, and reoccupied it. Quneitra, the capital of the Golan and reoccupied it, and Israeli forces advanced until they reached the former ceasefire line between Syria and Israel The previous ceasefire line between Syria and Israel after the 1967 war, known as the

The purple line, which is the line from which the Syrian forces began the offensive on October 6, 1973.

October 1973, thus returning the situation to what it was before the war.

General Eliezer

Chief of Staff, decided to postpone the attack on Syria by only one day to complete preparations and reorganization.

preparations and reorganization, with the general offensive to begin on October 11 in the direction of Damascus.

Why did Israel consider crossing into the West Bank?

On the morning of Wednesday, October 10, General Chaim Bar-Lev, who had been assigned

to take over the Southern Command, as already mentioned, arrived at the command's forward headquarters in Umm Marjam. After

a brief meeting with General Shmuel Gonen, the former commander who had been acting as his deputy since

and the command's senior officers, General Bar-Lev actually began to exercise his command.

the three armored divisions stationed on the front line in Sinai to learn about their combat conditions

He was also busy observing the battles that were taking place at the time between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the frontline

between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the frontline. The battles during this period were little more than

small push-and-shove operations with limited localized gains, with the Egyptians only aiming to

to expand and deepen bridgeheads and modify some of their tactical positions.

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by capturing some of the key points in their sectors and completing the control of the artillery road

(Cross Road No. 2) about 10 kilometers east of the canal. Israeli forces were in the Sinai were fighting a "Containing battle" and were only aiming to only aimed at preventing Egyptian advances in the direction of Crossroad 3 (about 30 kilometers east of the canal).

about 30 kilometers east of the canal). General Gonen's report on the situation to General Bar-Lev upon his arrival indicated

to General Bar-Lev upon his arrival indicated that, for the first time, there had been a significant improvement in the

of the Israeli forces in the Sinai along the front, which was readily observable easily noticeable. In his estimation, the crush ratio had changed in favor of the IDF, as Egyptian tanks

Egyptian tanks were losing more than Israeli tanks. Gonen attributed this the improvement in the military situation due to several factors, the most important of which was the completion of the arrival of most of the Israeli reserve forces

and the high efficiency of tank maintenance and repair units and crews which were able to repair many damaged tanks in a short time. In addition sub-unit commanders of Israeli armored units benefited from their bitter experiences

while fighting in the early days of the war against Egyptian tank-hunting crews, which

This led them to change their tactical approach to dealing with Egyptian infantry in order to avoid heavy losses to avoid heavy losses.

When General Bar-Lev visited the Central Sector Command, General Sharon expressed his dismay at the stalemate of the stalemate on the Egyptian front in the south, while the main effort was focused on the Golan Heights in the north on the Golan Heights in the north. Sharon was of the opinion that this was a strategic approach because time is not on Israel's side, and the Egyptians are not trying to push eastward to the east and are content with digging and fortifying their defensive positions, this means that they are to wait for the Security Council to issue a cease-fire so that they can then be in a position of strength. a position of strength. If the IDF remains static in Sinai, it loses the key advantages that have made it victorious in wars that allowed it to win previous wars, namely retaining the initiative and fighting on the move mobile, maneuverable and agile armored forces

Sharon had devised a plan to attack the Third Army's bridgehead with two armored brigades from his division from the north to the south. armored brigades of his division from north to south, advancing on the road parallel to the Bitter Lakes to secure their flank. of the Bitter Lakes to secure their right flank, in coordination with the forces of General Albert
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Mandler stationed in the southern sector. At a meeting at Southern Command headquarters on October 11, chaired by chaired by General Bar-Lev and attended by Sharon and the commanders of the two armored brigades that would carry out the attack. Colonels Amnon and Haibim, Sharon presented his plan of attack against the Third Army sector. However, General Gonen, who was present at the meeting, rejected the plan and was joined by General Bar-Lev. The basis of the objection to Sharon's plan was that it was that it would be an expensive, low-impact operation that would result in the two Israeli armored brigades suffering heavy losses. The memory of the failure of General Avraham Adan's division's attack on the Second Army on Monday, October 8, was still fresh in mind, when dozens of Israeli tanks burst into flames within minutes in a matter of minutes. At the same time, there was an urgent need to to keep the Israeli armored force strong and intact in anticipation of the expected Egyptian armored attack which, according to the Soviet style of fighting followed by the Egyptians, was expected to take place on the sixth or seventh day of the war, i.e. on the sixth or seventh day of the war, October 11 or 12 at the latest. It was inevitable was bound to be followed by a major tank battle between the two sides.

After Bar-Lev's arrival on the southern front, he began to feel the effects of imposing discipline on Shinaron. Moshe Dayan and General Eliezer recognized that the Sharon had caused to his former commander Gonen due to the sensitivity of the situation between them would end as soon as Bar-Lev Bar-Lev's arrival at the headquarters of the Southern Command, as Bar-Lev had previously been chief of staff Sharon was one of his subordinate commanders, so it was assumed that his command authority would be Sharon's command authority would be honored without question. But trouble soon began and disagreements quickly escalated between the two sides.

This was not the first time Sharon had disagreed with Bar-Lev. Sharon had previously opposed the construction of the Bar-Lev Line and strongly criticized his method of fighting the Palestinian Fedayeen Palestinians. When Sharon was appointed commander of the Southern Command in January '70, he criticized publicly criticized the Chief of General Staff in front of the newspaper editors he met with for the wrong approach taken by Israeli forces on the Suez Canal front in response to the Egyptian the war of attrition launched by the Egyptians. But General Bar-Lev could not hold back his indignation Sharon's clumsy behavior this time, and could no longer tolerate his immaturity and defiance.

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to his orders, so on October 12, only two days after taking command, he asked the Chief of Staff to relieve Sharon of his post General Eliezer replied that he would consult with the Defense Minister. When the matter was brought to Moshe Dayan's attention, he replied that such an action at this time would politically problematic, as Sharon's retirement made him a prominent member of the opposition Likud party. of the Likud party, which is opposed to the Labor government that was in power at the time. Despite these sensitive circumstances communicated to Bar-Lev, he was again forced to Sharon's disregard and disobedience to his orders to formally propose Sharon's removal from his his command

There were no significant events on the Southern Front on October 10, the day General Bar-Lev on October 10, the day General Bar-Lev assumed command of the front, other than the success of a force under General Kalman Magen, who had previously previously assigned to the northern sector under the command of General Adan (Bern), succeeded in engaging the on the Mediterranean coast southeast of Port Fouad (the Budapest), which Israeli armored vehicles had to use a force of paratroopers to reach paratroopers because it is located in an area sandwiched between the sea and the marshes, and the two forces worked together to The Israeli armored vehicles had to use paratroopers to reach the fort. This was was the only one of the Bar-Lev line's forts that did not fall, and held out until the end of the war due to the difficulty of accessing its location and the courage and valor of its garrison. According to Israeli authorities that Magen's force's meeting with the garrison was one of the few moments of happiness in the war The soldiers exchanged hugs and kisses and immediately evacuated the wounded to hospitals in the rear across Israeli lines. to hospitals in the rear across the Israeli lines. There was another fort that was still resisting It was the fort on the tongue of Port Tawfiq at the southern entrance to the canal. Despite the immunity of its location to be surrounded by water on three sides, its garrison was forced to surrender, as mentioned above, to the forces of the

19th Infantry Division on October 13 through the Red Cross. Since October 10, the Israeli Southern Command had been concerned that that the Masdar forces might remain entrenched in their exclusive defensive positions within the bridges, while being under no serious threat from Israeli aviation

They were superior because they were within range of the Egyptian SAM missile network deployed on the west bank of the canal.
on the west bank of the canal, which provided them with complete protection from Israeli air strikes.
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The activity of the Egyptian forces in digging and laying large minefields around the defense positions
defense positions was a clear indication that the Egyptian forces did not intend to implement the second phase of their
of their offensive plan, which was to develop the attack eastward to reach the line of mountain passes.

The fact that five full Egyptian infantry divisions remained entrenched in their positions within the
bridges, supported by at least
850 tanks and 5 armored brigades attached to the five infantry divisions in addition to the tank battalions
divisions and organic infantry brigades) It means that the Israeli forces will have to fight
a bitter war of attrition, during which Israeli tanks will bang their heads against the rock
in front of the solidity of the Egyptian defenses, as happened in the Israeli counterattacks on October 8 and 9, which were launched in a frontal manner
and October 9, which were launched in a frontal manner from the direction of the ruins to the east.

The only way to unbalance the Egyptian forces and allow the IDF to
to regain its renowned agility and maneuverability was for Israeli forces to cross the
from east to west and work on the rear of the Second and Third Armies.
In this way, Israel would escape the static warfare trap that the Egyptians had forced it to follow.

The crossing of the Suez Canal from east to west was not a sudden idea
was not a sudden idea that came to the minds of those in the Southern Command during the war.
was in fact an essential element of Israeli military planning that had been in place since 1968 to defend the Sinai against any attack
1968 to defend Sinai against a large-scale Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal.

The preparation and construction of the equipment needed for the Israeli crossing took several years, and three areas were selected as viable crossing points

Three areas were selected as viable points for future crossings, namely the areas of Qantara East
Al-Defreswar (north of the Great Bitter Lake), and in the area north of Suez City.

The Israelis deliberately reduced the thickness of the sand berm on the eastern shore of the canal in these areas

In these areas, red brick markers were placed at the places where the berm was to be opened

in preparation for pushing crossing equipment through them to the waterline. In addition, special

special roads for towing prefabricated bridges towards the selected crossing points, and at each

a special apron (la), which was a paved area measuring 150 yards by 700 yards, surrounded by high walls of sand, to be used to prepare the crossing equipment before it was lowered into the water.

before being lowered into the water.

In addition to these preparations, the necessary exercises were conducted in the form of mobilization projects for the westward crossing of the canal at the major levels, starting with the commanders of the reserve armored divisions in Sinai Sinai Armored Reserve Commands and the Southern Command to the branches of the General Staff in Tel Aviv. It turned out that General Sharon, when he took over as head of the Southern Command, prepared a detailed dossier on the crossing to the west and conducted a maneuver to train his troops for it. to train his troops on it. When the Israeli Southern Command recovered from the shock of the Egyptian crossing on October 6 which had thrown it off balance, and began to regain its cohesion, especially after increasing the number of tanks under its command tanks, this command began to prepare for the major operation that had been prepared for several years the crossing to the west bank of the canal with the aim of disrupting the balance of forces east of the canal east of the canal and create an opportunity for the Israeli armored forces to move from the stage of static ruins east of the canal from static, immobilizing ruins east of the canal to mobile combat in which they can exploit their key advantages of agility and of agility and maneuverability across the open terrain west of the canal. On the night of October 9/10, General Junin ordered the Chief Engineer of the Southern Command to take the necessary steps to assemble the parts of the prefabricated bridge N552 in an area close to the canal in preparation for to push it forward to the point to be chosen for the crossing to the west of the canal.

The crossing to the west of the canal will be postponed

On the evening of Thursday, October 11, an important conference chaired by General Chaim Bar-Lev took place at the Southern Command's forward headquarters, attended by the command's branch chiefs and armored division commanders to agree on the most appropriate point from which to cross to the West Bank of the Canal. During the conference, several proposals were discussed including crossing from the far north to capture the cities of Port Fouad and Port Said, as well as crossing from the northern end of the Gulf of Suez to conduct an operation similar to the amphibious armored raid on Zafarana on amphibious armored raid on Zafarana on September 9, 69.

the Kantara East area. These suggestions were all rejected. The best of the suggestions made during the meeting proved to be the one made by by General Junin, that the crossing should be made from the Dafraswar area. Despite the reservations of Sharon and Adan, Gonen insisted on his opinion, which, from his point of view, would allow the Israelis to reach the canal without to the canal without encountering any significant resistance, while crossing from the

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would require a major battle and penetration of Egyptian defenses. before the actual crossing began. At the end of the discussions, General Bar-Lev favored the idea of the idea of crossing through the Dafraswar area because of its great advantages, as the left flank of the of the forces assigned to the crossing would be fully secured because there is a gap of about 35 kilometers between the head of the Third Army's bridge and the head of the between the Third Army's bridgehead and the Second Army's bridgehead on the

shore of the lagoon.
Egyptian forces, and the terrain facing the crossing point on the west bank of the canal is the most favorable terrain for military operations for the Israeli crossing forces after they reach the western shore of the canal.
the western shore of the Canal, as there is only one freshwater tributary stretching from Ismailia to Suez.
from Ismailia to Suez that can be easily crossed, and the area in front of it is open, making it well suited for troop movements.
making it well suited for armored troop movements and maneuvering, while the Qantara area
Qantara does not allow the crossing forces these advantages due to the presence of several water canals and agricultural areas
in the way of their advance, making the movements of the armored forces restricted and limited. The timing of the
of the attack depended largely on the expected movements of the Egyptian forces.

. The issue facing the Israeli Southern Command was: What should it
in the event that the Egyptians insisted on remaining entrenched inside the fortified bridgeheads
on the east bank of the canal, waiting for the Security Council to issue a cease-fire and the
the second corps of the two armies and the General Reserve remain in place west of the canal without any thought of
The Egyptian leadership did not think of pushing them to cross the canal and rush east into the straits. It was the only action
The only way for the Israeli leadership to save the situation was to carry out a crossing of the canal.

But a crossing into the West Bank would undoubtedly be extremely dangerous with two armored divisions (4th Armored Division and 21st Armored Division) and two mechanized divisions
(6th and 23rd Mechanized Infantry Divisions), and three armored brigades from these four divisions were
attached to three infantry divisions east of the canal: One brigade from the 21st Armored Division and one brigade each from the
so the actual number of tanks west of the canal did not exceed
400 tanks, but they were accompanied by a large number of tracked armored vehicles belonging to the two mechanized divisions.
These armored forces were positioned within the confines of the Second and Third Armies.
about 20 kilometers west of the canal, occupying fortified defensive positions, and tasked with
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with the main duty of early detection of any enemy forces that could penetrate the Malayan defense positions east of the canal
east of the canal and engage them in the field to destroy them and prevent them from reaching any vital targets west of the canal.
any vital targets west of the canal.

As a result of this situation, the general impression among Israeli commanders was that it was
too dangerous for Israel to carry out the crossing to the West Bank in the presence of such a large number of armored and mechanized forces
Egyptian armored and mechanized forces

On Friday, October 12, General Bar-Lev flew by helicopter to Tel Aviv, where he where he attended a meeting at the General Headquarters where he presented the main lines of the crossing plan to
General Eliezer, Chief of Staff, and his senior staff. When Defense Minister Moshe Dayan
attended the meeting to present the plan to him at the request of the Chief of

Staff to obtain his endorsement, he expressed his skepticism. He was skeptical of the feasibility of the entire operation and asserted that it would not force the Egyptians to ask for a cease-fire. Bar-Lev came to the defense of the plan: "This is the only step to turn the tide of the war. Without a crossing, there will be no ceasefire, because there is no pressure on the Egyptians, not even political pressure."4 Dayan responded sharply: "Leave the political issue and you have to look at it from a military point of view, is the plan feasible from this point of view?" 4. Dayan left the meeting without specifying his position.

At General Eliezer's insistence, the War Council was convened, attended by members of the Golda Meir, Prime Minister, Igal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister, Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, and Yisrael Galili, Minister of State. Yisrael Galili, Minister of State, and the Chief of the General Staff was accompanied by a number of his senior aides. General Bar-Lev attended the meeting, but in his capacity as commander of the Southern Command, not as a cabinet minister. Bar-Lev presented his plan for crossing the Suez Canal and explained in detail the main lines of the crossing. The crossing was hotly debated, as those present were in fact discussing one of the most important and complex military operations and at the same time the most dangerous for Israel in terms of the outcome in terms of the consequences if it failed. From the discussions, it became clear that the Chief of Staff and Air Force Commander General Benny Peled are among the most enthusiastic supporters of the plan, and Moshe Dayan is also a supporter.

At the same time, however, voices of opposition to the plan were raised, with one senior commander warning

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warned of the danger of crossing a water barrier as difficult as the Suez Canal, with the enemy controlling each side on either side of it. Another commander advised that we should wait until the Egyptian armored forces would make their expected attack and, after it was repulsed, Israeli forces would counterattack across the. He stated that according to Soviet doctrine, the Egyptians were expected to launch a large-scale attack with their armor between October 11 and 12.

As the tone of dissent in the Council grew stronger, and the ministers' questions increasingly reflected the extent of their anxiety and discomfort in undertaking such a risky venture, Gen. Bar-Lev felt a sense of frustration, as he realized that the plan on which he had built all his hopes to regain control of the situation and regain the initiative from the Egyptians and regain the initiative from the Egyptians could not, in these circumstances, be ratified by the so he began folding his papers and maps in preparation to leave the meeting and return to his headquarters. to his headquarters:

But fate intervened miraculously. Minutes before the meeting adjourned, an of the operations officers to make a dramatic announcement that shook everyone

present. The long-awaited

The long-awaited Egyptian armored crossing had begun, and units from the 4th and 21st armored divisions

on the Egyptian bridges on their way to the east bank. Bar-Lev rose in ecstasy to ask the War Council to postpone any decision until the Southern Command could repel the

the Egyptian attack first, for he had made his bold plan and was now reaping the rewards.

General Albert Matdler's shell

As soon as General Eliezer arrived at the Southern Command outpost in Umm Marjam on Saturday morning

Saturday, October 13, he boarded his helicopter with General Bar-Lev, the commander of the Southern Command

headed for Tassa. The forward command center of the Central Sector, which was commanded by

General Sharon, which was chosen as the headquarters for the commanders' meeting with the Chief of the General Staff due to its location

intermediate position in the front. Gen. Gonen flew in another helicopter, accompanied by Gen. Ezra

Weizman, a former air force commander and former head of the Operations Branch of the General Staff.

He was one of the former commanders who had been called up from the reserves to assist the Chief of Staff during the war.

Chief of Staff during the war, and a radio conversation took place between General Gonen during

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in the airplane and General Albert M. Nadler, the commander of the Southern Command, who was then riding in his command vehicle near an observation post.

his command vehicle near an observation post on the front line of his sector because of the operations

that had taken place that morning in the Third Army sector, with which General Mandler was unhappy

with their results. Junin and Mandler agreed to meet to discuss the matter further

at the location from which Mandler was speaking, which was located on one of the side junctions of the road leading to the Capricorn Pass

after the meeting of the Chief of the General Staff at the Tassa.

in the bowl. Mandler gave Junin the code name on the map for their meeting place expected . Gonen asked Mandler another question but did not receive an answer,

so he immediately said to his airplane companion, General Weizmann on the plane, General Wiseman: "Something has happened to Albert." 4 Weizmann replied: "What is this

"What nonsense, asshole?" 4. But Junin felt a sudden contraction, and said, "If Albert hasn't answered my question

"As long as Albert didn't answer my question, it can only mean one thing: He's dead, and the airplane's radio operator tried to

tried to get an answer, but to no avail. When the helicopter landed at the Sharon was waiting for a message from his deputy, informing him that General Albert Mandler

After returning from a helicopter tour of his sector, Albert had boarded his armored command vehicle

armored vehicle and proceeded to an observation post on the front line, where a reconnaissance unit was

A reconnaissance unit was standing 500 meters away and radioed a warning that the observation post the command vehicle was advancing toward was

was in the range of the artillery artillery. While Albert reconnoitering Egyptian positions with his binoculars, his vehicle was hit by an Egyptian shell from one of the Third Army's artillery batteries.

Third Army artillery, killing four of its passengers, including Albert Mandler and Rafi Unger, a reporter for

Israeli radio reporter who had followed his squad.
Albert was still alive when they transferred him to a helicopter to fly him to a hospital.
but he died on the way. General Gonen entered the meeting sadly, and whispered the news to General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, who immediately ordered that Kalman Magen, who had been attached to the to replace Albert Mandler as commander of the Southern Sector. Thus ended the story of of the boy who fled Austria with his mother after the Nazi occupation and arrived in Palestine just before the outbreak of World War II as an illegal immigrant. Albert was a tall, blue-eyed with blue eyes was an extraordinary character, and his attachment to his commanders and soldiers was commanding.

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He belonged to the generation of Israeli generals who, during the 1948 war, were company commanders
During the June 1967 war, Albert was in command of the Madi'a Brigade, which penetrated the Syrian defenses.
which penetrated the strong Syrian defenses in the Jahalan Heights, and he was supposed to leave his post as commander of the Israeli forces in Sinai.
his position as commander of Israeli forces in Sinai on Sunday, October 7, to be succeeded by Kalman Magen.
after Albert was appointed commander of the Israeli Army's armored forces, succeeding General Avraham Adan (Bern), who retired and was recalled after the outbreak of the war to command a reserve armored division.

Albert last spoke to reporters at his forward headquarters, saying: "This war has changed
"This war has changed a lot of my values, and I have a reputation as a stubborn and professional officer, but I am fundamentally a liberal.
fundamentally liberal. Now, after this sudden outburst by the Egyptians, it seems to me that we can no longer
we can never again allow ourselves to take risks of this kind. And it will be the most difficult aspect of this war for me will be going to the families of my fallen soldiers.
Fate seems to have spared him this unpleasant task, for only three days later he was
and his death symbolized the collapse of the Israeli defense line that he was responsible for
responsible for him. When the Arabs broke through the Bar-Lev line

During the Chief of Staff's meeting with the Israeli commanders at Tassa, which was attended by Kalman Magen after being summoned from his headquarters to receive his official appointment as commander of the armored division in the southern sector. General Eliezer issued orders to prepare for the crossing of the Suez Canal on the night of October 14/15 whether or not the Egyptian attack took place, as an Egyptian armored force crossing the crossing the canal to the east would have meant that the Egyptian defenses west of the canal would have lost their balance, making the hope of of a successful crossing from Dafraswar to the west.

At around 1:30 p.m. on October 13, a reconnaissance plane appeared over the canal area
not only covered the entire front but also flew over the Delta before exiting Egyptian airspace
out of Egyptian airspace. Although it flew over areas heavily populated by surface-to-air missiles

8%, the air defense men were unable to shoot it down, and the fighter jets could not

It turned out to be an American H71 spy plane flying at an altitude of 30 kilometers at Mach 3 (three times the speed of sound). It has been proven that this aircraft over Sinai, Israel and Syria, i.e. over all the battlefields in the north and south.

and the South, it has been reported that as a result of this plane's passage over the territories

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Israeli territory, sirens sounded and interceptors tried to catch up with it without success

unsuccessfully. Whatever the truthfulness of the Israeli accounts of this aircraft, it is logical that the United States

that the United States provided Israel with all of the highly accurate imagery and information

obtained by this aircraft, and thus Israel became fully aware of the status of the Egyptian forces east and west of the canal

Egyptian forces east and west of the canal with certainty.

Syrian pressure on Egypt to develop the eastward offensive

It was a major surprise for Israel on the afternoon of October 6, 73 to face a real full-scale war

on two fronts, each remote from the other: The Golan front in the north and the Sinai front in the

which were separated by a distance of about 500 kilometers, which should have forced it to distribute its forces and dispersed its efforts and did not allow it to

its forces and dispersed its efforts and did not allow it to transfer its forces from one front to the other

As was the case in the June 1967 war, thanks to the existence of the Federal Command of the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

of the Egyptian and Syrian armies, this command was able, through the process of organizing cooperation between the Egyptian and Syrian commands

to coordinate a joint attack plan on both fronts at the same time.

The air strike was unified so that about 200 Egyptian and 100 Syrian planes crossed

crossed the front lines with Israel on both fronts at the same moment to hit vital targets in the

The timing of the artillery fire was also synchronized to be carried out by about 2,000 Egyptian and 1,000 Syrian artillery

Egyptian artillery and 1,000 Syrian artillery at the same moment.

The plan, preparations and coordination of the operation were carried out under the full control of

of the Commander-in-Chief of the Federal Forces, General Ahmed Ismail, and in conjunction with the operations committees of both countries.

The war began in the form of an odor, and in complete harmony and coordination that caused panic and confusion in the ranks of the Israeli forces.

and confusion in the ranks of the Israeli forces. However, this successful joint start soon faded

gradually faded as soon as offensive operations began on both fronts, as there was a complete disconnect between the

between the two Arab armies in the north and south, and the leadership of each army managed its operations according to the

according to the situations and events that confronted them.

This strategic situation on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts provided the opportunity for the

to prioritize its work and avoid facing a serious crisis on both fronts at the same time

simultaneously. The main reason for this was the lack of a unified command structure for the two fronts

that had the authority to issue operational orders and movement instructions to troops on both fronts. Despite the fact that Although a joint operations body was formed at the Federal General Headquarters in Cairo, headed by Major General Bahi and including Egyptians and a number of Sorbian officers, as well as the presence of a number of Egyptian Egyptian liaison officers in the Syrian command in Damascus, the reality of the situation proved that the presence of the Operations Authority in the Federal Command was of no use, as it could not conduct any kind of coordination or linkage between the two fronts coordination or linkage between the two fronts in the actual combat phases, and its work was limited throughout the war was limited to the task of communicating between the two fronts by exchanging signals and radio messages and busy deciphering and communicating information about the military situation on the Syrian front to Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail. Lt. General Ahmed Ismail, without giving this body any real opportunity or capabilities to perform its coordinating operations and linking joint plans between the two fronts.

It was supposed to have a unified command structure that included a full department of operations and another for intelligence, which would have ensured the exploitation of the severe crisis and confusion faced by the Israeli leadership during the first days of the battle when during the first days of the battle, when the Israeli leadership received the shock of violent warfare on both fronts simultaneously. on both fronts simultaneously. Had such a command existed, it would have capitalized on the opportunity to concentrate Israel's air effort and reserve forces in the initial period of devastation against the Syrian front Syrian front to successfully develop a Malassian offensive eastward toward the Jahbilyah Gorge without the conducting the long pause that lasted about five days (from Bom 9 to October 13), which This missed a precious and irreplaceable opportunity to reach the natural line of defense of the canal. of the Canal, the strategic mountain fjords. Had this been done, it would not have been possible for the 1 Israeli forces could not have made the subsequent breakthrough in the Egyptian defenses east of the canal at Dafraswar on the night of October 15/16, which ended with crossing the canal and reaching the west bank of the canal and operations on the rear of the Second and Third Armies west of the canal.

Israel was able to get out of the difficult situation it faced at the beginning of the war by focusing its attention on each front separately and considering them as two separate fronts. He revealed Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan revealed this Israeli viewpoint when he said: "Our Our forces are taking defensive positions on the Canal front and erecting defensive lines to stop the Egyptian advance until the situation on the Golan front in the north shifts in Israel's favor over the next few days in the next few days.

Despite the close alliance between Egypt and Syria, which was at its peak on

at its peak on October 6, 73, when the two countries launched a joint attack on the Sinai and Golan fronts and the Golan Heights, the events of Kharb soon began to affect the close ties between the two countries

Since the outbreak of the war, tensions between the Egyptian and Syrian leaderships have been increasing in both the military and political spheres. in the military and political spheres, until the matter finally reached a dangerous stage of misunderstanding, suspicion and the exchange of accusations misunderstandings, suspicion, and accusations.

From the first day of the war, the seeds of suspicion were sown.

At 8:00 pm on October 6, the late President Al-Masadat received the Soviet ambassador at the Tahira Palace

Vinogradov, who informed him that Soviet President Brezhnev had telephoned him and asked him to

to convey a verbal message to the Egyptian president, which included two paragraphs: The first was to congratulate

the Soviet Union's congratulations to Sadat on the successful crossing of the Suez Canal. The second

The second paragraph, which surprised Sadat, was that the Syrian political leadership had no objection

from submitting a draft resolution to the Security Council for a ceasefire. The Soviet ambassador assured Sadat

assured Sadat that the Kremlin leaders are very interested in the next political move he sees.

Sadat marveled at the Soviet ambassador, asking him where Moscow got its information about the Syrian demand for a cease-fire from

about the Syrian demand for a ceasefire, and he assured him that this was done in a meeting between

between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and the Soviet ambassador in Damascus just a few hours before the outbreak of the war

hours before the outbreak of the war. Sadat asked Vinogradov to return to Moscow to confirm his information because he

that he did not believe that Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had made such a request.

that the ceasefire proposal came from the United States since the game was being played in favor of the Arabs.

Arabs. As for Egypt, it is impossible to contemplate a cease-fire, as five Egyptian

Egyptian infantry divisions are beginning to establish themselves on the honorary shore of the Canal, and as soon as the bridges are completed bridges, the armored forces will join them immediately. Sadat concluded the meeting by saying:

â «We want peace, but don't think about it until the last Israeli soldier is evacuated from Sinai.

On Sunday, October 7, another meeting between Sadat and the Soviet ambassador took place.

Vinogradov confirmed the authenticity of the message that the Soviet ambassador in Damascus had received from the Syrian president

that Syria has no objection to the idea of a ceasefire if a proposal is submitted to the Security Council

a proposal to the Security Council. Immediately after the meeting, Sadat sent a radio telegram to

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Hafez al-Assad in which he told him that a ceasefire now is not in the interest of the Arabs and that it will make

Israthil in a stronger position than it was before the outbreak of the war. He emphasized that it was a mistake to think

that the purpose of the war is to gain territory, as the purpose should be to deplete the enemy's forces

of the enemy's forces, and in order to achieve this we must be prepared to take any losses

us. On Monday, October 8, Sadat received a reply from Hafez al-Assad to his

telegram of the previous day

In his reply, the Syrian president denied that he had asked the Soviet Union to submit a draft

that he had asked the Soviet Union to submit a draft resolution to the Security Council for a ceasefire, and that he was surprised by this false information Assad explained that the battle in the Golan Heights was proceeding successfully according to Syrian planning

according to Syrian planning, the enemy has suffered heavy losses, and Syrian forces were able to liberate

more than half of the Golan Heights, and the rate of Syrian losses is considered normal and can be replaced from Syrian reserves

to be replaced from Syrian reserves. At the end of his cable, the Syrian president emphasized that any important decision

such as a ceasefire can be discussed with no one at all until after agreement between the

the two allies first.

But the next four days (October 9-12) witnessed a sharp military disagreement between the Egyptian and Syrian leaderships

between the Egyptian and Syrian leaderships. The Syrian leadership objected to the Egyptian forces remaining

Egyptian forces to remain at the bridgeheads after successfully repelling Israeli counterattacks

because of the instructions issued to them to make a mobilization pause, thus missing a golden opportunity to advance to the

the line of strategic mountain passes in the center of Sinai. The Syrians stated that the process of organizing

cooperation conducted on June 7, 1973 at the Cairo General Command for the offensive plan

(Plan Badr) between Egyptian and Syrian forces, in which a number of senior Egyptian and Syrian commanders participated.

in which senior Egyptian and Syrian commanders defined the objectives on the basis of the arrival of Egyptian forces

to the Sinai Gorges and Syrian forces to the Jordan River and Lake Tiberias.

After achieving these objectives, only a tactical pause could be made, but the Egyptian leadership

was of the opinion that a tactical pause was necessary after the crossing of the canal and the storming of the Bar-Lev line in order to

to reorganize and prepare for the expected Israeli counterattacks, after which this phase could then be advanced towards the straits.

The Egyptian tactical pause was not only criticized by the Syrians.

officials in the Soviet Union expressed concern that the Egyptian offensive had stalled after its overwhelming victory over the

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the Israelis and the destruction of the Bar-Lev line, and expressed surprise that the Egyptians did not capitalize on their success

to reach the Straits Line, especially since this advance is not only a military necessity but also an important mobilization phase

an important mobilization phase, it would also help relieve the pressure on Syria

on Syria by concentrating the main Israeli effort against it.

On Wednesday, October 10, the last major Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from the

Jahalan Heights to the 1967 ceasefire line from which they had started the attack on October 6

After suffering heavy losses in lives, weapons and equipment, Israel prepared to launch a general attack on the Syrian rear

to launch a general attack on the Syrian interior, forcing the Syrian leadership to throw into the battle

its last strategic reserve, the 3rd Armored Division, which was stationed in

northern Damascus

Damascus. At 11:00 a.m. on Thursday, October 11, Israeli forces began their general offensive deep into Syria on two axes after violent air attacks on Syrian forces

When Moshe Dayan arrived at the front, he told Raphael Eitan, commander of the Northern Command:

â€œThere will be a taste of my sixty years if I see you on the hills of Damascus.â€ 9 In the evening, the Israeli armored column arrived. The Israeli armored column on the northern axis reached about 40 km from Damascus. But on

On October 13, the Israeli attack on Syria reached its limit.

The three Israeli armored divisions that had repelled the Syrian attack on the Golan

The three Israeli armored divisions that first repelled the Syrian attack on the Golan and then, despite their heavy losses in lives and equipment, were tasked with the general attack towards Damascus

Damascus to continue advancing one step forward, their forces were completely exhausted.

especially since the Syrian forces, after withdrawing from the Golan, returned to their fortified

on the old ceasefire line (the purple line) and were joined by formations of the Iraqi 3rd Armored Division, equipped with British-made Centurion tanks, joined them in the defensive line.

British Centurion tanks, whose vanguard had arrived at the front on October 11. as well as the Jordanian 40th Armored Brigade, equipped with American Patton tanks. King Hussein

summoned the American ambassador on October 11 and told him that he could not stand by and not intervene in the war

to intervene in the war, but that he would not open a new front on his country's border with Israel and would only

to send the 40th Armored Brigade to help the Syrians, and King Hussein also sent a message to this effect

to the late President Sadat in Cairo.

Thus, the main battles on the Syrian front can be considered to have ended on the evening of the 13th.

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October, and that the purple defense line returned as it was before the October 6 war without any change.

In the central and southern parts of it, while in the northern part, Raphael Eitan's division succeeded

Eitan's division succeeded in advancing 15 kilometers north of the old line, forming what was known at the time as the Sa'Sa's pocket.

A city located 40 km from Damascus, and when the Soviets realized the extent of the collapse of the Syrian front

realized the extent of the collapse of the Syrian front and the extent of the danger to Damascus, an angry statement was broadcast from the Kremlin

from the Kremlin that read: â€œThe Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the criminal actions of the Israeli army.

â€œThe Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to the criminal actions of the Israeli army. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, relayed the warning to Dr. Henry Kissinger

the warning to Dr. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, and informed him that the Soviet Union

would not be indifferent to Israel's threat to Damascus, and if Israel continued to advance

things could get out of hand. Following this warning, the administration received a letter from Moscow

Moscow expressing its strong protest against Israel's bombing of civilians in Egypt and Syria.

and the bombing of merchant ships in Syrian ports. In addition, the Soviet Union decided

took it upon itself to protect the ports of Latakia and Tartus.

Soviet missile ships and surface-to-air missiles were placed on their berths, and the Israeli naval and air force refrained from
The Israeli navy and air force have since refrained from any attacks against these two ports.

When the Syrian leadership realized that the Egyptian forces were still remained in place east of the canal, with no signs of an order on the horizon that an order was expected to be issued to move eastward towards the straits in accordance with the plan agreed upon between the two beasts. The Syrian command in Damascus began bombarding the Federal Command in Cairo with a barrage of cables inquiring when the Egyptian forces would advance forward to relieve the pressure on the Syrian front. General Bahieddine Nawfal, head of the
The head of the Joint Federal Operations Authority in Cairo was feeling more and more embarrassed as he showed of these cables to Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, commander of the Federal Command. In the face of this pressure Sadat was forced to respond to the demands of the Syrians and took the dangerous decision to develop the Egyptian offensive eastward on the morning of October 13 which was postponed for 24 hours to take place on the morning of October 14. Unfortunately, this correct decision was issued at the wrong time and became the same as the wrong decision issued at the right time and had the worst consequences for the course of the war.

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How did the political decision to develop the attack come about?

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces during the October War, explained the circumstances in which the political decision to develop the attack was issued, stating on pages 245 and 246 of his memoirs:

âAfter my return from the front on Thursday, October 11, the minister (Lt. Gen.

Ismail) on the subject of developing our attack towards the straits, but I opposed the idea and gave him

I opposed the idea and gave him reasons, and it seemed to me that he was convinced of this and closed the matter. However, he approached me again the next morning (Friday, December 12)

the next morning (Friday, October 12), this time claiming that the purpose of our attack

was to relieve pressure on the Syrian front. I opposed the idea on the grounds that our attack would not

relieve pressure on the Syrian front, as the enemy has 8 armored brigades in front of us, and would not need to

to withdraw additional forces from the Syrian front, as these forces are capable of repelling any

attack. We have no mobile air defense except for a very small number of SAM 6s, which are not enough to protect our forces

to protect our troops. Our ground forces will fall prey to the Israeli air force because they will be dispersed as soon as they

once they get out from under the air defense umbrella, which is about 15 kilometers east of the canal. If we

this operation, we will destroy our forces without providing any help to relieve the pressure on the Syrian front

Syrian front. Around noon, the minister touched on this topic for the third time in 24 hours.

This time he said: âThe political decision is that we must develop the offensive towards the straits.

begin tomorrow morning, October 13.â By noon, the instructions for the development of the attack had been prepared

had been prepared, and General Muhammad Ghoneim moved to the Second Army and General Taha al-Majdoub to the Third Army to the Third Army, carrying these orders to the commanders of the two armies. As soon as the instructions arrived Major General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, called me on the phone and said angrily Lieutenant General, I cannot carry out the instructions you sent with General Ghoneim. And it didn't take a few minutes later, Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, was also on the line on the phone and expressed strong opposition to the instructions he had received with General Taha al-Lajdoub. And in my conversation with both General Saad Maamoun and General Abdel Moneim Wassel, I made no secret of the fact that I also opposed these instructions, but I was forced to do so. I again discussed the matter with the minister, and it was decided to summon Saad Maamoun and Abdel Moneim Wasel to attend a conference at the command the same evening. During this conference, which lasted until 243 p.m.
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11:00 p.m. Each of us repeatedly reiterated our point of view, but there was an insistence from the the minister insisted that the decision was political, that we must abide by it, and that all that could be done was to postpone the attack to dawn on the 14th instead of dawn on the 13th. This decision was the first major mistake made by the Egyptian leadership during the war. This mistake led to a series of other mistakes that had a major impact on the conduct and outcome of the war. In order to develop our eastern offensive while while keeping the bridgeheads strong and secure, we had to push the second echelons into battle battle . Saad al-Shazli's statement ended.

Thus, after reading what Saad al-Shazly wrote in his memoirs, it is clear that this is a fact known to most of the commanders of the October War. It is a fact known to most of the commanders of the October War that the decision to develop the eastward attack that took place on the morning of October 14 was a political decision on the morning of October 14 was a political decision made by the late President Anwar Sadat on his own responsibility As the head of the country's political leadership and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, it was his his responsibility and competence to set the country's supreme strategy, and thus issue political decisions Whatever the opinion of the Muskarian leaders on the political decisions made by the head of state political decisions issued by the head of state, this opinion is nothing more than an advisory opinion and it becomes their duty, after giving their advice, to implement the political decisions to the letter without objection without objection, no matter how much they assess the dire consequences for their troops, which is exactly what happened on the evening of October 12 during the commanders' conference on the evening of October 12 during the commanders' conference held at Center 10 of the General Command in Cairo Cairo. The Muskarian commanders voiced strong objections to the political decision made by Sadat's decision to develop the eastward offensive at the wrong time, but Lt. Gen. Ismail, the commander-in-chief, insisted that the decision was a political one and that military commanders should abide by it.

This difference of opinion, which often occurs between the political and military leaderships, is a thorny and dangerous topic. It is a thorny and dangerous subject, with countless examples and precedents in both ancient and modern history. Although it is the Egyptian leaders who bear the sole responsibility in front of public opinion and history for the consequences of wrong political decisions, whether they result in disastrous consequences or disastrous defeats on the battlefield. On the battlefield, strategic rules and constitutional systems make it imperative for them to submit to political decisions without objection, regardless of the degree to which they violate the principles of the art of war. The basis for the use of the armed forces is that they are to be the executing tool of the government. The basis of the use of the armed forces is to be the implementing instrument of the state's foreign policy, and what is ruined, according to the Egyptians, is nothing but a continuation of the political action but in another form.

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Although history is replete with historical evidence of wrong political decisions that led to disastrous defeats or catastrophes that led to bitter defeats or bitter military disasters, we are content to mention only one example here. We have chosen it because it is still alive in the hearts of Egyptians. In Egypt less than twenty years ago, and Egypt is still suffering from it today, if not the entire Arab nation.

the entire Arab nation.

In the preparatory phase leading up to the June '67 war, which began with the mobilization of Egyptian forces in Sinai on May 15, '67

in Sinai on May 15, 67, the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued three decisions

during this period, which were undoubtedly one of the main factors in the disastrous defeat of the Egyptian forces in the June War. It is well documented that some military commanders voiced their objections to these decisions. They objected to these decisions and warned of their dire consequences, but the political leadership did not heed their objections and insisted on their position. These political decisions are summarized below

briefly:

1 The political decision to withdraw the international emergency force: On the instructions of the political leadership The Egyptian government asked U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, on May 17, 67 to withdraw the International Emergency Force from the Gaza Strip and Sinai. When U Thant agreed On May 18, Egypt announced the decision to end the presence of these forces on its territory, followed by another political decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli ships.

The Armed Forces had no choice but to implement the sudden political decision as quickly as possible had no choice but to establish an air bridge between Almaza Airport and the Sharm el-Sheikh area, and moved across it before first light on May 19 Before first light on May 19, an entire unit of paratroopers carried on helicopters helicopters, while at the same time a ground column of tanks and artillery

representing sub-units that had been pulled from several large formations and combined with them to form a special force which, of course, weakened these formations, and the moving column faced Hundreds of vehicles broke down along the way, and the Hundreds of vehicles broke down along the way, and the personnel suffered the worst of the bad weather, and this force did not arrive until a few days later only a few days later. As a result of the opening of the new Tahboua axis, which the military leadership had not had not previously accounted for in its military plan, the Air Force also had to had to make strenuous efforts to station a fighter squadron in Hurghada, where it was not

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airport was not equipped. The navy had to move more than six naval vessels of various types from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aqaba, thus increasing the the length of the front line with Israel to double the original front line (500 kilometers from Rafah to Sharm el-Sheikh instead of from Rafah to Sharm el-Sheikh instead of 250 kilometers from Rafah to Ras al-Naqab). increased the military and administrative burdens on the Egyptian forces in Sinai, weakened their combat capacity, and dispersed their units. The opening of this new axis did not provide any strategic or tactical benefit to the Egyptian forces in Sinai strategic or tactical advantage.

2 The political leadership decided in a military conference attended by the late President Abdel Nasser the need to defend Rafah, reminding that our commitments to the Palestinians and the Arab countries requires the defense of this area. This decision was surprising to the military leadership, as it was The front line of the Egyptian defenses, according to the plan established since 1957, is a few kilometers east of Al-Arish a few kilometers east of al-Arish and far from Rafah, and there was not enough time to study the land and complete the necessary engineering work for the positions to study the land and complete the necessary engineering work for the new positions, which of course were chosen in a hurry urgently . To implement this political decision, the 7th Infantry Division and the 14th Armored Brigade were pushed into the Rafah area starting on May 22 to occupy an unprepared defensive line in a coastal strip with no defensive depth This led to the Israeli Northern Axis forces penetrating the Egyptian positions in Rafah without any difficulty on Egyptian positions in Rafah without any difficulty on June 5, 67, despite the valor shown by these forces. and suffered heavy losses.

3 It was the most serious political decision made by the late President Nasser during the preparatory phase. one of the main factors in the defeat of June 67 was the decision he announced in the most important military meeting held in He announced it in the most important military meeting held in Field Marshal Amer's office on Friday, June 2, 67, on the sixth floor of the General Command building in Nasr City on the sixth floor of the General Command building in Nasr City, which was attended by politicians Anwar Sadat Zakaria Mohebi al-Din, Hussein al-Shafi'i and Ali Sabri, and from the military, Gen. Mohamed Fawzi and Shams Badran, then Minister of War, as well as force

commanders, branch chiefs, field commanders and directors of the Field Marshal's office.

field commanders and directors of the Field Marshal's office. This meeting is considered a major turning point in the course of the war of the events leading up to the war, and clearly illustrates the serious impact that a wrong political decision can have on the integrity of the strategic situation of the military forces.

on the strategic integrity of military forces. Nasser announced During the meeting, after briefly analyzing the political and military situation, Nasser announced that Egypt's strategy had

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shifted from an offensive to a defensive strategy, and that Israel was likely to launch offensive campaigns

offensive campaigns in two or three days, i.e. on June 4 or 5, 67, and that Israel would

start its attack with an air strike against our air force and air defense to cripple it and take it out of the battle.

He asked the Muskarian commanders to prepare for the first strike and to take the necessary measures

to minimize their losses so that we can then strike a deterrent blow against the enemy's air forces.

air force . This decision led to the destruction of the Egyptian air force on the ground on the morning of June 5

in a few hours, and thus the defeat of the infamous June '67 war.

We do not mean by mentioning the decisions made in the preparatory phase of the June '67 war

to hold Nasser solely responsible for Egypt's defeat in this war, as Field Marshal

Abdul Hakim Amer was involved with him in all the decisions issued during the preparatory phase, whether military or political

whether military or political, and can be considered a co-conspirator in all his actions and decisions regarding this war

and his decisions regarding this war. Field Marshal Amer did not actually represent the Muskarian leadership

in the sense that we mean in this research, as his work was primarily political, and in this way

we can consider that Nasser and Abdel Hakim Amer together represented the political leadership that issued the aforementioned decisions

that issued the aforementioned decisions. Once the war broke out on June 5, 67, Field Marshal Amer

June 67 to exercise the actual military command of the Egyptian forces, and he became primarily responsible

for its management, his hasty, erratic and erratic leadership led to the collapse of the military situation on the Egyptian front

the military situation on the Egyptian front in a way that was unimaginable to even the most optimistic of Israel's leaders.

of Israel even in his wildest dreams.

Thus, it can be fairly determined that the wrong political decisions made in the preparatory phase of the war, in addition to the

in the preparatory phase of the war, in addition to the poor and nerve-wracking military management

contributed to the unparalleled catastrophe of June '67

in the history of Egypt.

It may be useful to readers as we review the issues of disagreement that sometimes arise between the political and military leadership over strategic decisions

the political and military leadership over strategic decisions, it may be useful for readers to record this serious incident that took place during the Korean

War at the beginning of the year

that took place during the Korean War in the early 1950s, when the famous American commander

The famous American commander, Douglas MacArthur, who was in charge of the general command of the American and Aim forces.

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in the war between South and North Korea in 1950 tried to ignore the political leadership and follow the dictates of the situation.
to ignore the political leadership and follow the dictates of the military situation on the battlefield, despite his
of his major battles for the liberation of the Philippines during World War II, when he was
commander of U.S. forces in the Far East, and despite the fact that he was the U.S. commander who
to occupy Japan after its surrender in August 1945, US President Harry S. Truman did not hesitate to remove him
Truman did not hesitate to remove him from all his positions on April 11, '51 due to his pride in his opinions
disregarding the political decisions made by the American president, and disagreeing with him about the American strategy to be followed towards China. U.S. strategy toward China, which was supporting North Korea at the time by supplying it with weapons and equipment, and then evolved into supplying it with some muskrat units
fighters to repel the Americans as they approached the Chinese border.

General plan of attack development

The modification to the Granite II plan of attack that led to its designation as Plan Granite II Amended (then Plan Badr) was to seize the line of strategic straits in the Sinai
in the Sinai. The purpose of this modification was to convince the Syrian leadership of the plan
Egyptian offensive plan when organizing cooperation between the Egyptian and Syrian armies before the war
It did not make sense for the Syrian plan to aim to liberate the Khulan Heights and reach the
to the Jordan River and the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias at a depth of about 25 kilometers from the starting line
while the Egyptian plan is limited to the modest goal that was included in the original
the original Granite II plan to establish a bridgehead area 1210 kilometers east of the canal.
Accordingly, the plan for crossing and establishing the bridgeheads became known as Phase I, while the plan to develop the offensive eastward became known as Phase II.
while the plan to develop the attack eastward to capture the strait was called Phase II.

On June 7, 1973, at the General Command in Nasr City, the cooperative organization of the
which was attended by Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, commander of the Federal Command, Major General Bahey El-Din Nawfal, head of the Federal Command's operations staff, and a number of senior Egyptian and Syrian commanders.
and a number of senior Egyptian and Syrian commanders, where the objectives of the attack plan on the two fronts were determined
The timing of the air and artillery strikes was standardized. What is noteworthy is that
The first phase of the plan was discussed during the process of organizing cooperation at all levels

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in all its minute details, while the second phase was passed over quickly. He justified

General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces during the October War, justified this phenomenon in his memoirs that he himself had never expected that Egyptian forces would be asked to carry out the second phase, and that this was the same feeling of the commanders of the Second and Third Armies.

What is clear from our analysis of the facts and events during the first days of the war is that the Egyptian leadership

The Egyptian leadership, after its success in realizing the first phase of the plan

1 Badr, namely storming the Suez Canal, breaking the Bar-Lev line and establishing a bridgehead area 12-10 kilometers east of the canal.

at a depth of 12-10 kilometers east of the canal, it did not seriously consider implementing the second phase of the offensive plan

If it had, it would have been quick to seize the opportunity for Israel to concentrate its main effort against the Syrian front in

its main effort against the Syrian front in the north and the chance that Israel's main counterattack

Israel's main counterattack against the left-handed Second Army forces on Monday, October 8, failed miserably.

Israeli armored forces in the Sinai suffered heavy losses of tanks in the first three days of the war.

the first three days of the war, to implement the second phase of Plan 1bdra, and would have ordered its forces to advance on October 9

ordering its forces to advance on October 9 at the latest in an easterly direction to seize the

strategic mountain fjords, as this was the best possible timing for this operation during the

during the entire war. As for the political decision to develop the attack eastward on the morning of October 14

In addition to being mistimed, as we have already explained, the development plan issued by the General Command to implement this decision was completely different from the original

the original development plan that was included in the revised Granite II Plan 1 Badr, on the basis of which the organization of cooperation on all levels was carried out.

on the basis of which the process of organizing cooperation at all levels was carried out, which was called Phase

II . The original attack development plan called for the Egyptian main forces to advance from the

the bridgehead area east of the canal, supported by armored and mechanized divisions in the second echelon

in the west of the canal in an easterly direction with the aim of capturing the straits, i.e. penetrating them, reaching their eastern entrances

its eastern entrances and take defensive positions on the general line.

Matla, Al-Jadibir, Jadibir, Jafjafa, Bir al-Eid, i.e. the entire Egyptian defense line advances from the

the area of the bridgeheads at a depth of 10-12 km east of the canal to the line of the Kharb mountain wall

of Sinai at a depth of 8075 km east of the canal, which is in fact the natural line of defense for

Egypt.

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The plan to develop the attack on October 14 was impossible to execute as originally planned

both in terms of method and in terms of the objectives to be achieved, as the overall strategic situation had changed

after the Syrian front was frozen and Israel was fighting on only one front, the Egyptian front.

the Egyptian front, which made it concentrate its entire main effort against it, and it became dangerous for any large forces to advance

dangerous for any large forces to advance eastward beyond 2015 kilometers east of the canal, which is the range of protection that the

the protective range that the air defense network can achieve, so that these forces do not become easy prey for Israeli planes and are destroyed for Israeli aircraft and would be destroyed before they reached their targets. For these reasons, the
The new development plan is based on the bridges of the Second and Third Armies remaining in place
and only pushing forward detachments, most of which were allocated from the 4th and 2nd Armored Divisions
from the 2nd echelon west of the canal, to cross the canal and then push out from thrust lines inside the bridgeheads to reach the
bridgeheads to reach crossroad No. 3, which passes by the western entrances of the Matla and El Gedi straits.
Mitla and Gedi Straits, then intersects with the middle road at Tassa and the coastal road at
This road is located at a depth of about 30 kilometers east of the canal, which means that there is a difference between the original and new development plans in terms of the depth of attack
between the original and new development plans in terms of depth of attack, at least 45 kilometers.

The plan was to develop the attack eastward from first light on October 14
The plan was to destroy enemy concentrations on the front line, and to begin the attack with a 15-minute firefight preceded by an air strike against targets
15-minute fire support preceded by an air strike against hostile targets in Hamak, with the main effort focused on
the air force to protect the troops from the air and provide direct support to them as they advance, while the air defense forces
air defense forces focus their main effort on securing the push to engage the forces and protect the main grouping of forces.
the main grouping of troops. The development plan called for four forward detachments (two from each army) to advance
Army) on the following four main axes:

The axis of the Matla corridor: An armored brigade from the 4th Armored Division (the second echelon of the 3rd Army) advances
in the direction of Matla Pass to seize and secure the western entrance to the pass, assisted by a forward detachment on the right flank
A mechanized infantry battalion from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division (from the
Third Army's 2nd Corps). .

Al Jedi Pass axis: A mechanized infantry brigade from the 7th Infantry Division (left division of the
of the 3rd Army's 1st Corps) advances east to seize the intersection of Sick Road 3 and
in cooperation with a battalion of the 25th Independent Armored Brigade (attached to the 7th Infantry Division).

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Al-Tasasa Axis The 21st Armored Division (2nd Army 2nd Corps) advances honorably to seize the intersection of
the intersection of Transverse Road 3 with the Middle Road at Al-Tassa.

Baluza axis: 15th Armored Brigade (attached to the 18th Infantry Division) advances east
to capture the intersection of Transverse Road 3 with the coastal road at Balwaza.

Tank battle in front of the Matla Gorge

At 10:30 p.m. on October 12, the Third Army Command was instructed
Third Army was instructed to push an armored brigade from the 4th Armored

Division as an advance detachment to seize and secure the western entrance to the Matla Gorge.

Brig. Gen. H. Mohamed Abdel Aziz Qabil, the division commander, summoned Colonel A. H. H. Nouredine Abdel Aziz, commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade, as well as the chiefs of combat arms to his command center, where he assigned the mission to the brigade commander. Before the first light on October 13, the 3rd Armored Brigade moved from its position south of Jabal Oweid using the Cairo-Suez road.

Cairo-Suez road, and its advanced elements began to reach Bridge No. 1, the crossing assigned to it in the 19th Infantry Division's sector. As the bridge was occupied by an air defense unit

air defense unit, the brigade was unable to complete the crossing until 1:00 p.m.

The brigade assembled in the designated forward waiting area on the Shatayoun Moussa road. During

While the brigade units were in the forward waiting area, the enemy shelled the area with artillery fire

Long-range artillery fire, and the units suffered some losses in lives and vehicles, due to the lack of

There was no engineering equipment in the area. The brigade commander, while his units were crossing, had finalized

prepared his decision and presented it to General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, at 11:00 a.m. on October 13 at the

at 11:00 a.m. on October 13 at the army's advance command center, where he received

his ratification. As soon as the brigade commander arrived at the forward waiting area where the

of the armored brigade and support units, the procedures for organizing the battle immediately began.

The commander took battalion commanders and branch chiefs to reconnoiter the line from which the brigade

to engage inside the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead, and traffic control elements began to open

axes of advance . At 7:00 p.m., the commander completed the procedures for organizing the battle.

While the armored brigade was busy all day on October 13 with the crossing operation

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and battle organization procedures, the Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the 113th Mechanized Brigade of the

of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, stationed in the area of Biber Adib on the western shore of the Gulf of Suez, south of Jebel Ataqa.

Brigadier General Muhammad Abul Fath Muharram, the division commander, was assigned

the mission to its commander in accordance with the instructions issued by the Third Army commander, namely that the battalion is to act as an

as an advance detachment on the right flank of the armored brigade on the axis of the Ayoun Marsa road to seize the area of its intersection with the

transverse road

On the night of 12/13/12, the Mechanized Infantry Battalion

The mechanized infantry battalion moved north from Bir Adib on the road to Suez, and at 10:30 a.m. on October 13

10:30 a.m. on October 13, it began crossing the canal at one of the crossings of the 19th Infantry Division

Infantry Division. Once across, it was placed under the command of the 3rd Armored Brigade of the 4th Division, which was tasked with

development mission. On the instructions of the Commander of the Third Army, an armored company of the 3rd Armored Brigade was placed

Armored Brigade under the command of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion to reinforce it. The battalion then headed south on the

Shatt al-Tour road east of the Gulf of Suez to its assigned forward waiting area in the Oyoun Moussa, where it was joined by its assigned support units. The commander of the 3 Armored Brigade commander issued cooperation instructions and an engagement payment plan to the battalion commander.

To secure the mechanized infantry battalion's push to engage from its assigned line in the Oyoun Moussa area Moussa area, the battalion commander organized cooperation with neighboring units, namely the of the 19th Infantry Division and the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division stationed in the Oyoun Moussa area, acting as a flank guard for the 19th Infantry Division (this task was assigned to the assigned to the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade on the afternoon of October 11 after it failed to reach Ras Sedr). At 8 p.m., the mechanized infantry battalion commander arrived at the command center of the of the 3rd Armored Brigade in the forward waiting area inside the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead. He presented his decision to the brigade commander, who ratified it, and the two commanders organized cooperation.

At 11:00 p.m., Brig. H. Mohamed Eid al-Aziz Kabil, commander of the 4th Division Brigadier General Mohamed Eid Al-Aziz Qabil, Commander of the 4th Armored Division, inspected the 3rd Armored Brigade in the evening waiting area. and took the brigade commander with him to the advanced command center of the 19th Infantry Division Commander Brigadier General of the commander of the 19th Infantry Division, Brigadier General 2.H. Yousef Afifi, where the organization of cooperation between the 19th Infantry Division and the armored brigade was carried out. 19th Infantry Division and the armored brigade. The sub-units of the armored brigade continued to the organization of the battle until about 4:00 a.m. on October 14.

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In order to obtain information about the enemy, a reconnaissance group was pushed by the orders of the commander of the from the division's reconnaissance battalion on the afternoon of October 13 from the area of Ayoun Moussa on the axis of advance of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion, as well as the 3rd Armored Brigade before first light On October 14, two reconnaissance groups from the brigade were pushed towards the line of advance

At the appointed time, units of the 3rd Armored Brigade began to advance from the waiting area The artillery units fired a 15-minute burst of fire to secure the brigade's advance. for 15 minutes to secure the brigade's advance, but the artillery shelling was ineffective, as it was done in a and was not directed against specific targets, as the information about the enemy's position on the front line was very inadequate. This was one of the main factors in the unsuccessful development of the front line development along the frontline, and furthermore, the sortie that was requested by the requested by the army, which was supposed to be carried out by fighter-bombers.

The armored brigade's strength was further weakened by the fact that some of the important support units that had been allocated to it did not arrive before the

hour of the attack, forcing it to carry out the development without them. to carry out the development operation without them, including a company of anti-tank guided missiles anti-tank missiles (Malotka missiles on Bardam vehicles), a 57m anti-aircraft biplane company and a platoon of military engineers.

At 6:30 a.m. on October 14, the brigade's units began crossing the from the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead under the supervision of the commander of the 4th Armored Division and his His command . One of the most important factors that helped the 3rd Armored Brigade to continue advancing towards the The most important factor that helped the 3rd Armored Brigade to continue advancing towards its objective was the skill with which its axis of advance was chosen, as it was adjacent to the main road (Al-Shat Matla) which was densely packed with enemy fortifications and anti-tank curtains, and instead Instead, the armored brigade made a detour from Jakhnoub on the enemy's left flank through Wadi Wadi Mabouk and Wadi al-Murr, advancing eastward to the deepest depth reached by an Egyptian unit in the October War October War (about 25 kilometers east of the canal), and was able to reach a distance of only about 6 kilometers from The Israeli authorities recognized that the only Egyptian surprise in the development of the Egyptian offensive on October 14 in the development of the Egyptian offensive on October 14 was in the southern sector in front of the division of Gen. Kalman Magen's division, where the armored brigade of the 4th Armored Division made a deep encirclement by penetrating one of the main valleys in a detour from the south to the northeast, and that this was 254

the only place where the Egyptians succeeded in penetrating eastward more than 20 kilometers into the the road to the Matla Pass.

The 3rd Armored Brigade was advancing in two columns and in reserve. The first corps consisted of two battalions Tank battalions supported by two mechanized infantry companies, the second corps consisted of a tank battalion with the exception of company, and the reserve consisted of the brigade's mechanized infantry battalion and two companies. At 8:00 a.m. In the morning, the 1st Corps right battalion encountered an Israeli armored force consisting of tanks and infantry and mechanized infantry supported by curtains of TA5 anti-tank missiles, which stopped it from advancing. Enemy aircraft carried out a concentrated aerial bombardment on the brigade's combat formation and severely attacked the vehicles of the command centers, artillery, and reserves. command center vehicles, artillery and reserves. As a result of the aerial bombardment, the brigade's artillery column was separated from the rest of the brigade's combat formation was separated from the rest of the brigade's combat formation, destroying some of its tractors and plunging others into the sands of Wadi al-Mar in the sands of Wadi al-Murr and were unable to follow the tanks that continued to advance.

At the same time, the brigade's reconnaissance elements reported that strong enemy armored units were occupying a group of high mountain ranges about 43 kilometers from the entrance to the Matla Pass. They were in complete control of the armored brigade's approach to the western

entrance of the pass. Shortly after approaching these heaths, the two 1st Corps battalions were met with concentrated fire from artillery and anti-tank missile curtains, destroying from the first moment of engagement the two companies of the and the command and control centers of the two battalions, and the remaining tanks of the two battalions heavy losses. This intense and concentrated fire caused a severe state of confusion in the combat formation of the two battalions of the First Corps the combat formation of the two 1st Corps battalions. The tanks were piled up in a narrow area and were unable to to deploy to take the battle formation. Despite the intense fire and the loss of control of the troops, some some tank companies succeeded in occupying favorable opening lines and heavily engaged the Medu force and destroyed about 13 tanks.

The misfortune of the armored brigade to lose its artillery group during its advance as a result of air bombardment was a major factor was a major factor in its inability to silence enemy anti-tank elements and control the entrance to the strait, which caused the brigade more losses. The advance command center of the brigade was located in front between the two battalions of the first corps and was within the range of the enemy's direct fire weapons Despite this, the brigade commander, Colonel A.H. Nouredine Abdel Aziz, moved his command vehicle between

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his units in rare courage until his vehicle was hit by a direct shell from one of the enemy's forward positions. The hero was martyred on the spot, and the brigade command center lost control of the two battalions of the first corps.

The brigade's chief of staff, who was in the rear command center with the second corps battalion, was completely unaware of what was going on in front. was completely unaware of what was happening in the front, as the command vehicle and the tanks of the two battalion commanders of the armored battalions of the first armored tanks of the first corps, which were heavily engaged with the enemy forces stationed west of the entrance to the Matla Pass. the entrance to the Matla Pass. The brigade's chief of operations pushed a liaison officer from the forward command center to the brigade's rear command center to inform him of the situation, and for the brigade's chief of staff to assume command of the brigade The brigade commander was martyred, but the liaison officer was unable to arrive due to the intensity of the enemy's intense aerial bombardment and the rugged terrain. and the rugged terrain, and the brigade's chief of operations, who had the rank of lieutenant colonel, was forced to was forced to assume command in these difficult circumstances, and in order to save the situation, he ordered the 2nd Coordination Battalion to advance on the brigade's left flank to advance on the brigade's left flank with the aim of maneuvering on the enemy's flank and rear in order to to destroy it, and to relieve the pressure on the 1st Corps forces halted by the intensity of the enemy's fire. However, the 2nd Battalion was unable to achieve the desired maneuver, as its tanks became entangled in in a very rugged sandy terrain, rendering them unable to advance, and came under fire from the enemy. enemy fire. At the same time, the enemy moved a squad of tanks on the brigade's right flank to form

the brigade's fighting, causing the mechanized infantry battalion protecting the flank to come under fire from enemy tanks. Its vehicles opened up and engaged the enemy tanks immediately.

At around 10:00 a.m., as the situation was unclear to the brigade's command center the brigade's chief of staff moved forward to the front of the brigade's command center, where contact was established with the three armored battalions and the mechanized infantry battalion, all of which were in open lines engaged in bitter fighting with enemy tanks and anti-tank weapons, and the brigade's chief of staff, who took command of the brigade at this time, ordered who took command of the brigade from that point on ordered the brigade's battalions to hold the line and improve the position of their companies, which were within the range of enemy tanks and projectiles. of enemy tanks and anti-tank guided missiles to minimize the impact of these bulls on them in order to minimize losses. losses. Since the radio 151, which was intended to communicate with the Third Army commander, was was in the brigade commander's command vehicle, which was destroyed, the Chief of Staff sent a brigade operations officer with a report on the brigade's position to the army headquarters. In the report, the brigade's line of approach was only about 6 kilometers from the western entrance

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of the Matla Pass. The report also outlined the brigade's losses and asked the Third Army commander to reinforce the brigade the brigade with a mechanized infantry battalion so that the brigade could secure the line gained by the infantry's occupation of the the sand dunes to the north and southeast of Wadi al-Murr, in preparation for the tanks to complete the attack and capture the entrance to Omar al-Murr to complete the attack and seize the entrance to Omar Metla after expelling the enemy forces controlling the road to it or reinforce the gained line with mechanized infantry. The chief of staff ordered The Chief of Staff also requested to bombard the western entrance to the Matla Pass with artillery or air force.

Due to the presence of some tanks and armored vehicles that had not been destroyed and were embedded in the the brigade command was given the task of forming rescue crews from some of the tanks and tracked vehicles. They rescued and repaired them with great courage under concentrated enemy fire, making it possible to the brigade's combat efficiency. During the rescue work, the radio operator who was working in the command vehicle was found who was working in the command vehicle was found with the 51A3 device intact, and at about 2:00 p.m., while the brigade's command center was trying to communicate with the army's headquarters while the brigade command center was trying to contact the Third Army command, the commander of the 4th Armored Division picked up The brigade's chief of staff and the division commander were connected. After listening to the division commander's heard a report on the brigade's position and issued an order that the brigade's units should hold the acquired line without without falling back. The acting brigade commander continued to try to improve the defenses, carry out The brigade commander continued to try to improve the defenses, carry out engineering works, and push troops to secure the flanks and keep a reserve to face any threat

While the enemy continued to bombard the brigade's defensive sector with artillery fire and reconnaissance

reconnaissance, and helicopters arrived at the enemy lines to transport their wounded.

The commander of the 4th Armored Division explained the situation to the commander of the Third Army and informed him of the brigade's losses which amounted to about 60 T-55 tanks, 9 armored vehicles and all the guns of the field artillery battalion as a result of aerial bombardment and anti-tank missile curtains, in addition to the death of the brigade commander

The brigade commander was martyred and there were a large number of martyrs and wounded on the battlefield. This is at a time while there are no troops from the Third Army to support the brigade, and there are no

anti-aircraft weapons to provide the brigade with protection from the air, especially after it moved forward and out of the defense grid

forward and out of the air defense network. Given these poor conditions for the brigade, the commander of the

Third Army ordered the acting commander of the 3rd Armored Brigade to retreat to the head of the bridgehead of the 19th Infantry Division

The withdrawal took place on the night of October 14/15, and the brigade's units took advantage of the hours of darkness to avoid enemy fire.

exploited the hours of darkness to avoid enemy fire, allowing them to reach Ras Kobri without any losses.

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of the 19th Infantry Division at 11:00 a.m. on October 15. The brigade immediately began and reorganization to quickly restore the brigade's combat efficiency.

The 6th Division's Mechanized Infantry Battalion had also been pushed from the to engage in the Oyoum Moussa area at 6:30 a.m. on October 14 after a on October 14 after a 15-minute bombardment from the 1st Infantry Brigade's artillery group.

Mechanized Brigade to carry out its assigned mission, which was to advance as a flanking detachment of the 3rd Armored Brigade on the Ayoun Moussa road The battalion was unable to continue its advance.

It ran into an enemy armored force and came under heavy fire from artillery, tank fire, and rocket-propelled grenades.

tanks and anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades at the same time as it was subjected to

under intense aerial bombardment, which led to great confusion and loss of control, and the battalion's column dispersed in every direction.

in every direction. Due to the interruption of radio communication between the Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the 3rd Armored Brigade, which was moving on its left due to the martyrdom of its commander

which was moving on its left due to the martyrdom of the brigade commander and the destruction of his vehicle as mentioned earlier, the commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division

The commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, who was at the forward observation post in Ayoun

Moussa, pushed the division's operations and signal chief to the battalion commander in front to inform him

the need to continue advancing, and that all future radio communications with the Third Army headquarters

directly through radio 51 in his command vehicle, and the battalion commander rushed

the battalion commander pushed forward with part of his forces despite the intensity of enemy fire to reach the intersection of the road

to fulfill the mission assigned to his battalion, but the rest of the battalion was separated from him by

The enemy managed to destroy the armored vehicles advancing towards him and captured the battalion commander and the group accompanying him. The battalion commander and the group accompanying him were captured. The battalion's companies began to retreat in batches to the The commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division ordered on the instructions of the commander of the Third Army to place the remains of the retreating mechanized infantry battalion under the command of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Mechanized Infantry Brigade in the Oyoum Moussa area, while working to count losses and reorganize to restore the battalion's combat efficiency as soon as possible.

The Battle of the Geddah Strait, which was a day ahead of schedule The force assigned to carry out the development operation in the left sector of the Third Army was a brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the 7th Infantry Division, which was commanded by Brig. H. Ahmed Badawyatim
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Pushed from the division's bridgehead to serve as the army's forward detachment in the direction of the Al-Gedi Pass. And it was The Mechanized Infantry Brigade was supposed to begin its attack at the same time as the for all forward detachments facing the Second and Third Armies to develop the attack to the east at 6:30 a.m. on October 14. But an incident A unique incident occurred for this brigade. It developed its attack 24 hours earlier than the time when all the forward detachments of the Second and Third Armies The true story of this incident is as follows:

We have already mentioned that on the afternoon of October 12, instructions were prepared for the development of the attack on the order of Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail at Cairo's Center 10, and Maj. Gen. Ghoneim to the Second Army and General Taha Al-Majdoub to the Third Army, carrying with them the instructions for delivery to Major General Sekhad Maamoun and Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, the commanders of the two armies. The development was to begin at 6:30 a.m. on October 13. When Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, the commander in chief, learned from Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, the chief of staff of the two army commanders' staunch opposition to the development of the attack during their phone call with him on the phone, he decided to summon them to a conference at General Headquarters, Center 10, Cairo, on the evening of the same day the same evening. Although the two army commanders went to Cairo, their respective command centers continued to make the necessary preparations for the battle as soon as it received the operational instructions from from the General Headquarters due to time constraints, on the understanding that the development of the offensive would commence according to the at 6:30 a.m. on October 13. Therefore, warning orders were immediately issued to the detachments assigned to the operation and to the formations and other formations that will secure the advance of these detachments from their designated lines of advance in accordance with the instructions. However, at 11:00 p.m., Major General Saad Maamoun and Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel from Cairo's Center 10 called their command centers at the front and informed them that the mission had been postponed by 24 hours, meaning that the development process would begin at 6:30 a.m. on October 14

October 14 at 6:30 a.m.

The Operations Division of the Second and Third Armies, on the instructions of the commanders of the informed all army formations and units of the 24-hour postponement of the development operation.

However, a mistake was made in informing the command of the 7th Infantry Division of the postponement. He lost

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It is established that the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, Brig. H. Ahmed Badawi was overlooked by the Third Army Operations Division

to notify him of the postponement decision like the rest of the army's formations.

As a result, the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division, in accordance with the previous instructions previously issued to the division command, was pushed alone along the front at 6:30 a.m. on October 13 to develop its attack. on October 13 to develop an honorable attack in the direction of Murr al-Jadidi.

one of the most extraordinary incidents recorded in the history of warfare. Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, had summoned the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Brigade (the center brigade in the first echelon of the division's defensive sector) at midnight

. October, assigning him the mission in accordance with the instructions previously issued to him on 12/13/12

It was summarized as follows:

1 The 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade is pushed from the left of the brigade's defensive position inside the division's bridgehead to act as a frontal detachment to seize the intersection of Al-Jadidi Road and Cross Road 3.

The hour of X (the start of the attack) was set to push it and the other detachments on the front line.

at 6:30 a.m. on the morning of October 13, with the detachment to cooperate with a fire for 15 minutes before the start of the push.

2 The brigade is supported by the division's tank battalion and the necessary elements of field artillery, mortars (220 mm), anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, engineers, reconnaissance and thunderbolts engineers, reconnaissance and thunderbolts.

At 1:30 a.m. on October 13, the brigade commander arrived at his command post where a set of orders was waiting for him, and he was assigned tasks to the commanders of his sub-units

His decision on the brigade's combat formation was that the brigade's 2nd Coordination Battalion would be assigned

to act as an advance detachment, to be supported by the division's tank battalion and other reinforcing elements

and push from the brigade's push line at X hours, with the two rear battalions to follow

about 3 to 5 kilometers apart, with one battalion moving to the right of the Al-Jadidi road

and the other battalion on the left of the road (the right battalion was

equipped with Buck's armored vehicles while the
the left battalion was equipped with armored B vehicles), and to the rear of the
two battalions were marching
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Brigade Artillery Group, followed by the brigade's reserves. At 6:30 a.m. on
October 13

October 13 morning, the advance detachment battalion crossed the defense line
after a 15-minute barrage of fire from the division's artillery group
from the division's artillery group in an arithmetic multiplication, but without
being joined by the division's tank battalion

The division's tank battalion was late in arriving due to the lack of time to
prepare for the battle.

for the battle. For the same reason, neither the anti-tank missile company nor
the anti-aircraft artillery battalion arrived

for the same reason, neither the anti-tank missile company nor the anti-aircraft
artillery battalion arrived. The commander of the

The brigade commander had pushed a thunderbolt battalion at 5:00 a.m., an hour
and a half before the brigade was scheduled to be pushed

an hour and a half before the brigade's advance. Elements of the Thunderbolts
succeeded in infiltrating

through enemy positions and reach behind their defenses facing the brigade's
advancement axis, and were of great use during the battle.

a great benefit during the battle in terms of reporting enemy positions, the
movement of their reserves, and the effect of our artillery fire on their
positions.

of our artillery fire on his positions.

No sooner had the advanced detachment battalion moved about one and a half
kilometers east on the Jedi road

when it was forced to stop and open in combat formation, as it encountered an
enemy force

An estimated tank company, supported by artillery fire and curtains of TA-58
anti-tank missiles

They were holed up in defensive positions in the area of the intersection of Al-
Jadidi Road and Cross Road 2

The battalion immediately engaged the enemy elements in a firefight, and at
around 8:50 a.m.

the division's tank battalion arrived, but was unable to join the battalion's
combat formation

due to the intensity of the anti-tank missiles fired at it, forcing it to halt
some distance behind the battalion's battle formation

100 meters behind the battalion's battle formation. To the rear of the tank
battalion, the

the advanced brigade command center took up a position to observe the battle,
and given the halt and the destruction of the enemy

the brigade commander decided to push the left rear battalion with armored
vehicles to the front of the brigade's battle formation

B.8 armored vehicles. After a 15-minute burst of fire from the brigade's
artillery group, the brigade commander decided to turn around the enemy's left
flank

the enemy's left flank and destroy it in its positions or force it to retreat by
taking advantage of the nature of the terrain in this direction.

the nature of the terrain in this direction and taking advantage of the speed
characterized by these vehicles (about 31

kilometers per hour). The Division Commander ratified the Brigade Commander's
decision.

At around 11:30 a.m., the B.8.3 armored battalion was pushed from

from the extreme right of the advancing detachment battalion on the enemy's left
flank and took a formation

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The battalion was unable to advance more than 2 kilometers and was halted by the

enemy's concentrated artillery and anti-aircraft missile fire. artillery and anti-tank missiles on the battalion's combat formation. The enemy also concentrated its aerial bombardment on the brigade's battle formation, causing the units great losses. In the face of the helplessness of B.P. vehicles were unable to advance in the face of the anti-tank curtains, the brigade commander ordered to hide the armored vehicles behind earthworks and sand dunes and disembark their crews to operate as ordinary infantrymen on foot, and to use the fire-and-movement method to try to advance to enemy positions under the cover of fire from tanks and armored vehicles hidden in the rear in the rear. The decision resulted in some platoons succeeding in reaching close proximity to the enemy. However, the brigade units did not complete their attempts to advance towards enemy positions. At around 1:00 p.m., the commander of the 7th Infantry Division issued an order by radio to the brigade commander to to the brigade commander to halt the brigade's advance and immediately fall back to its original position inside the division's bridgehead. The brigade commander suggested to the division commander that his decision to retreat be delayed until last light on October 13, as his units were in a state of engagement with the enemy, and if they attempt to break the engagement and retreat west toward the division's bridgehead, the enemy would would chase them and inflict heavy losses on the brigade's units. The Division Commander endorsed Brigade Commander's proposal.

As a result of our careful research into the death of Israeli General Albert Mandler.

it became clear to us that during the heated battle between the units of the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the Israeli forces that were blocking them from advancing towards the Gedi Strait, it happened that the brigade's the brigade's artillery group, while shelling enemy positions, hit the command vehicle in which Gen. the command vehicle in which General Albert Mandler, commander of the Southern Sinai Sector, was riding when he was reconnoitering the battlefield with his binoculars.

He was reconnoitering the battlefield with his binoculars from an observation post on the front line.

Four occupants were killed, including Albert Mandler and Rafi Unger, an Israel Radio correspondent who had followed his squad. The story of General Mandler's death is told at the beginning of this chapter chapter. At last light on October 13, General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, arrived and Brig. Gen. H. Ahmed Badawi, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, arrived at the forward headquarters of the infantry brigade Mechanized. After discussing the situation, the brigade commander was ordered to bring back the sub-units

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of the brigade to their original positions inside the division's bridgehead and prepare to develop the attack to the east at 6:30 a.m. the next day, October 14 at 6:30 a.m. the next morning, October 14, with the rest of the advanced detachments along the the front line to accomplish the same mission previously assigned to the brigade on the morning of October 13. The reason for this was

The reason for this, as already mentioned, was due to the failure to notify the commander of the 7th Division of the decision to postpone development for 24 hours.

The commander of the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade made two key requests to the Third Army commander in order to

so that he could successfully fulfill the mission required of him the next day. The two demands were:

1 Postponing the brigade's push to engage from 6:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on October 14

1:00 p.m. on October 14, so that the armored vehicles could be refueled in the morning

refueling, replacing ammunition, and reorganizing the brigade after the fierce battles that its units fought with the enemy.

its units with the enemy.

2 Supporting the brigade with an additional tank battalion from the 25th Independent Armored Brigade (attached to the 7th Division Infantry) To be pushed to engage from the brigade's right flank in the direction of the intersection of Al-Jadi Road with crossroad 2, with a flanking movement to the left of the enemy stationed in the area of the crossroads

while the brigade is pushed from its line of advance

to engage. For this reason, the brigade commander suggested that the tank

battalion be pushed from the

about 15 minutes before the brigade's forward detachment battalion.

The commander of the Third Army decided to ratify the brigade commander's request, and it was decided to secure the brigade's forward units, which were still engaged with the enemy, to retreat to the head of the division's bridge

the brigade's forward units that were still engaged with the enemy to the head of the division's bridge. The brigade was allowed to retreat westward under cover of artillery fire and regained its defensive positions at the head of the bridge at around 2:00 a.m.

At 9 a.m. on October 14, while the brigade's units were preparing for battle, the brigade commander

preparing for battle, the brigade commander confirmed assignments to its sub-unit commanders and assigned

the new mission to the commander of the tank battalion sent from the independent 25th Armored Brigade.

At around 1:00 p.m. on October 14, the tank battalion from the 25th Independent Armored Brigade

Independent Armored Brigade was pushed from its assigned line after securing its push with 15 minutes of artillery fire.

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minutes. The tank battalion was able to advance toward the crossroads so quickly that

that it covered a distance of 7 km in 15 minutes until it was close to achieving its attack objectives.

The battalion engaged the enemy during its advance and destroyed about 5 tanks. However

At around 1:15 pm, the Third Army Command was ordered to halt the advance of the the Mechanized Infantry Brigade, as well as the withdrawal of the tank battalion previously pushed to the head of the

The reason for this was due to a decision made by the General Headquarters at Center 10 in Cairo after realizing that the development of the attack on the other axes had failed. It was

The development on those axes had begun at 6:30 a.m., more than six hours before

more than six hours before the development on the Capricorn Corridor road. After receiving these instructions from the 7th Infantry Division Command to the brigade commander, he ordered the brigade units that were that were about to move at the scheduled time to push for engagement to hold their positions inside the brigade's the division's bridgehead, and radioed an order to the commander of the tank battalion to retreat to the division bridgehead. Since the disengagement and the retreat to the west had taken place during the day had taken place during the day, the enemy resumed its fierce attack on the rear of the tank battalion and the company assigned to cover its retreat, and concentrated its artillery fire on it, resulting in heavy losses to the battalion. The battalion lost 13 tanks and a large number of its members were wounded. Its commander was martyred after his tank was hit by an anti-tank missile. The artillery of the 7th Infantry Division covered the recoil of the tank battalion with all available means of fire, according to the orders of the division commander. At around 4:00 p.m., the battalion was able to enter the 7th Infantry Division's bridgehead.

Second Army's plan to develop the eastward offensive

Although the development of the eastward attack that took place in the Second Army sector on the morning of on October 41, 73, was consistent with the development in the Third Gehishe sector in terms of the timing of the attack and the depth of the targets in terms of the timing of the attack and the depth of the objectives to be achieved, the only difference The only difference between them was in the size of the forces that participated in the in the Second Army sector was much larger, especially in tanks. The reason for this was The reason for this was that the main effort to develop the offensive according to the plan was located in the Second Army's sector.

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The development plan in the Second Army sector was summarized as follows: The 21st Armored Division (2nd Army's second echelon) would be pushed from the bridgehead of the 16th Division Infantry with the task of reaching the general line of Highway 3 and capturing the bowl. The reason for allocating a full armored division to capture Al-Tassa is due to its importance its vital location in relation to the front line with Israel. In addition to its location at the intersection of of the Central Road and Cross Road 3, it also housed the advanced command center of the Central Sector commanded by General Ariel Sharon, as well as a staging area for Israeli tactical reserves Israeli tactical reserves as an intermediate position in relation to the battlefield from which armored and mechanized units could be pushed armored and mechanized units to any threatened sector of the front to the north or south using The capture of Tassa would have opened the way wide open for Egyptian forces to advance eastward without the need for Egyptian forces to advance eastward without having to breach straits or cross any natural obstacles. At the same time, it poses a serious threat to the Israeli Southern Command's advanced command center in the Am Marjam, which is only about 40 kilometers east of Tassa.

#15 Independent Armored Brigade (attached to the 18th Infantry Division in the Kantara East sector) is pushed from the division's bridgehead on the northern axis with the mission to reach the Balouza area and seize the intersection of the coastal road with the transverse road.³ The timing of the development of the eastward attack in the Second Army's sector was in accordance with operational directives issued on the afternoon of October 12 was the morning of October 13. Since the commander of the Second Army had been summoned to Cairo to attend the conference held at 10 p.m. on October 12 on October 12, which was chaired by General Ahmed Ismail and also attended by the commander of the Third Army. Second Army Chief of Staff Mouawad Tayseer Al Akkad was transferred from the main command center to the advanced command center of the Second Army to the Second Army's forward command center to take over the organization of the battle, as the time set for the start of the development of the offensive, 6:30 a.m. on October 13, was not was only 12 hours away. Major General Tayseer al-Aqkad urgently issued urgently issued warning orders with the content of the mission to the commanders of the formations that would carry out the development operation in the morning in the morning to begin preparations for the battle, as well as to the commanders of other formations and heads of arms and branches in the 2nd Army to prepare to secure the advance of the 21st Armored Division from the head of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division and the 15th Armored Brigade from the bridgehead of the 18th Infantry Division. Since

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The 14th Armored Brigade is part of the formation of the 21st Armored Division) was attached to the 16th Infantry Division since October 6, and had crossed the Suez Canal on the night of October 7/6, and was stationed at this time in the area east of Tosun, the 1st Armored Brigade was urgently instructed to Armored Brigade, which was stationed with the rest of the division's forces in the second echelon west of the canal, was urgently instructed to cross the Suez Canal Suez on the night of October 13/12 on the caliber of the 16th Infantry Division, to be stationed in a waiting area northwest of the village of Al-Galaa. The first brigade and the advanced command center of the 21st Division Armored Division crossed the Suez Canal on the night of 12/13 October, and the brigade completed its positioning in its designated waiting area around 8:30 a.m. on October 13. At 11:00 p.m. on October 12, General Saad Maamoun had called from Cairo's Center 10 after the conference to the Chief of Staff of the German Army and informed him that the execution of the mission had been delayed by 24 hours, i.e. the development of the attack would begin at 6:30 a.m. on October 14. He ordered him to move the command center from Abu Sawir to the Ismailia interchange center before midnight at midnight, and to invite commanders and superiors to attend a conference at the new command center at 8:00 a.m. the next morning (Saturday, October 13) the following morning (Saturday, October 13).

The conference was held at the Second Army's advanced command center in Ismailia under the chairmanship of Major General Saad Maamoun It was attended by the Chief of Staff of the Second Army, the commanders of field formations, and the heads of At the beginning of the conference, the Second Army's reconnaissance chief explained the general situation of the enemy in front of the Second Army according to the information available to him. According to the information available to him

It turned out that the enemy has about 230 tanks in contact with the bridgeheads of the three Egyptian divisions 16, 2, and 18 Infantry, the remnants of the armored brigades whose counterattacks had been repulsed and destroyed by these divisions their counterattacks in the previous days. Detachments of these tanks occupied carefully selected carefully selected lines of repulsion by taking advantage of the terrain on the potential approach routes of our forces after reinforced by curtains of K5K anti-tank missiles, the enemy was able to mobilize two armored brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade two armored brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade as a tactical reserve in front of the Second Army.

The enemy's planning after discovering our intentions to develop the attack to the east was to Prepare to repel the developing Egyptian forces through the previously prepared lines of repulsion with tanks and supported by armored reserves and anti-tank missiles, and by cooperating with Israeli aviation to try to destroy them, while maintaining a strong tactical reserve of troops
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armored and mechanized forces in preparation to seize the initiative from the Egyptian forces after the elimination of the the development of the attack, and immediately launch a powerful counter-strike âœOAB 52AMAHâ so that the Egyptian forces lose their balance. Egyptian forces to lose their balance.

Major General Saad Maamoun explained to the commanders present the General Command's decision to develop the offensive eastward in order to to relieve pressure on the Syrian front, and outlined in general terms the mission the Second Army was tasked with to achieve, namely the capture of the general line of Tassa Balwaza on the Al-Marri Road 3, which is about 15 kilometers deep. about 15 kilometers deep, and stated that the General Command had decided to allocate a major air effort to secure the advancement and development of the Second Army's offensive operation. As a result, he confirmed the tasks to the commanders that had already been assigned to them in accordance with the plan previously assigned to them according to the plan, and specified the measures he decided to take to secure the positions of the Army's bridgehead and the developing forces, which were summarized as follows:

The 2nd Infantry Division will push a mechanized infantry battalion supported by the division's mechanized brigade to act as a forward detachment and advance on the axis of the Aram Road (the road extending from Fardan to crossroad)3 with the mission of securing the left flank of the 21st Armored Division as it advances east.

The 18th Infantry Division will push a mechanized infantry battalion supported by the division's mechanized brigade to act as a forward detachment and advance on the Qantara Road, Abu Samara Basin, with the mission of capturing the crossroads in the Abu Samara area and secure the right flank of the independent 15th Armored Brigade as it advances east. as it advances east.

The 24th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and attached to the 2nd Division Infantry Division since the start of the war) is withdrawn from the 2nd Infantry

Division assembly to be stationed in the area of Station 3 east of Ismailia as a reserve in the hands of the Second Army commander in favor of the Second Army's bridgehead (16th Division and 2nd Infantry Division) due to the involvement of the 14th Armored Brigade (which was attached to the 16th Infantry Division) within the forces of the 21st Armored Division in the development process. Following the conference the commanders presented the idea of their decisions to the commander of the Second Army for ratification. The idea of the decision was Brig. Gen. H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division (the main effort of the Second Army in the offensive development process) that he presented to the Second Army commander involved the division advancing south of the Middle Road in the direction of Al-Tassa with the aim of capturing it. The advance would be in two coordinates:

1st Armored Brigade on the right (the division's main effort) and 14th Armored Brigade on the left.

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The second is the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade.

Major General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, endorsed the division commander's decision, and after the commander of the 21st Armored Division quickly conducted his reconnaissance due to time constraints, he assigned the task to the commander of the 1st Armored Brigade and the 14th Armored Brigade (the division's first echelon) at 5:00 p.m. at the forward command post of the 16th Infantry Division. The two commanders did not have enough time to conduct their reconnaissance on the ground, with only 30 minutes left before last light minutes. The armored battalion commanders took their battalions into battle the next day without They and their company commanders did not have time to conduct any reconnaissance on the ground, which violates all rules and tactical principles. The commander of the 21st Armored Division was unable, due to time constraints, to assign the mission to the commander of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (2nd Formation) only at 4:00 a.m. on October 14, two and a half hours before the start of the battle. Since a large group of units of the 21st Armored Division had been reinforcing the 16th Infantry Division since the start of operations on October 6 or in the following days, there was no time to issue detailed battle orders to these units as they were deployed inside the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead. The organized cooperation between the 21st Armored Division and the 16th and 2nd Infantry Divisions to open gaps in the minefields minefields in front of the two armored brigades, so that they could be pushed from their planned lines of advance. Cooperation was also organized with the Thunderbolt elements that were scheduled to be pushed southwest of Tassa, but contact with these elements was lost from the moment they were pushed. Based on the instructions of Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade began crossing the Suez Canal began crossing the Suez Canal at around 4:00 a.m., but its crossing was delayed One of the bridges was damaged by enemy long-range artillery fire. The brigade's final

the brigade was stationed in a forward waiting area east of Tosun on the morning of October 14 in preparation for moving east to the Taliyah area in preparation for being pushed into the engagement by order of the division commander.

Battle of the 21st Armored Division

At 6:30 a.m. on October 14, the 21st Armored Division was pushed from its The 21st Armored Division was pushed from its designated push line inside the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division (1st Armored Brigade on the right and 14th Armored Brigade on the left).

and the 14th Armored Brigade on the left) and was secured by an air strike in the vicinity of the main brigade.

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(1st Armored Brigade) from 6:00 a.m. to 6:15 a.m.
16 artillery battalions and consumed 0 4 fire units.

At 8 a.m., the division's forces encountered heavy resistance from prepared positions

The enemy on the front line Point 118 Al-Qatawiya Point 146, south and north of the road

South and north of the middle road (Dheeb Aifan, north of the middle road). At the same time, information was received that that the enemy began to move its armored reserve in the direction of Jabal Habita on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division

Infantry Division. The 1st Armored Brigade's situation was very bad from the time it started moving. It was subjected to

175mm long-range enemy artillery, as well as heavy tank fire and 5H anti-tank missile curtains from Point 118, resulting in the martyrdom of Col.

The brigade commander and the brigade's artillery commander were killed in the first 15 minutes of the battle.

The tank of the left battalion commander was destroyed and the brigade's chief of staff took over the command. As a result

The intensity and intensity of the fire concentrated on the brigade's units led to the loss of

control, especially after communication between the brigade headquarters and some of its sub-units was cut off. As a result

as a result, some of these units lost their direction and moved northward to avoid the heavy resistance

instead of moving eastward according to the plan, which led to some of the tank companies getting stuck

Some tank companies from the 1st Armored Brigade joined the units of the 14th Armored Brigade.

The position of the 14th Armored Brigade was better than that of the 1st Brigade.

and was able to advance about five kilometers in front of the front line of the bridgehead of the 16th Division.

in front of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division and was able to reach the general line of Dhib al-Industrial

but was forced to stop in the face of tank fire and anti-tank curtains that concentrated on his units from the enemy position.

concentrated on his units from the enemy's fortified and prefabricated position at Point 146 north of

and along the middle road.

At 8:30 a.m., General Sahad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, who was who was monitoring the situation of the 21st Armored Division from the army's advanced command center, suffered a heart attack.

He called General Taysir Al Akkad, the Chief of Staff of the Army, who was in the back at the army's main command center

and informed him of his illness, and invited him to come to the army's forward command center to take command in his place.
to take command in his place, and he moved to the command center's rest room, where some doctors began treating him.
doctors began treating him.

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Accounts differ as to the real cause of General Saad Ma'mun's illness, which led to his relinquishing command of the Second Army on his relinquishment of command of the Second Army on October 14 and his subsequent evacuation to Maadi Hospital.
Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazli, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the October War, addressed this issue in his memoirs.
on this subject in his memoirs, stating on page 247 "The impact of the news of the defeat of
The news of the defeat of his forces (meaning General Saad Maamoun) this morning had a great impact on him and he collapsed. His aides were believed that after a few hours of sleep he would regain his energy, so they withheld this information from the General Command.
information from the General Command.

At 10:00 a.m. on October 14, General Tayseer al-Akkad, Chief of Staff of the Second Army, arrived
arrived at the army's advanced command center in Ismailia and assumed command of the army as of that time
as of that time. The 21st Armored Division was still engaged in heavy fighting with enemy resistance
that had stopped it from advancing. The division commander ordered the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade
(the division's second echelon) to move to the Taliyah area and be ready to push to engage from
Khatheb al-Khail to the right of the 14th Armored Brigade. The division commander's idea was to use the
dismounted infantry to cooperate with tanks to destroy the enemy resistance that halted the advance of the 14th Armored Brigade
especially at Point 146 after being bombarded by air and artillery fire. He was killed
The attack of the 21st Armored Division was supported by a massive artillery fire that included
Second Army Artillery and the artillery groups of the 21st Armored, 16th Infantry and 2nd Infantry Divisions.
Their fire was concentrated on the enemy positions that stopped the advance of the 21st Armored Division, and on
enemy artillery battery positions in the rear. When the division commander requested air support, the
The armored division's artillery struck a smoke screen to determine the line reached by the detachment's forces.
Three sorties were flown by the division's auxiliary, and the planes bombed the enemy positions.
enemy positions, but the impact of the strike was limited due to the lack of direct communication between the division and the aircraft to identify the targets to be destroyed.
and the aircraft to identify the targets to be destroyed.

The situation of the First Armored Brigade was still bad after the brigade command lost control of some of its sub-units
as a result of the martyrdom of the brigade commander at the beginning of the battle and the loss of communication with one of its
with one of its armored battalions due to the destruction of its commander's tank, which led to elements of the brigade joining the 14th Armored Brigade
Armored Brigade, and part of its sub-units entered the head of the 16th Infantry Division. And he

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Brig. Gen. H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, made a great effort to regroup the 1st Armored Brigade
1st Armored Brigade and tighten its control in preparation for restoring its combat efficiency.

At the same time, the 14th Armored Brigade continued to fight stubbornly from its position on the Duneb line
Industries Khatib Aifan against the fierce resistance of the enemy at point .146 and the 2nd Infantry Division
Infantry Division supported the armored brigade and protected its left flank with artillery and anti-tank fire.
When the enemy launched a counterattack on the brigade's right flank with two tank companies
supported by some mechanized infantry, the brigade was able to cooperate with the division's anti-tank reserve
the brigade was able to repel the counterattack and destroy 5 tanks.
of the enemy. Throughout October 14, the enemy concentrated its long-range artillery fire of
155mm 175mm artillery and running shelling on the positions and units of the 21st Armored Division and the 16th Infantry Division
Infantry Division. When some of the enemy's armored reserves attempted to counterattack from the
Abyssinian Dune from the south on Highway 2, the 16th Infantry Division repelled the attack
The 16th Infantry Division repelled the attack and managed to destroy 4 tanks.

At 1:30 p.m. the position of the 21st Armored Division became critical. Because The 1st Armored Brigade was unable to develop its fighting in the east and suffered heavy losses.
its remaining 66 tanks. The 14th Armored Brigade came under concentrated air attack and heavy fire
and direct hits from tanks and K5K anti-tank missiles.
44 tanks, meaning that the division lost about 50 of its tanks if we include the tanks of the Mechanized Brigade.
Mechanized Brigade that did not participate in the fighting.

The 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade continued to assemble in company columns in the Taliyah area
in preparation for being pushed into the engagement, during which time it was subjected to aerial bombardment and concentrated artillery fire. As for the Dhi artillery units were still in place behind the line of defense inside the bridgehead of the
of the 16th Infantry Division, and were supporting the units with their fire. The decision of the division commander
Ladraa was to hold the general line of Khatib al-Industries and Khatib Aifan with the strength of the 14th Armored Brigade
and the battalion that joined it from the 1st Armored Brigade, and to regroup the 1st Armored Brigade (except for
battalion) in the area south of Dheeb Abu Wafaqa, with the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade still stationed west of
Al-Taliya, and quickly restore the combat efficiency of the division in preparation for resuming the advance and achieving the mission
mission. The Acting Army Commander ratified the decision of Divisional Commander Hakhan at approximately 02:00 hrs.
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noon. At the same time, Major General Tayseer Al Akkad, who was in command of the Second Army
contacted General Ahmed Ismail at Cairo's Center 10 and explained to him the

situation of the 21st Armored Division and his decision to continue of the 21st Armored Division and his decision to continue the division's mission, but asked the commander-in-chief to provide air support to the division to help it dislodge the obstacles that blocked its path and stopped it from advancing. and stop it from advancing.

Faced with the new situation after most of the 21st Armored Division's units were stationed inside the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division of the 16th Infantry Division, Major General Taysir al-Akkad ordered the 24th Armored Brigade to remain in its original position at the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division. at the head of the 2nd Infantry Division's bridgehead and canceled the previous decision to move it to the Lahta 3 area. Ismailia's honor to be a reserve in the hands of the army commander in favor of the unified army's bridgehead.

President Sadat had arrived around 1:30 p.m. on October 14 to Post 10 at the request of the Commander-in-Chief and was informed by General Ahmed Ismail after coming to the headquarters that the development of the offensive along the front had been unsuccessful, and that the armored and mechanized forces The armored and mechanized forces that carried out the development in the Second and Third Army sectors had suffered heavy losses of about 250 tanks. President Sadat ordered Sadat ordered Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, to move immediately to the front to raise the morale of the officers and soldiers officers and soldiers. At around 4 p.m., Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly arrived at the advanced command center of the Second Army and visited General Saad Al-Shazly. and visited General Saad Maamoun, who was lying in the restroom next to the doctor who was supervising his treatment. Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly mentioned in his in his memoirs that when General Saad Maamoun was informed during his visit that he would be evacuated to Maadi Hospital Maadi Hospital, he was very upset and begged him not to do so, emphasizing that he could exercise his responsibilities immediately. However, the doctor, based on a prior agreement with Saad Shazly, called him by phone the next morning (October 15) and told him that Saad's condition October 15) and told him that Saad Maamoun's condition had not improved, so he was evacuated to and then to Maadi Hospital, where he remained until after the ceasefire. Thar . After General Saad Shazly left General Saad Maamoun's room, he met with the officers of the Second Army Command and discussed the situation with them. and discussed the situation with them. He also called all the team's commanders and conveyed the president's greetings and encouragement to them.

and encouragement from the president. Despite Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi's warnings to General Saad al-Shazly not to go east of the canal due to the darkness east of the Canal due to the falling darkness, which would make nighttime movement on the battlefield extremely difficult 273

dangerous, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly insisted on visiting the 21st Armored Division, as it is the formation that bore the brunt of the battle on the morning of the battle which bore the brunt of the battle this morning, but he was unable to cross the canal with his vehicle. He found one of the bridges destroyed and the other bridge raised to avoid being destroyed by the enemy artillery, which was constantly shelling, so the Chief of Staff The Chief of Staff was forced to return again to the army command center, which

he arrived at around eight o'clock in the evening.
eight o'clock in the evening. After telephoning Brigadier General Ibrahim El Orabi, he left to return to Cairo
He arrived at Center 10 around 11:00 p.m., where he reported the situation to Lt. Gen.
Ahmed Ismail. Around midnight, the late President Sadat called him, and when he inquired about the situation
about the situation, he repeated everything he had seen and done on that visit.

At 9:00 p.m., orders were issued by the Second Army Command based on
to the commander of the 21st Al-Daraa Division to assemble the division inside the head of the bridge
16 Infantry Division before first light on October 15 to reinforce the defense of the bridgehead
The regrouping of the division will continue and its combat efficiency will be restored as soon as possible.

Despite the heavy losses suffered by the 21st Armored Division and the difficult situations it
during the development of the attack on the morning of October 14, the division fought the enemy
and lost a large number of men and tanks. But the unfavorable conditions and tactical mistakes
and tactical errors prevented the division from achieving the mission it had been assigned.

The Battle of the 15th Independent Armored Brigade

The mission assigned to the 15th Independent Armored Brigade was to push as the division's forward detachment
on the northern axis after being reinforced with the necessary support units with the mission of reaching the area of Balouza
(located at the northernmost point of Transverse Road 3, 25 kilometers east of the canal) and seize the
the intersection of Cross Road 3 with the northern coastal road (Qantara Road east of Al-Arishid).
To secure the armored brigade's advance, a mechanized infantry battalion from the Mechanized Infantry Brigade
of the 18th Infantry Division, supported by the brigade's tank battalion, on the axis of the Kantara Road.
with the task of securing the right flank of the shield brigade.

At 10 p.m. on October 13, Col. H. Tahsin Shannon, commander of the brigade
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15 Armored Brigade presented his decision to Brigadier General A.H. Fouad Aziz Ghali, commander of the 18th Infantry Division, which was based on
The armored brigade was to push towards Baluza on three axes, with a battalion of tanks advancing on each axis.
The battalion that was to advance on the central axis (Qantara Road to be the brigade's forward detachment, pushed to engage from the line of defense inside the 18th Infantry Division's
the 18th Infantry Division's bridgehead at 6:30 a.m. on October 14, to be followed by
to be followed 45 minutes later by the brigade's main force consisting of a tank battalion
A reinforced tank battalion and the brigade's command center moving on the A-road axis, and a tank battalion moving on the B-road axis.
moving on the left road axis. At 06:00 a.m., the forward detachment battalion was
the forward detachment battalion was pushed after a 15-minute artillery barrage, and about 45 minutes later, the forward detachment battalion commander
the Forward Detachment Battalion Commander reported that his battalion had come

under concentrated artillery fire, and it was clear from his reconnaissance that the enemy was occupying a fortified defensive position that blocked the brigade's advance towards the east. This position was 2 to 3 km from the front line of the 18th Infantry Division's defenses and extended from Bir al-Burj in the south to strongpoint 17 in the north. The enemy defenses at this strongpoint had a significant impact on the brigade's advance, as it was equipped with tanks and anti-tank missiles, as well as artillery support, and it was not far from the main coastal road. It was no more than 200 meters north of the main coastal road, giving it complete control of the road of the main coastal road. There was no hope that the brigade could accomplish its mission until capture this strong point or dislodge enemy resistance.

The battalion commander of the forward detachment, halted by Haddo's resistance, attempted to attack strongpoint No. 17, which had been shelled by the division's artillery group for 10 minutes, by facing it with part of his force while making a flanking movement with the rest of his companies, but the attack made by the battalion commander under the cover of the under the cover of his artillery battalion was unsuccessful due to the intensity of hostile fire affecting his companies. The commander of the armored brigade tried to reinforce the attack of the forward battalion by pushing the tank battalion moving on the right road axis from the right flank of the forward detachment at to continue advancing eastward toward Baluza and, after successfully overcoming enemy resistance, become the enemy resistance to become the brigade's forward detachment battalion. However, this plan was not successful due to due to the intensity of enemy artillery and anti-tank missile fire, forcing the brigade's three battalions to come to a standstill.

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The brigade commander recognized the need to storm the enemy force stationed at Point No. 17 to open the way for the brigade's formation to achieve its mission. The brigade commander informed the division commander of his decision, which was to attack the enemy positions at this strong point after shelling. The brigade commander communicated his decision to attack the enemy positions in this strong point after a 10-minute fire bombardment from the artillery group and the brigade's artillery group with the strength of two tank battalions in the first column and one battalion in the second column second. The division commander ratified his decision, and at 11:00 a.m. the attack began under the cover of artillery fire. under artillery fire. Ten minutes later, the commanders of the two battalions of the first echelon reported heavy artillery fire enemy artillery and anti-tank missile fire from the front and flanks and This led to the deployment of the tank companies to minimize losses

At around 11:30 a.m., the commander of the armored brigade issued orders to halt and hold the line that the tanks had reached, and halted the advance of the second corps battalion which was about to be pushed into the engagement to reinforce the two battalions of the first corps and informed the command of the 18 Infantry Division.

The division commander soon ordered the commander of the armored brigade to hold the line that his troops had reached

and reinforce the two battalions of the 1st Corps with reinforcements of anti-tank weapons. At

At 6:00 p.m., the division commander, on the instructions of the Second Army Command, ordered the regrouping of the

The brigade was ordered to regroup in its position in Qantara East, and was executed by withdrawing the 1st Coordination forces under the fire of the 2nd Coordination Battalion.

Second Corps Battalion. The 15th Independent Armored Brigade returned to its original position inside the bridgehead of the
of the 18th Infantry Division, with losses of 18 T-62 tanks and 6 armored vehicles. K.

Evaluation of the Shara development plan

It was not possible to judge the development of the majoum based on the plan that was explained or the

The attack was conducted with armored forces in a distributed attack method. It was planned to push four armored brigades and two mechanized infantry brigades on a front

about 150 kilometers long on four separate axes without any interconnection or mutual aid.

Suffice it to mention that the northern axis on which the independent 18th Armored Brigade advanced was far from the

The axis of the central road, on which the 21st Armored Division advanced south towards Tassa, was at least

at least 50 kilometers, and the axis of the Matla Strait road in the extreme south, on which the 3rd Armored Brigade of the 4th Armored Division

3 Armored Brigade of the 4th Armored Division was at least 60 km from the central road. This

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Only four armored brigades (one brigade on the
brigade on the northern axis, two brigades south of the central road, and one brigade on the southern axis) The commander of the
of the 21st Armored Division and the commander of the Second Army saw no point in pushing the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade

(the division's second echelon) to engage to reinforce the attack of the two armored brigades of the first echelon according to the plan

After they were stopped by enemy resistance, failure, according to tactical principles, should not be

should not be reinforced. The 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division did not attack

on the Jakhdi Gorge road on October 14, as planned, as it turned out to be development alone along the front on October 13 as initially instructed on the afternoon of October 12

on the afternoon of October 12 because the commander of the 7th Infantry Division was not informed of the 24-hour postponement of the attack by the

After the brigade failed to achieve its objective and returned to the division's bridgehead at midnight, it was not possible to

the division's bridgehead at midnight, it was not possible to resume the attack at 6:30 a.m.

in the morning as planned, so the push was postponed to 1:15 p.m. Before the the order to halt the push had been issued, and the brigade remained in position inside the division's bridgehead

7 Infantry Division.

The Egyptian command made the same tactical mistakes that the Israeli command had made when it launched its attack

the Israeli leadership had made when it launched its main counterattack against the Second Army's front

on October 8 in terms of ignoring the sound principles of using armored armored forces in a fist-like grouping, which means that it is necessary to mobilize

and large armored units on a narrow front in order to create the required shock power and penetrate the enemy's defensive positions, while planning an armored attack along the battlefront using 4 armored brigades on separate axes that are too far apart to any cooperation between them or coordination of their attacks, this means that the battle is considered a failure before it even begins

before it begins.

It seems that most commanders at various levels before the battle were not convinced of the soundness of the of the plan, and did not feel that it could achieve the purposes it was intended to achieve

in contrast to the overwhelming enthusiasm that prevailed on October 6 before the crossing of the Suez Canal.

They seemed to regard the operation as a mere fulfillment of a duty to satisfy the president who made the political decision political. This is evidenced by the fact that some units (the 3rd Armored Brigade of the 4th Division

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Armored Brigade and the Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division) were pushed into the attack without receiving some vital and indispensable support units, the absence of which undoubtedly affected the

the combat actions of these units, so that they were unable to fulfill their assigned missions. This is also evidenced by

in the rapidity with which the attacking units stopped as soon as they encountered enemy defensive positions and did not make serious and desperate attempts to advance as was the case after the breakthrough of the Suez Canal. Also

This phenomenon is also evident in the reluctance of higher formation commanders to assist sub-units

sub-units halted in the face of enemy resistance with all the means at their disposal to ensure that they continue to advance

or at least ordering them to hold on to the positions they have reached.

Instead, we find that

All the orders issued on the afternoon of October 14 to the developing units were to

to abandon the positions they had reached after suffering heavy losses, and to return to the bridgeheads

bridges from which the attack started, contrary to all agreed principles.

Undoubtedly, one of the major tactical mistakes made was pushing the armored brigades

armored brigades to attack frontally against positions that had been engineered and equipped with tank emplacements

and curtains of K5 anti-tank missiles without the participation of

dismounted infantry to help them reach enemy positions using infantry tactics of without strong and effective support from artillery and aviation to silence the enemy's resistance.

enemy resistance, as this was not possible due to poor information about the enemy. The result was

The result, as expected, was that the Egyptian armored forces lost more tanks in the attack on

October 14 attack in a few hours, more than they had lost in the first eight days of the war

war .

The development of the attack, with its abrupt timing and inadequate battle plan, was

was an operation that could not have succeeded in any way, and it was carried

out despite the opposition of some senior commanders.

It was carried out despite the opposition of some senior commanders, including the commanders of the Second and Third Armies

It was carried out in implementation of an emotional political decision that did not take into account military considerations, and its goal, as announced by the late President

Sadat, who was responsible for its issuance, to relieve pressure on Syria. It is unfortunate

that this war operation, in which the Egyptian forces lost a great deal of lives, weapons and equipment

in lives, weapons and equipment (the loss in tanks alone was about 250 tanks), which caused

morale among its members, did not achieve the desired goal in any way, as Israel did not withdraw

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any part of its forces from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front, and contrary to what happened in the Egyptian forces

The results of the battle boosted Israeli morale. As General Herzog noted in his book

War of Atonement: General Chaim Bar-Lev, commander of the Southern Command, called Prime Minister Golda

After the battle, he told her in his calm voice: "This was a good day, our troops have returned to themselves, and so have the Egyptians.

and so have the Egyptians." 4. Israeli forces on the Sinai front on the ninth day of the war did not

on the ninth day of the war did not need troops to come to their aid from the Syrian front, as he was stationed

three full armored divisions were stationed on the Egyptian front, commanded by Generals: Abraham Adan (Bern)

Ariel Sharon and Kalman Magen, and they were sufficient to repel any Egyptian attack, especially if we consider

considering that the unnecessary five-day mobilization pause on the Egyptian front

on the Egyptian front (from October 9 to October 13) gave the Israeli Southern Command the opportunity to prepare itself and its forces to defeat any Egyptian attack

to prepare itself and its forces for a possible Egyptian attack, all reserves were brought in.

armored divisions were reorganized, all damaged and destroyed weapons and equipment were replaced and repaired

damaged and destroyed equipment, and most importantly, this command and its subordinate commands have had time to

to fortify the defensive positions facing the Egyptian bridgeheads with engineering equipment

Tank emplacements and anti-tank weapons, and artillery

plans and calculations to flood the killing ground sandwiched between the front lines of the Egyptian bridgeheads and the Israeli positions with concentrated fire.

between the Egyptian bridgeheads and Israeli positions with concentrated and effective fire from its field and long-range artillery

and heavy mortars.

The Israeli leadership made the decision to focus Israel's main effort on the on the Egyptian front as of October 14, not because of the development of the

offensive, but because its plan to liquidate the Syrian front

to liquidate the Syrian front was realized after that front was stabilized on October 13.

This decision did not realistically mean moving ground forces from the north to the south, which would have been

difficult due to numerous military and administrative considerations, not to mention that it was not needed at the time.

It meant primarily transferring the main effort of the Israeli Air Force to the Egyptian front.

Egyptian .

October 14, 1973 was one of the decisive days in the history of the October War. It was possible

Israeli forces were able, after eliminating the development of the attack, to wrest the advantage of the initiative from the Egyptian
Egyptian forces, which had been in their possession since the beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the fact that Gen.

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David Eliezer, Israel's Chief of General Staff, issued an order to the Southern Command on the afternoon of

October 14, after the end of the campaigns, to prepare immediately to carry out an operation to cross the Suez Canal from east to west

from east to west from the Dafraswar area on the following night (October 16/51). At

At 6:30 p.m. that evening, the first large aircraft landed at Lod Airport Galaxy C5 aircraft of the American airlift, it was President

On October 13, US President Richard Nixon ordered the establishment of an American airlift to supply Israel with

Israel with the weapons and military equipment it needs openly and from American bases.

The American airlift was able to transport more than 800 tons per day of weapons, equipment and ammunition
and ammunition, most of which was transported to the Israeli front in the Sinai, after the activity almost stopped
on the Syrian front. Israeli forces in Sinai began to receive an uninterrupted stream of

of advanced American weapons and equipment, so that they did not suffer from any shortage or deficiencies in any type of weapons and equipment
in any type of weapons, equipment, ammunition, or ammunition, but rather began to use

new weapons and equipment that it had not previously used in the previous phase of the war because they were not in Israel's possession

such as the 573 anti-tank missiles, bombs

and TV missiles. It also transferred through the American airlift equipment and electronic devices

Advanced electronic equipment and devices, so American experts specialized in electronics arrived with them to train the soldiers to use them

to train soldiers to use them. Because of these sudden developments on October 14, there was a serious shift

A serious shift in the course of events and the progress of the war, and the Egyptian troops faced with patience and heroism

during the next ten days from October 15 until the issuance of Security Council Resolution No. 340

on October 24, 73, to establish an international emergency force, a difficult phase and very difficult times.

What did the 21st Division fail to accomplish in its mission?

The commander of the 21st Armored Division, Brig. H. Ibrahim al-Orabi did not expect that he would be asked on the ninth day of fighting

on the ninth day of the fighting to organize an attack with his division to the east and capture Tassa, as most of the division's units had been withdrawn

units had been withdrawn from under his command since October 6 and the following days to reinforce the 16th Infantry Division

16th Infantry Division. The entire 14th Armored Brigade, a tank battalion from the Malachi Brigade

Mechanized Brigade, anti-tank and anti-aircraft battalions and companies, and rocket artillery. He was also put

in support of the 162nd Infantry Division was a field artillery brigade from the 21st Division and a field artillery battalion from the

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

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In addition to the previous support units withdrawn from the division, the 18th Infantry Brigade was occupying the 16th Infantry Division's third position west of the canal, and had pushed a mechanized infantry battalion to occupy the terraces west of the canal and another battalion to occupy a position north of Fayed airfield. The withdrawal of these units from the 21st Armored Division undoubtedly affected its canal efficiency. And if The General Command had a real intention from the beginning of the war to allocate the task of developing the eastern offensive the 21st Armored Division, it would not have allowed the withdrawal of any sub-units from it to reinforce another division. sub-units to support another division, and would have kept the armored division intact with all its units as the Second Field Army's main striking force that could be pushed either to develop the eastern offensive or to stave off any enemy threat against the Second Army, whether on the eastern or western bank of the Suez Canal on either the east or west bank of the Suez Canal. In addition, there were several other factors that led to the division's failure to fulfill its assigned mission. to achieve the mission it was assigned, the most important of which can be summarized as follows: The information about the enemy's situation, whether in the face of the division's attack or at the level of the and the status of his reserves, both near and far, was inadequate and inaccurate, and the military intelligence apparatus undoubtedly bears a large part of this undoubtedly bears a large part of this responsibility, as obtaining accurate information about the enemy whether through air, ground or electronic reconnaissance is one of its core duties. The reconnaissance elements in the Second Army also share part of this apparent lack of accurate information about the enemy of accurate information about the enemy. In addition, it was the duty of the 16th Division Infantry Division and the 21st Armored Division were to conduct joint reconnaissance and combat patrols on the night of the in front of the front line of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead to gather accurate information on enemy positions close to the Egyptian defenses before the start of the 21st Armored Division's attack in the morning. Enemy positions facing the line of thrust were no more than 3 km from the front line of our defenses. the front line of our defenses, and were located on a series of heights extending from Jabal Habita in the south to the Aifan dune in the north, which made them completely dominate the division's line of defense and its axis of advance to the east. of the division's advance to the east. The enemy took advantage of these heights to engineer and equip them with tank emplacements and anti-tank missile curtains, thus making the The low-lying area between the front line of our defenses and the enemy positions became an ideal killing zone against

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tanks of the 21st Armored Division, and it was the duty of the Second Army Command to assign special forces of thunderbolts and infantry to capture these heights in a night operation before pushing the division to engage in the morning. Moreover, the close proximity of the enemy positions to our defenses and their fire control over the lines of advance meant that the armored brigades

were exposed to duos fire as soon as they were
as soon as they were pushed out of their lines of defense and were forced to
fight the battle with enemy positions
This deprived them of the most important advantages of armored forces: agility
and maneuverability.
maneuverability and the ability to perform flanking and encircling movements.

The General Command's choice of 6:30 a.m. as the time of the push was an
unforgivable mistake
unforgivable. While 2:00 p.m. was chosen as the start of the attack on October 6
so that the sun would be in the enemy's eyes, the timing of the attack was an
unforgivable mistake.
so that the sun would be in the eyes of the enemy, the attack was timed at 6:30
a.m.
This means that we handed this advantage to the Israeli forces by our own
choice, and at the same time subjected our forces to the
the great hardship of advancing with the sun in their eyes, which made it
difficult for them to pinpoint
enemy positions facing their advance, and made it impossible for the crews of
the
cannons from inside the tanks to destroy hostile targets. At the same time, the
the morning fog that thickens in the lowlands east of the canal at this time of
year
at this time of the year, which makes it very difficult to maintain direction.

It was easy for the enemy to discover our intentions to develop the attack to
the east and to prepare its forces accordingly
to receive the expected attack. It did not require any special skill on the part
of enemy intelligence
or its ground and air reconnaissance elements, the armored and mechanized
brigades that were
and support units, as well as the SAM 2 and SAM 3 missile battalions that were
to be pushed east of the canal to
3, which were to be pushed east of the canal for air defense, mostly crossed the
Suez Canal on the night of 12/13/12
October from the divisional crossings through which they were to be pushed, and
other units completed their crossing on the night of October 14/13
It became clear that enemy aircraft deliberately did not interfere with the
crossing of these forces by attacking them or
the crossing of these forces by attacking them or trying to destroy the bridges
they were using, as it was in Israel's interest
Israel's interest was consistent with clearing the West Bank of armored forces
in preparation for the
crossing the canal to the west, previously prepared from the Deverswar area. We
have already explained that
that the point of contention in the Israeli leadership was whether to cross the
the Suez Canal to destroy the Egyptian armored forces or wait until they cross
the Suez Canal to

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When they learned on the night of December 13 that our forces had begun
crossing, they decided that their main battle would be east of the canal.
that the main battle would be east of the canal, so they let the Egyptian
armored forces cross in peace
to lure them into their carefully prepared killing zones.

It is not tactically possible to fight a successful battle without proper battle
organization procedures
proper. Since the decision to develop the offensive eastward was a sudden
decision with no prior preparation or warning
without warning, it was impossible for the attack to begin on the date that was
initially set

on the morning of October 13. When the commanders of the Second and Third Armies succeeded during the conference at Post 10 on the evening of October 12 succeeded in delaying it by 24 hours to begin on the morning of October 14 the morning of October 14, there was still not enough time for commanders at various levels to properly organize the battle, and as a result, they did not these commanders did not conduct their reconnaissance on the ground to make their decision and assign tasks to subordinate commanders. It was Mosfa's order that the commanders of the two armored brigades of the 21st Armored Division, due to time constraints, did not have the opportunity to conduct their reconnaissance until half an hour before last light half an hour before last light, and the commanders of the battalions and armored companies could not see the terrain they would be penetrating with their units that their units would penetrate the next morning, depriving them of the advantage of reconnoitering the positions of the enemy and to choose the most appropriate routes for their tanks to advance. The commander of the 21st Armored Division was forced to assign the task to the commander of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade at 4:00 a.m. morning on October 14, two and a half hours before the start of the drive, and in addition there was not enough time to take the necessary actions to secure the advance of the troops from the push line to the engagement such as marking axes and opening lines and identifying gaps in minefields. Especially since the pushing lines were about 7 kilometers from the forward waiting areas where the where the troops were stationed after crossing the Suez Canal. Failure to make these arrangements due to time constraints led to some unfortunate individual incidents, such as the firing of Tanks from the 21st Armored Division fired on positions in the front line of the 16th Infantry Division believing that they had come out of the division's bridgehead and that the positions in front of them were Israeli positions. This mistake is a common occurrence in warfare.

The development according to the original Granite II plan was to push the 21st Armored Division and the 16th Infantry Division except for a brigade from the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead south of the center road.

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the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and the 2nd Infantry Division except for a brigade from Ras Kobri, 2nd Infantry Division After the development plan in the sectors of the 2nd and 16th Infantry Divisions was modified 16 Infantry to limit the development to the 21st Armored Division, it was better to make some to push one armored brigade north of the Orst road and the other armored brigade south of this road. The other armored brigade south of this road, as this method achieves the following advantages:

1 Distributing the units of the 21st Armored Division at the head of two bridges (the 16th Division and the 2nd Infantry Division) instead of instead of cramming the forces of the 16th Infantry and 21st Armored Divisions into one narrow bridgehead, which This made enemy air and artillery strikes very effective and led to increased losses.

2 Relieving pressure on the crossings of the 16th Infantry Division, on which a large number of units and administrative columns.

3- Increasing the ability to maneuver by attacking from two different directions, and reducing the losses resulting from Concentrating air and artillery strikes on forces attacking from one direction.

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Chapter Five

The Israeli Crossing to the West of the Gaza Strip

Israeli preparations for crossing the Suez Canal began on the evening of Thursday, October 11

October 11. During a conference held at the Southern Command's forward headquarters, chaired by Gen.

Chaim Bar-Lev and attended by the commanders of the three armored divisions and the heads of the command's branches, it was agreed that General Gonen's proposal to choose the Dafraswar area (where the Suez Canal enters the Great Bitter Lake)

(where the Suez Canal enters the Great Bitter Lake) as a place to cross to the west bank of the canal due to the many advantages of this location

many advantages. On Friday, October 12, while Gen.

and the heads of the branches of the Southern Command were busy working out the exact details of the crossing plan, General

Chaim Bar-Lev flew by helicopter to Tel Aviv to obtain the General Staff's ratification

on the main lines of the plan. Due to differences of opinion among senior commanders

and the indecision of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, the Chief of Staff requested that the Kharb Council be convened

During the council meeting, which was chaired by Prime Minister Golda Meir, the crossing plan faced

The crossing plan faced sharp opposition from some ministers and some military commanders, especially General Tal.

Deputy Chief of Staff, as they appreciated the risk of the Israeli crossing operation to the west in the presence of two Egyptian armored divisions

in the presence of two Egyptian armored divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions and groups of

Thunderbolts and a total of about 400 tanks stationed on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Suez Canal. When the meeting heard the exciting news that the Egyptian armored forces would begin crossing

Egyptian armored forces to the east of the canal, it was agreed to postpone a final decision until the

Southern Command would first repel the expected Egyptian attack.

On Saturday, October 12, the Southern Command was ordered to assemble all crossing equipment

located in various places in the Sinai in the Central Sector, commanded by Gen.

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Sharon, and engineers were tasked with installing the parts of the bridge to be thrown into the Suez Canal at the

An armored battalion of the Haim Brigade (from Sharon's division) was assigned to the crossing area to connect the two shores.

Sharon) has been assigned to train for the task that its armored battalion will perform when the crossing decision is made, namely dragging

this prefabricated bridge from the Yukon to the direction of the Dafraswar crossing point (the Yukon is located midway between the bowl and crossroad 022 Following the Egyptians' failure to develop the attack on Sunday, October 14, Gen. David Eliezer, Israel's Chief of the General Staff, ordered the Southern Command to prepare to carry out the planned crossing of the Suez Canal on the night of October 15/16. On the evening of October 14, General Eliezer attended a meeting of the Israeli government in Tel Aviv where he explained the general plan for crossing the canal to the West Bank in the Dafraswar area, and presented the great gains that Israel would reap from a successful crossing, both militarily and politically, while at the same time the expected collapse of the Egyptian forces east of the canal when they see Israeli forces working on their rear lines west of the canal on their rear lines west of the canal. The meeting ended after long discussions most of the ministers ratified the crossing decision. At eleven o'clock on the evening of October 14, a meeting was held in the Southern Command's operations room, headed by General Chaim Bar-Lev, attended by General Gonen, his deputy Uri Ben-Ari, the commanders of the three armored divisions and the heads of branches of the Southern Command. The purpose of the meeting was to issue detailed orders to the division commanders to execute the plan to cross the Suez Canal from east to west at Deverswar on the night of October 15/16 This plan was given the Hebrew name 7 Ma'ahatam, which is correctly translated in Arabic as â ¤Brave Heart. in Arabic is (Brave Heart). As for the codename Al-Ghazala 'Ala'aa'ah, which was associated with this operation is due to an error in translation from Hebrew to English by a reporter from the Kharbian news agencies, and this misnomer was then popularized everywhere until it was repeated in the writings of most muscovite historians and analysts. The general lines of the Israeli crossing plan were summarized as follows: General Sharon's division. It was called the 143rd Garrison Group and was It consisted of 3 300 armored brigades (tanks) led by Lieutenant Colonels Amnon Reshef, Tuvia Raqif and Haim Arez . A parachute brigade was attached to it for the crossing operation under the command of Colonel Danny Matt. The parachute brigade had previously been stationed in reserve in the area of the Mitla Pass and Yattieh

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Southern Sector, commanded by General Kalman Magen. Sharon's division was assigned the following tasks

Sharon was assigned the following tasks:

1 Establishment of the bridgehead: The division is to establish a bridgehead on both banks of the Suez Canal on the night of October 15/16 in the Dafraswar area, and it is also responsible for erecting two bridges on both banks of the Suez Canal and two bridges on the Suez Canal, one of which is a pre-installed ferry that connect them to each other, with at least one of them to be ready for use on the morning of October 16. The crossing will take place at X hour by the Parachute Brigade in in inflatable rubber boats, with the brigade being crossed on mobile ferries by the tank company that has been reinforced, and an armored battalion of the Haim Brigade crosses the canal on

An armored battalion of the Haim Brigade crosses the canal on mobile ferries just behind the Parachute Brigade and before the construction of the two fixed bridges.

2The security mission east of the canal: Since the left wing of the bridgehead is secured by the lake
Therefore, securing the right wing becomes east 4 kilometers from the water line and north 4 kilometers from the crossing point at Dafraswar, i.e. until the area north of the Chinese farm
(Al Jalaa village) while simultaneously clearing the two main axes on which the troops and equipment intended for the crossing will move:
The first axis: Akafish, which we call the Tassa Tal Road.
(Tel Salam is one of the Bar-Lev Line's strong points, and the Israelis used to call it Lakikan), located on the eastern shore of the Great Bitter Lake about 6 kilometers southeast of Dafraswar, and its garrison evacuated it without a fight on the evening of October 8
The Israeli garrison evacuated it without a fight on the evening of October 8.
The 16th Infantry Brigade (the
of the 16th Infantry Division) pushed a reconnaissance patrol on the evening of October 12, which searched the
and returned with an Israeli flag after raising the Egyptian flag
on it. Despite the importance of this vital position, no orders were issued to occupy it because it was located in the
the 35-kilometer gap between the Second and Third Armies that the General Command had left vacant
about 35 kilometers based on faulty tactical thinking, namely that the body of water of the Bitter Lakes
of the Bitter Lakes is a natural barrier that the enemy cannot cross. The Israelis reoccupied
the Tel Salam strongpoint on October 15 and relied heavily on it
to protect and secure the left flank of their crossing at Dafraswar.

The second axis: The Tartour axis, a road that the Israelis had constructed and paved before
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war, and extends from Transverse Road No. 2 to the fortified point at Dafraswar, which is one of the fortifications of the Bar-Lev Line
one of the forts of the Bar-Lev line (the point consisted of two fortified positions
on the shore of the canal, separated by a gap of about 500 meters, which the Israelis called
called by the Israelis Mitzmaid) It was stormed and captured by an assault detachment from
battalion of the 16th Infantry Brigade at 6 a.m. on October 9. It was
Tartour Road was constructed specifically for the movement of large bridges and ferries to the
crossing at Al-Defreswar as one of the favorable intersections chosen by the Southern Command
chosen before the war on the front line with Egypt in case an Israeli crossing was contemplated
Israeli crossing to the west of the canal. Since the 16th Infantry Brigade's sector
over several parts of the Akavish and Tartour axes, and the last part of the Tartour axis penetrates
the last part of the Tartour axis penetrates the brigade's frontal defenses, it was one of the
of the plan to secure the Dafraswar crossing and clear the Akavish and Tartour axes of advance
and Tartoura was to destroy the 16th Infantry Brigade and occupy its defensive positions or at least
move it north about five kilometers to clear the area up to north of the village of

Al Jalaa from Egyptian forces (up to the main feeder).

Security mission west of the canal: The Parachute Brigade, reinforced by a tank battalion from the Haim Brigade
Widens the bridgehead west of the canal in a westerly direction to the Khalwa Water Tirat (Suez Tirat)
It extends it 4 kilometers north and south of the landing point so that the crossing is out of range of mortars and anti-tank missiles

General Abraham Adan's (Bern) division, which was called Operational Group no.

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15 tanks. and early on the 30th) 3rd Armored Brigade, which consisted of 162
This division was withdrawn from its area of operation in the northern sector and moved to a staging area south of the Tassa.
to the south and abandoned its defensive line, the Coastal Sector Force under Brigadier General Sasson assumed responsibility for the entire northern sector. was responsible for the entire northern sector, and the front line with the Egyptian forces
was divided between Sassoon's force in the north and Kalman-Magen's division in the south.
following the assignment of responsibility for the crossing operation to the Sharon and Berne divisions. The mission was assigned
October 16 task assigned to General Abraham Adan's division (Bern) was to cross on the morning of
15/16 on the two bridges that Sharon's division had been tasked with installing on the canal on the night of

October. According to the plan, the three brigades of the armored division were to
the western shore of the canal, they were to break through the agricultural barrier and destroy the Egyptian forces in the area
between the Ismailia Tara'a in the north and the Suez Canal in the east, and up to 20 kilometers from the water line in the west and Jebel Ataka in the east. water line to the west and Mount Ataka to the south, clearing the west bank of the canal and Bitter Lake. The
Bern's division then had to fulfill two main duties: The first was to destroy the Egyptian missile battalions
SAM anti-aircraft missile battalions in this area to allow the Israeli air force to gain
air superiority on the battlefield. The second duty was to develop the offensive to the
south along the Suez Canal and occupy the city of Suez, thus isolating the Third Army

field army east of the canal from its lines of communication in preparation for its siege and destruction.
The Kalman Magen Division, which was called the 252nd Operations Group and consisted of
of two armored brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade, its duty in the first phase was to engage
with Sassoon's force in the north to launch strong and continuous tank and infantry attacks
and mechanized infantry along the front to hold the Egyptian forces in their defensive positions and distract them
from what is happening in the Dafrawar area, and once General Sharon's forces have succeeded in erecting the two bridges on the canal and securing the
the two bridges on the canal and secure the crossing at Deverswar, which is 4 kilometers north, south, and east of the bridges.
and east of the bridges, they replace Sharon's division in maintaining the

safety and security of the
and keep it open to the east. According to the plan, Sharon's division, after
being evacuated from its
was then to cross to the western shore of the canal, and move in the direction
of the bridge to protect

the rear of Adan's division and join him in carrying out the tasks assigned to
his division.

However, the crossing plan developed by the Southern Command was not executed
according to the tasks assigned or in the phases
that were assigned or the stages that were determined. The facts proved that the
plan was formulated in an
in an atmosphere of excessive optimism, and on the assumption that everything
would go smoothly and easily
without any obstacles or difficulties, and that the Malasian resistance on the
eastern shore of the canal
on the eastern shore of the canal would be weak enough to secure the crossing
area and open the two axes of advance (Akafesh
and Tartour) and the installation of the two bridges on the canal on schedule,
as well as the clearing of the western bank of the canal from the
the western bank of the canal from the Ismailia Canal in the north and the
occupation of the city of Suez in the south will not
beyond October 18. The actual implementation of the plan was quite different.
As we will see, there were major modifications to the plan, and the difficulties
and issues reached the point
to the extent that the Israeli commanders responsible in the evening of October
16 seriously considered
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to cancel the entire operation and order the paratroopers and armored forces
that had crossed
back to the eastern shore.

Sharon's plan for crossing the Dahursar

From our study of the Israhelli crossing plan to the west of the Canal, it is
clear that the main thrust of the
of the crossing was placed on the shoulders of General Ariel Sharon. His
division was assigned the two most dangerous
the two most dangerous tasks of the entire operation, namely the construction of
a bridgehead on both sides of the canal in the area of
and the task of securing it both on the eastern and western shores of the canal.
western shore. Securing the eastern shore required clearing the two main axes on
which the
the two main axes on which the troops and equipment assigned to the crossing
would move, namely the Akafish axis (the Tassa-Tel road) and the
Salam) and the Tartor axis, a road that the Israelis had constructed and paved
before the war to connect
Transverse Road No. 2 and their fortified point at Al-Defreswar.

This task required that the area north of Al-Defreswar-which was chosen as the
chosen as the crossing point to the west must be free of Egyptian forces to a
distance of at least 5 kilometers
north to secure the crossing from small arms, mortar and anti-tank missile fire
anti-tank missiles. In addition, the positions of the 16th Infantry Division's
right brigade had fire control
over many parts of the two axes of advance, and the last part of the Tartour-
Defreswar road
was penetrating the forward defenses of the 16th Infantry Brigade's sector (the
division's right brigade).
Sharon's armored forces were forced to engage in some of the bloodiest clashes

this phase of the war with the Madriyan forces that were stationed in the brigade's sector, as well as forces of the 21st Armored Division in what was known as the Battle of Chinese Farm (Al-Jalaa village), which the Israelis admitted that it was one of the fiercest battles they fought during the war, and that their losses were heavy, as will be detailed in our explanation of these battles. In addition to the task of securing the crossing east of the canal, Sharon was also tasked with securing the landing point west of the canal. By advancing his forces westward to seize the crossings on the Sweet Water Tributary and expand the bridgehead 4 kilometers north and south.

The dream, which has been in General Sharon's mind since the beginning of the war, was to implement the project that he had conceived when he was commander of the Southern Command, namely the crossing of the Suez Canal by Israeli forces

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to strike. He made numerous attempts in the first phase of the war to convince the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of Defense to implement this project

General Staff and the Minister of Defense to implement this project, which he saw as the only way for the IDF to wrest the initiative from the Egyptians and regain freedom of movement and maneuverability after being shackled by the fixed shackles of war imposed on it by the Zionists after they were immobilized and stabilized in their fortresses. and stabilized in their impregnable fortifications inside the bridgeheads east of the canal. And when the wheels began to turn to prepare for the crossing plan and bridges, ferries and crossing equipment began to assemble in the central sector, which Sharon commanded

the Central Sector, which Sharon commanded on the orders of the Southern Command on October 13.

Sharon eagerly awaited the moment when the crossing he had pinned all his hopes on would begin

his hopes. At a meeting held at Southern Command headquarters at 11 p.m. on October 14

October 14, General Sharon received detailed orders regarding the mission assigned to his division as part of the Aboud's general plan.

After meeting with his aides at his advanced command center in Tassa, Sharon drew up the plan

for his division, which was summarized as follows:

1- Armored Brigade under the command of Tuvia: At 5:00 p.m. on Monday, October 15

Deceptive attacks with its armored battalions on the center and left of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division to fix Egyptian positions on the one hand, and to draw the attention of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions to the direction of the middle road (Tassa Ismailia East) on the other hand. At the same time

at the same time to divert the Egyptians' attention from the crossing site at Dafraswar, south of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division.

2 Armored Brigade commanded by Amnon: Due to the magnitude of this brigade's responsibility in the crossing plan, it was

It was reinforced with an armored battalion from the Tuvia Brigade and two mechanized infantry battalions, bringing its strength to 4 armored battalions and 3 mechanized infantry battalions, in addition to the

division's reconnaissance battalion.

At 6:00 p.m. on October 15, the brigade makes a flanking movement south of the Akavish Road (Tassa Tel Salam) through the sand hills to reach the abandoned fortress of

Lakikan (Tel Salam) on the shore of the Great Bitter Lake, about 6 kilometers southeast of Dafraswar, the brigade would then advance north along the lakeshore to seize the Metsamid fortress (Al Dafraswar), which was also empty of Egyptian troops

It is infiltrated through the gap between the 16th Infantry Brigade's defenses and the Suez Canal.

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Once at the crossing point of Al Dafreswar, Amnon's force split into three groups:

• An armored battalion heading northeast on the Akavish road to clear it of any Egyptian forces

and secure this road for the advance of a parachute brigade led by Dati Mat as it sweeps from

Tassa to Deverswar.

A group of 3 armored battalions led by Colonel Amnon clearing the Tartour Road. attacking the 2nd Army's right flank (16th Infantry Brigade) and forcing it to retreat

north to widen the crossing corridor, capture the Chinese farm (Al Jalaa village) and divert

the attention of the Egyptian commanders from the canal crossing operation taking place south of Ras Kobri

The 16th Infantry.

A group of 3 mechanized infantry battalions in half-track vehicles in reserve near the Dafraswar crossing.

The division's reconnaissance battalion secures the Lahla square surrounding the crossing area until the arrival of the parachute brigade
the arrival of the parachute brigade.

A group of 3 mechanized infantry battalions in semi-trailer vehicles in reserve near the Dafraswar crossing.

After the Amnon Brigade succeeds in accomplishing the tasks assigned to it, the brigade crosses to the West Bank

on the bridges that will be installed and hand over the task of securing the bridgehead east of the canal

to the Tuvia Brigade.

3- The armored brigade under the command of Haim: An armored battalion from this brigade drags the bridge sections

(the prefabricated bridge and the ferry bridges) from Yukon to Deverswar. And after

Parachute Brigade crosses the Suez River in rubber boats, an armored brigade from this brigade crosses directly behind it to the West Bank

An armored battalion from this brigade on moving ferries to the West Bank.

4 Parachute Brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Matt: This brigade, reinforced by a tank company, advances

on the Akavish road, which is opened by an armored battalion of the Amnon Brigade.

As it approaches the canal, it moves west out of the road and heads for Fort Mitzmaid

(The brigade then crosses the Suez Canal to the West Bank in rubber boats that will be delivered to him.

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The Parachute Brigade's crossing into the Arabian Peninsula

The Parachute Brigade was assembled in reserve in the Matla Pass area of the southern sector of the front

At 6:00 a.m. on October 15, Colonel Danny Mat, the brigade commander, was summoned

was summoned to General Sharon's forward headquarters in Tassa, where he received instructions for the brigade's crossing of the Parachute Brigade to the West Bank of the Canal on the night of October 15/16. The important point was that the brigade according to Israel's general plan to cross the Canal to the west became the the first Israeli units to set foot on Egyptian soil after crossing the Canal. After that

Colonel Dani returned to the brigade's staging area in the area of the Matla Pass, he ordered the brigade's units to prepare to move, and then developed his detailed plan to achieve the mission assigned to the brigade.

It was summarized as follows:

The brigade's reconnaissance company and engineer company under the command of the brigade's second commander, Lt. Col.

Arik will lead the crossing operation to establish a bridgehead on the west bank of the canal, and the deputy commander of the brigade will be assigned the brigade's deputy commander to be the commander of the crossing yard at Dafraswar, a yard measuring

007 meters by 150 meters had been prepared on the orders of General Sharon, when he was commander of the Southern Command.

It is surrounded by protective sand walls, located in the center of the square on the shore of the point canal

Within the square were positions that could be used as a base for the Tiran to occupy enemy forces on the other shore of the canal.

enemy forces on the other shore of the canal. 0

As soon as the first foothold on the western shore of the canal was occupied, a battalion of the brigade, commanded by

Nadam Dan, crosses and expands Ras al-Karbari in the direction of Lajoub, while another battalion of the brigade

of the brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Zvi extends it in the direction of.

North . The crossing forces occupy

crossings on the Khalwa Water Tributary (Suez Tributary), located about 2 to 3 kilometers west of the canal

The width of the bridgehead must be at least 3 4 north and south.

At 1:00 p.m., Lieutenant General Danny Mat presented his plan to General Sharon, who

approved it. At 1:30 p.m., Colonel Danny returned to his Luwatha headquarters and issued orders to his sub-unit commanders

to his sub-unit commanders that the brigade's abandonment would begin at 4:30 p.m. on October 15

October 15. Although the brigade commander had been informed that he would be allocated 60 rubber boats, which would be

delivered to his camp at 10:00 a.m., the boats did not arrive until the brigade the brigade's movement, and the half-track vehicles that the brigade was to be provided with: 60 semi-trailer vehicles to be provided to the brigade

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to move to Dafraswar, only 32 of them arrived. Col. Dani used used an illegal means to supplement the armored vehicles based on the principle

that the end justifies the means.

He sent one of the company commanders and 30 drivers to the Refdim area (Jafjana)

where they seized 26 half-track vehicles that were intended to be delivered to a representative of one of the divisions.

The paratrooper was able to convince the officer in charge of delivering these vehicles that he was the

and rushed the vehicles to the brigade headquarters, thus increasing the number of half-tracks in the parachute brigade

The number of half-track vehicles in the Parachute Brigade increased to 58.

Colonel Danny Matt learned during his search for

that the boats were located 5 kilometers west of Tassa, where they had been mistakenly sent due to confusion

They were mistakenly sent to this location due to confusion caused by similar code names.

After the brigade commander issued orders to his sub-unit commanders based on the plan he had drawn up and which had been ratified by the division commander which had been approved by the division commander, the brigade began moving at 4:30 p.m.

in the evening. As the brigade continued its movement on Highway 3 in Atbah al-Tassa, it encountered

a large traffic jam so that it traveled 25 kilometers to reach Al-Tassa in two and a half hours.

in two and a half hours. The brigade's column veered from Tassa to the west on the Akavish road leading to the

to refuel the crossing boats that were waiting for it a few kilometers west of Tassa, and the traffic congestion on this trip was

The traffic on this trip was so much worse than it had ever been before that the brigade column traveled the five kilometers in two hours.

the five kilometers in two hours, and he received the boats at nine o'clock in the evening, although

orders were to arm them at his camp at ten o'clock in the morning. In other words, the delay in Balkh

about 12 hours.

The brigade commander, lacking half-tracks for the size of his troops, was forced to put

25 soldiers in each vehicle, in addition to the boat that was placed on its back. The commanders of

of the village units took advantage of the slow pace and the many stops due to traffic congestion to finalize

to make arrangements for the crossing and to distribute lifebelts and other equipment to their soldiers.

Col. Danny Matt had to make some adjustments to the Habbur plan, as the brigade's reconnaissance company

The brigade's reconnaissance company, which had been assigned to lead the brigade and was lagging behind to move in regular vehicles or

was soon stuck in the sand, so Lieutenant Colonel Dan's battalion was assigned to this duty. And at

At about 10:30 p.m., when the parachute brigade was about 11 kilometers from the canal

from the canal, it was joined by a tank company from the Haim Brigade and moved at the head of the brigade's column.

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As the brigade approached the canal, the column came under artillery, rocket and machine gun fire.

A number of vehicles and boats were hit, and the brigade's column, which was led by the

The brigade's column, which was led by the assault force, turned away from the Akavish axis shortly after midnight, heading west toward the

to the west toward the location of the crossing yard, which was about 33

kilometers away.

Amnon's brigade had already crossed this area and reported that it was free of Egyptian troops.

As an extra precaution, he ordered the brigade's tank company to take up a position at the junction of the Tartor Road and the transverse road at the junction of the Tartar Road and Transverse Road No. 1 (the road parallel to the canal) at a distance of about

80 0 0 meters north of the crossing area to act as a buffer against any possible intrusion of Malasian forces

from the north or east. However, the tank company was soon caught in an elaborate ambush prepared by

by a force from the Egyptian 16th Infantry Brigade at the crossroads, and the entire tank company was destroyed without

Colonel Danny Matt knew nothing of its trampled fate.

Following the brigade's arrival at the square, traffic control points were set up, and the

at the entrance to the square, and the planning was based on the establishment of two sailing points:

One green and the other red, with lanterns of these two colors on both shores.

on both shores so that the boats from the sailing point would go from the sailing point to the color assigned to them at the landing point.

But when the soldiers approached to lower the boats into the water, they discovered that the ground to the north of the square

was sticky, so the plan was modified and only one sailing point was used, but the rest of the plan

It was decided to land the force on the Kharbi beach at two points according to the plan.

Immediately after the sailing, and at the command of the Parachute Brigade commander, all artillery units opened

that were assisting the crossing operation opened fire and concentrated on the landing area on the western shore of the canal opposite the Al-Ibjar area.

on the western shore of the canal opposite the Ibejar area, in a sector 100 meters long and 200 meters wide.

An estimated 70 tons of shells were dropped on this area. It is astonishing that The area where all this bombing was concentrated was empty of fishermen. At one o'clock

35 minutes on October 16, the first wave of Israeli troops crossed the canal and set

their feet on the west bank of the canal. Immediately upon arrival, the engineers cut through the barbed wire and found no

found no mines or ambushes, and the commander of the assault force radioed the brigade commander

that everything was fine, while a voice on the radio shouted, "We are now in Africa. And crossed

The brigade's command group crossed at 2:40 a.m. The brigade's units continued to cross until

at 5:00 a.m., when all the paratroopers had crossed. The brigade began in accordance with

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the plan to move on foot to complete the operation to secure the bridgehead west of the canal to a distance of

4 kilometers to the north and seize the crossings on the Sobis Canal to the west. On the morning of October 16

On the morning of October 16, Field Marshal Danny Mat was in control of a bridgehead that stretched from the northern shore of the Bitter Lake

up to 4 km north, and the resistance he encountered was negligible. Since the the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal had not yet been known to any of the Egyptians until then.

The Israeli paratroopers were able to annihilate many elements of various Egyptian units

The Israeli paratroopers were able to annihilate many elements of various Egyptian units that were moving on the canal road in safety, and were shot down

before their occupants were able to realize what was happening
before their occupants could realize the tragedy that had taken place.

Before morning, a number of mobile ferries arrived at the crossing yard in Defreswar and could not be lowered into the water could not be lowered into the water until the sand berm on the canal was removed, and when two bulldozers removed it the ferries slid into the water, tanks rushed to take their places on top of the ferries, and a few minutes later a few minutes later, the engines revved up and the ferries headed to the western shore, where the tanks were unloaded. The crossing of tanks from the Haim Brigade proceeded steadily according to plan according to the plan. In a morning radio report to General Bar-Lev, Sharon reported that the The entire Parachute Brigade had crossed to the West Bank by boat after midnight. It was reinforced on the morning of October 16 by a group of 30 tanks that crossed over the ferries from Brig. Haim, who himself crossed at the head of the group. Sharon also reported that Lt. Col. Haim had begun deploying its tanks through Ras al-Kob Berri to attack the SAM anti-aircraft missile batteries on the West Bank anti-aircraft missile batteries on the West Bank.

The complication for General Bar-Lev was that the bridgehead on the on the East Bank had not yet been secured, and no bridge over the canal had been built to link the isolated Israeli force on the West Bank with the to connect the isolated Israeli force on the West Bank with its bases on the East Bank, jeopardizing the The crossing to the west was in serious jeopardy.

Why the Habur plan almost failed 9

Despite the good planning of Ariel Sharon, commander of the 143rd Mechanized Group to fulfill the mission assigned to his regiment as part of Plan 7A of the IDF (Braveheart), which was to which was to establish and secure a bridgehead on both banks of the Suez Canal at Dafraswar on the night of October 15/16 in preparation for the crossing of the division of General Abraham Adan (Bern) on the morning of 304

October 16 on the two bridges that Sharon's division was tasked with installing on the canal.

Sharon's plan was about to fail due to two main factors:

First: The late arrival of bridges and crossing equipment to the crossing area at Dafraswar, as a result of traffic congestion on the two main axes of advancement (Akavish and Tartour) and the closure of parts of them because they were under the control of Egyptian forces. The original Israeli plan for the crossing planned before the war was based on the premise that the crossing would be carried out while Egyptian forces were west of the canal Egyptian forces west of the canal, meaning that the eastern shore of the canal would be controlled by by Israeli forces, that the Bar-Lev Line forts would be used to secure the crossing. The heavy bridges and crossing equipment would be assembled and equipped in the vicinity of the Lexikon (Cross Road No. 1 parallel to the Canal) without any pressure or interference from the Egyptians.

But the conditions under which the actual crossing took place on the night of October 15/16 were very different. The operation was carried out despite the fact that both the eastern and western shores of the canal the east and west shores of the canal were under the full control of Egyptian forces, and the crossing equipment the prefabricated bridge, the Ponton ferry bridge, and the Ponton ferry bridge, all of which were dragged by tanks about 20 kilometers over the sand and were subjected to a barrage of Mussulman artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, delaying their arrival for a long time.

The second major factor that almost caused the failure of the crossing was the disruption in securing the crossing at Dafraswar and clearing the two main axes of advance (Akafesh and Tartour), which necessitated the need to control the area extending from the crossing point up to 5 km to the north, i.e., to the north of the Chinese farm, which was scheduled to take place during the night of October 15/16 October 16. Sharon assigned this task to Amnon's armored brigade, which he reinforced with a battalion armored brigade from the Tuvia Brigade and two mechanized infantry battalions, bringing its strength to 4 armored battalions and 3 mechanized infantry battalions mechanized infantry battalions, as well as the division's reconnaissance battalion. Although Amnon concentrated his attack with such a large force on the 16th Infantry Brigade sector (the 2nd Army's far right flank), whose positions within the security zone required to be evacuated from Egyptian forces, the Israelis were surprised that the force he faced The Israelis were surprised that the force they encountered was larger than they had estimated, and the stubborn resistance and the stubborn resistance was much stronger than they had expected.

As a result of these two factors, the Israeli crossing plan faltered and the timetable collapsed

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The parachute brigade led by Colonel Danny Mat, who crossed the Suez Canal on the night of October 15/16 October in rubber boats had a difficult time. It was isolated on the west bank of the canal with 30 tanks from the Haim Brigade that crossed on moving ferries from their bases on the east bank for nearly 40 hours for nearly 40 hours, as no bridge connecting the two shores of the canal had been built by October 17/18, and General Chaim Bar-Lev issued an order on the afternoon of October 16 that no Israeli troops or tanks tanks to the Kharbia Bank in boats or on mobile ferries until fixed bridges are built over the canal. over the canal so as not to increase the size of the Israeli force west of the canal, isolated from its bases in the east and exposed to isolated from its bases in the east and at risk of annihilation.

Had the Egyptian leadership at various levels been alerted early on to the nature and objectives of the the nature and objectives of the operation that was taking place at Al-Defreswar, and had they taken the necessary quick measures the Israeli force that crossed to the west of the canal, which consisted of a

parachute brigade, could not have survived. Canal, which consisted of a parachute brigade and 03 tanks, could not have survived the entirety of October 17/16 without risk of being annihilated or captured, and it would have been impossible for the Israeli leadership to complete the crossing and establish any fixed bridge over the canal if the landing point west of the canal fell into Egyptian hands. west of the canal into Egyptian hands, nor would it have been able to make another crossing another crossing from a new point other than Deverswar after the element of surprise had been removed. But luck in addition to the negligence of some Egyptian commanders. Thus, the Israeli plot, which was bound to fail, succeeded, and the Israeli leadership because of this success, the Israeli leadership gave itself a halo of greatness, glory, and the ability to achieve the supernatural when in fact the operation was not worthy of all these attributes.

Diverting Egyptian attention from the Aboud area
Israeli planning for Operation Ayyur was primarily aimed at diverting the attention of Egyptians from what would take place on the evening of October 15 at the fortified point of Mitzmeed (Dversouane) which was chosen as the site of the crossing and was once one of the fortresses of the Bar-Lev line. It was A storming detachment from one of the 16th Infantry Brigade's battalions had already stormed and captured it on the morning of October 9 October 9. To achieve this goal, concentrated Israeli airstrikes began at 5 a.m. on October 15 5 a.m. on October 15 on the bridgeheads of the Second Army, especially the bridgehead of the of the 2nd Infantry Division and the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, which also housed units of the
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21 Armored Division. The air raids continued until near the last light of the day. As a result The continuous air strikes delayed the planned regrouping of the 21st Armored Division after the offensive development battle it had participated in the day before, in which it suffered during which it suffered heavy losses, especially in tanks.

Under cover of artillery fire, Tuvia's armored brigade attacked the center and left of the 16th Infantry Division of the 16th Infantry Division in order to direct the attention of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions north towards the Middle Road (Al-Tassa Al-Ismailia East Road). When the Israeli attacks began to begin to intensify in the evening on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade, the Egyptians believed for more than 24 hours that the real Israeli objective was to collapse the right flank of the left-handed Second Army. no one realized that these fierce, sustained battles against the 16th Infantry Brigade were to deceive the Egyptians about what was happening at the crossing point at Deverswar on the eastern shore of the Canal. on the eastern shore of the Canal, which was not more than 33 kilometers from the eastern limit of the brigade's sector.

The fact that the two fortified points of Al-Defreswar and Tel Salam were devoid of civilian forces (they were among the among the previously captured Bar-Lev Line forts) was one of the most important factors that helped

General Sharon to carry out much of his plan with ease and without difficulty Amnon's brigade was able to make a detour through the sand hills away from the two main axes of advance

1Akafesh and Tartour, and was able to reach the Lakikan fortress (Ten Salam) on the shore of the Great Bitter Lake, 6 kilometers southeast of Deverswar, and reoccupy it.

and reoccupy it, then advanced north on the road adjacent to the lake that the Israelis had previously built to connect the two fortresses of Dafraswar that the Israelis had previously constructed to connect the two fortresses of Al-Dafraswar and Tel Salam, which they called the Nahala Road, and through the the gap between the canal shore and the ion boundary of the 16th Infantry Brigade's defenses.

The Israhelli forces were infiltrated to the Hassina point in Dafraswar, where they reoccupied it and used the

The square next to it, which had been prepared for this purpose since Sharon was the commander of the

to be the crossing point through which the Parachute Brigade crossed by rubber boats.

and three tanks from the Haim Brigade crossed on floating rafts to the West Bank, as mentioned earlier.

Thus, the Israeli forces used the Dafraswar fortress as the main crossing point for their forces

to the west, as well as using the Tel Salam fortress to protect and secure the left flank of their crossing at

without exerting any effort or engaging in any fighting to achieve this goal and what raises

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surprisingly, the two former Israeli forts of the Bar-Lev Fortresses remained after they fell into the hands of the Egyptians

without being occupied by any troops or at least blown up and rendered unusable despite the fact that the infantry division commanders were instructed to blow up all

within their divisional sectors, and this was done during a conference held at the advanced command center of the Second Army in Ismailia on the morning of command center of the Second Army in Ismailia on the morning of October 13, in accordance with the orders of the General Commander

Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail.

The Battle of Tura Junction

The rapid advance of the Amnon Brigade, which took place on the evening of October 15 without encountering any

The rapid advance of the Amnon Brigade, which took place on the evening of October 15 without encountering any resistance, had the effect of spreading a wave of optimism in the advanced center of the Southern Command, which was General David Eliezer, Chief of Staff, and Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister. after Sharon informed them of the capture of the Tel Salam and Deverswar forts, and that the

Akavish had been cleared for passage, and while the division's reconnaissance battalion, which Sharon

that Sharon had attached to Amnon's brigade was securing the crossing area at Dafraswar, waiting for the arrival of a parachute brigade

(the first Israeli force to cross the canal to the ruins, as we explained earlier), Amnon sent a battalion

Amnon sent an armored battalion of his troops to the Akavish road to clear it after learning that it had been

three armored and three mechanized infantry battalions to the north and east to the north and east to attack the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division (16th Brigade).

Amnon initially sent two armored battalions from Fort Lakikan (Tel Salam)

northward on the Laxikan Road (Transverse Road No. 1) and barely approached the the Mafrag area (the intersection of the Tartour Road and Highway 1, which is in the sector of the right battalion of the of the 16th Infantry Brigade, his troops came under rocket and anti-tank fire. 27 Israeli tanks were destroyed, but 7 tanks were able to penetrate the IAF position in the strongest defenses on both sides of Cross Road No. 1. Colonel Colonel A.H. Abdelhakhemid Abdel Sami'a the commander of the 16th Infantry Brigade to push large numbers of tank-hunting crews from the brigade's battalions to the to the area of Al-Jalaa village to destroy the enemy tanks that had succeeded in penetrating the position and advancing northward in Atambah village, as well as closing the breach area around the main road with anti-tank fire. The brigade's artillery group was placed in support of the brigade's right battalion with a company of tanks. put the brigade's artillery group in its alignment. Amnon battled with the rest of his troops under cover of darkness

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along the canal berm in Sidon, out of range of the 16th Infantry Brigade's defenses. And when Israeli tanks pushed northward, Amnon suddenly found himself in the center of a huge of lorries, vehicles, cannons, anti-aircraft missile launchers and radar stations. It turned out that Amnon's tanks had entered the administrative areas of the 16th Infantry Brigade's and its artillery emplacementsâ and soon approached the main command center and the Chthon administrative areas of the 16th Infantry Division and the 21st Armored Division. were placed in this rear area close to the canal as safe from enemy attack from enemy attack, whose expected direction of attack was from the east, where the strongest Egyptian defenses Egyptian defenses. However, Israeli tanks stormed the rear areas from an unexpected direction from the south to the north, where protective measures and defenses are at their weakest The fire from both sides was soon spread by thousands of weapons of all types and in all directions ammunition carts and rocket launchers caught fire. Two armored battalions from the 21st Armored Division launched a counterattack on Israeli tanks and forced them to retreat. Israeli tanks and forced them to retreat south after suffering heavy losses.

DThe issue facing Amnon was the need to capture the vital point (the intersection of Tartour Road and Rudai Road No. 1, as the procedures for securing the crossing point and clearing the Tartour Road was contingent on this, and due to the bravery and heroism of the 16th Infantry Brigade and units of the of the 21st Armored Division were brave, heroic and desperate to fight in the battle for the village of Al-Halaa (Al-Mazraa). Chinese) 0, I have chosen to record the description of this battle according to the Israeli references so that no one may doubt that what we record is biased or exaggerated. As follows A summary of what is mentioned about this movement in the Israeli references:

At midnight, Amnon ordered Lieutenant Colonel Anathan, commander of a mechanized infantry battalion, after supporting him

with a tank company to attack the crossroads area. Nathan pushed the tank company forward.
When its commander reported a few minutes later that the road was open, Nathan ordered a group of
from his battalion, led by Halevi⁴, to reach the intersection from the side via a crossover. As the armored vehicles moved forward, it became clear that the tank company that had preceded them had been
was destroyed, and the armored vehicles soon came under fire, forcing them to halt
Its commander, Halevi, reported that he could not move and that he had suffered heavy losses.
the rest of the battalion's armored vehicles tried to advance to help Halevi's force, but they were soon
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hit hard, the area was flooded with concentrated terrain, and all attempts to reach the wounded armored vehicles in front failed.
It became clear that the mechanized infantry battalion had been caught in a trap.
exposed in the open under overwhelming fire from Egyptian positions in the 16 Infantry Brigade sector, and unable to move in any direction or rescue the isolated armored vehicles
isolated armored vehicles. The officers and soldiers of the battalion were forced to abandon their armored vehicles and lie down on the ground trying to dig shelters with their fingernails. Lt. Col. Nathan, the battalion commander, miraculously survived
and a number of his armored vehicles miraculously out of the fiery area, but it was a painful tragedy for him when he realized
tragedy for him when he realized that his battalion had been reduced to a scattered remnant.

In order to save the armored vehicles in front, Amnon assigned a second tank company
to advance to rescue them. The tanks advanced north to the village of Jalaa (the Israelis called it
called the Chinese farm, due to graffiti on its walls in Japanese written by by Japanese agricultural experts who had been working in the village before the June '67 war.
The Israelis thought that these writings were in Chinese and called it the Chinese farm.
This name was associated with the village in all their writings about the October '73 war, and all foreign writers and authors followed suit.
All foreign writers and authors followed suit, until this name became a flag on it).

As the Israeli tanks approached the village, their commanders could see a group of infantrymen armed with bazookas
armed with bazookas, RPG-7s and Malotka rockets, crouching in the canals and barriers of the village.
and village barriers, and the tanks swooped down in a superhuman effort to reach the isolated armored force
who were engaged in a firefight with the Egyptian positions, but a torrent of rockets
chased the Israeli tanks, forcing them to retreat. Nathan
pleaded with his boss, Amnon, by radio to help him reach his troops
Amnon promised him that he would do his best, but little did Nathan know that Amnon himself was
Amnon himself was at that moment fighting a bitter battle, struggling to survive against Egyptian
Egyptian forces and that his units had suffered heavy losses. Nor did Halevi realize the hopelessness of

that any Israeli troops would come to his rescue, he carried his wounded and tried to sneak his troops out of the battlefield. Under the cover of two groups of machine guns, and while they were moving slowly and agonizingly towards their lines Egyptian tanks (from the 21st Armored Division) intercepted their retreat and soon wiped them out. They were soon wiped out.â End of the Israeli description of the battle.

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Despite the losses Amnon's force suffered in the crossroads battle, he stubbornly insisted that a second attack on the crossroads area should be carried out immediately, and ordered Lieutenant Colonel Brom, the commander of the division's reconnaissance battalion attached to his brigade, which was stationed near the crossing yard at Dafraswar for security, to launch the attack with his battalion on the intersection. To ensure surprise, he ordered the attack to come from the west, since the Egyptian positions were preparing to face the attack from the east and south. Lieutenant Colonel Brom attacked with his armored vehicles from Dafraswar on the intersection from the west, but Brom was killed within 30 meters of the Egyptian positions. He was killed 30 meters from the Egyptian positions and his forces suffered heavy losses, which thwarted the attack, forcing Amnon to order his Amnon had to order the commander of the second reconnaissance battalion to pull the battalion back to reorganize.

Amnon continued his stubborn attempts to seize the crossroads, ordering Lt. Col. Eitan (second brigade commander) to advance at the head of a tank company to attack the intersection from the south. The attack began at 4:00 a.m. on October 16, but was met with heavy resistance. Three tanks were hit, including Lieutenant Colonel Eitan's tank, and the third attack attempt failed.

How did Sharon fail to secure the Fareswar crossing?

In the previous pages, we explained the fierce battles fought by the Amnon Armored Brigade (part of General Sharon's division) on the night of October 15/16 to penetrate the positions of the right battalion of the 16th Infantry Brigade and seize the crossroads area (Tartour Road and Latitude Road no. 1 parallel to the Suez Canal) and reach the village of Al Jalaa (Chinese Farm) to fulfill the mission assigned to him in the plan, which is to secure the crossing at Dafraswar by clearing the area up to the north of the village of Al Jalaa of Egyptian forces, and clearing the two main axes of advance, Akavish and Tartour, to secure the arrival of the crossing equipment and the bridges that will be built over the canal to connect the crossing point in the east and the landing point in the west. For this purpose, Amnon launched three fierce attacks on the crossroads area from after midnight until dawn on October 16 with tanks and mechanized infantry, but all three attacks ended in failure after the attacking forces suffered heavy losses in personnel, weapons, and supplies.

At dawn, Col. Amnon ascended to a high hill overlooking the battlefield. As he later recalled, the desert was covered with large numbers of tanks, vehicles, guns, and artillery. Tanks, vehicles, cannons and tankers burning and burning. As well as dozens of Command vehicles, mobile maintenance workshops, and huge platforms for carrying SAM 2 missiles and missile launchers. Mobile . The remains of Israeli soldiers were scattered here and there, separated by only a few meters from the Egyptian positions only a few meters from the Egyptian positions

A New York Times reporter visited the battlefield just after the end of the war. He described the heartbreaking scene he saw, saying: "I am a small piece of land that does not exceed a few thousand square meters, I found 24 Israeli Patton tanks completely wiped out. The lesser damaged tanks were pulled out of the area for repair. A large number of destroyed Egyptian tanks were scattered across the battlefield. In one place I found an Israeli Patton and an Egyptian T55 tank with only a few meters between their guns."

The fall of the road junction

As reports began to reach Israel's Southern Command before dawn on October 16 of the Amnon Brigade's bitter fighting and the unforeseen difficulties that had arisen in the implementation of the plan. The advanced command center of the Southern Command was tense and anxious. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan proposed to withdraw the parachute brigade from the landing point on the western shore of the and cancel the entire operation, justifying it by saying: "We tried, but our attempts were in vain. I propose canceling the crossing because the Egyptians will slaughter our troops on the other shore. On the other shore, General Junin replied: "If we had known in advance that this would happen, we would not have. We would not have started the crossing, but now that we have crossed, let's continue until the bitter end."

General Chabem Bar-Lev supported Gonen's opinion, and Moshe Dayan did not attempt to debate them, in keeping with his the approach he had taken throughout the war, which was to avoid issuing direct orders for execution.

At around 6 a.m., Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, called Moshe Dayan from Tel Aviv to Moshe Dayan to inquire about the situation, and Dayan informed her that the bridges over the canal had not yet been built. Egyptian forces north of the crossing were able to block the advance to Al-Defreswar on the east bank of the canal, threatening the bridgehead on the west bank.

He told her that there was great hope of overcoming this resistance, moving the bridges to the crossing and installing them

during the Tehran period. As for the situation on the West Bank, Dayan informed the Prime Minister that the

parachute brigade under the command of Colonel Danny Mat had completed its crossing to the landing point west of the canal without any interference from Egyptian forces from the Egyptian forces, and that there are no intentions of the army command to return it to the east bank even if the bridges are delayed if the bridges are delayed. Golda Mather was very concerned that the Egyptians might isolate the paratroopers that the Egyptians might isolate the paratroopers, and that this had caused great controversy among the ministers during the cabinet meeting Cabinet meeting.

Colonel Amnon did not give up trying to fulfill the mission assigned to him, despite the his forces suffered heavy losses during his three consecutive attacks. On the morning of October 16, he led Amnon himself led a concentrated attack on the crossroads area for the fourth time with the 40th Armored Battalion after with a group of tanks that had been repaired during the night, Amnon conducted the attack from two directions. While the 4th Armored Battalion advanced from the direction of the canal to the direction of the intersection from west to east, a squadron of tanks attacked from south to north north. From Amnon's reconnaissance during the day, he discovered that the Egyptians had erected a strong anti-tank barrier in the area of the junction, consisting of well-positioned tanks and anti-tank weapons and missiles, in addition to the mines they had laid on both sides of the road of the road, resulting in the explosion of a number of Israeli tanks during previous attacks. Infantrymen from the 16th Infantry Brigade's Right Battalion, armed with RPG-7 bazookas and rocket-propelled grenades Malotka rockets had skillfully elected their positions, taking advantage of the earthen berms and dry irrigation canals of the Chinese farm. of the Chinese farm, leading to the failure of all previous Israeli offensives.

Learning from the lessons of previous battles and from his reconnaissance of Egyptian positions, Amnon did not This time, he did not rush his forces from Atambahi to the west and Al-Jukhnarab towards the intersection area so as not to inflict heavy losses on his tanks. As in previous attacks, his tanks were heavily damaged by the sweeping anti-tank bulls fired by the Egyptians fired by the Egyptians. This time, Amnon resorted to a new method of stopping his forces far away from the the intersection and begin a slow battle of attrition to gradually eliminate the resistance of the The Egyptian forces defending this vital position were exhausted after the heroic and glorious fight glorious all-night fight against Amnon's armored forces, and their position was worsened by ammunition shortages, forcing them to withdraw from their positions. Amnon advanced Amnon advanced with his forces and captured the Al-Tar junction area, and pushed northward, taking up positions in the area between between the Chinese farm (Jakhlaa village) and the Suez Canal.

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Early on the morning of October 16, General Sharon had sent two tank battalions led by Lieutenant Colonels Emi and Uzi to come to Amnon's aid after learning of the heavy losses his forces had suffered on the night of On October 15/16, Amnon, having captured the crossroads and the to the Chinese Lazraa to accomplish the next dangerous task he had been

assigned, which was to clear the Tartor Road
Tartour Road, so he left a tank battalion of his brigade (about 30 tanks) in the
area between the crossroads and the west of the Chinese farm
and west of the Chinese farm, and launched an attack with the two armored
battalions that Sharon had given him
on the Tartour Road in the part of the road controlled by the 16th Infantry
Brigade units. One battalion
attacked from the northeast, while the second attacked from the direction of
Kharb.
The attack failed, as it came under heavy fire from tanks and anti-tank weapons
from the 16th Infantry Brigade's
Left Battalion positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade and Amnon was forced to
withdraw.

By the morning of October 16, Amnon's brigade was in dire straits, with only 27
tanks left
It had lost more than two-thirds of its tanks during the battles at the
crossroads, the Chinese farm, and the clearing of the Tartour road.
and the clearing of the Tartour road, as well as a large number of casualties,
with a high percentage of officers and tank commanders among the casualties.
and tank commanders were among the wounded, and the Tartour axis remained closed
despite all the attacks
remained closed. Amnon's only success was the capture of the crossroads area
and an armored battalion of his Luwatha in the area west of the Chinese farm.
Given his dire need to
to regroup his forces, refill his tanks and replace lost ammunition and
equipment, Amnon asked
Amnon asked his commander Sharon to authorize him to withdraw the rest of his
brigade to the Lakikan (Tel Salam) position on the shore of the Bitter Lakes
on the shore of the Bitter Lakes to renew its combat efficiency.

The Bern Division's mission to secure Aboud
On the morning of October 16, Sharon sent a report to General Bar-Lev regarding
the situation east of the
Canal, stating that the prefabricated bridge had been broken in one of its parts
while
a tank battalion from the Haim Brigade was dragging it along the Akayesh Road,
and that engineers would need
a few hours to repair it. Sharon stated that he needed additional forces to
securing the crossing east of the canal due to the fierce resistance offered by
Egyptian forces in the 16 Infantry Brigade sector
of the 16th Infantry Brigade, causing Amnon's forces heavy losses in personnel
and tanks, and making them
unable to achieve the mission assigned to them, which was to penetrate the
defensive position north of the crossing
and destroy it or force the defending forces occupying it to withdraw northward
for a distance of
5 kilometers, clearing the area as far north as the Chinese farm.
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Based on Sharon's report, General Bar-Lev sent an ultimatum to General Abraham
Adan (Berne), which was ready according to plan to cross to the west of the
canal as soon as the bridge was erected
to prepare for the possibility of being called upon to participate in the
opening of the corridor towards the canal alongside Sharon's division
alongside Sharon's division.

In the meantime, Sharon and the Southern Command were again debating whether to
proceed with the crossing plan without waiting for the bridges to be built
the crossing plan without waiting for the construction of fixed bridges, as the
ease with which the parachute brigade
parachute brigade and the armored battalion that followed it and did not

encounter any resistance
encouraged General Sharon to ask General Gonen to use this opportunity to order the crossing of the
to use this opportunity to order the Gitral Burn Division to cross the Suez Canal with its tanks on
on moving rafts at the scheduled time, ignoring Egyptian resistance at the Chinese farm and on the Akavish and Akavish roads.
Chinese farm and on the Akavish and Tartour roads. When General Gonen objected to this proposal, Sharon turned to General Bar-Lev.
Sharon turned to General Bar-Lev to see if he could get him to overcome Junin's objection.
Bar-Lev supported Junin's point of view and explained to Sharon the danger of implementing his proposal.
The Southern Command's crossing of the canal is a large-scale offensive, not just a quick raid across the canal.
A cross-Channel raid with Sharon's and Bern's divisions, i.e. a force close to the size of a corps
with a force roughly the size of a corps of several dozen tanks without a supply route over a fixed bridge across the canal
a fixed bridge across the canal would be unwise and irresponsible, as these tanks would have to
stop moving within 24 hours after running out of fuel. Bar-Lev also expressed his disapproval
tanks and personnel crossing the Suez Canal on mobile rafts, exposed to Egyptian artillery and airplane fire
to Egyptian artillery and aviation fire. Given the stubborn resistance of the Egyptians to the
Israeli raids to secure the crossing area at Dufreswar and their preparations to launch counterattacks on Israeli forces in that area
counterattacks on Israeli forces in that area, moving Adan's force to the Kharbia Bank
would mean that there would be insufficient Israeli forces east of the canal to counter Egyptian hostilities
of the Egyptians. For these reasons, Bar-Lev rejected Sharon's proposal and decided that the duty
should be assigned to the Berne Division was to complete the clearing of the corridor on the eastern shore of the canal. As a result
General Bar-Lev issued an order on the afternoon of October 16 that no Israeli troops or tanks
tanks to the west bank of the canal until further orders.

In the early morning of October 16, General Gonen boarded a helicopter for
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General Bern's advanced command center, which was located on a high hill overlooking the Akavish road.
In his post-war Hebrew-language book, Up
the banks of the Suez Canal, that General Gonen, during a visit to his advanced command center, complained to him about Sharon's failure
complained to him about Sharon's failure to carry out the mission assigned to him in the plan, and told him frankly: Sharon
Sharon has disappointed us. I don't know what happened to him in this war. To save the endowment
Gonen assigned the task of moving the ferry bridge to the Bern Brigade.
Brigadier General David Tamari, Bern's deputy, the responsibility of moving the bridge.
on the neck of Brigadier General Sharon's deputy, Brigadier General Jacob, and at the same time issued a
an ultimatum to General Bern to be ready with his division at noon to clear the Akavish and Tartar axes
and Tartour axes and throw the ferry bridge into the canal, and communicated his instructions to Gen.
Bar-Lev at his command center. At midday, Gonen informed Sharon of the new tasks

assigned to the divisions
 assigned to the divisions, namely that Bern's division would clear the Akavish
 and Tartour advance axes
 while Sharon's division would capture the Chinese Farm and the Malassar
 positions north of it and adjacent to the Suez Canal
 Suez Canal. However, as Sharon's tanks, following the previous night's battles,
 needed to
 refueling and ammunition, he agreed with Gonen to wait for Bern's division to
 clear the two axes of advance
 Bern's division to clear the two axes of advance first before his division began
 this operation so that he could launch his attack on the
 the Chinese farm after his division's combat efficiency had been optimized.
 At 4:30 p.m. on October 16, the three commanders met with Moshe Dayan
 General Bar-Lev and General Gonen met at the Southern Command's advanced command
 center, and Gonen explained
 that in the absence of the arrival of the (pre-installed) fixed bridge or the
 ferry bridge, there would be no
 withdrawal from the West Bank of the Canal would be unavoidable. In the event
 that only a number of
 mobile only, the force that had crossed to the west could remain, but should not
 Bern's division should not be moved by this means to join it, but as soon as any
 fixed bridge is erected on the canal
 all troops intended to cross to the west bank should begin their crossing at
 Khal.
 General Berne had been stationed with his division (162nd Operations Group)
 south of Tassa, ready since dawn on October 16
 ready since dawn on October 16 to take advantage of the success and cross the
 bridge being installed on the canal to the West Bank
 across the canal to the West Bank. For this purpose he moved forward with his
 command group.
 breaking through the sand along the Akavish road, since the road itself was
 blocked by huge convoys.
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This was a page of the book, but it is missing.

Here is a partial translation::

âœIn the midst of great operations and in an endless sea of vehicles, were
 trucks carrying fuel and ammunition, and when Bon (a name Iâ™m assuming)
 advanced in the tier bridge where he was surrounded by military engineers
 conducting a major effort to repair under Egyptian artilleryâ
 And when Bon realised the akafish axis had been closed entirely he ordered the
 general to encircle the army with his tanks across the desert to prepare to
 cross the canal when the bridge is repaired and when Sharon knew of the arrival
 of these brigades completely, he contacted Bon and explained the bad situation
 of general amnon after his tank had run out of fuel and ammunition, and Sharon
 requested to command the forces which Bon granted him. Sharon then ordered the
 brigades to head to the area between the Chinese farm and the Suez Canal to
 replace Amnonâ™s force, and give him the chance to withdraw and reorganiseâ

The Battle of the Egyptian 16th Infantry Brigade

When it was close to 10 p.m. on October 16, Colonel Uzi Meiri introduced himself

to General Berne, and told him that his parachute brigade had arrived and was ready to carry out any operation assigned to it. Bern briefly explained the situation to Colonel Uzi, and after a short discussion the parachute commander prepared his plan to fulfill the mission he had been assigned, which was to move in the direction of the canal with his forces to clear the Akavish and Tartour advance axes. At 11:30 p.m. the paratroopers began moving along the two roads, led by Lieutenant Colonel Isaac's battalion. about a third of the way up and reached the narrowest area where the Akavish and Tartour roads converge and Tartour, which is no more than two kilometers wide, the battalion was surprised by a torrent of artillery and machine gun fire of artillery and machine gun fire from the Left Battalion positions in the 16th Infantry Brigade sector which was facing this area and whose defenses extended deep into the direction of the village of al-Jakhlāa (the Chinese farm). Chinese). The paratroopers discovered that more than a dozen Grinov machine guns in fortified positions were fermenting the area they were traversing with a deluge of fire, and the paratroopers' position was critical. The paratroopers found themselves in the process of clearing the axis of advance without prior reconnaissance or knowledge of the Egyptian positions. They also advanced along the two roads alone, without any armored units to open the way for them armored units to open the way for them, and they could not get artillery support. Since it was a night operation, it was difficult to locate them in the dark.

Isaac's battalion had no choice but to attack the machine-gun emplacements to silence them and dislodge the Egyptians from their positions. Yaki's company, followed by Margale's company, rushed toward the Egyptian positions. There were bloody clashes in which paratroopers came within a few meters of the Egyptian positions. Egyptian positions. Since the Egyptians were in fortified positions, they did not need to come out of their positions to meet the paratroopers from their positions to meet the advancing paratroopers in the open, dozens of scattered along the line of Egyptian defenses, and the paratrooper companies spread out in the area. The Egyptian fire was so overwhelming that most of the company commanders and paratroopers were killed. Most of the company and platoon commanders were killed, and many were severely wounded. When General Bern, faced with the poor situation, ordered the paratroopers to abandon the Tartour Road adjacent to the Egyptian defenses and focus on clearing Akavish, the paratroopers discovered that they were unable to leave their positions or perform any kind of movement or maneuver, as the intensity of the Egyptian fire forced them to stick to the ground.

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As the clock struck three in the morning and dawn approached, General Bern realized that that if he could not, during the few hours of darkness that remained before daybreak, push the ferry bridge the pontoon bridge to the crossing yard at Diversuwar, it would mean another day without a bridge across the canal across the canal, and thus no new Israeli troops crossing west of the canal, which would inevitably

put Sharon's limited force that had crossed to the west at risk of complete destruction. At the time
While the paratroopers were embedded between the Akavish and Tar Tor roads in front of the right flank of the
16 Infantry, General Bern made a new attempt to push the ferry bridge to the waterline, sending
a reconnaissance company in half-track armored vehicles to reconnoiter the Akavish road to the canal
and identify the Egyptian resistance blocking the road.

Just before 3:30 a.m., Bern received a radio message from the commander of the reconnaissance company
that he had made it to the crossing point at Dufreswar without encountering any resistance
along the route. It was clear to General Berne that the Shadow Force, despite its heavy losses, had
had done a great service to the crossing operation.
had done a great service to the crossing operation. The Egyptian positions north of the two axes of advance that
that controlled the Akavish road with fire were completely distracted from the movements that were taking place
on this road, having focused all their attention on the fierce battle that was raging at the time between
between Egyptian and Israeli shadow forces on the Tartour Road.

General Bern seized the opportunity and ordered Brigadier General David Tamari to move as quickly as possible on the
on the Akavish road at the Pontoon Ferry Bridge. Mid-David was able to push some heavy bulldozers in front of his convoy were able to clear the burnt and disabled tanks and vehicles that were
obstructing movement, clearing the road. The convoy of pontoon equipment advanced unimpeded
on the Akavish road until it reached the Lakikan fortress (Tel Salam) on the Bitter Lake
The convoy then continued north on the Nahala road along the shore of the lake until it
I arrived at the crossing yard in Dafraswar, and at around 6 a.m. on October 17, the
Sharon's engineers pushed the first pontoon ferry into the waters of the Suez Canal in preparation for the
the rest of the ferryboats, which, when connected together, will form the first pontoon ferry bridge across the Suez Canal.
Canal, which is about 180 meters wide.

As the sun rose, it became clear to the paratroopers that they could not take the
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Malasian positions facing them, and their restricted commander Uzi felt that his forces were exhausted.
and that he should be assisted in evacuating the wounded on the battlefield and authorized to
that his force be replaced by another force so that he could reorganize his shattered units.
with General Junin, Junin refused Uzi's request to withdraw the paratroopers, and only agreed to evacuate the wounded
evacuate the wounded only. When General Bar-Lev visited General Bern and found out the truth about the
the situation of the paratroopers, he approved their withdrawal to the rear for reorganization, and an armored battalion was assigned to rescue the downed paratroopers.
An armored battalion was allocated to rescue the paratroopers lying on the sand in front of the Malassian positions. He could not

Ehud, the commander of the armored battalion, could not pinpoint the exact location of the paratroopers, so their commander fired a grenade. This turned out to be a double-edged sword, as the Egyptians in turn were able to locate the paratroopers. The Egyptians, in turn, were able to pinpoint the exact location of the paratroopers and the Egyptian artillery poured a barrage of shells, inflicting new casualties. Israeli tanks began to attack the Egyptian positions on the Egyptian positions, and within two minutes three Israeli tanks were engulfed in flames by Egyptian anti-tank missiles. Despite the overwhelming Egyptian fire, the Israeli tanks remained steadfast in the battle, which lasted from midnight for 14 hours straight. It turned out that the paratroopers could not be extricated from the battle, so armored vehicles were used. Armored vehicles rushed in under a hail of fire and evacuated the wounded. Finally, it was possible to replace the paratroopers with a battalion from the Tuvia Armor Brigade and pull them back to the rear under cover of tank fire. The losses of the paratroopers amounted to 70 killed and 1,001 wounded in addition to the loss of weapons and equipment. Colonel Uzi, the commander of the paratroopers, admitted that this was the most severe battle his troops had fought during the entire war. Moshe Dayan described in his memoirs the story of his meeting with Colonel Uzi Mathiri, the commander of the paratroopers on October 21, days after the end of the battle. Days after the end of the battle: I knew Uzi well since he was the director of the Chief of Staff's office under Bar-Lev. I knew that he had lost many of his men in the battle, but I did not expect to see him so depressed. His face bore a look of indescribable sadness. We talked about his battle to open the entrance road to the canal. Chabem Bar-Lev, who was with me, said that Uzi had suffered heavy losses, but he opened the road. Uzi remained steadfast in his opinion, insisting that he did not open the road and the tanks opened it: I would like to say that my unit opened the road, but it didn't happen, and we lost 70 men because we were too quick to start the battle before we had proper information about the enemy's defenses.

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Egyptian reaction to the Israeli crossing

When orders were given to develop the attack eastward and push the 21st Armored Division on the morning of October 14 from the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, the West Bank of the Canal in the sector of the Second Army had no combat formations to crush any enemy fire except for the 10th Infantry Brigade. Mechanized Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier General Mahmoud Tamar (from the General Headquarters Reserve), was responsible for securing the west bank of the canal in the Qantara sector, and the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division (excluding the 24th Armored Brigade attached to the 2nd Infantry Division) commanded by Brig. Gen. stationed west of the canal in the Second Field Army's second defensive zone north of the Tarama. In order to achieve some sort of balance in the second defensive perimeter, General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, ordered the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection (the intersection of the Ismailia-Cairo

desert road

with the Qamsasin Abu Sultan Road), so named because of the presence of a private rest house

It is located about 30 kilometers west of the canal. The

at the intersection at 1 p.m. on October 13 and was tasked with

a counterattack to repel any enemy penetration south of the Ismailia Canal up to the border line with the

Third Army in the south.

An infantry company supported by the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was assigned to work against the

against hostile airdrops. This brigade pushed a mechanized infantry battalion that occupied the intersection of the

(Abu Sultan Road and Treaty Road) parallel to the canal at 2 p.m. on October 14

This intersection is located about 5 km west of the Great Bitter Lake and the airfield

Al-Defreswar. The western shore of the Great Bitter Lake was occupied from Dufreswar in the north to

Fayed to the south by a Kuwaiti infantry battalion, and from Fayed to the border line with the Third Army by the

No. 10 Hikharas, two poorly armed and poorly trained battalions. The 129th

Thunderbolt Group was stationed at Abu Sawir Airport, and a heavy mortar

battalion and a radar detection company were stationed

at Al-Defreswar Airport, which was not used for aviation purposes. An artillery group

No. 1 Army was occupying its bunkers south of the Ismailia Tara'a, while No. was commanded by Brig. Gen.

Abu Ghazaleh, commander of the Second Army's artillery. As for the SAM 2 and SAM 3 missile battalions

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were deployed in their positions about 10-15 kilometers west of the canal to provide

the necessary protection from the air for the Egyptian forces east and west of the canal.

No information was received by any of the Egyptian commanders about the crossing of the Israeli paratrooper brigade

Israeli parachute brigade westward to Dafraswar under the command of Colonel

Danny Mat, which began around 1:30 a.m. on October 16 by

1:30 a.m. on October 16 by rubber boats and ended at 5:00 a.m. until 7:00 a.m.

5:00 a.m. until 7:00 a.m. The commander of the radar detection battalion

reported to the

Second Army's main command center that his company commander at the Dafraswar airfield reported the presence of some Israeli tanks with a paratrooper force.

Israeli tanks with a force of paratroopers, and was requesting authorization to destroy the

that he was operating so that it would not fall into the hands of the enemy. The Chief of Staff of the Second Army immediately ordered

to send a reconnaissance patrol in two armored vehicles from the Mechanized Infantry Battalion

stationed at the intersection of Abu Sultan Road and the Treaty Road, to

reconnoiter the enemy force at the

The patrol was not more than 5 kilometers east of the intersection, but the patrol

was ambushed and destroyed at the entrance to the airfield.

A wounded member of the patrol was able to report the situation to his superiors at around 9:30 a.m.

9:30 a.m.

At around 10:00 a.m. on October 16, the first report of the presence of Israeli forces

west of the canal to the Second Army's forward command center at Camp El-Galaa in Ismailia.

Second Army Reconnaissance Branch reported that the heavy mortar company at the Dafraswar airfield had reported the presence of five Israheili amphibious tanks at the airport. At 10:30 a.m., the head of the reported an enemy airborne landing, and that the enemy had managed to seize the Bailey Bridge on the Suez Canal (about 2 km west of the Canal). Suez (about 2 km west of the canal), over which the Abu Sultan road runs to the Osman intersection.

At 11:00 a.m., the Second Army Command issued orders to the mechanized infantry battalion
Mechanized Infantry Battalion stationed at the intersection (Abu Sultan Road and the Treaty Road) to push an infantry company
a mechanized infantry company supported by a tank platoon to the Dafraswar airfield to destroy the enemy force at the airfield, which was
However, this company soon lost contact with its command and was unable to accomplish its mission.
It became clear that it was unable to fulfill its mission.

Just before noon, Al-Atho carried out the first major offensive operation in West Attahbah.

A force of about 13 tanks, some semi-trailer vehicles and guided projectiles

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11 59% rockets surrounded the position of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion at the intersection of Abu Sultan Road and Treaty Road) near Dafraswar, a column of his forces, estimated at 8 tanks and 4 in a westerly direction, penetrating the desert land north of the Abu Sultan junction in the direction of Othman Ahmed Othman intersection.

At 12:00 p.m., Major General Tayseer al-Akkad, who took command of the Thawafi Army
after the illness of General Suhad Maamoun on the morning of October 14, took the decision to destroy the column advancing to Al-Adar in
He instructed the commander of the 116th Infantry Brigade stationed in the area of Taqatam Othman to move east
with a battle group consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion supported by a tank platoon, an artillery platoon
100 TA, a field artillery battalion and a 37mm anti-aircraft company with the mission of destroying the enemy
the advancing enemy at the Osman intersection. As a result of the battle group's movement on the asphalt road
from Othman Junction to the direction of the canal without pushing
reconnaissance elements in the front of the force and assigning
flank guards to protect the flanks and with no previous familiarity with the terrain, the entire battle group was ambushed
The entire battle group was ambushed by the enemy at the intersection of the Abu Sultan junction with the
the road coming north from Abu Sawir (15 km east of the Osman intersection), taking advantage of
the 16th Infantry Division's previous engineering preparations at this intersection before crossing to the east of the
Canal . The battle ended with the martyrdom of the commander of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, Col. H. Hussein
Radwan and the destruction of 15 armored vehicles and most of the tanks and assault guns, and the remaining forces after the battle occupied a defensive position
The remaining forces after the battle occupied a defensive position 6 km away from the intersection where the battle took place

the battle. As for the attack by Israeli tanks on the Mechanized Infantry Battalion at the intersection of Abu Sultan intersection of the Treaty Road after the siege, which ended with the breakthrough of the battalion's defenses. The battalion's defenses were breached and its personnel were dispersed and lost their combat capability.

At the level of the General Headquarters, Center 10 in Cairo, the first information arrived from the command of the Second Army Command about the enemy crossing to the west on the morning of October 16, and the information was satisfactory. It did not raise any concern or alarm, as the report said: Small groups of the enemy have succeeded in crossing to the West Bank. The Second Army is taking the necessary measures to eliminate them. During the day on October 16, however, information began to reach Center 10 that several SAM battalions were attacked by enemy tanks and some of these battalions were located about 15 kilometers west of the canal. Israeli tanks were suddenly appearing with 7.5
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tanks near a missile site, then engage the site from a distance of about 2 kilometers, destroying it or silencing it. destroying or silencing it, then suddenly withdrawing to appear elsewhere, and so on. The SAM battalions did not have Sam's missile battalions did not have the ground weapons with which to respond to such an attack, so Enemy tanks would withdraw after carrying out the mission without suffering any losses.

How Egyptian commanders were misled about the reality of the Israeli crossing

The reports that rained down on the Second Army Command on the morning of October 16, 1973 characterized by inaccuracies and inconsistencies, indicated that a limited number of Israeli tanks had crossed to the west bank of the canal. The report that the army command was supposed to rely on the branch of the army responsible for gathering information about the enemy, the Reconnaissance Branch that there were five Israeli amphibious tanks at the Deverswar airfield. And it happened at a time when there was a full Israeli paratrooper brigade west of the canal a full Israeli parachute brigade, about 30 tanks and a number of semi-armored vehicles.

The severe deficiency in the reconnaissance method and the obvious inability to obtain correct information about the enemy, which is the core of the work of the Military Intelligence Service in the field as well as the reconnaissance branches of the Second Army Command and its subordinate formations. misleading the local commanders in the Second Army's sectors, and then at the level of the General Command in Cairo about the reality of the enemy's actions at the time, which led to the impression among these commanders that the Israeli tanks that were seen and reported were nothing more than a bold Israeli raid intended to cause as much damage as possible. to cause as much confusion and inconvenience to the Egyptian forces in this area as possible. Egyptian forces in this area as a form of psychological warfare, and that the

Israeli raiding force would not
would soon return to the eastern bank before being in danger of being
annihilated or captured.

As a result of the constant underestimation by local commanders of the size and
mission of the
the size and mission of the Israeli raiding force, no one in the Second Army
Command or the Cairo General Headquarters
that what was going on behind their backs at Dufreswar was a large-scale
military operation to establish a bridgehead on both sides of the canal.
bridgehead on both banks of the canal, and that it would not be long before
three armored divisions
three full Israeli armored divisions to the west bank of the canal.

It is well established that information about the presence of Israeli tanks in
the Deverswar area west of the canal
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was received from the Second Army Command to General Headquarters Center 10 in
Cairo on the morning of October 16
October 16. Although the reports were reassuring and not alarming, as the local
commanders
were capable of eliminating this small enemy force, the 23rd Armored Brigade
(from the
3 Mechanized Infantry Division of the General Headquarters Reserve), which was
stationed in Cairo, received a warning order
from the Operational Authority to raise its readiness and be ready to move to
the Second Army's sector on the
on the Canal within one hour of the order.

It is questionable that, despite the reports of the presence of an Israeli force
west of the
the 23rd Armored Brigade was mobilized to be ready to move, the two most senior
officials in charge of the war in Egypt, the
responsible for the war in Egypt - the President of the Republic and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces - were not
were not immediately informed of the dramatic news. The statements of the late
President Sadat
and General Ahmed Ismail that they attended the People's Assembly session held
at noon on October 16
October 16, during which Sadat delivered his famous speech in which he announced
Egypt's terms of
without being informed of any rumors about the presence of JAAT ISRAEL
west of the Suez Canal

General Ahmed Ismail was interviewed by Mr. Mohamed Hassanin Heikal, the editor-
in-chief of Al-Ahram at the time.
Al-Ahram's editor-in-chief at the time, and the date of the conversation was
November 18, 73, Ahmed confirmed
that he personally did not receive any information about the enemy crossing to
the west of the canal until after his return
from the People's Assembly. The information he found waiting for him, he said
that small numbers of Israeli amphibious tanks had infiltrated west of the
canal.
the local commanders' assessment was that they could be quickly eliminated.
General Ismail returned
General Ismail returned to the reasons for the shaky picture during the Israeli
crossing to the west of the canal.
Among the reasons he cited were that there was a miscommunication of information
as a result of
A change in responsibilities in some commands due to urgent circumstances and
the commander was undoubtedly referring to
The influential change in the command of the Second Army.

Appointment of Abdel Moneim Khalil as commander of the Second Army
When the process of developing the eastward attack began at 6:30 a.m. on October 14
October 14, while General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, was in his advanced command center to monitor the position of his forces the position of his troops, he suffered a sudden heart attack at 8:30 a.m., rendering him incapable of
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to continue commanding and was transferred to the rest shelter in the command center, where some doctors began to treat him. After spending two days under treatment, he was evacuated to Qasasin Hospital and from there to Maadi Hospital. As soon as General Saad Maamoun stepped down from the command, General Taysir Al Akkad, the army's chief of staff, was contacted at the main command center in the back, and he immediately transferred to the command center to advance to Ismailia. According to the rule of thumb in such situations
At 10:00 a.m. on the morning of October 14, General Tayseer assumed command of the Second Army. There is no doubt that the illness of General Saad Maamoun and his absence from the command of the Second Army at this critical stage of the war is a great loss to the Second Army and affected
There is no doubt that General Saad Maamoun's illness and his departure from the command of the Second Army at this critical stage of the war is a great loss for the Second Army
The experiences and expertise he gained during his successful command of this army, both during its preparation for combat and during the could not be easily replaced. Under his leadership, the Second Army carried out all the tasks assigned to it in accordance with the 1 Badr plan.
The Israeli forces that carried out violent counterattacks along the front of the army especially on October 8 and October 2, suffered devastating defeats.

In accordance with customary and established rules and regulations and what has already been done in similar cases, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces in similar cases, the Chief of Staff of the Army should have continued to assume command responsibility, whether it was General Tayseer al-Akkad or anyone else), since the rule that was followed when selecting any Chief of Staff, whether for a unit or a formation, must be fit to assume the position of commander of the unit or formation in the event of an emergency. of the unit or formation in the event of any emergency that prevents the original commander from continuing in command, such as For example, he is martyred on the battlefield, wounded or sick. If the suitability of the chief of staff to assume command is measured with such precision when selecting any officer to fill the position of chief of staff in units and formations, it is even more important that this precise criterion be applied when

The General Command's view on the suitability and qualifications to assume the position of commander of the Second Army in the event that General Saad Maamoun stepped down from his command, as happened on October 14 due to illness that he fell ill.

But what happened was quite different from what was expected; at twelve o'clock
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noon on October 16, Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Central Region, was summoned
General Abdel Moneim Khalil was summoned to General Headquarters Center 10 to meet Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, who had been entrusted with the Second Army
to take command of the Second Army, and asked him to go to the army's advanced command center in Ismailia to assume command immediately.
Ismailia to assume command immediately. When General Abdel Moneim asked for information about
the situation of our forces, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly referred him to Major General Mohamed Ghoneim, Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff
who showed him on a map a general idea of the conditions of the Second and Third Armies. As for the latest
developments in the enemy situation, the information he received from either Lieutenant General Al-Shazly or
that seven Israeli tanks had crossed the canal at Dafraswar, and that elements of the
Thunderbolts from the Second Army are engaged and have managed to destroy some of them, and that the situation in general is still unclear
is still unclear.

As Lt. Gen. Saad al-Shazly was expediting the departure of General Abdel Moneim Khalil to the Canal
General Abdel Moneim boarded a jeep and headed to the forward command center of the Second Army in Ismailia
of the Second Army in Ismailia, where he arrived at 4:00 p.m. At the command center
General Khalil met with Major General Taysir al-Akkad, the Chief of Staff, who was in charge of the army
He also visited General Saad Maamoun, who was still lying in the shelter of the rest house
but doctors transferred him to Qasasin Hospital after General Abdel Moneim's arrival and from there to Maadi Hospital.
Maadi Hospital.

At 4:30 p.m., General Ahmed Ismail, the commander-in-chief, called
called General Abdel Moneim Khalil after he returned from the People's Assembly session and asked him about the situation.
He replied that he had only arrived at his command half an hour ago and that he was still engaged in studying the situation.
Ahmed Ismail wished him well and urged him to destroy the Israeli tanks that had infiltrated the
Israeli tanks that had infiltrated the Dafraswar that night. Following this, the new Second Army commander began
to call the commanders of the formations under his command to inform them of his assumption of the command of the army and to find out
He asked the Operations and Reconnaissance Branches to provide him with the latest information
to provide him with the latest information on the Israeli force that had crossed to the west of the canal.

One of the most important reasons why the NAMA leadership chose Maj. Gen. Khalil to take command of the Second Army was that he had previously commanded this army for nearly three years
for nearly three years, including during the War of Attrition, in which the army did well under his command.

However, on January 5, 1972, he handed over the command of the Second Army to General Saad Maamoun, meaning that he had he had been away from this army for about 21 months.

Despite our recognition of General Abdel Moneim Khalil's competence and intellectual abilities, and despite we are convinced of his personal qualities and qualifications that made him a successful and beloved commander in the various commands he held. he was appointed commander of the Second Army in such a sudden manner and sent him directly from Cairo to the battlefield from Cairo to the battlefield to take command of the army at the most dangerous stage of the war without had no previous contact with the course of operations on the battlefield or knowledge of the deteriorating situation he had to face The deteriorating situation that he had to face was undoubtedly a big mistake, and it does injustice to General Abdelnaim Khalil and his history, because it only means that he was sent to face a failure that none of the of the senior commanders at Center 10 to face.

The commander who should have been appointed to this major field command in such The commander who should have been appointed to this major field command in such circumstances had to fulfill two basic conditions: He must have been in contact from the beginning of the war with the conduct of operations along the front and fully aware of the situation of our forces and the enemy's losses. He does not need to be indoctrinated when he is assigned to show him the map and explain the situation, or He does not need to make contact with the commanders of the formations under his command to learn from them the reality of the the ground in their sectors when he arrives at his command center, something that forced General Abdelnaim Khalil Abdelnaim Khalil was forced to follow. The second condition was related to the military situation which had deteriorated in the Second Army sector in such a serious way, it was necessary to In this case, it was necessary to choose a commander with weight and weight in the 10th position in the General Command so that the Commander-in-Chief could give him full authorization to exercise to give him full authorization to exercise his powers there, so that he would have the right, among other things, to to make immediate decisions on the ground and in accordance with the situation he faces without without returning to Center 10 to inform them of every new situation and the decision he has taken. to obtain the necessary authorization, which wastes time in vain. If we apply these two conditions to the the commanders present at the time, we find that they only apply to one of two people: Either Lt. Gen. Shazly, the Chief of Staff, or General Abdul Ghani al-Gamsi, the Chief of the Operations Authority.

Now, after all these years, we have the right to pose this important question to past and present Egyptian commanders past and present Egyptian military leaders: Which one was better for Egypt? Al-Shazly Shazly and Gamsi remain at position 10, receiving radio signals, discussing in front of maps and looking at the arrows indicating enemy movements arrows indicating enemy and our troop movements, or for one of them to go to the 330

command center to personally lead the fierce battle that was taking place at the

time, on which the fate of Egypt and the future of the war depended.
on which the fate of Egypt and the future of the war depended. The battle for
the Israeli crossing of the Dafraswar
is undoubtedly the turning point. For the October '73 war, there were no other
other battles along the front. This fact required the General Command to
mobilize
to mobilize all of its expertise and leadership capabilities, not just its
forces, to save the day.
save the situation. The General Command would have to mobilize all its expertise
and leadership capabilities, not just its troops, to save the situation.
or, at the very least, send a personal representative with full authority to
replace him in this task
this task. The absence of either Shazly or El-Gamsi from Center 10 would not
have led to any shortcomings or confusion
confusion in the work, as those present could have taken over in addition to
their own work
the competence of the absent colleague who was sent to the field to take
command.

This is not unprecedented in the history of warfare.
A similar situation occurred in contemporary history, in the Western Desert War
during World War II.
When the famous German commander Field Marshal Erwin Rommel inflicted a crushing
defeat on the forces of
British General Ritchie in the Battle of Ghazala, after which the British army
retreated towards the Egyptian
in a state of chaos and confusion, while Rommel advanced his forces in Cyrenaica
with his forces in Cyrenaica on the coastal road towards Alexandria, and Britain
faced the most serious
the most serious ordeal in the Middle East, Field Marshal Claude O'Connell
15> the commander-in-chief of British forces in the Middle East, relieved
General Ritchie of his command on
June 25, 1942, and went to the battlefield himself, taking command of the Eighth
Army
He was able to stop the German forces at the El Alamein line. General O'Connell
had no qualms about
commander-in-chief of all British armies in the Middle East, had no qualms about
taking command of one of his
one of his field armies in order to save his country from its predicament.

Sadat's speech in the People's Assembly
The U.S. government was certain that within 48 hours of the start of the
fighting on October 6, 73, Israel would be able to regain the initiative and
defeat the Egyptian and Syrian forces
Dr. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, tried unsuccessfully to convince
the Soviet Union and Egypt to support the resolution.
to persuade the Soviet Union and Egypt to support a Security Council resolution
for a ceasefire and the return of
belligerent forces to pre-October 6 lines.
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When Kissinger sent a letter to Hafez Ismail on October 9 inquiring about
Egypt's next step, Hafez Ismail, the president's advisor for national security
affairs, replied on October 10
October 10 that Egypt's conditions for settling the situation are defined in
five points:

1 A ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 67 lines under the
supervision of the United Nations

under the supervision of the United Nations.

2- Freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and guaranteed by the presence

of the United Nations in Sharm el-Sheikh for a specific period for a specified period.

3- Ending the state of war with the completion of the Israeli withdrawal.

4 - The right of self-determination for the residents of the Gaza Strip

Convening a peace conference under the supervision of the United Nations within a specified period of ending the war.

When the Egyptian victories continued and the Israeli counteroffensive failed, Kissinger changed his position
Kissinger changed his position and adopted the call for a new Security Council resolution to stop fighting on the current lines
existing lines. The United States instructed British Prime Minister Edward Heath to push this proposal on Egypt, and he did indeed send its contents to Sadat in a letter delivered to him by Sir Philip Adams, the British ambassador in Cairo. Sir Philip Adams, the British ambassador to Cairo, in a meeting between them at 5:00 a.m. on October 13
on the morning of October 13.

Sadat rejected the proposal and stated that he would ask the People's Republic of China to use its
(veto) if the two superpowers submitted it to the Security Council.

With the failure to develop the Egyptian offensive on October 14 and the beginning of the Israeli counterattack on the Egyptian front on October 15, Sadat
on the Egyptian front starting on October 15, Sadat felt that the situation called for a
political solution . He planned to deliver a speech to the People's Assembly at noon on October 16, with the real intention of announcing to the world
to announce to the world his plan to bring peace to the Middle East

In that speech, Sadat mentioned Egypt's willingness to accept a ceasefire if Israel agrees to withdraw to the pre-June 5, 67 lines under international supervision. Sadat announced
that once this withdrawal is completed, Egypt is ready to attend an international peace conference organized by the
by the United Nations and that he would do his best to convince the concerned leaders and representatives of the people
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Sadat emphasized that Egypt intends to immediately begin work on clearing the Suez Canal so that it can be opened to shipping
of the Suez Canal so that it could be opened to international navigation

Since Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir was scheduled to address the Knesset at the same time as Sadat
Knesset at the same time as Sadat's speech to the People's Assembly.
Golda decided to postpone her speech until 4:00 p.m. so that she could hear Sadat's speech
and respond to it. When Golda Mather delivered her speech, the most important thing that caught the attention of the whole world at the time
that Israeli forces were now fighting both east and west of the canal. This passage was a startling surprise to Sadat.
was a startling surprise to Sadat, so he immediately telephoned the commander-in-chief, Gen.
Ahmed Ismail, who informed him that he had only just learned on his return from the People's Assembly to the command center
that seven Israeli tanks had succeeded in crossing to the west of the canal and that the
would destroy them immediately. These false and misleading reports

sent to the General Command was the starting point for the grave mistake made in the October War 73 and was the unfortunate prelude to the tragedy that followed.

Kosygin and Sadat's talks

After the late President Sadat finished his speech to the People's Assembly, he received a radio message from Syrian President Hafez al-Assad that clearly reflected the beginning of the hardening of the The edifice of the close relations between the two allied countries, whether in the military or political aspect. Hafez al-Assad wrote: "I would have preferred, while we are still in the middle of the battle, to I would have preferred, while we are still in the middle of the battle, to see the proposals that you announced before the People's Assembly. Mullahs. I don't want to follow the example of others by taking a position of support or opposition to these decisions but I feel that both of us have the right to know each other's ideas and goals before hearing them on the radio. I don't feel happy as I write these words, but I don't want to hide

from you any of my opinions and thoughts since we clashed side by side in a battle of life and death."

Sadat immediately responded to the letter saying: "Brother Hafez. The proposals I announced yesterday I announced yesterday were mainly based on the policy that we agreed upon together. There was nothing new in them as long as they stipulate Israeli withdrawal and the rights of the Palestinian people of the Palestinian people. I was compelled to hasten this speech when I learned that Golda Meir 333

about to address the Israeli Knesset. Given my conviction that we must continue military and political battles side by side, I thought that by announcing these proposals we could move forward, knowing that there is no room for maneuver in the formula I have proposed. If anything new comes up, we must of course consult with each other, and I am very happy that your feelings for me have not changed. your feelings towards me have not changed.

At 5 p.m. on the same day, October 16, Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin arrived in Cairo and immediately began talks with Sadat. The Soviets wanted a cease-fire on the current lines, and they were in full agreement with the United States Kosygin explained to Sadat that the war in the Middle East had reached a at a crossroads, that the Arabs were unable to make further gains, and that their decline was now expected to begin that their decline would begin. The development of the Egyptian offensive to the east failed on October 14. Syrian forces have withdrawn from the Golan Heights, and Damascus is within range of Israeli artillery The battle, with its high rate of loss of weapons and equipment, is now considered dangerous.

Kosygin's talks with Sadat continued throughout the next two days, spending the entire day at the Soviet Embassy and met with Sadat in the evening, and it

is likely that Kosygin had no had no information about the Israeli crossing of the Suez Canal when he left Moscow, but the news he subsequently received during his visit to Cairo increased his pressure on Sadat for a Security Council resolution to cease fire on the current lines.

When Sadat explained to him that this was a limited Israeli incursion intended to for psychological effect, on the evening of October 18, Kosygin showed him Soviet satellite imagery taken by Soviet satellites and hastily sent from Moscow to Cairo, clearly showing the Israeli bridgehead clearly showing the Israeli bridgehead on both sides of the canal. Kosygin tried to convince Sadat that he should be lenient and not stick to the condition he had announced in his speech, namely that Israel must that Israel must declare its agreement to the principle of withdrawal to the pre-June 5, 67 lines before Egypt can declare its acceptance of the ceasefire. Egypt's acceptance of the ceasefire. Although the awkward situation west of the canal made Sadat was inclined to be lenient, he feared the psychological impact on the Egyptian people if he waived this condition He also feared the negative political impact on other Arab countries if he waived this condition

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especially his ally Syria. Sadat and Kosygin's talks did not reach a final solution.
The Soviet president left for home on October 19.

The situation of the Egyptian forces inside Ras al-Kobri Unified

The units of the 21st Armored Division were faced with the development of the eastward attack on October 14 which ended in failure, the Second Army Command instructed the division's command Division command was instructed to regroup its units inside the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division before the end of the day on October 15.

Although the 21st Armored Division lost about 50 of its tanks that participated in the the division's units continued to regroup in accordance with the tasks assigned to them by assigned by the division commander, H.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, throughout the day on October 15 in the face of concentrated enemy air strikes and long-range 155mm and 175mm artillery fire, the division's three brigades were able to The division's three brigades were able to position themselves in their assigned areas as follows:

The 1st Armored Brigade (66 tanks) was stationed in the area of Station 3 (Ismailia East) in preparation to repel any penetration.
The 14th Armored Brigade (39 tanks) was stationed in the area west of Abu Wafaqa to support the defenses of the left brigade of the 16th Infantry Division.
The defenses of the Left Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division, the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (31 tanks) Positioned under command of the 16th Infantry Division and stationed in the area east of Tosun in preparation for the counterattack to protect the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division.

On the night of October 15/16 - as mentioned above - some Israeli tanks succeeded in penetrating the right flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade the right flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade and advanced north toward the village of Al-Jalaa (Chinese Farm). Israeli tanks from the Amnon Armored Brigade of General Sharon's division pushed into the administrative areas of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions after moving along the canal berm away from the defenses of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division) and approached to the main command center of both the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions. In the face of this a tank battalion plus a company from the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and a tank battalion from the 14th Armored Brigade to trap the enemy tanks in the breach and prevent them from expanding it. The two battalions launched a counterattack and forced the Israeli tanks to retreat south after inflicting heavy losses.

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The plan approved by the Second Army Command to prevent the enemy from extending its penetration northward was to move the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade from its position east of Tosun to occupy a defensive line behind the brigade's sector to occupy a defensive line behind the 16th Infantry Brigade's sector north of the village of Al-Jalaa (without the tanks), this battalion was placed at the disposal of the commander of the 16th Infantry Division to act as a general reserve while at the same time moving the 1st Armored Brigade from its position in Salta 3 (Ismailia East) to occupy the line (Ismailia East) to occupy the line north of the main feeder (adjacent to the position of the 18th Infantry Brigade Mechanized Brigade between Highway 1 and the Suez Canal). The 1st Armored Brigade immediately upon its arrival with groups of tanks from the Israeli Armored Brigade under Amnon's command, which that managed to reach the village of Al-Jalaa, destroying about 15 tanks and some half-tracked armored vehicles. armored vehicles.

At 1:00 p.m., a powerful Egyptian sortie was carried out on the village of Al-Jalaa

At 2:00 p.m., the enemy tried to encircle the 1st Armored Brigade the 1st Armored Brigade by surrounding it with a tank battalion on its left flank, but the 1st Brigade managed to 10 tanks were destroyed and the rest were forced to retreat south. The heavy bombardment continued from the air and from Israeli long-range artillery on the units of the 21st Armored Division, with a special tower focused on the 1st Armored Brigade. a special tower on the 1st Armored Brigade. Enemy losses during the fighting with the 21st Armored Division Throughout October 16, about 50 tanks and half-track armored vehicles, with two tanks captured

Despite the heavy losses, the enemy continued its attacks on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division in successive waves of tanks under the cover of strong air cover to reinforce his forces that succeeded in penetrating. The number of Israeli tanks stationed

west of

The number of Israeli tanks stationed west of Al-Jalaa village amounted to about 30 tanks and helped them to disappear by taking advantage of the nature of the land, buildings and the edge of the canals and drains that were inside the village.

At around 3:30 p.m., a decision was issued by the General Headquarters, Center 10, to the command of the Second Army

Second Army Command to restore the position on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division and liquidate the enemy force the enemy force that had made the breakthrough.

In order to ensure unity of command and tight control of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, which

16 Infantry and 12 Armored Divisions together, Major General Taysir al-Aqada, Commander of the Second Army, issued

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issued an order that Brigadier General A.H. Abdul Rab al-Nabi Hafez would take command of all forces inside the bridgehead as the senior commander. He also issued combat instructions to the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions

The 21st Armored Division was to take advantage of the air strike and artillery fire for 10 minutes to destroy

artillery for 10 minutes to destroy the enemy that had broken through and positioned itself in the village of Al-Jalaa and prevent it from retreating south

withdrawing southward while holding the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division and restoring

The situation on its right flank was restored in accordance with the decision of the General Command.

At 4:00 p.m., Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil arrived from Cairo to the command center

of the Second Army in Ismailia, where he took charge of the command. As a result, the order was canceled

that Brigadier General A.H. Abdul Rab al-Nabi, commander of the 16th Infantry Division, was responsible for the command of all forces in

The commanders of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions were invited to attend a conference to organize cooperation between the two divisions

between the two divisions at 8:00 p.m. The command center of the 21st Armored Division is headed by Lieutenant General

Taysir al-Akkad, Chief of Staff of the Second Army, but General Taysir al-Akkad was not able to arrive at the

to the conference venue until around 10:00 p.m. due to the withdrawal of all crossings of the 16th Infantry Division

northward towards Ismailia because they were exposed to direct ground fire from the enemy force east of the

Canal at the crossing point at Deverswar, as well as concentrated aerial bombardment after the success of enemy tanks that crossed west of the Canal at Ismailia.

that crossed to the west of the canal succeeded in silencing and destroying a number of SAM 2 and SAM 3 missile battalions.

This led to a breach in the Egyptian air defense network, which allowed enemy aircraft

to carry out air raids on bridges, crossings and ground forces east and west of the canal.

The crossing of the 16 Infantry and 12 Armored Divisions was restricted to the bridges and crossings of the 2 Infantry Division

bridges and crossings of the 2nd Infantry Division stationed in the north in the Fardan sector, using them only at night due to the activity of enemy aircraft

during the day.
enemy aircraft during the day. For this reason, General Taysir crossed the canal using a Soviet-made Type 2 amphibious vehicle from one of the crossing points in the 2nd Infantry Division sector.
During a cooperation organization conference held by General Taysir at the command center of the 21st Armored Division attended by Brigadier General Abdul Rab al-Nabi and Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Arabi, it became clear from the study of the situation of the two divisions The 21st Armored Division could not go it alone - given the fierce battles fought by the division's units.
and the heavy losses it had suffered from October 14 to October 16, it was clear that the 21st Armored Division alone could not the counterattack to close the breach, destroy the tanks in the village of Al Jalaa, and regain the position on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division, in accordance with the combat instructions issued by the Second Army Command

Second Army Command at 4:00 p.m. in accordance with the decision of the General Command (Center 10).
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Before the conference ended, the commanders present were surprised to learn that Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division Armored Division was requested on the radio to communicate with the General Headquarters at the 101st Center in Cairo.
Cairo, and a conversation took place between him and the General Commander, General Ahmed Ismail, who began to emphasize the need for the 21st Armored Division to close the breach and destroy the enemy inside and restore the situation to what it was before. He then asked him to talk to the late President Sadat who was then at the center.10 A short conversation took place between Sadat and Orabi that ended with a poignant phrase when Sadat concluded with a touching phrase when Sadat concluded his speech by saying: 1Honor Egypt, Orabi?

Since General Tayseer al-Aqkad arrived east of the canal in a jeep with only Signal officers with the 151st. He was not provided with any command staff or means of communication.
The commanders of the 16th and 12th Armored Divisions had to offer him to stay with him in his command center so that he could manage any future operations using the capabilities
However, General Taysir preferred to stay in the advanced command center of Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi
Commander of the 21st Armored Division

Israel's S2F Kirchhoff Conference

When the battle between the Israeli Parachute Brigade led by Colonel Uzi Meiri and the 16 Infantry Brigade was raging on the night of October 16/17, General Abraham Adan (Bern) ordered his two brigade commanders (Colonels Nitka and Gabi) to move in and clear the Akavish and Tartar axes. When Bern noticed that the Tuvia Brigade (part of Sharon's division formation) was deployed with its tanks in front of the front of the of the 16th Infantry Division without any effective combat action, while the two brigades of his division were engaged in heavy fighting to open the two axes of advance; he asked Gen. Junin to certify that the armored brigade under Colonel Tuvia be placed under his command until the completion of his mission his mission. Junin immediately agreed.

Bern thus began to put pressure on the forces of the 16th Infantry Division stationed in the corridor area with three armored brigades from east to west, and one of his tank units managed to evacuate the paratroopers. one of his tank units was able to evacuate the involved paratroopers fighting against the 16th Infantry Brigade from their positions from its positions around 11 a.m. on October 17.

That same day at noon, Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan arrived at the

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command of General Bern's advance on a hill near the Kishuv position (south of the intersection of the Akavish Road and Satisfactory Road No. 2) and was immediately followed by General Haim Bar-Lev. Shortly thereafter, a helicopter landed from which General David Eliezer, Chief of Staff accompanied by Yuri Ben-Ari, General Gonen's deputy. Finally, General Sharon arrived in a semi-truck He was blindfolded because his forehead was slightly injured by shrapnel from an Egyptian shell. The commanders present held a war council after they all sat in a circle on the hill in front of them The heavy losses, the constant pressure, and the air and artillery bombardment In addition, personal relationships were not characterized by harmony, especially among the leaders. especially between Eliezer and Bar-Lev on the one hand and Sharon on the other. on the other. Sharon was convinced that they were prejudiced against him and did not trust his views on the battle, and his superiors were constantly complaining about him. his superiors constantly complained that he constantly ignored their orders and that he was inspired by personal motives personal motives, namely to highlight his own person and his own accomplishments. and that he violates the basic principles of the muskrat system by calling his friends and political figures in Tel Aviv from his headquarters in Africa (Sharon's term for the on the West Bank of the canal), and illegally inserting these friends into the chthon Sharon, who had once again early in the morning argued loudly with his superiors about the necessity of crossing a with his superiors about the necessity of floating General Bern's tanks across the canal on rafts, came to this conference to present a proposal to this conference to make another proposal that would bring him more fame and glory.

Sharon's proposal was that General Adan's (Bern's) troops would replace his troops stationed at the head of the bridge on both sides of the canal bridge on both banks of the canal, allowing Sharon's division to complete the crossing of the canal and capitalize on the success west of the canal by pushing south success west of the canal by pushing south behind the Malassian Third Army, but Berne vehemently objected. to this proposal, stating that his units had been fighting for 30 hours straight to achieve the objectives for which Sharon had previously been responsible and had been unable to do so and that this proposal was nothing more than an attempt by Sharon to gain all the honor and and honor. Before the discussion between Sharon and Byrne could escalate,

General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, intervened and resolved the situation. In his opinion, the planning of Operation Braveheart was done with wisdom and ingenuity. Although there had been some disruptions in implementation, there was no reason to make any changes to the original plan. Sharon should continue his operations to hold on to the head of the

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bridgehead and secure the passage leading to it. Bern's division would then pass through it to the west of the canal to capitalize on the success to the south, after which General Kalman Magen's division would take over the bridgehead and Sharon's division joins Bern's division.

At Sharon's insistence, the 30th Tank Battalion of the Haim Brigade which had crossed to the west of the canal on floating rafts at dawn on October 16 due to some losses General Bar-Lev agreed to allow some additional tanks to cross on pontoons as well. to bring Haim's force up to a full armored brigade, with the proviso that no more tanks would be crossed until after the fixed bridges across the canal had been erected fixed bridges across the canal. Around 1:00 p.m., the commanders at the conference stopped discussing Their attention was focused on what was happening in the south. A message from Gen. Magen, commander of the Southern Sector, had informed them at the start of the conference that his reconnaissance points had detected an Egyptian armored column near the eastern shore of the Great Bitter Lake on its way north. Before the conference ended, they received another message from Colonel Amnon, who was still who was still busy reorganizing his armored brigade and repairing his broken tanks near the fortress of Lakikan (Tel Salam) that a huge dust storm was blowing in from the south, indicating that an Egyptian armored column was approaching. of the approaching Egyptian armored column that the Third Army had pushed north. Soon aerial reconnaissance soon confirmed that the column was an armored brigade consisting of about 100 T .62 General Adan (Bern) left the conference with his advanced command post and headed south to lead the battle against this brigade. the battle against this brigade, which turned out to be the independent 25th Armored Brigade, which was attached to the 7th Infantry Division of the Third Army.

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Chapter Six A

Egyptian Attempts to Reinforce the Differswar Fortress

With the succession of fierce Israeli attacks with armored forces on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division Infantry Division's right flank since the night of October 15/16, the Egyptian General Command realized that the Israeli forces were superhuman effort, with no regard for the heavy losses they had suffered, to open a corridor from east to west as far as the Dafraswar area north of from east to west to the Dafraswar area north of the Great Bitter Lake, but it could not have imagined that while the fighting was so intense

that while the fighting between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the corridor area was so intense and fierce the corridor area, the Israeli command could risk dropping a large force across the canal to the West Bank without first establishing a secure route to receive supplies via fixed bridges between the two shores. the two shores. This is why the Zionist leadership initially focused its efforts on trying to destroy the the Israeli corridor on the east bank of the canal by closing the breach that occurred on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division (the right flank of the Second Army) and then annihilate or capture the Israeli force the Israeli force that was stationed at the time inside the breach.

This is why the Egyptian leadership did not give the attention it should have given to destroying the Israeli force that had crossed to the west of the canal the Israeli force that had crossed to the west of the canal, which was initially easy to destroy or capture Believing that the purpose of sending this force was to carry out a series of daring raids to create a psychological impact on Egyptian forces to lower their morale, as well as to operate against Egyptian missile sites west of the canal with the aim of destroying them. against Egyptian missile sites west of the canal with the aim of destroying or silencing them to open a gap in the Egyptian air defense system Egyptian air defense after Israeli aircraft were unable to achieve that purpose, which would which would allow Israeli aircraft to gain air superiority over the battlefield.

This belief was reinforced by the misinformation that was reaching the army's leadership.

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Second Army and Center 10 in Cairo, which was reassuring and underestimating the enemy's strength west of the canal, which clearly revealed the inadequacy of the means of information gathering and reconnaissance work, which was the core responsibility of Military Intelligence in the field and the reconnaissance branches of the Second Army and its field formations. reconnaissance branches of the Second Army and its field formations. Moreover, the Israeli paratroopers and the Israeli tank battalion managed to avoid detection from any aerial reconnaissance by disappearing into the green belt between the Suez Canal and the parallel sweet water canal (the Suez) Most of the Israeli tanks also hid in the bunkers of the abandoned Dufreswar airfield.

The Egyptian plan to destroy the penetration from east of the canal

During a conference held by General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, at Center 10 on the afternoon of on October 16 following his return from the People's Assembly session, which was attended by the Chief of Staff The decision was made to destroy the penetration gap by launching a strong strike against the enemy in the area of the Canal by launching a powerful strike against the enemy in the penetration area in Dafraswar, east of the canal. It was The 25th Independent Armored Brigade attached to the 7th Infantry Division (from

the Third Army formation)
Third Army) was to strike from south to north east of the Great Bitter Lake to meet
with the attack of the 21st Armored Division, which was to strike from its positions east of the canal on the
the right flank of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division (north of the village of Jalaa, the main feeder) in a southerly direction with the aim of closing the penetration gap
in a southerly direction with the aim of closing the penetration gap at Dafraswar and destroying the enemy force
while the 16th Infantry Division holds its defensive positions at the bridgehead, and at the same time
The 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade west of the canal is conducting a secondary strike from west to east
to destroy the enemy force that had crossed to the west of the canal.

As the timing of this plan was initially set for the night of October 16/17
On the afternoon of October 16, the acting commander of the Second Army, Major General Taysir al-Akkad, issued instructions for
which included the tasks assigned by the General Headquarters to the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions, in accordance with the orders received by the Second Army Command.
According to the orders received by the Second Army Command. In the Third Army sector at the same time.
Brigadier General Nabih El Sayed, the head of operations of this army, assigned the mission to Brigadier General Ahmed H. Ahmed
Helmy Badawi, commander of the 25th Independent Armored Brigade at the command center advancing the 7th Infantry Division
In the presence of Brig. The brigade's movement was to begin at last light on the last day of
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25 Infantry Brigade on the withdrawal of the October 7 Brigade. Due to the strong objection of the commander of the 16th Division
Armored Division under his command on the grounds that this would affect the defensive balance of the
3 Division, Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, ordered to place a tank battalion from the armored brigade
Armored Brigade (which was acting as a reserve for the 3rd Army commander) to be the 4th Armored Brigade (from the division's
7 Infantry Division Command

Although the General Command's plan to clear the breach at
seemed sound in theory, the course of events proved that it was a flawed and unrealistic plan
unrealistic and wrong. The most important mistake was pushing the independent 25th Armored Brigade on the
on the east bank of the canal. The correct decision was to cross it from the east of the canal to the western shore during the night
during the night, and on the morning of October 17, after completing its assembly, it would strike from south to north on the western bank of the canal
from south to north on the west bank of the canal.

The idea of pushing the independent 25th Armored Brigade on the eastern bank of the canal proved to be
was met with strong opposition and caused a serious division among the commanders within Center 10 to the extent that it led to
to invite the late President Sadat to come himself to Center 10 to express his opinion on this dispute.
When he arrived a few hours later, he supported the Generalissimo's decision and violently revolted against the
commanders who requested the crossing of the armored brigade to the west to push

it from this direction, and ordered not to withdraw any troops from the east to the west

any troops from the east to the west or to discuss the idea at all. Major General

Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, had already contacted the Chief of Staff and informed him that he would prefer to to withdraw the armored brigade from the east to strike against the breach from the west and that the commander of the of the 25th Armored Brigade shared this opinion, but of course these opinions no longer had any effect after the President personally intervened in the matter. the President personally intervened in the matter and supported the decision to push the brigade on the eastern bank of the canal.

Disadvantages of the plan to push the armored brigade from the east

There is no doubt that the idea of pushing the 25th Armored Brigade from the south to the north east of the canal on

The idea of pushing the 25th Armored Brigade from the south to the north east of the Canal on Cross Road 1 (Shatt Road) parallel to the Bitter Lakes to strike a strong blow in conjunction with the with the 21st Armored Division pushed from north to south to destroy the enemy at their rendezvous point in the

It was a brilliant plan, but only on the map. On the realistically and under the conditions that existed at the time, it was a failed plan before it was implemented implementation for the following reasons:

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The distance the armored brigade was supposed to travel from its position at the head of the 7th Division's bridgehead

Infantry Division to reach the battlefield in Al-Defreswar was more than 30 km, and the enemy was

in full control of the area, which was bound to encounter several enemy resistances and several disruptive battles

several disruptive battles during the movement of the armored brigade column, which would lead to

Disruption and casualties.

â€œThe armored brigade column will be confined throughout the movement in a strait-like channel due to the

The shore of the Bitter Lake on its left is lined with long-standing and continuous minefields.

Since the terrain east of the canal rises in elevation as we move eastward, the the enemy is expected to occupy the series of heights and governing bodies that lie east of the armored brigade's

of the armored brigade's line of movement and control it with fire. With the brigade's column trapped in such a

the armored brigade will have lost the most important characteristics of an armored force: agility, maneuverability, and

agility, maneuverability, and the ability to make flanking and flanking moves, and was forced to

to fight its battles with enemy forces in a frontal manner.

The armored brigade could only benefit from the assistance of the Third Army's artillery for a limited distance

(even with 130mm2 medium artillery, after which the brigade is

out of range of the Third Army's artillery, and it was difficult to benefit from the support of the Second Army's artillery

The Second Army's artillery on the west bank of the canal was out of range due to the presence of the

the Great Bitter Lake, which has an average width of 14 kilometers, on the one hand, and on the other hand, there was no

coordination or organization of cooperation with the Second Army for this operation.

The armored brigade column was exposed throughout the movement to enemy air attacks, especially low flying

The conventional anti-aircraft weapons accompanying the brigade were unable to 57mm double-barreled guns and 14 5mm machine guns mounted on lorries could not could not provide the required protection for the brigade. In addition, the brigade's column was expected to be subjected to to enemy 155mm and 175mm long-range artillery fire; in addition to the air strikes and artillery fire are expected to cause losses in personnel, weapons and equipment, they would undoubtedly cause confusion and disrupt the movement of the brigade's units.

Due to time constraints, it was not possible to organize cooperation between the 25th Armored Brigade

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and the 21st Armored Division, despite its vital importance in such circumstances.

The anticipated meeting between the Second Army Armored Division and the Armored Brigade of the Third Army

had not been previously rehearsed or coordinated, it was imperative to prevent any accidental incidents between them, any amount of organization of cooperation or direct contact between the two parties to determine the lines of convergence and the line of approach.

direct contact between the two sides to determine lines of convergence, cease-fire lines, and signals

as well as organizing the cooperation network between them to ensure the security of the means of communication.

It was established that the 25th Armored Brigade did not have any information before its departure about the enemy

that it was expected to face after such a long and arduous movement over a distance that was supposed to be more than

over 30 km, the Third Army Command, of course, had no information about the the enemy positioned in the breach gap in the Second Army sector, and the Cairo headquarters did not have

Cairo General Command did not have a clear and accurate picture of the enemy situation east and west of the canal due to

reconnaissance work was severely deficient, which resulted in the Third Army Command not being informed

information that should have been provided to the 25th Armored Brigade prior to its movement. As a result

As a result, when the armored brigade approached the battlefield, it was greeted by

162nd Operations Group, commanded by General Abraham Adan (Bern), which consisted of

consisting of three armored brigades, the ratio of enemy superiority over the 25th Armored Brigade's forces

was 021: 3)

The 21st Armored Division, which according to the plan was supposed to meet up with the

the independent 25th Armored Brigade at the Dafraswar area was not expected to reach this area

nor was it expected to meet with this armored brigade in any way. When determining

the size of any force in relation to the task assigned to it is based on its real capabilities

not its organizational size. Therefore, when the number of tanks of the 21st Armored Division

Armored Division on the evening of October 16 reached about 100 tanks, the size of this division should be estimated that it is only the size of an armored brigade, and when it is assigned a mission, this mission must be commensurate with its real capabilities, i.e. with its real capabilities, that is, the capabilities of an armored brigade. The 21st Armored Division
Armored Division since its battle in developing the eastern offensive on October 14 and then its fierce battles on October 15 and 16 against enemy tanks October 15 and 16 against enemy tanks in the village of Al-Jalaa, and in repelling counterattacks counterattacks on the Second Army's main flank, about 150 tanks, in addition to the losses of
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other losses it suffered as a result of intensive artillery and aviation bombardment due to its positioning with the 16th Infantry Division in one narrow bridgehead, which made the enemy's air and artillery bombardment and artillery to great effect. Enemy forces expected to face the 21st Armored Division
Armored Division as it moved to execute the plan and advance south along the canal to meet up with the 25th Armored Brigade.
to meet up with the 25th Armored Brigade coming from the south at the Dafraswar area.
143rd Operations Group, commanded by General Sharon, consisting of three armored brigades and a parachute brigade. As the parachute brigade and an armored battalion from the Haim Brigade crossed to the west bank of the canal
West Bank of the Canal on the night of October 15/16, the force expected to be encountered by the 21st Armored Division
Armored Division in the area of the penetration gap at Dafraswar was at least 200 Israeli tanks.
In other words, the enemy outnumbered the forces of the 21st Armored Division 2 to 1.
It should be noted that the losses of Israeli armored units in their battles were immediately compensated either by repairing the damaged tanks in the field by efficient repair shops or by the arrival of new tanks thanks to the American airlift that began shipments to Israel as of October 14, 1973.

Among the arms shipments that the United States sent to Israel via 2,000 657 missiles, which are guided and tracked by wire.
target by wire. These missiles are the second generation of the French 10 8 and 11 55 after improvements, so they are more accurate and effective on tanks
tanks than the French missiles, as well as the Soviet-made 5a missiles (Malotka), which Egyptian infantry used very efficiently against Israeli tanks in the first phase of the war.
in the first phase of the war, inflicting heavy losses. Israeli official sources denied
Israeli official sources denied rumors that Israeli forces used the 657 missile during the last phase of the war
during the last phase of the war, and emphasized that this missile did not reach the hands of the Israeli forces
before the ceasefire on October 24, 1973.
in various foreign references, including American ones, it can be concluded that The 6573% missile and the crews that trained the Israelis to use it arrived in Israel on October 14.
Israel as of October 14, so it is unlikely that these deadly missiles were used against Egyptian tanks on the day the eastward offensive was developed on October 14.

But they were certainly used on October 17 against units of the 21st Armored Division and the 25th Armored Brigade, causing high casualties, and they were used thereafter in all battles on both sides of the Suez Canal against Egyptian tanks from until the ceasefire.

What would have been the best solution to eliminate the Dafraswar Gap?

If the 25th Armored Brigade had followed the best solution of crossing the canal on the night of 16/17/16

October during the hours of darkness on the crossings of the 7th Infantry Division, and then at first light on October 17

October 17 towards Dafraswar on the west side of the canal on the Treaty Road axis, it would have had the following advantages

The following advantages would have been realized:

1 The distance the brigade would have traveled from south to north was all under the control of the Egyptian forces, which would have ensured that it would not be disrupted during the movement.

On the contrary, the Egyptian forces west of the canal would provide the support and protection

that he needed during his movement in all kinds of ways.

2- The land west of the canal, with its agricultural and desert nature, is considered a good ground for fighting tanks, due to the presence of trees and bushes

tanks, due to the presence of trees and buildings in some parts of it, which allows tanks to take cover

Tanks during airborne attacks when colliding with any enemy resistance, and the The presence of most of the high ground bodies west of the brigade's line of movement (Al-Shalofa Mountains

Jnifa, al-Jawzah al-Hamra, Shabrawit, and Shihabi) The brigade's column was protected from the

its left flank by the force it would have pushed to act as a flank guard in that direction

which, by occupying these successively higher bodies

along the road of advance, fully control the movements on the treaty road and prevent

any flanking or encircling movements by enemy tanks - which had crossed to the west of the canal - against the brigade column.

against the brigade column. Meanwhile, the brigade's right flank was secured by the

Suez Canal and Bitter Lake.

3- The brigade could have benefited from the support of the Third Army's artillery, and then the Second Army's artillery

Second Army's artillery as soon as it left the Third Army's borders, because most of the Third Army's

artillery of the two armies were stationed west of the canal, and there was no wide interval such as

body of water of the Great Bitter Lake to put the brigade column out of range of the Second Army's artillery.

Second.

4 Ensuring adequate protection from air attacks As the brigade moved under the

SAM air defense umbrella west of the canal, it was difficult for long-range enemy artillery on the east bank of the Bitter Lake could not effectively bombard the brigade's convoy due to the long range on the one hand, and the difficulty of observing the tanks on the other.

5 The enemy expected to be encountered in the Dafraswar area on October 17, west of the canal consisted of a parachute brigade, 83 tanks and some half-track armored vehicles. The 25th Armored Brigade with its T-62 tanks with a 115mm cannon was able to overcome Israeli tanks with a 105mm cannon, and the 115mm cannon on the Egyptian tank was capable of firing 115mm cannon on the Egyptian tank was capable of firing high explosive rounds up to 533 km and armor-piercing rounds of various types armor-piercing rounds of various types to a distance of about 2 km, which was enough to cause heavy losses in the Israeli force west of the canal (both armored and paratroopers).

6- Eliminating the Israeli breach required a strong, concentrated strike supervised by a single command to ensure tight command and control, and this was only possible with the availability of two factors:
Achieving the power of shock, with a joint attack by two armored brigades at the same time

against the enemy force at Al-Defraswar west of the canal, one of the two brigades was the 25th Armored Brigade Armored Brigade coming from the south, while the other brigade was supposed to be the 23rd Armored Brigade Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division of the Cairo General Headquarters Reserve). The brigade had arrived according to General Command's instructions at the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection (the intersection of the Ismailia-Cairo Desert Road and the Qassasin Abu Sultan Road) at 9 p.m. on October 16. The intersection was located about 30 kilometers west of the canal, and it was easy to coordinate this brigade's attack from the west on the Dafraswar area simultaneously with the 25th Armored Brigade's attack from the south Before noon on October 17.

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â Achieving unity of command and control by placing the 25th Armored Brigade under the command of the Second Army as soon as it enters the Second Army's borders, and thus the Second Army's command will supervise all battle procedures of the 23rd and 52nd Armored Brigades and organize cooperation between them provide the necessary artillery and aviation support and organize the cooperation network to ensure the means of communication between them, as well as communication with the Second Army Command, and then supervise the management of the battle to eliminate the breach. Directly supervise the management of the battle to eliminate the breach.
7- After the completion of the elimination of the breach west of the canal as expected, the Israeli leadership was unable to establish any Israeli bridges

across the canal
to build any Israeli bridges across the canal, thus canceling Operation
Braveheart and the plan to cross to the west
Operation Braveheart and the plan to cross to the west was completely canceled.
The Israeli forces could not
Israeli forces could not assemble in the narrow gap east of the canal, which was
estimated at around two armored divisions
armored divisions (Sharon's division and Bern's division) could not stay in this
confined space for long
Otherwise, their tactical position would have worsened, and the Israeli
leadership could not
In the event that Operation Braveheart failed, the Israeli leadership could not
conduct any further military operations
It was easy to revert to the old and proven failed method of conducting attacks
washed-out attacks on Egyptian bridgeheads. This was a dangerous situation from
a strategic point of view
from a strategic point of view should force Israel to quickly press the United
States to
for a Security Council resolution for an immediate ceasefire. The difference
between a resolution
that would have been passed under such a critical military situation for Israel
for Israel, and the one that was passed on October 22 with three full Israeli
armored divisions west of the Suez Canal
full Israeli armored divisions west of the Suez Canal.

Was the 25th Armored Brigade assigned a suicide mission?

The units of the 25th Armored Brigade occupied a defensive position on the left
flank of the front line
of the 7th Infantry Division's defenses. At noon on October 16, Brigadier
General Ahmed Helmy Badawi
the brigade commander, received instructions from the Third Army Command for the
brigade's assigned mission, which was to move
north along the eastern shore of Bitter Lake to meet up with the 21st Armored
Division to
destroy the enemy's breach in the Dafraswar area. Due to time constraints, the
brigade commander was unable to
issue combat instructions and instructions for organizing cooperation to the
command group only on maps at
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his advanced command center. At the scheduled movement time of last light on
October 16, the brigade's column began
The brigade column began moving north in combat formation through gaps in the
minefields made by the
opened by the 7th Infantry Division's Left Infantry Brigade: Before the front
guard company of the
The brigade commander received an order from the 7th Division commander to halt
the brigade.
The brigade commander received an order from the 7th Division commander to halt
the brigade, which had only
The brigade commander received an order from the 7th Division commander to stop
the brigade, which had only left the division's bridgehead, and to return all
units to their previous positions.
ready to move to me within an hour of the order. The brigade commander ordered
his units
that had previously vacated their positions and rejoined the combat formation to
reoccupy their equipment
- engineering. Because this operation was carried out during darkness, the
brigade commander was unable to notify the
the division commander until 2 a.m. on October 17. At 4 a.m. on October 17
the commander of the 7th Infantry Division called the commander of the armored

brigade to inform him that instructions had been given to move the brigade the brigade at first light on October 17 to fulfill the mission that had been assigned to it.

What is surprising is why the orders were so strangely contradictory, and within a few short hours.

within a few limited hours. This, of course, led to the many movements made by the brigade's

the brigade's units unnecessarily and unjustifiably, causing the officers and soldiers to suffer from fatigue and fatigue and prevented them from getting enough sleep on the night of the battle to be fully prepared for it in the morning.

in the morning. Although the movement of the brigade from its positions at the last light of day on October 16

October 16, and the order less than two hours later to halt and then reoccupy was not recorded in any Arab or foreign reference, and therefore no writer or historian has

no author or historian has offered a convincing explanation for it, although it is possible to get to the bottom of it if we use the

its secret if we use the method of logical analysis. We have already recorded the sharp disagreement that took place

that took place between the commanders at Post 10 on the afternoon of October 16, following the return of General Ahmed

Ismail's return from the People's Assembly session and his notification that some Israeli tanks had crossed to the west of the canal

The reason for the disagreement, as we mentioned, was due to a difference of opinion among the commanders regarding the direction from which to push the 25th Armored Brigade

the 25th Armored Brigade, and whether it is better to push from the east or the west of the canal.

The natural course of action was to temporarily postpone the advance of the brigade and postpone the implementation of the plan to clear the breach from the east of the canal

to clear the breach from the east of the canal until a final decision could be reached.

In view of the bureaucratic slowness of the system of information and order flow between the command.

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General Command and the Third Army Command, some evidence of which we have already recorded, the

General Command's order to postpone the movement of the 25th Armored Brigade, which had been communicated to the 7th Division Command through the the Third Army Command only arrived late, and after the armored brigade had already organized its units

in combat formation and had already moved out of the bridgehead of the 7th Infantry Division's front battalion and the brigade's advanced command post.

and the brigade's advanced command center. This was the reason for the confusion that occurred and the

The commander of the 7th Division had to order the brigade to halt and return its units to their original positions.

When the dispute was resolved after President Sadat was summoned to Center 10 and the

to implement the plan without any modification, the order was issued at midnight from the General Command to move the armored brigade

at midnight from the General Command to move the armored brigade at first light on October 17.

Since General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, was of the opinion to push the 25th Armored Brigade

armored brigade from the direction west of the canal, he communicated this opinion by telephone to the Chief of Staff at Markaz 10.

The situation became more complicated from his point of view after the brigade units evacuated their positions and organized into a combat formation. The movement order was canceled and the units returned to their original positions before dawn without any rest or sleep. General Abdel Moneim Wasel decided to make a final attempt to prevent the brigade's mobilization, one last attempt to prevent the brigade's movement on the morning of October 17.

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, the Chief of Staff at the time, recorded this attempt on page 254

Chapter 7 of his memoirs: "Around midnight I went to bed, but the operations officer on duty woke me up at three o'clock in the morning and told me that General Abdel Moneim Wasel wanted to talk to me urgently. Wassel told me that the 25th Armored Brigade would not be able to move on this day (October 71) for technical reasons. It was clear that General Abdel Moneim Wasel and the commander of the 25th Armored Brigade were expecting a disaster for the brigade and wanted to create issues that could prevent this suicide operation from taking place. I felt in my heart every word Wassel said, but my responsibility at the time was to oppose Abdel Moneim. I had to oppose Abdel Moneim Wasel. As a general principle, leaders can disagree when expressing before a decision is made, but after a decision is made, each of them must work to the best of their ability to implement it, whether he agrees with his point of view or not.

The decision has been made and there is no going back now. After a long conversation with Abdel Moneim

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Wassel, he said to me in despair: "There is no power but God. I will carry out these orders. But I say it beforehand: This brigade will be destroyed.

The Battle of the 25th Armored Brigade

At 6:30 a.m. on October 17, the 25th Armored Brigade's column began moving from the intersection of Highway 1 and the Al-Jadi Pass Road, and at the head of the armored column, the advance battalion, supported by artillery, mechanized infantry, air defense, and engineers. In front of it was the Forward Guard Company. Immediately behind the advance battalion, the brigade's command center accompanied by the anti-tank reserve, the engineer reserve, and the forward observation officer of the Third Army's artillery group, which had taken up positions east of the canal. After a break from the lead battalion, the brigade's main force, led by the main command center, consisted of two reinforced tank battalions. Behind the main force was the brigade's artillery battalion (excluding the company attached to the lead battalion), immediately followed by the rear guard. At the tail of the column of the armored column were the brigade's First Administrative Corps patrols carrying ammunition, fuel and some ambulances.

The brigade command took the necessary measures to secure the flanks by

assigning a tank company
from the main force to act as a flank guard on the right flank, moving steadily
on the
high ground bodies on the right of the movement axis to repel any counter-
attacks from this
A tank platoon from the rear party has been assigned to act as a flank guard on
the
on the left flank in the event of any threat from the direction of the Great
Bitter Lake. In order to
to obtain information about the enemy, the brigade's reconnaissance company
pushed several patrols in their armored vehicles
armored vehicles to the extreme front and flanks outside the brigade column.

As the brigade's combat formation advanced north along the eastern shore of the
Great Bitter Lake
the Great Bitter Lake, it encountered some enemy resistance from the front and
from the
to the right to disrupt his movement, but he was able to overcome them and
continued his advance without losing
only a few tanks out of its 75 T-62 tanks.

From the beginning of the armored brigade's movement, the Israelis focused on
it. Gen.

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Kalman Magen, commander of the Southern Sector, sent a message to the commanders
gathered at the advanced command center
General Abraham Adan (Bern) near the Kishuv position: the Minister of Defense,
the Chief of the General Staff
and General Chaim Bar-Lev, informing them that an Egyptian armored column had
moved close to the eastern shore of Bitter Lake
the eastern shore of Bitter Lake on its way north, and this information was soon
confirmed by aerial reconnaissance
by aerial reconnaissance. At around 1:00 p.m., the three commanders received
another message
from Colonel Amnon, commander of an armored brigade in General Sharon's
division, who was
was busy reorganizing his brigade and repairing his damaged tanks near Fort
Lakikan (Tel
Salam) after fierce battles on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division,
that a
A huge dust storm was blowing in from the south, signaling the approach of the
Malassian armored column.
General Adan soon left the conference with the members of his advanced command
center and headed south
to personally lead the battle against the Egyptian armored brigade.

Before leaving the conference, General Adan asked General Chaim Bar-Lev to
return the armored brigade under Col.
The armored brigade under the command of Colonel Aryeh was part of his division,
but it was withdrawn to serve as a general reserve.
withdrawn to serve as a general reserve in the hands of the commander of the
Southern District. Bar-Lev responded immediately
to Adan's request

Since three armored brigades commanded by Colonels Tuvia, Nitka, and Gabi were
engaged at the time
in heavy fighting with units of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions to
open the Akavish and Tartar axes
and Tartar axes and to complete the capture of the Chinese farm (Al-Jalaa

village), General Adan instructed Colonel Titka to leave a battalion of his armored brigade to participate in the operations of the Gabi and Tuvia, with the understanding that he would extricate himself from the battle with two armored battalions from his brigade to follow him to the next battlefield the next battle. While General Adan was rushing at full speed to the south on Cross Road 2 (the artillery road) with Colonel Nitka at the head of his two armored battalions behind him armored battalions, he heard Colonel Amnon's voice on his radio calling for help. The Egyptian armored brigade was approaching its position by the Bitter Lake and had with only 30 battleworthy tanks.

The 25th Armored Brigade had encountered many hardships and dangers during its advance. heavy shelling from 155mm and 175mm long-range artillery, which proved to be 368

of the southern sector artillery groups commanded by General Magin, which It was also later involved in aiding Israeli tanks during the main battle against the Egyptian armored brigade. At the same time, Israeli aircraft continued their air attacks against his tanks and vehicles at medium and low altitudes. As a result of the cluster bombs dropped by cluster bombs dropped by these aircraft, most of the tires of the tractors pulling the 122mm howitzers made of kerosene shrapnel, and their rupture made it impossible to open the combat formation of the brigade's artillery of the brigade's artillery, thus depriving the armored brigade of any artillery support during its main battle. The armored brigade had previously been out of range of the Third Army's artillery subgroup no. 2 after being out of range of its 130mm guns. General Adan set up an elaborate trap for the 25th Armored Brigade, taking advantage of its superior number of tanks, rockets, artillery and aviation support, and set up ambushes to surround it from the three sides the north, east, and south, with the Great Bitter Lake completing the rib of the ambush on the western side. While Amnon's brigade was confronting the Egyptian armored brigade with its tanks and rockets Egyptian armored brigade in front at Lakikan Fort (Tel Salam) and had placed four tanks on the road south of the fort to protect his troops. south of the fort to protect his troops, General Adan ordered Colonel Nitka to place a strong anti-tank screen from his brigade of his brigade in the area of the Abyssinian Dune (about 7 km east of Tel Salam) so that the curtain The curtain would extend southward and face the Great Bitter Lake on the right flank of the Egyptian armored brigade. He also ordered Colonel Arebeh, who was in reserve in the Tassa area, to move his brigade quickly to move his brigade quickly across the junction from Transverse Road 3 to Transverse Road 2 and then make a detour in a southeasterly direction to occupy several positions behind the Al-Ladra's axis of advance in order to cut off the Egyptians' line of retreat in case they tried to to retreat to the 3rd Jukhish sector or enter the Butzar fortress (Sulphur East). The The 25th Armored Brigade was still marching in formation at the time, and the

Israelis reported

Israelis reported that visibility was very good, making the Malseri brigade an ideal target.

As the lead battalion's tanks began crossing dry drains about 2 km south of the line, the battalion's tanks came under a torrent of artillery and rocket-propelled grenade fire from

and rocket-propelled grenade fire from the front, from the direction of Tel Salam, and from the right flank, from the direction of

The brigade's combat formation rushed to open in preparation to engage the enemy forces.

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that had encircled it from the front and the right flank. The first attempt by the armored brigade

to penetrate the anti-tank screen from the left flank in the direction of Tel Salam, the

The lead battalion pushed the front guard company and then pushed the company that followed it, but the attempt failed

Due to the heavy losses, the battalion was forced to stop. The brigade commander asked the

the Third Army Command by radio to support it with air support and urgent artillery support and to be allowed to halt so that its units could

to be allowed to halt so that his units could reinforce the ground gained, but the army command replied that they would not

that the brigade should continue its advance toward the 16th Infantry Division's Ras Kobri bridgehead (the brigade's

Brigade units were still about 8 km away from the bridgehead of this division).

The brigade commander decided, after the attempt to break through the enemy's curtain on the left from the

to make a new attempt to bypass the curtain on the right from the direction of the bitter lake

The brigade commander decided that the Umqaddamah battalion should hold the positions it had reached

with improved positions and act as a base of fire against the enemy curtain, while the front battalion of the main force

the forward battalion of the main force would make a flanking movement on the side of the curtain in the area of the Abyssinian Dune

Abyssinian dune area with the aim of reaching the enemy's rear, hoping to meet up with any units of the 21st Armored Division

21 Armored Division, which, according to the plan, was supposed to advance from its position north of the village of

Al-Jalaa in a southerly direction to meet up with the 25th Armored Brigade.

As a result of the intense tank artillery and rocket fire from the direction of Duneb

al-Habashi, a high ground plateau that dominates the entire area around it, in addition to the intensity of the artillery

artillery shelling and continued air attacks, the Egyptian tank battalion failed in its attempt to encircle the enemy

to encircle the enemy, especially since its attack was not supported by any artillery or air support, except for a sortie

of two MiG-17s, which bombed enemy positions in Dheeb al-Habashi with missiles before last light. When the attempt on the right failed, some tanks from the

second battalion of the main force

from the second battalion of the main force rushed towards Lake Amra to attack Tel Salam from the left, but were

became entangled in the minefield along the Bitter Lake and most of them were injured.

the brigade commander sent a radio signal reiterating his request to the Third Army command

to allow him to stop to reinforce the ground gained or to authorize him to retreat with the remaining force of the brigade the brigade's remaining force to Fort Sulphur East, but the army command reiterated its previous instructions to advance at all costs to the head of the division's bridge to advance at all costs to the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division. Tank and projectile fire soon followed.

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rocket fire from the Israeli anti-tank curtains soon destroyed the tanks of the advanced command center of the 25th Armored Brigade as well as the command vehicle in the main center, and set fire to a large number of Egyptian tanks Egyptian tanks. The brigade commander had no way to contact the Third Army headquarters except by through a spare radio in a jeep he found in the main command center. the situation and the impossibility of advancing. The brigade's remaining tanks took cover behind some of the berms of the dry canal and began exchanging fire with the Israeli anti-tank curtain positions until nightfall. until darkness fell. The commander of the 25th Armored Brigade ordered the brigade's remaining tanks and vehicles to retreat to Fort Sulphur East under cover of darkness.

Unfortunately, the brigade lost some of its intact tanks on the way back as they became entangled in the minefield that surrounded the fort. surrounding the fort.

Thus, the battle of the 25th Armored Brigade came to a tragic end after it was thrown into this deadly trap deadly trap that deprived it of the opportunity to use its characteristics as an armored brigade in terms of agility and maneuverability and maneuverability. It also prevented him from taking advantage of the superiority of his 115-meter guns gunnery advantage over the 105mm Israeli tank gun, as he never had the opportunity to

to engage Israeli tanks face-to-face in a tank battle, as it has been proven that

Most of the losses in Egyptian tanks were caused by guided rocket-propelled grenades and artillery

tanks concealed in anti-tank canopies. Despite the poor conditions in which the 25th Armored Brigade fought, Israeli and foreign authorities recognized that most of its

of its tanks fought bravely and skillfully, and that the brigade had no chance of success

due to the overwhelming superiority of Israeli tanks in terms of numbers and maneuverability

maneuverability, the huge number of lethal rockets that supported them, and their effective support from artillery and aviation.

artillery and aviation, while the Egyptian armored brigade was fighting far away and isolated from any Egyptian forces.

isolated from any Egyptian forces and deprived of any effective support from either artillery or aviation.

Israeli sources estimated the armored brigade's losses at 86 tanks, 62 out of 96 tanks with which the brigade claimed to have started its movement, and that the remaining ten tanks were able to return

to Fort Butzer (Sulphur East), in addition to the loss of all armored vehicles belonging to the brigade

of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion, which is part of the brigade's organic formation, as well as all the vehicles of its

its administrative convoy, and claimed that Israeli losses in this battle were limited to 4 tanks

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which were destroyed due to their involvement in the minefield that surrounded the Potzer fortress while chasing the Egyptian tanks.
chasing Egyptian tanks.

In fact, the 25th Armored Brigade did not exceed 75 tanks when it moved, as it lost a number of its tanks during its previous battles, especially in the development of the attack on October 14 while One of its battalions was supporting the 11th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 7th Infantry Division. One of his armored companies was inside the defensive perimeter of Fort Sulphur East, and he did not replace the tanks he lost lost, as was the case in Israeli armored units, especially after the influx of shipments American airlift. It was established that 10 tanks were able to reach Fort Sulphur East, so the total loss of the brigade is about 65 T-62 tanks, and 7 armored vehicles (BK) and 801 officers and soldiers from the Mechanized Infantry Battalion that were distributed as support units to the tank battalions. as support units for the tank battalions. These heavy losses were the natural result of the of the wrong plan to push the 25th Armored Brigade from the east of the canal and not from the west West

The relationship between the political leadership and the military leadership

In Chapter 4 of this book, we have already explained the responsibility of the head of state in drawing the the state's supreme strategy and his right to issue political decisions aimed at implementing this strategy. We emphasized that the duty of the muskrat leadership is to implement these decisions without any As the basis for the use of the armed forces is to be the savior of the state's foreign policy foreign policy of the state

But the right of the head of state in this area should be limited to a certain framework and that his role is limited to drawing the supreme strategy only. His role is limited to drawing the supreme strategy only, without interfering in the details of the war plans through which the implementation of this strategy is realized, as this matter is the responsibility and competence of the The head of state may be a civilian who has no knowledge of military affairs. of military affairs. Assuming that the head of state is a military man, it is not inevitable that he that he has the muskrat culture that qualifies him to intervene in the war plans drawn up by the which operates under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff or Commander-in-Chief, and which is made up of officers with the highest level of military culture, competence and experience.

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The late President Sadat did indeed exercise his responsibilities as head of state within these in the period immediately preceding the October War. He sent political and military guidance on October 1, 73 to General Ahmed Ahmed Ismail, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Sadat soon followed this directive with another strategic directive to Gen. Ismail on October 5, 1973.

This directive outlined the tasks that the president had decided to assign to the armed forces

It was defined in three main tasks, namely:

1 Removing the current military stalemate by breaking the ceasefire as of October 6

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. To inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy in terms of personnel, weapons and equipment 2

3- Working to liberate the occupied territories in successive stages according to the capabilities of the
and capabilities of the Armed Forces

From analyzing this strategic directive, it is clear to us that the President of the Republic did not specify to the Commander-in-Chief

only the strategic objectives to be achieved by the Egyptian Armed Forces, which were in line with Egypt's strategy

were in line with Egypt's strategy, which the president had already explained in the military and political directive

and political directive issued by him on October 1, 73 to the Commander-in-Chief,â i.e., the President did not interfere at all

in determining the war plans by which these objectives would be achieved, but left this matter - as it should be

to the Muskrat Command, as it is the only body that has the authority to translate strategic objectives into war plans and prepare the forces

strategic objectives into war plans, prepare the armed forces to implement these plans, and then

managing the military battles on the battlefield with the aim of achieving the strategic objectives

set by the head of state.

This distinction between the responsibilities of the head of state as the pinnacle of political leadership and the responsibilities of the

can be considered a criterion for distinguishing between strategy, which can be defined as the art of

of general leadership in the entire war, and military tactics, which can be defined as the art of leadership on the battlefield.

on the battlefield. This distinction in responsibilities does not mean that there is a dividing line or barrier

between strategy and tactics that cannot be crossed. It is well known that 373

It is known that the supreme strategy of the state cannot be drawn by the head of state alone, but must be contributed by a group of advisors

a group of advisors and experts who specialize in military, political, and economic affairs.

political and economic affairs. Although the president's responsibility is limited to drawing the supreme strategy of the state

It is not his responsibility to intervene in the formulation of military plans, as this is the responsibility and competence of the

However, this does not mean that he is completely removed from military affairs, whether during the preparatory phase that precedes

during the preparatory phase that precedes the war or during the phase of conducting battles when the war actually breaks out.

It is the duty of the head of state to give his opinions and advice to the military leadership to capitalize on his experiences.

to take advantage of his experience and strategic and political horizon. He is also

He is required to make the military leaders feel his material and moral participation during the preparatory phase of the war

During the preparatory phase of the war, by attending some important meetings of the military leaders and attending some maneuvers and demonstrations and visits to some field formations and units. and other aspects of military activities of particular importance.

During the war phase, the president is required to visit the headquarters from time to time

from time to time to familiarize himself with the latest developments on the front, as well as making some field visits

to command centers to advance some formations on the battlefield as a means of boosting the morale of commanders and troops on the front

as a means of boosting the morale of commanders and troops on the front and making them feel the extent of the state's participation and appreciation of their efforts.

1 However, all of this should take place within a specific framework and within set limits, and on the condition that the president does not involve

the president himself in the operational plans and not get involved, especially if the president is a military man - especially if the president is a military man - under the influence of his latent tendencies and

under the influence of his latent tendencies and previous military service to the extent that he himself issues or

tactical decisions about ongoing battles with military commanders, as this would

This would mean the interference of the political leadership in the actions of the military leadership, which, according to the lessons of

has serious consequences for the course and outcome of wars.

The most prominent example of this in recent history is what happened in the Second High War. Stand up

At a time when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt were limited to drawing up strategic plans for the

successor camp, leaving

the management of combat and command of battles to their commanders, such as Eisenhower, Montgomery

Alexander, Bradley, Patton, MacArthur and others, while the inexperienced German dictator Hitler

interfered in the actions of the German military leadership and forced them to carry out

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wrong war plans, despite the fact that they included some of the best and most skilled Muscovite commanders, such as

von Rundstedt, Erwin Rommel, Guderian and others, which led to the paralysis of these commands

and their inability to execute their plans, and the final outcome was the victory of the Allies and the destruction of Germany

And its loss of the war.

It was clear from the first day of the October War that President Sadat was eager to

to exercise military leadership in addition to his political leadership. The biggest proof of this is

Sadat wore his military uniform permanently throughout the war, and appeared in it in all visits, meetings, and public events, even in

meetings and public events, even when meeting with politicians and foreign ambassadors.

Sadat's penchant for wearing military uniforms predates the October War

It began to emerge after Sadat took over the government in October '70, which is

undoubtedly due to psychological factors
This is undoubtedly due to psychological factors embedded in him since his early youth and the beginning of his military service when he was very impressed with the German military. No sooner had he assumed the reins of power these repressed tendencies came to the surface, and it became clear that he was very passionate about the uniform to the extent that he wore the uniforms of the army, navy, and air force on various occasions naval and aviation uniforms. His pride in the lavish military uniforms he personally created for the commander-in-chief Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, which was very similar to the uniforms of German commanders, to the extent that he made his picture in this uniform as the official image of the country that hangs on the walls of offices and public places

and public places.

It is natural that after Sadat was convinced of his leadership qualities, he turned to the realization of his great dream and the wish of his youth when he his great dream and the wish of his youth when he was a junior officer, a dream that usually haunts the imagination of every the dream of every officer upon graduation from the Military Academy, namely that he would one day find himself at the head of the Armed Forces and assume its general command during of the Armed Forces and assume its general command during war. That's why Sadat showed up just before before zero hour on October 6 to the headquarters of General Command Center 10 in a military jeep, accompanied by accompanied by General Ahmed Ismail, and headed to the operations room, where Sadat sat in the in the center, with the commander-in-chief to his right, the chief of staff to his left, and a huge map in front of them on which the positions of our forces and those of the enemy were depicted. Sadat remained Sadat continued to receive reports from field commands on the crossing of our forces to the eastern bank of the canal on the east bank of the canal for six hours straight, while simultaneously receiving reports from the commanders of
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Weapons on the operations of their forces in support of the field formations, until at 8:00 p.m. he was forced to leave the operations room to 8 p.m., he had to leave the operations room to head to the Tahera Palace when he learned that Ambassador Vinogradov wanted to meet with him. Sadat mentioned in his book âSearching for Selfâ that he moved to the Tahira Palace on Thursday, October 4, after it was equipped with the latest communication equipment to serve as a command center to manage the war.

The prevalence of military leadership in Sadat's thinking is surprisingly evident from an incident recounted by renowned journalist recounted by the well-known journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, who during the war period was almost with Sadat most of the time about a meeting between the president and Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov on the afternoon of October 9 the afternoon of October 9. On page 219 of his book âThe Road to Ramadan,â the London edition. 75, states the following: âIt seems that the last topic on which the Soviet ambassador spoke was a question he asked the president about the political purpose he wanted to

achieve by fighting.

The Soviets were always thinking about Egypt's next move. The president then looked at the the ambassador and said with a frown on his face: "You are now talking to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I take it I didn't listen to you. If you want to talk about the political situation, go talk to with Dr. Mahmoud Fawzi2 .

This strange incident clearly indicates the true feelings of Sadat, especially at this stage of the war. at this stage of the war, which was full of hard work and military victories, namely his lack of interest in emphasizing his role as president His lack of interest in emphasizing his role as head of the political leadership, while his attention was focused on appearing especially in front of the Soviets, whose experts and advisors he had expelled from Egypt in July '72 Egypt in July '72-as the head of the military command that achieved the miracle of crossing and breaking the Bar-Lev line and defeated the Israelis.

What can be observed from Sadat's actions at the 13 center is that during the first phase of the the first phase of the war, the period of Egypt's glorious victories and the infliction of humiliating defeats on the Israeli forces 1 Israel, he had no incentive to intervene in the affairs of military operations. Therefore, his visits to the General Headquarters were characterized by cheerfulness, calmness, and encouragement of the commanders.

However, this view soon changed when Sadat made his political decision to develop the offensive eastward on October 14 to develop the offensive eastward on October 14 to relieve pressure on the Syrian front. Following the failure of the Egyptian forces suffered heavy losses, and after the Israelis 376

crossing the Canal to the West Bank on the night of October 16/15 at Dafraswar and the subsequent deterioration of the military situation Sadat's nerves began to fray as he realized his personal responsibility for the deterioration of the military situation for the deterioration of the military situation as a result of his wrong political decision to develop the attack, which resulted in the relocation of the tactical reserve to the eastern bank of the canal. In order to to salvage the situation, Sadat made desperate attempts to restore the military situation to what it was before the breach on the right flank of the Second Army and before the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal. These attempts led to Sadat's blatant interference in the workings of the General Command, and led to his increasing involvement in taking responsibility for tactical decisions that were that were then issued from Center 10 to the field formations with the aim of destroying the penetration gap at Al-Defreswar. Sadat became so involved that he began to radio himself to some of the division commanders in the field to boost their morale at times, such as when he called Brig. Gen. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, to say to him, "Honor Egypt with Orabi? And other times to issue verbal directives, as when he called Brigadier General

Mohammed

Abdel Aziz Qabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division, to tell him, "Hold the Israelis and don't let them Do not let them expand, and do not engage them until you receive supplies.

Sadat at position 10 in the final phase of the war, with his raging temper and his sharp words created an atmosphere of intimidation, which made some commanders choose to remain silent and not express their true point of view. Sadat created an atmosphere of fear, which made some commanders choose to remain silent and not to disclose their real point of view on the situations faced by some formations and units in the field and propose sound solutions to them for fear of being exposed to the intensity of his anger.

There are two incidents that clearly reveal the atmosphere that prevailed in Center 10 in the last phase of the war in the last phase of the war. Following the failure of one of the units to fulfill the mission that Sadat that Sadat and the General Commander had assigned to this unit, even though the mission was wrong and impossible to execute Sadat was furious as soon as he heard the news of this failure and ordered The commander of the unit was immediately stripped of his rank and removed from his command, despite the fact that he was one of the most competent and courageous commanders. and brave commanders, the commander-in-chief was forced to intervene to calm the situation and asked the president to leave him to deal with the matter. 0

The second incident was reported by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, the Chief of Staff at the time, on page 253 of Chapter Seven of his memoirs, and it occurred on the evening of October 16, when the commander opposed him

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in his proposal to withdraw some forces from the east to strike against the enemy from the west. He stated the following: "After a few hours, the President arrived at position 10 and I thought I thought of using the President of the Republic to overturn the decision of the General Commander and to agree with my point of view regarding the withdrawal of some troops from the east Withdrawing some troops from the east and directing our strike against the breach from the west west. I explained my suggestions, but the president did not give me time to finalize them, and he became furious and lost his temper He lost his temper and shouted at me nervously: "I don't want to hear from you again these suggestions for the withdrawal of troops from the East. If you raise this subject again, I will I will put you on trial.

The relationship between Ahmed Ismail and Shazly

The bad personal relationship between Ahmed Ismail and Saad al-Shazly affected the course of of events in the October '73 war, as the two could not stand each other. The roots of the hatred between the two men go back The roots of the hatred between the two men go back to 1960, when they happened to be at the same time in Leopoldville, Congo Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo: Col. Saad al-Shazly, commander of the

Malasian battalion that was part of the United Nations forces in the Congo and Brigadier General Ahmed Ismail, head of the Egyptian mission to study ways to improve the Congolese army, and when the Brigadier General tried to impose his authority on the Colonel by virtue of seniority, Shazly categorically refused, as there were no working links between the two missions. The two exchanged harsh words until they almost came to blows. On March 10 69, the late President Abdel Tasser appointed General Ahmed Ismail as Chief of Staff after the martyrdom of Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riad. Immediately, Brigadier General Saad Al-Shazly went to the office of General Mohamed Fawzi, Minister of War, tendered his resignation and headed home, where he stayed for three days away from his work from his work. The president intervened and sent his son-in-law, Ashraf Marwan, to Shazly's home where he convinced him to return to work after assuring him of the president's promise that Ahmed Ismail would not come into contact with him. Ismail with him. "Indeed, during his six months as chief of staff, Ahmed Ismail never set foot in the Anshas base where Saad al-Shazly was serving as commander of the Special Forces (Thunderbolts and Parachutes). On September 10, 69, Nasser retired General Ahmed Ismail after the Israeli amphibious raid on Zafarana on the Gulf of Suez. On the night of May 15, 1971, following President Sadat's liquidation of the power centers. The president simultaneously used the two rivals to strengthen his position and stabilize his rule, entrusting Saad

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Shazly as Chief of Staff, replacing Lieutenant General Mohamed Sadek, who was appointed by Sadat that night as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after the ouster of General Mohamed Fawzi. He also recalled General Ahmed Ismail from retirement and gave him the position of Director of General Intelligence General Intelligence . Although there was no direct friction in the work between the director of intelligence and the chief of staff and the Chief of Staff, the relationship between the two men remained the same in terms of coldness and mutual dislike And mutual hatred.

On October 26, 72, Sadat carried out his measure by dismissing General Mohamed Sadek and appointing Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. A few hours before his appointment a few hours before Ismail's appointment, Sadat offered the position to Saad Shazly, to his unpleasant surprise, recounted to the president the long history of their disagreements since 1960 in the Congo and the coldness of their relationship, making cooperation between them almost impossible. almost impossible . But the president assured him that the relationship between them would be good and much better than the previous relationship between him and Mohamed Sadek

Al-Shazly wrote in his memoirs that he considered resigning, but two factors prevented him from doing so. The first of them: His resignation would be interpreted as solidarity with General Mohamed Sadek after the president's dismissal The president dismissed him. The second factor: Some may interpret his resignation as not wanting to enter the war while the truth is the opposite.

Thus, the two rivals suddenly found themselves in the same headquarters and in two neighboring offices after being forced by circumstances to cooperate. They were forced by circumstances to cooperate with each other and jointly command the armed forces during one of the most critical periods in its history, namely the period of completing preparations for the offensive battle, for which General Saad Al-Shazly had, for truth and history, exerted strenuous effort and hard work to prepare the Armed Forces for this fateful battle since he assumed the position of Chief of Staff. as Chief of Staff.

Despite the apparent improvement in relations between Ahmed Ismail and Saad Shazly, the deep hatred between the two men remained unchanged, and this was not in favor of the Egyptian Armed Forces. the Egyptian Armed Forces, of course, because how can things be normalized in the 228th position when there is such a rift between the two commanders who hold the two most dangerous positions in warfare. Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff. It is indisputable that part of Sadat's anger

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and his unbridled rage against Saad al-Shazly in the last phase of the war to the point of threatening him with threatened him with court martial and ended up removing him from his post was due to Ahmed's efforts Ismail's efforts to turn Sadat against him by criticizing his actions and complaining about his his disobedience to his orders and legacies.

Ahmed Ismail, on the other hand, was extremely loyal and faithful to Sadat, and would not Ahmed Ismail, on the other hand, was very loyal and loyal to Sadat, and could not think of opposing him or standing in the way of his views. after Nasser ousted him on September 10, 69, and he realized at that time that his working life was over His career was over and he had no choice but to remain in the shadows of oblivion until his death.

This sense of absolute loyalty to Sadat, in addition to the harsh lesson he received from Nasser when he from Nasser when he was dismissed from his position due to the Israeli raid on Zafarana. Ahmed Ismail's approach to the 10th position and his style of command throughout the war. Ahmed Ismail's approach to leadership throughout the war was to be careful not to anger Sadat, which made him interfering in military affairs and operational plans in a way that was totally inconsistent with the the prestige of the General Command and respect for its jurisdiction. This is in addition to Ahmed Ismail's personal welcome Ahmed Ismail's personal welcome for the president to participate with him in the issuance of military decisions of particular sensitivity and gravity in order to ensure that he does not bear the responsibility in the event of failure, as the decision in this case is the president's decision, and who would dare to blame or blame the commander-in-chief at that time? or demand that he be held accountable?

How did the 21st Armored Division use the wrong tactical approach?

One of the major flaws in the Egyptian General Command's plan to destroy the penetration east of the canal in the Deverswar area was that the 21st Armored Division was assigned the task of advancing on October 17 from its positions north of the village of al-Jalaa, the main feeder in the southern direction, to meet up with the independent 25th Armored Brigade, which was to be pushed from the Third Army sector from the south to the north north. When the two forces meet at the Dafraswar area - east of the canal - the enemy is trapped within the breach gap and destroyed. The 21st Armored Division was unable to fulfill the mission. In any case, as we have already explained when determining the size of any force in relation to the task assigned to it of any force in relation to the task assigned to it - this determination should be made according to its real capabilities.

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and not according to its organizational size, while also taking into account the strength of the enemy that is expected to

expected to be encountered in the execution of the mission. Given that the real capabilities of the 21st Armored Division after the fierce battles fought since the

the development of the offensive on October 14 until its assignment to this new mission was no more than an armored brigade only an armored brigade, no unit of the 21st Armored Division was able to could not meet up with the 25th Armored Brigade to participate in the mission assigned to the two forces. This was This was one of the main factors that led to the destruction of this armored brigade south of the Dune line after an asymmetrical battle that some foreign references described as a a classic tank battle that every commander dreams of. After the failure of the 21st Armored Division to achieve the mission assigned to it in the development of the on October 14, during which it lost about 50 of its tanks. in the battle, its commander, H.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, did not have the opportunity to regroup his division's units to regroup his division units and carry out rapid repairs of damaged equipment in the proper manner. and away from enemy pressure so that he could renew the division's combat efficiency. They spent Throughout October 15, the division's units spent the entire day under concentrated enemy aerial bombardment and artillery fire 155mm and 175mm long-range artillery fire. This increased the division's losses and paralyzed its ability to deploy to avoid the losses of air and artillery fire. to deploy to avoid air and artillery losses by being crammed with the 16th Infantry Division at the head of one narrow bridgehead, which made the situation even more difficult and complicated. In addition to the bad situation the division faced throughout October 15, which hindered the regrouping of its units, the situation became even more precarious after the Israeli command decided to start implementing its plan The Israeli leadership decided to start implementing its "Braveheart" plan from the night of October 15/16 October 15/16 to establish a bridgehead on both banks of the Suez Canal at Dafraswar. The bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, which includes the 21st Armored Division, became the target of a fierce and continuous attack by

Israeli armored forces to penetrate the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division in order to secure the crossing at Al Dafraswar (the former Israeli fortress Mitzmid) and extend the penetration northward to a distance of about 5 kilometers about 5 km north of the village of Al Jalaa and the main feeder, and to clear the two axes of advance Akavish and Tartour, on which the troops and equipment intended for the crossing would move, and which were in Beymaran in front of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division). the brigade's forward positions. Achieving the objectives of the Israeli crossing plan to the west of the Canal

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meant destroying the 16th Infantry Brigade and occupying its defensive positions, or at least moving it north about 5 kilometers to clear the area from the crossing yard in Dafraswar to north of the village of Al-Jalaa and the main feeder from the Egyptian forces. The Israeli attacks were concentrated on the right flank of the of the 16th Infantry Division's right flank, which ended with the penetration of the 16th Infantry Brigade's defensive position and the arrival of Israeli tanks reached the village of Al Jalaa, causing the units of the 21st Armored Division to be tasked before they could complete the regrouping process to launch counterattacks on the enemy forces in the breach breakthrough and attempt to expel the enemy tanks from the village of Al-Jalaa.

Due to the critical situation on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division, the was forced to use the units of the 21st Armored Division in a way that violated sound tactical principles in the use of armor, as the division was pushed to counterattack with a distributed attack. ealm, scattering its armored battalions in various directions and dispersing its efforts on various fronts. which ultimately led to its fragmentation and the loss of its striking power.

Although the 21st Armored Division suffered losses of more than 150 tanks, the main mission the main mission that the Second Army Command used to assign to it since the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal has always been to restore the situation to what it was in the Second Army's Second Army's right flank. The 21st Armored Division was likely to succeed in performing this difficult task could have succeeded in this difficult task, despite the harsh conditions it faced, if it had been given the opportunity to replace its losses in tanks tanks, and received new tanks to return to its full organizational size, as was done in Israeli armored units Israeli armored units, especially after the influx of airlift shipments. However, this was not possible due to the lack of spare tanks in the Egyptian Armed Forces warehouses. in the Egyptian Armed Forces warehouses, and the Soviet tanks that were sent via the 400 T-55 and T-62 tanks were all shipped by sea from the port of Odessa on the by sea from the Black Sea port of Odessa to the Syrian port of Latakia, due to the heavy losses Syrian forces suffered heavy losses during their attack on the Golan Heights, which did not allow for any shipments of new Soviet tanks to reach Egypt.

Operations east of the Canal on October 17

On the evening of October 16, 73, the situation of the units of the 21st Armored Division was as follows:

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1st Armored Brigade: North of the main feeder area between Highway 1 and the canal
Suez Canal.

14th Armored Brigade: East of Taliyah to protect the contact point between the 16th Infantry Brigade (right brigade) and the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade (center brigade).

18 Mechanized Infantry Brigade: In defensive positions north of the village of Al Jalaa without the tank battalion which is part of the brigade's organic organization after it was assigned to serve as a reserve at the disposal of the commander of the 16th Infantry Division.

The enemy was still attacking the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division to complete the opening of the Akafish and Tartour axes, and to widen the penetration gap at Dafraswar. The Southern Command

1 had assigned General Abraham Adan (Bern) to accomplish this mission after General

Sharon had failed to accomplish it, so he began attacking the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead with two armored brigades

two armored brigades from his division (Colonel Nitka's brigade and Colonel Gabi's brigade). In addition to the armored brigade commanded by Colonel Tuvia (from Sharon's division and placed under Adan's command to fulfill the mission

assigned to it). The ferry bridge was able to be moved by Brigadier General David Tamari's deputy

General Adan was able to move it around 4:00 a.m. on October 17 on the Akavish road.

and reached the crossing at Dafraswar at around 6 a.m. the same day.

The Israelis therefore concentrated their efforts on opening the Tartour Road so that Brig. Gen.

Sharon could move the pre-installed bridge on this road to the crossing yard

The two bridges between the two shores of the canal will be built according to the plan, after the unexpected delay

the unexpected delay that almost caused Operation Braveheart to be canceled.

At around 4:00 a.m. on October 17, the operational directive from Center 10 in Cairo to the Second Army Command, indicating that Haddo had mobilized about 50

tanks supported by anti-tank missile elements in the area from Kabrit Sharq to that he was attacking the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division with 80 tanks, and that the

is for the Second Army to launch a counterattack to restore the situation at the head of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead

the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead. The date was set for 7:00 a.m. on October 17

to get ready to move. The General Command's decision was to push the 25th

Armored Brigade at first light on October 17 from the Third Army sector

light on October 17 from the Third Army sector to the north to assist the Second Army in destroying

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penetrating enemy. The decision emphasized the need to pay special attention to the identification and differentiation of troops and to ensure that troops fight against enemy anti-tank curtains and enemy anti-tank reserves flying (i.e., helicopters equipped with air-launched anti-tank missiles air-launched anti-tank missiles). Beginning at 5 a.m. on October 17, the enemy concentrated its air strikes and artillery fire and artillery fire on the positions of the 1st Armored Brigade and the 81st Mechanized Infantry Brigade. caused some casualties.

At around 7:00 a.m., the Second Army Command was instructed to push the 1st Armored Brigade Armored Brigade to destroy the enemy east of Al-Dafraswar and secure the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division. assigned by the commander of the 21st Armored Division to the commander of the first brigade was that the armored brigade, after A 15-minute air strike and artillery bombardment ending at 8:15 a.m. attack the enemy in the area southeast of the village of Al Jalaa, destroy it and capture the strong point at Dafraswar, in cooperation with Egyptian paratroopers occupying the west bank of the canal The 1st Armored Brigade will be ready to connect with the 25th Armored Brigade. ready to contact the 25th Armored Brigade, which crossed the Sulphur Line at 7:00 a.m. through the 145th cooperation network.

Thus it became clear that the 21st Armored Division could not push any armored force to the Al-Janrib to meet up with the 2nd Armored Brigade, except for the remnants of the 1st Armored Brigade, which had no more than The division's other units were tasked with other vital missions that they could not abandon in order not to lose Ras Kobar. They could not abandon them lest the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division lose its defensive balance.

At 8:15 a.m. on October 17, after an air and artillery bombardment that lasted for 15 minutes according to plan, the tanks of the 1st Armored Brigade launched a counterstrike from their position north of the main feeder. counterstrike from its position north of the main feeder to the direction of Dafraswar to the south, despite the harsh conditions the brigade was facing the 1st Armored Brigade's tanks were able to destroy the enemy in the area south of the main feeder and west of Qirbet al-Jalaa, and to reach the strong point of al-Dafraswar in the north and occupy it around 9:00 a.m. and occupy it around 9 a.m., but were forced to retreat to the north Under enemy pressure, concentrated air strikes and long-range artillery fire, the remaining tanks of the 1st Brigade The remaining 33 tanks of the 1st Brigade, after 2 tanks were wounded in the battle, returned to their positions on the main feeder line to their positions on the main feeder line and continued to fight the enemy, whose tanks continued to apply pressure. 384

The enemy was able to reach a distance of only one kilometer south of the main feeder line. The fighting between the 1st Brigade's tanks and the Israeli tanks continued until 9:00 p.m., when the 1st Brigade was able to take defensive positions.

At around 2:00 p.m. on October 17, instructions were issued to appoint Major General Tayseer

Al Akkad, Chief of Staff of the Second Army, was appointed commander of the unified bridgehead of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions.

Armored Division. Since he was not provided with any command staff or any means of communication with the Second Army headquarters or the formations he was assigned to command, all that was assigned to him was a jeep, a signal officer

with a 151 device and a guard soldier, General Taysir was forced to stay at the command center of the

of the 21st Armored Division in order to exercise his command and communication through the Qaydah tank assigned to Brig.

1.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division.

At around 5 p.m. on October 17, an idea was floated in the Second Army's headquarters

approved by the General Command to prevent the enemy from expanding the penetration gap, namely flooding the area north of the village of Al-Jalaa and the main feeder

north of the village of Al-Jalaa and the main feeder with water by releasing water into the Dheikh pipes extending from west to east of the canal.

from west to east of the canal. There were six huge pipes stretching across the bottom of the Suez Canal

to transport water from the Suez Canal to the east of the canal.) to the east of the canal to pour into the

This system is called the main feeder, and its purpose is to transfer Nile water to the Suez Canal.

The purpose of transferring Nile water to Al-Galaa is to irrigate the reclaimed land within the village.

Following the defeat of the June 67 war and the capture of Sinai by Israeli forces, the Egyptian authorities stopped

The Egyptian authorities, of course, stopped pumping water from the West Bank, which led to the drying up of the canal. The Second Army Command

Second Army Command was aiming to pump the water heavily through pipes to flood the land north of the village of Al-Jalaa to serve as a

Manka against tanks, a good idea that many countries have resorted to in the Kharoub. Despite

a mobile detachment of Muskarian engineers was sent to the pumping station west of the canal to release the water

water, the operation was not carried out for technical reasons that were undoubtedly due to damage to the

of the pumping engines, which had been out of service for more than six years.

At 5 p.m., the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was taking defensive positions north of the village of Al-Jalaa to liquidate the enemy present in the village with one of its battalions

to secure it. The battalion's attack was unsuccessful and the battalion suffered The battalion suffered heavy losses and was ordered to be withdrawn from its

position and regrouped south of Kobr

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Sarabioum. The rest of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade continued to defend the line north of the

Suez Canal after being reinforced with 10 tanks from the 14th Armored Brigade.

Faced with a severe shortage of tanks in the 21st Armored Division, Major General Tayseer al-Aqkad, commander of the

ordered a tank battalion from the 24th Armored Brigade (attached to the 2nd Infantry Division since the beginning of the war from the 23rd Infantry Division the beginning of the war from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division) to the Ras Kobri area of the 16th Infantry Division

to be placed under the command of the 2nd Armored Division, and when the tank battalion moves from the position of the 24th Armored Brigade

24th Armored Brigade (Ismailia East) on Cross Road No. 1 (Shatt Road). And just

before

before the battalion reached the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, enemy aircraft swooped down on it in an attempt to
The battalion commander's good judgment saved it from destruction, as he ordered the tanks of the battalion to turn to the east to the east and quickly deployed, so that the battalion did not suffer any losses.

The 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead shrinks

The bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division has been exposed since the night of October 15/16, during which the
the Israelis began their crossing to the west of the canal, the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division was subjected to continuous fierce attacks along the confrontation

with concentrated air strikes and heavy fire from 155mm and 175mm long-range artillery, which inflicted heavy losses on the division's units.

the division's units with heavy losses. General Sharon, whose division was tasked with constructing the

and securing the bridgehead at Dafraswar, focused his attacks on the positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the division

16 Infantry) aiming to penetrate and destroy the brigade's positions to secure the crossing area from the north. After

fierce and continuous fighting between Colonel Amnon's armored brigade and the brigade's right battalion

brigade, in which the Israelis suffered heavy losses, finally fell on the morning of October 16 at the intersection of

(Crossroad No. 1 and Tartour Road), and Amnon pushed his tanks northward, occupying the area between al-Zar'a and Tartour Road.

occupied the area between the Chinese farm (Al-Jalaa village) and the Suez Canal, and on the night of October 17, a parachute brigade led by

The Parachute Brigade, commanded by Uzi Meiri, who had been airlifted by helicopter from Ras Sidr on the Gulf of Suez

The left battalion of the 16th Infantry Brigade on the Gulf of Suez attacked the position of the left battalion of the 16th Infantry Brigade, and the fighting continued to rage

throughout the night. Due to the heavy losses suffered by the Israeli paratroopers, they could not be withdrawn

only under the cover of a tank battalion, which, after the paratroopers were withdrawn, launched

attacks on the Egyptian battalion's position, resulting in heavy losses.

The enemy tanks were able to stabilize the village of Al Jalaa, despite the counterattacks of

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against them, the enemy exploited the nature of the land and buildings in Al-Jalaa village, as well as the drains

dry drains and the vehicles of the administrative columns that were destroyed or abandoned by their drivers during the air strikes.

Israeli . The nature of the sandy, loose terrain meant that Egyptian forces in this sector were poorly equipped to protect

Egyptian forces in this sector, especially from the air raids that intensified after the Israeli forces crossed to the west of the canal, as a result of the as a result of the gap in the air defense network west of the canal

after Israeli tanks attacked SAM positions on the west bank of the canal. At

At 5:30 p.m. on October 17, the 16th Infantry Brigade's situation had worsened The brigade's artillery group had been destroyed, as well as most of the tanks, weapons, and anti-tank missiles

and anti-tank missiles in the brigade's units, and the casualty rate had risen dramatically

and the ammunition situation worsened alarmingly

As a result of the brigade's units, command center, and administrative area coming under heavy attack from enemy tanks enemy tanks, while the air strikes intensified and the intensity of artillery fire increased, and the brigade became unable to hold its positions, the command of the 16th Infantry Division sent a radio signal to the commander of the of the 16th Infantry Brigade to adjust his position and assemble the remaining elements of the brigade on the line of the isolated building and join the defensive positions occupied by the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 21st Armored Division Armored Division north of Al Jalaa village to reinforce the defensive line. With the evacuation of the 16th Infantry Brigade from its defensive positions the enemy achieved its goal of widening the breach gap to the north to secure the Dafraswar crossing. At the same time At the same time, the commander of the 16th Infantry Division was forced to adjust the positions of his defensive units, as the the division's bridgehead was reduced and the enemy was able to open the Akafish and Tartour roads and occupy the Chinese farm (Al-Jalaa village), in which both sides suffered heavy losses.

Attacking Egyptian missile sites (SAM) west of the canal
At 4 p.m. on October 16, General Abdel Moneim Khalil arrived from Cairo to the the advanced command center of the Second Army in Ismailia after he was appointed commander of this army, replacing General Saad Maamoun, who had suffered a sudden heart attack on October 14 at 8:30 a.m. heart attack that prevented him from continuing his command. Upon General Abdel Moneim's arrival, doctors General Saad Maamoun was transferred to Qasasin Hospital and then to Maadi Hospital.
General Abdel Moneim Khalil began exercising his command over the Second Army in one of the most difficult phases since the beginning of the war on October 6, 1973.
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As of the morning of October 17, the enemy had not succeeded in establishing a fixed bridge across the Suez Canal
Suez Canal in the Dafraswar area as planned, which is why General Sharon's General Sharon's force, which had crossed to the west of the canal using rubber boats and was isolated from its bases east of the canal for nearly 40 hours. consisted of a parachute infantry brigade led by Colonel Danny Mat and 30 tanks from the Armored Brigade led by Colonel Haim and a group of armored vehicles. Gen. Chaim Bar-Lev, the personal representative of the Chief of General Staff in the Southern Command, despite the urging of General Sharon - refused to authorize the crossing of any supplies to reinforce this force until after fixed bridges had been established across the canal for fear that the Israeli force west of the canal would be in danger of being annihilated or captured.

The Israeli force that crossed to the west of the canal, despite its small size, had caused a lot of anxiety and confusion among the Egyptian commanders and forces west of the canal
The Israeli force that crossed to the west of the canal, despite its small size, caused a lot of anxiety and confusion among the Egyptian commanders and forces west of the canal.
and ground reconnaissance by taking advantage of buildings, trees, and the abandoned Dafraswar airfield, which
The information relayed by reconnaissance elements to local commanders was characterized by inconsistencies, inaccuracies, and a tendency to exaggerate

and a tendency to underestimate the size and strength of the enemy.

The Israeli bridgehead west of the canal in its first phase, before the construction of fixed bridges across the canal

The Israeli bridgehead west of the canal, in its first phase and before the construction of fixed bridges across the canal, extended from Marsa Abu Sultan on the Great Bitter Lake in the south to near

Sarabium in the north (about 8 km) and from the Suez Canal in the east to the Sweet Taraa in the west (about 2 to 33 km).

2 to 33 kilometers). Members of the Parachute Brigade, responsible for protecting the bridgehead west of the canal

occupied important structures and targets in the area and barricaded themselves in the trenches they had dug and occupied some Egyptian terraces

and occupied some of the former Egyptian terraces on the earthen berm adjacent to the canal

This posed a serious threat to Egyptian forces east of the canal. To reinforce the paratroopers, Gen.

General Sharon ordered seven tanks to remain inside the bridgehead, while the rest of the tanks used

They were carried in small detachments (3 to 5 tanks).

small detachments (3 to 5 tanks) supported by mechanized infantry in half-track armored vehicles

and anti-tank missile elements. These detachments were advancing westward into the deep

taking advantage of buildings and cultivated areas for easy concealment, and

attacking the positions of Egyptian SAM 2 and SAM 3 anti-tank missile battalions Egyptian SAM 2 and SAM 3 anti-aircraft missile battalions. Israeli tanks would

appear

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suddenly appear near a missile site and then engage the site from a distance of about 1.5

2 kilometers), destroying or silencing it, then suddenly withdrawing to reappear elsewhere, and so on. And they did not

Sam's missile battalions did not have the ground weapons to respond to such an attack. And before

Israeli armored detachments would return to their bases at Ras al-Kobri to sleep and refill. The enemy's aim in these continuous raids on the SAM battalions was to liquidate the air defenses in a wide sector west of Ras al-Kobri.

to eliminate air defenses in a wide sector west of the canal, to secure a passage for Israeli planes

from which Israeli aircraft could freely access the west bank of the canal to provide air support to ground forces

to provide air support to ground forces in their operations against the Egyptian forces.

During the night of October 16/17, the enemy was able to regroup its forces at Ras al-Kobri

west of the canal in the areas of Al-Defreswar, Abu Sultan Marsa, Kadesh camp (north of the airport)

Al-Defreswar) Sarabium, and his forces succeeded in pushing back the Egyptian forces that were pushed to pressure him

and in occupying the Egyptian terraces in the Deverswar area west of the canal.

Freedom operations west of the Canal on October 71

The situation of the Egyptian forces in the Second Army sector that were assigned to attack the head of the

Israeli bridgehead west of the canal on the morning of October 17 was as follows:

116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade: A unit of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division, which was commanded by

commanded by Brigadier General Ahmed Abboud al-Zamar, was stationed before the Israeli crossing in the area of the intersection of Othman Ahmed Othman (30 km west of the canal), and on October 16, this brigade suffered heavy losses

Enemy tanks attacked one of its battalions, which was occupying a defensive position at the intersection of

Abu Sultan and the Treaty Road, penetrating its defenses and scattering its personnel. When the brigade commander advanced from the Othman junction east on the Abu Sultan junction at the head of a battle group consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion

with the mission of destroying the enemy advancing in the direction of the intersection, the entire group fell into

The entire group was ambushed by the enemy at the intersection of the Abu Sultan junction with the road coming north from Abu

The battle ended with the martyrdom of the brigade commander and the destruction of

A large part of the brigade's tanks, armored vehicles, and assault guns, and the remaining forces occupied

The remaining forces occupied a defensive position about 6 km west of the intersection where the battle took place.

On the morning of October 17, the Second Army commander ordered the infantry battalion to move

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of the 116th Brigade, stationed at Osman Junction, to move east on the Abu Sultan junction.

Sultan, to be joined by the remnants of the two battalions that the enemy had destroyed the day before

The brigade's chief of staff, who assumed command after the commander's martyrdom, is to regroup the brigade's units and occupy the

Brigade units and occupy the third position (a defensive position west of the Abu Sultan junction with the

Treaty Road) It is located about 5 kilometers away from the Deverswar Airport and the Great Bitter Lake

with the mission of preventing the enemy from advancing westward. The 116th Brigade was reinforced with 14 tanks out of a total of 20

tanks that the 2nd Army received from Cairo to cover the losses.

129th Thunderbolt Group: The group, led by Colonel Ali Heikal, had been stationed since the beginning of the war

since the beginning of the war at Abu Sawir Airport (part of the Second Army's reserves) and on October 16

On October 16, after the Second Army Command received information that a number of Israeli tanks had infiltrated

west of the canal, and based on the mission received by the group commander, the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion (except for

company) was sent to a staging area in Ain Ghossein (on the Sweet Teraa, about 12 km south of Nafisha).

Nafisha) - the mission assigned to the battalion commander by Colonel A.H. Ali Heikal was to advance south

in the direction of Dafraswar and Abu Sultan to destroy seven Israeli tanks that had managed to infiltrate to the west bank of the canal

West Bank of the Canal

According to the mission, on the afternoon of October 16, a thunderbolt company advanced from Ain Ghossein on the

when it approached the northern side of the Dufreswar airfield.

of the Dufreswar airfield, it was surprised by strong resistance from Israeli paratroopers who were hidden in the airfield.

The clash continued throughout the night. Due to the company's inability to advance and its dire need for ammunition

ammunition, it was ordered by the group's command on the morning of October 17 to withdraw to Sarabioum

where it took up a defensive position that was reinforced by another thunderbolt platoon sent by the group commander.

The other company of the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion had advanced from Ain Ghosse in on the tracks

west of the Sweet Taraa in the direction of the Abu Sultan camps and the railroad station to reach the northern shore of Bitter Lake, south of the A platoon was able to infiltrate the northern shore of Bitter Lake, south of Deverswar.

The company was discovered by the enemy on the morning of October 17 Israeli tanks attacked the company from their positions southwest of Al Dafraswar Airport.

Despite the company's heavy losses, especially officers, it managed to destroy 5391

Israeli tanks and tracked vehicles, although the company received an order from the group's command

to withdraw to the Abu Sultan camps, the company was unable to do so due to the intensity of the enemy's fire

and was forced to cling to its positions, which prompted the group commander to ask the Second Army's artillery to bombard the area.

The Second Army artillery shelled the entire area occupied by the enemy in Abu Sultan with shells, including the Egyptian thunderbolt company. Egyptian thunderbolts.

85th Parachute Battalion: The battalion was stationed within the units of the 182nd Parachute Brigade in the

The 182nd Parachute Brigade was ready with its equipment and devices and was fully prepared

to be airlifted and dropped in any area according to the instructions of the General Command. But after the awkwardness of the situation

on the west bank of the canal after the Israeli crossing to Dafraswar, the command decided to

to use the 182nd Parachute Brigade as a regular infantry brigade, which was undoubtedly

a great loss in terms of the loss of the parachute brigade's main advantage, in addition to the fact that it differs in terms of its training and armament training and armament than infantry brigades. At 2 p.m. on October 16, Lt. Col. Atef Monsef, commander of the 85th Parachute Battalion, received from Colonel Ismail Azmy, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade

Parachute Brigade received an order to move with vehicles to the Osman Ahmed Osman intersection, where it was decided to

to be placed under the command of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division. At 7:00 p.m., following the arrival of the

85th Parachute Battalion to the intersection area, Brigadier General A.H. Ahmed Abboud Al-Zumer, commander of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division

assigned the 85th Parachute Battalion to attack enemy tanks that had crossed to the

and destroy them, and then occupy and secure the Abu Sultan marina and the two strong points in the

Sultan and the two strong points of the Dufreswar airfield. The 85th Parachute Battalion was reinforced by an armored battalion

from the 23rd Armored Brigade. At first light on October 17, the 85th Battalion moved east to the intersection of the

The cooperation was organized between the battalion commander and Colonel Salah Taha

the General Staff of the 116th Mechanized Brigade, who was given command of the brigade following the martyrdom of its commander on October 16.

At 4:00 p.m. on October 17, the 85th Parachute Battalion began executing its mission
its mission by advancing on two axes:

The secondary axis was advanced by a parachute company supported by a tank company from the Mazraa Battalion (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade) towards Marsa Abu Sultan with the mission of destroying enemy forces and to capture and secure the Abu Sultan anchorage. When the parachute company, supported by a company
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tanks reached the stone bridge on the sweet Suez Canal, the force fell into an Israeli ambush
It was destroyed and most of its officers were martyred.

The main axis to which the 85th Parachute Battalion (except for a company) advanced, supported by the armored battalion except for a company (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade) under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Atef Monsef, from the intersection of the Makhkheda and Sarabioum junction in the direction of the Deverswar airfield (135 degrees angle) with the mission of destroying enemy forces and capturing the airfield
enemy forces, capture and secure the airfield, and occupy the two strong points of the airfield. The
The tank battalion (excluding a company) was separated from the 85th Parachute Battalion (excluding a company) due to the impossibility of
Tanks with dismounted paratroopers could not move because the terrain was unsuitable due to several
obstacles in the way. For this reason, the tank battalion moved east toward the canal
in order to advance south on the road parallel to the Suez Canal. The commander of the
of the 85th Parachute Battalion and the commander of the Tank Battalion on the method of cooperation between the two battalions when approaching
approaching the Dafraswar perimeter to conduct a joint attack on the enemy force at the airfield.

However, this operation was not successful, as the tank battalion was caught in an Israeli ambush
near the Sarabioum station, where it was destroyed. The 85th Parachute Battalion (Mada Company)
the operation alone and unaided. The tanks, due to the destruction of the armored battalion, met
a group of enemy tanks and armored vehicles that were stationed in the densely wooded area
surrounding the Dafraswar airfield. Although units of the 2nd Army's artillery supported the expedition
The 85th Nazlat Battalion (except for one company) suffered heavy losses. Some of the battalion's men were displaced and drowned in the Suez Canal. The battalion and its remaining personnel headed towards the intersection of the Makhkheda Road and the Abr Sultan Fajraoum link.
October 18, the intersection was the forward command center of the 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division. At
At 6:00 p.m. on October 018, the 85th Parachute Battalion was re-positioned at the Inthanas camps
to renew its combat efficiency.

23rd Armored Brigade: From the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, which was part of the
strategic reserve of the General Command. It was ordered to move from its Cairo

Cairo to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection to occupy the position occupied by the 116 Mechanized Infantry Brigade before it was pushed east. Based on the instructions of Brig. Gen. Farhat, the division commander, the 23rd Armored Brigade began moving on the Cairo-Ismailia-Sahzawi road.

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at around 2:00 p.m. on October 16 on tank tracks, and arrived at the intersection at around 9:00 p.m. on October 16, and was immediately placed under the command of the Second Army. On the morning of October 17, the Second Army commander ordered an armored battalion from the 23rd Armored Brigade to join the 85th Parachute Battalion in moving from the Othman intersection to the intersection of the Treaty Road to the Saraboum junction, from where the parachute battalion would attack enemy forces in the Dafraswar area with the help of the armored battalion.

The commander of the Second Army also ordered that the 23rd Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) be ready to counterattack the enemy forces in the directions of Al-Dafraswar and Marsa Abu Sultan, provided that the armored brigade should immediately send reconnaissance elements to the area through which it will move to prevent surprise. The commander of the armored brigade was informed that it would be placed under the command of the 233rd Infantry Division Mechanized .

The plan to liquidate al-Thafra west of the canal

On the morning of October 17, General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, called Brig. Gen. Ahmed Abboud al-Zumer, commander of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division, and informed him that on the instructions of the 23rd Army Commander that he had been assigned the task of eliminating the enemy force that had crossed to the west of the canal, and it was decided to place the units in the Second Army's sector south of the Ismailia Canal will be placed under his command. to move the advanced command center of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division from north of the canal to the south of the Ismailia Canal.

Due to a report received by the Second Army Command of an enemy force advancing south in the direction of Fayed, the Second Army Commander requested the Operations Staff at HQ-10 to assign the Third Army Command to send a patrol from the Palestinian Battalion to send a patrol from the Palestinian battalion guarding the shore of the Bitter Lake from the Second Army's border in the north to the end of the lake in the south, to deal with the enemy force. He also requested that the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade remain in defensive positions west of the intersection of the Treaty Road with the Abr Sultan link (north and south of the link) to prevent an enemy advance to the west or north.

As of 9 a.m. on October 17, Egyptian forces were unable to accomplish the tasks. The enemy continued to occupy the Dafraswar airfield, and the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion was unable to enter the airfield. The 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion was unable to enter it or reach Marsa Abu Sultan.

In addition to the enemy force stationed at Dufreswar and Marsa Abu Sultan, a small detachment of

a small detachment of its tanks attempted to infiltrate out of the Deverswar area on the Abu Sultan link and cross the

A second detachment headed to the Abu Sultan railroad station, while a third detachment

a third detachment headed to Camp Zakaria, located north of the station, and a fourth detachment tried to head north to Sarabium.

As of 2 p.m. on October 17, the Egyptian units had not yet

had not yet been able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them and the breach gap west of the canal had not been eliminated.

The operations staff of the General Headquarters issued 10 operational instructions to the Second Army Command

These included the following tasks:

1 Destroy individual enemy tanks that had infiltrated the West Bank.

2 To locate and destroy enemy tanks gathered in the areas of Dafraswar and Marsa Abu Sultan

west of the canal and then destroy them.

3- The 23rd Armored Brigade pushes a reconnaissance group towards the east in preparation for

a counterattack on the enemy forces in Al-Defreswar.

4 The shores of the Bitter Lakes are secured with beach mines.

5 The terraces on the west bank are being occupied to support the operations of the forces on the

East Bank .

At 3:00 p.m. on October 17, the commander of the Second Army issued instructions to

the commander of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division, who became responsible for all operations to clear the

of the Israeli bridgehead at Al-Defreswar west of the canal and assigned him the following tasks:

â 85th Parachute Battalion: The battalion (except for a company) will be jointly with the armored battalion except for

Company (from the 23rd Armored Brigade) and the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion (from the 129th Thunderbolt Group) carry out

the tasks previously assigned to these units, and counterattack enemy forces in the area between Marsa Abu Sultan in the south to Sarabium in the north.

The 23rd Armored Brigade (except for one battalion) is prepared to counterattack in the direction of Dafar Soar

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and immediately sends elements to reconnoiter enemy movements in the area from which it will be pushed

and his movement through it.

Once the enemy is eliminated in the Dafraswar area, the berm is secured and the terraces are occupied

and control of all secondary axes of advance towards the west, with a focus on securing the

the Dafraswar and Jebel Maryam areas.

Military engineers are laying beach mines in an area from south of Al-Dafraswar to Fayed and in the fishermen's gaps on the Bitter Lake.

At around 5:00 p.m. on October 17, General Headquarters Center 10

its decision to push the 23rd Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division at 6:30 a.m. on October 18

in the morning of October 18, to carry out the previously planned counterattack

on enemy forces

in the Dafraswar area west of the canal, provided that the attack is carried out as quickly as possible and without interruption while to avoid engaging any resistance and accepting losses from ambushes, and the brigade was assigned the task of destroying enemy forces in the Deverswar area, occupy the terraces to a distance of 5 km north of Deverswar

Using the terraces west of the canal to destroy Israeli forces on the east bank of the canal

and prevent any enemy forces from crossing westward. The decision was finally made to push the 23rd Brigade

to carry out the counterattack on the morning of October 18 to destroy the enemy forces at Dufreswar.

Tactical Mistakes in Al-Thafra

Despite the small size of the enemy forces that crossed to the west of the canal in the area of Al-Defreswar, which

which consisted of a parachute infantry brigade and 30 tanks, and despite being isolated for nearly 40 hours from their bases east of the canal

isolated from their bases east of the canal and without any additional reinforcements

General Chaim Bar-Lev's instructions to wait for the construction of fixed bridges across the canal, and despite the fact that the

the counterattack on the Israeli bridgehead involved Egyptian forces that were clearly superior to the enemy channels in terms of size and armaments, the operation to liquidate the

The Israeli breach failed because the way it was liquidated did not conform to sound tactical principles.

sound tactical principles. This is evident from the following:

1-The Maldonian units were pushed to attack the Israeli bridgehead by the method of attacking

The attack on the enemy forces was assigned to small sub-units.

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size and poorly armed, which led to the failure of all their attacks, as none of them were able

to create the shock power required to eliminate the enemy.

2-If the units that were present in the area south of the Ismailia Terrace had been assembled

The 23rd Armored Brigade, the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the 85th Battalion

Parachute Battalion - 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion, in a single coordinated attack on the Israeli bridgehead west of the canal.

west of the canal, there would have been a reasonable hope of success. As for dispersing them in the manner in which they were dispersed made each of them easy prey

in front of the enemy.

3- What was surprising was the detention of the 23rd Armored Brigade in the area of the intersection

(Othman Ahmed Othman) for about 36 hours without being assigned to any combat mission.

All its commander received was a series of repeated orders to prepare for the attack on

and instructed him to push his reconnaissance elements in an easterly direction to prevent surprise

surprise. It was undoubtedly a mistake to withdraw an armored battalion from this brigade's formation

brigade to move to the Sarabioum junction of the Treaty Road to cooperate with

the 85th Battalion

Parachute Battalion in an offensive operation against the enemy.

as it was the only armored force under the command of the Second Army west of the Canal

Canal, which could have created a shock force against the enemy force at Dafraswar.

4 When the 23rd Armored Brigade was finally ordered to attack at 6:30 a.m.

on October 18, after an unjustified delay, misfortune played a major role in the failure of the mission.

misfortune played a major role in thwarting its mission, as the Israeli pontoon ferry bridge

had been set up across the canal at Deverswar on the afternoon of October 17, and during the night of

During the night of October 17/18, General Abraham Adan (Bern) crossed the canal to the West Bank at the head of his division

The armored division's crossing ended at 4:00 a.m. on October 18, so

When the 23rd Armored Brigade (minus a battalion) attacked on the morning of October 18, it was not

a force of less than 30 tanks inside the Israeli bridgehead, as was the case on October 17, but rather an armored division consisting of two armored brigades with a combined strength of

200 tanks, in addition to the tank force that existed before the bridgehead was built.

His attack, as expected, was a complete failure.

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Israeli bridges across the canal

General Abraham Adan, commander of the 162nd Operations Group, had taken advantage of the preoccupation of the

units of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division) were engaged in heavy fighting on the night of October 16/17

October against the Israeli Parachute Brigade, commanded by Uzi Mathery, which had been brought in by helicopter from Ras Sidr

by helicopter from Ras Sidr on the Gulf of Suez to send a reconnaissance company on the Akavish road

to test the strength of the Malassian resistance on this road. At 3:30 a.m. on October 17

October 17, General Adan received a radio signal from the commander of the reconnaissance company that he had managed to cross the

Akavish road and his company arrived safely at the crossing yard in Dafraswar without encountering any resistance

Although there was an Egyptian force north of the road, its attention was focused on the fierce battle

against the paratroopers on the Tartour road and the fighting at the Chinese farm

(the village of Al-Jalaa). General Adan immediately ordered his deputy, Brigadier General David Tamari, to move on the

with the portions of the Mahdiyat Mouna B bridge on the Akavish road, while the was idle on the Tartar road, pending the outcome of the fighting on that road.

Brig. Gen. David Tamari, pushing some heavy bulldozers in front of his convoy, was able to remove the wreckage of

of destroyed and disabled tanks and vehicles that were obstructing movement, clearing the road.

As a result, the pontoon convoy advanced unimpeded on the Akavish road until it reached

to the Lakikan fortress (Tel Salam) on the shore of the Great Bitter Lake, and then continued

north on the Nahala Road along the lakeshore, and as dawn began to break parts of the ferry bridge slowly began to arrive at the crossing yard in

Dafraswar.

At around 6 a.m. on October 17, engineers from Sharon's division pushed the first pontoon ferry into the canal in preparation for pushing the rest of the ferryboats across the Suez Canal, which is It is about 180 meters wide in this area.

At 11:00 a.m., Brigadier General Jacky, Sharon's deputy general, arrived at the crossing, and all forces in the area were under his command. And before an hour 4:00 p.m. on October 17, the last ferry in the bridge's chain of ferries was connected, and the ferry bridge was ready for the arrival of General Adan's division, which at that time was engaged in reorganization in reorganization, and his tanks were reloading and replenishing ammunition Near the Kishuv position where General Adan had opened his command center the day before
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outpost, near which, on the morning of October 17, the Kishuv conference was held, attended by the Minister of Defense, the Chief of Staff, General Bar-Lev, and Defense Minister, Chief of Staff, General Bar-Lev, General Sharon, and General Adan.

Crossing the Bern Division to the West of the Canal

On the afternoon of October 16, the artillery of the Egyptian Second Army heavy fire in the general direction of the Israeli bridgehead, where the Israeli engineers had not yet had not yet managed to build a bridge across the Suez Canal. Just before sunset on October 16 October 16, Malassian MiG-17s launched a concentrated attack on the Israeli bridgehead forces A fierce air battle soon ensued between Egyptian and Israeli aircraft 1 over the canal, after which each side claimed to have destroyed 10 aircraft. And on On the morning of October 17, after engineers from General Sharon's division had begun laying the ferry from the crossing yard at Deverswar to the western shore of the canal. The Egyptians realized the seriousness of the Israeli operation, and the Second Army's artillery began The head of the bridge on both sides of the canal was heavily shelled, hitting the command center of Colonel Danny Matt, the commander of the parachute brigade that crossed The commander of the parachute brigade that crossed to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16 was directly hit and wounded His deputy and dozens of his men were evacuated to the east bank of the canal. Artillery and rocket-propelled grenades artillery and rocket fire poured down on the east bank of the canal, and the Israelis realized that that the Egyptian artillery had succeeded in locating the crossing area and the ferry bridge, and directed dozens of artillery batteries of all calibers and types. From the morning of October 17 October 17 until the end of the war, the Egyptian artillery shelling did not stop at all. Despite the intensity of the artillery fire, Israeli engineers continued to build the ferry bridge across the canal ferries across the canal, evacuating injured personnel to the rear and replacing destroyed ferries that had been destroyed. A number of bulldozers were removing the sand berm on the shore of the canal

and leveling the ground at the location of the bridge, and floating rafts and rubber boats were going back and forth between the two shores of the canal back and forth between the two shores of the canal, carrying personnel and equipment to help build Israel's first bridge at Deverswar across the Suez Canal.

During the construction of the ferry bridge, Israeli aircraft in large numbers carried out heavy raids on the division's right flank on the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division and the units of the 21st Armored Division north of Farriyat al-Jalaa

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and the main feeder to prevent any Egyptian units from interfering with the construction of the ferry bridge. Israeli.

Following his battle with the Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade, General Abraham Adan (Bern)

After the battle with the Egyptian 25th Armored Brigade, General Abraham Adan (Bern) had closed his armored units back to the Kishuv area to carry out the reorganization process. Before sunset

Bern heard General Sharon's voice on the communication network of his command tank

âWhere is Bern? Everything is ready to cross, why is Bern disrupting everything?

2 Despite General Bern's anger, he immediately contacted Gen.

Junin and informed him that he was resupplying his units with fuel and ammunition and that he would be using

to cross the bridge over the canal just after dark, and asked for spare parts for his troops still under Sharon's command.

operating under Sharon's command and still engaged in combat with Egyptian forces on the

Second Army's right flank and the Chinese farm. These forces consisted of an armored brigade

commanded by Colonel Gabi and an armored battalion from Colonel Nitka's brigade. General Adan's division until late on the evening of October 17.

At 9:00 p.m. on October 17, General Bern's division moved from the Kishuv area On the Akavish road, Bern and his forward command post were in the lead, followed by Colonel Nitka's brigade

Nitka, followed by Colonel Gabi's brigade, which was expected to be joined by Colonel Aryeh's brigade before the start of the crossing.

General Bern completed his divisional units.

At ten o'clock in the evening, the column of General Bern's division, with its lights restricted, arrived at the bridge that had been built across the canal between the two strong points of Fort Deverswar (the former Israeli

At this time General Adan (Bern) received) received a radio message from General Gonen informing him that the armored brigade under Colonel Aryeh had been withdrawn from under his command

to become the general reserve of the Southern Command, and it is clear from this pregnancy how keen the commander of the Israeli Southern Command is is keen to keep a general reserve under his direct command at all times just in case. The armored brigade under the command of Colonel Tuvia of Sharon's division, which

which had been temporarily placed under Berne's command during the operation to clear the Akavish and Zartor axes. was returned

to Sharon's command when Berne's division prepared to cross to the west of the canal, so General Berne's force was reduced to about

to only about 200 tanks and his division was reduced to 9,000 officers and soldiers.

officers and soldiers.

As soon as the ferry bridge was reached, the tanks rushed to cross the canal to Dhorb, led by General Bern's General Berne's tank, which shouted jubilantly on the radio, "I have crossed into Africa. I crossed to Africa" while one of his men took out a bottle of wine and drank a toast. In celebration, the bottle was passed from one man to another. Colonel Haim was the commander of the Sharon's armored brigade, which had already crossed at the head of 30 tanks from his brigade to the west of the on the morning of October 16 was waiting for the Bern Division on the western shore of the canal to lead them to the the area designated for the division's assembly at the Dafraswar airfield. When Gen. with his command tank on the western shore of the canal, Colonel Haim greeted him with the warmest of welcomes after he had been alone with his 30 tanks and the Parachute Brigade for about 40 hours without any additional troops. As Bern stood on the western shore watching his division cross, only two tanks had arrived after his only two tanks after his own, he realized to his dismay that the crossing had stopped, as the artillery from Second Army artillery units rained down in thick clouds on the ferry bridges and the sailing yards east and west of the canal in the heaviest bombardment since the beginning of the war. General Adan and his command group were forced to take shelter in holes and walls of buildings to avoid the fire. buildings to avoid the concentrated fire that was raining down on them.

The military engineers who rushed to the bridge from the beaches, some on foot and others in boats, discovered that on foot and in boats - to check on its safety - discovered that one of the Egyptian artillery shells had opened a hole in the bridge had opened a hole in the bridge, which meant that General Bern's division could not cross. The situation was critical: a long line of tanks and vehicles laden with supplies had gathered in the crossing area and on the roads leading to it tanks and vehicles loaded with supplies and ammunition, and the pontoon ferry convoy had not yet arrived had not yet arrived. It was still stuck on the Akavish road in the traffic jam that had swarmed on it.

On the advice of Brig. Gen. Jackie, Sharon's deputy in charge of building and securing bridges, Gen. General Bern ordered to continue transporting tanks to the western shore on ferries until the bridge could be repaired, which was expected to take a few hours. As the ferries moved from east to west of the canal carrying the tanks, one of the ferries in the middle of the canal received a direct hit from Egyptian artillery and the two tanks on board sank. Only three crew members were able to jump out and survive, while the rest the rest drowned.

While General Berne was alarmed by the dire circumstances of his division's

crossing

facing his division's crossing. A clever idea occurred to one of the engineering officers that the bridge could be

to repair the bridge quickly, he ordered a Patton tank from Col.

Haim to climb onto the bridge, and at the place where the gap had opened, the tank stopped and stretched

over the ferry bridge the collapsible metal bridge attached to the tank, thus bridging the gap

The bridge was ready for General Bern's tanks to cross. By 4:00 a.m. on October 18

on October 18, all Bern's divisional units had reached the bridgehead west of the

which ran between the Suez Canal and the sweet water tributary parallel to the canal (the Suez Tributary).

Thus, on the morning of October 18, the enemy had two armored divisions west of the canal.

commanded by General Sharon and consisting of the Parachute Brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Mat and the Medea Brigade

commanded by Haim (after the rest of the brigade's tanks had crossed to the west and joined the

that crossed on the morning of October 16) The other division was commanded by General Abraham

Adan (Bern) and consisted of two armored brigades commanded by Colonels Nitka and Gabi.

Dayan's visit to Sharon's command west of the canal

On the afternoon of October 17, following the end of the Kishuv conference held at the Forward Command Center

General Bern left the conference with his command group and headed south to lead the battle against the 25th Armored Brigade

25th Armored Brigade. General Sharon took Defense Minister Moshe Dayan with him to the crossing site, where they crossed the Suez Canal together

crossed the Suez Canal together on a pontoon ferry and headed to General Sharon's advanced command headquarters on the bank

General Sharon's advanced headquarters on the west bank of the canal.

Moshe Dayan described this visit, which was his first visit to the West Bank of the canal

in his memoirs: "Eric (Sharon's nickname) asked me after we crossed the canal to climb into the back of an armored vehicle

to climb into the back of an armored vehicle, but I preferred to go part of the way on foot

on foot. The paratroopers were lying on the dirt slopes, laden with equipment They were exhausted and their eyes were half-closed. To the far west, deep in

enemy territory stood several tanks, Eric told me that he had left seven tanks with Col.

Danny Matt (commander of the Parachute Brigade) to defend the bridgehead while the rest of the

more than twenty tanks on the front line. On the previous day (October 16)

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During operations on the West Bank, they disabled 20 Egyptian tanks and destroyed two batteries of

SAM air defense missiles.

During a visit to Sharon's headquarters, Moshe Dayan proposed a new plan to widen the breach

penetration more effective in his view than the large-scale deep operations planned to encircle the Egyptian forces.

to encircle the Egyptian forces. Dayan stated that the best option was to fold the right flank of the Egyptian Second Army

east of the canal and by pushing northward in two parallel operations east and

west of the canal

With the mutual aid of Israeli forces on both shores, each force on its own shore could

on one shore could pose a serious threat to the flank of the Egyptian forces on the other shore of the canal

leading to the cleansing of the two shores and widening the breach gap.

On this very point, a sharp and violent debate erupted between General Sharon and General Gonen

Sharon demanded that his division's Amnon Armored Brigade cross to the west bank of the canal, while

while General Gonen insisted that it should remain on the east bank and be pushed

north toward Taliyah (in the middle of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead), in order to widen the breach

penetration. Sharon turned to General Chaim Bar-Lev (personal representative of the Chief of the General Staff, Southern Command)

Chief of General Staff, Southern Command) He responded to his request and ordered Amnon's brigade to cross into the breach.

Sharon and most of his division were already on the west bank of the canal after Amnon's crossing.

he went back to Bar-Lev to propose a change of plan, and instead of his division moving

south and west of Bern's division along the canal, Sharon's proposal was to stay in position

to enlarge the bridgehead, with the aim of then pushing north toward Ismailia, and Bar-Lev agreed.

Bar-Lev agreed, and summoned Gonen to inform him of the change in plan.

instead of being responsible for securing the bridgehead after taking over from Sharon's division as

the plan was to push south to the west of Bern's division toward Suez.

Sharon's duty was to keep his division at Ras al-Kobri in its vacant position to push northward to Ismailia

northward to Ismailia. Gonen immediately agreed to this modification of the plan.

explaining to Bar-Lev that life would be much easier for him if he commanded the divisions of Bern

and Magen divisions instead of Sharon's, since he would be dealing with

commanders he felt were cooperating with him, and their

their reservations, if any, would not be personalized. Mr. Gonen welcomed the Israel's push southward in a fan shape: Bern to the left, Magen to the right,

and from

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behind him, thus increasing the depth of the advance and creating a solid base of resistance in the event of a stalemate on the front
stumbles on the front.

Before the Amnon Brigade crossed to the west bank of the canal, General Sharon ordered it to attack the Chinese farm

(Al-Jalaa village) from the rear. The 16th Infantry Brigade and units of the 21st Armored Division

had been exhausted in the bitter and brutal battles inside the village, so it was not long before the Chinese farm fell.

The Chinese farm soon fell into the hands of the Israeli forces. In front of the eyes of

1 to the Israelis, a picture of a highly organized defensive area that included many abandoned sites for weapons, guns and Sajer (Malotka) anti-tank missiles that were heavily deployed in the area.

that were heavily scattered throughout the area. After the fall of the Chinese farm, Amnon continued

continued to push to extend the bridgehead east of the canal to a distance of about 5 kilometers to the north.

Dayan's visit to the Chinese Farm

In the afternoon, Moshe Dayan arrived on the battlefield accompanied by General Sharon.

In his memoirs, Moshe Dayan described his visit to the Chinese farm: "I could not hide my feelings when I saw it.

I couldn't hide my feelings when I saw it, it was a pile of smashed and burned military vehicles

were scattered everywhere, some still smoking, and there were Israeli tanks and Egyptian tanks not far away.

Israeli and Egyptian tanks were only a few yards apart, and there were

There were also abandoned supply trucks that were surprised by air strikes and artillery shells, and among the wrecked weapons and equipment

weapons and equipment destroyed were SAM-2 and SAM-3 batteries, and in the center of each battery was a stationary platform

and around it were vehicles loaded with missiles, some intact and some destroyed.

As we approached each tank, I hoped that I would not find the Israeli army's mark on it.

As we approached each tank, I hoped that I would not find an IDF marking on it. Although the scenes of war

I had never seen anything like it, not in nature, not in paintings, and not in movies.

Not in nature, not in paintings, not in the most horrible war movies. In front of us was a field

A vast field of carnage stretched as far as the eye could reach. Tanks, vehicles tanks, armored vehicles, cannons, and ammunition transport vehicles that were

broken, overturned, and torn apart were horrific evidence of the terrible battle that took place here."

When Amnon saw how moved and shaken Moshe Dayan was by the aftermath of this brutal battle

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he said to him, "Look at this valley of death." 40 In astonishment, Dayan muttered: "What are your men doing here?"

"What are your men doing here?" 4.

Erecting the prefabricated bridge

In the early morning of October 18, General Sharon ordered his deputy, Brigadier General Jackie, who

who was now in charge of erecting all bridges across the canal, to bring the prefabricated bridge

bridge forward. This bridge had been out of commission since the first night of the crossing (the night of October 15/16) after some of its parts were

planted on the Tartour Road, about 18 km east of the canal. about 18 kilometers east of the canal, and it was not possible to drag it

towards the crossing yard in Dafraswar

until after the Israeli forces had opened the Tartour Road, the last part of which penetrated the positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade (flank)

the positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the 16th Infantry Brigade). Given the success of General Adan's forces

succeeded in accomplishing the task assigned to them prior to their crossing into the West Bank, namely the opening of the

Akavish and Tartar roads and to join General Sharon's forces in capturing the Chinese farm

(the village of Al-Jalaa), so there was an opportunity to bring the broken bridge on the Tartour road

and quickly build it across the canal at Dafraswar next to the ferry bridge Pontoon, so that there would be two fixed bridges over the canal according to

the original plan (Braveheart).

It was dangerous to cross an armored corps (Sharon's and Adan's divisions) to the West Bank while relying on

with only one bridge connecting the two banks of the canal.

On Sharon's instructions, the prefabricated bridge, about 180 meters long, began moving west toward the crossing yard on the morning of October 18 on the Tartour road.

It was pulled by a group of 12 Israeli tanks, to which the bridge was connected by thick wire ropes

It was slowly gliding across the sand on top of rotating cylinders attached to it from below

from below. The traction ropes connecting the tanks to the bridge were not easy, and the convoy had to stop to repair them, in addition to the intense beating from the Malassian artillery

Malassian artillery firing from the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division east of the canal, which hindered the convoy's progress.

The convoy's progress was hindered, causing many losses of personnel and equipment.

Three heavy tractors were leading the convoy to remove any obstacles, including tank wreckage

and damaged or broken vehicles to push them out of the way. At the head of the bridge convoy was a

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jeep with Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Tan, the chief military engineer who had been assigned by General Jackie

with the task of bringing the bridge to the canal and erecting it in its designated location, and next to him sat his assistant

Yitzhak Ben-Dov.

Since the Tartar Road was littered with mines, the task of clearing it was assigned to a group of

of military engineers and explosives experts, and it was not an easy task, as the convoy was moving under continuous artillery fire

moving under continuous bombardment from Egyptian artillery, which made the demolition experts, in order to prevent disruption

risked lifting the mines without taking the necessary precautions to secure them so that they could place them on both sides of the road while they were alive.

on both sides of the road while they were alive, that is, without removing the detonator to neutralize them.

The Israeli tanks and engineers crossed the last section of the road that through the former 16th Infantry Brigade positions before the brigade units were

forced to evacuate them

and withdrew northward under enemy pressure. The aftermath of the fierce battles between the

The effects of the fierce battles between the two sides were clearly visible, as in every part of the road the bodies of Egyptians and Israelis

Egyptian and Israeli corpses were lying on the ground side by side, and the wreckage of tanks, vehicles

The wreckage of Egyptian and Israeli tanks, vehicles, and weapons made the area look like a valley of death or a terrible graveyard of war.

Although General Adan's forces were able to open the road and dislodge the Egyptian resistance

Egyptian resistance, Brigadier General Jackie assigned a unit of tanks and anti-aircraft weapons

to escort the bridge and secure it during the move. The crews of these tanks suffered

because they had to move slowly at the rate at which the bridge was being towed, and this made them

an easy target for Egyptian ambushes by tank crews.

The bridge was painstakingly brought to the intersection of the Tartour Road and the Lexikon Road (Road No. 1, which runs parallel to the canal, and upon reaching the intersection, the convoy was subjected to a fierce air raid by a group of Egyptian MiGs, forcing it to stop and attempt to spread out to protect itself from the attack. The raid cost the Israelis dearly. During the raid Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Tan, who was considered one of the most skilled Israeli military experts in the construction of bridges, was killed. He was one of Israel's most skilled military experts in bridge construction and was well versed in the conditions of the crossing area. He knew every inch of it. After his death, Brigadier General Jackie realized the extent of his predicament. Any wrong move could lead to the failure of the entire bridge. He did not

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He had no choice but to check for himself the durability of the soil from the intersection to the Brig. Gen. Jackie rode in the tank of the tank battalion commander who was protecting the convoy accompanied by a half-track armored vehicle, and moved from the intersection to the crossing area, examining the firmness of the ground so that the heavy bridge could follow its route without sinking into the sand. The experiment finally succeeded and the prefabricated bridge arrived at the crossing yard before last light on October 18. At midnight, the military engineers finished completed the bridge between the two shores of the canal in a position about 200 meters just north of the pontoon ferry bridge. With the bridge open for crossing, Israel now has two fixed bridges over the Suez Canal. On October 19, a third ferry bridge was erected north of the second bridge. The three bridges were erected in a longitudinal space of about 500 meters from the canal in order to concentrate its defense against both Egyptian aircraft raids and underwater infiltration by frogmen. The crossing yard in Dafraswar which became crowded with personnel, bridge equipment, tanks and vehicles, was managed and operated by Brig. Gen. Jackie's force, made up of battalions of military engineers to build, repair, and maintain bridges, bridges, repair and maintenance, anti-aircraft units to protect them from air raids, and medical centers to evacuate the wounded and medical centers to evacuate the wounded and injured coming from west of the canal to field hospitals.

The plan to clear the Ikhtarah Gap east and west of the canal. When the Egyptian leadership realized the reality of the major operation taking place on both sides of the Suez Canal and was able to monitor the area of the bridges over the canal as well as the crossing yard on the east bank and the landing field at Dafraswar on the west bank, all of these positions came under concentrated fire from Second Army artillery units east and west of the canal. The shelling was so effective that 41 officers and soldiers of Jackie's force were killed in just one night, and the number of those killed at the end of the phase in the crossing area alone, according to official Israeli statistics

more than 100 dead, in addition to hundreds of wounded and injured. The Egyptian plan to liquidate the Israeli penetration gap east and west of the canal on October 18 and west of it on October 18, the 23rd Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division) was to launch a counterattack counterattack on the enemy forces inside the Israeli bridgehead in the Dafraswar area.

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West of the Suez Canal, supported by the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the 182nd Parachute Brigade. At the same time, units from the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions are counterattacking the village of Al Jalaa (Chinese Farm) and the strong point at Dafraswar east of the canal to try to block the road leading to the to the Israeli crossing yard and restore the situation at the head of the bridgehead of the 16 Infantry Division (Second Army's right flank).

On the night of October 17/18, Major General Tayseer Al Akkad, the commander of the unified bridgehead which included the 16th Infantry Division under the command of Brigadier General Abd Rab al-Nabi Hafez and the 12th Armored Division under the command of Brigadier General Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi organized the town for the counterattack, in accordance with the decision of General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army. Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, at the advanced command center of the 21st Armored Division In the presence of the commanders of the infantry and armored divisions, as well as the commanders of the units that will participate in the counterattack.

The general attitude of the enemy and our forces was as follows:

Enemy: Defending about one kilometer south of the main feeder line, with an estimated strength of more than 50 tanks supported by mechanized infantry and two anti-tank battalions, in addition to several strong points in the villages of strong points in the villages of Al-Jalaa and Al-Defreswar area east of the canal.

Our troops: The number of tanks of the 21st Armored Division remaining after the battles we had fought since the development of the offensive on October 14, no more than 40 tanks. Therefore, orders were given to move a battalion of the 24th Armored Brigade from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and attached to the 2nd Infantry Division since the beginning of the war) to join the counterattack forces from the brigade's position in Ismailia East Its strength was 31 tanks, in addition to the 16th Infantry Division's tank battalion, which had a strength of about 2 tanks, making the total number of tanks assigned to the counterattack about 80 tanks.

The attack was scheduled to begin at 12:00 p.m. on October 18, due to the lack of the air effort that would be allocated to support the operation before that time

An hour before X (the start of the attack), the unified bridgehead was subjected to continuous attacks from enemy aircraft and heavy shelling from 155mm and 175mm long-range

artillery, which

This disrupted the offensive preparations of our forces and caused many losses to the extent that

that the commander of the unified bridgehead was forced to delay the hour of Q.

Among those who were wounded were

among those wounded was the commander of the 16th Infantry Division, who was hit by shrapnel in

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thigh from an artillery round while in the division's forward observation post east of

He was evacuated to Maadi Hospital, and Brigadier General Anwar Habab Al-Raman, Chief of Staff of the 16th Infantry Division, took command of the division.

Chief of Staff of the 16th Infantry Division.

The counterattack plan called for a mechanized infantry battalion from the 18th Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade to attack the village of Al-Jalaa, destroy the enemy there and take defensive positions south of it while ready to repel any enemy counterattacks.

The 1st Armored Brigade was to attack the enemy west of Al Jalaa village in the contiguous sector between

between Transverse Road No. 1 and the Suez Canal, destroying the enemy in front of it and developing the attack

relying on mechanized infantry to reach and capture the northern strong point of Al-Dafraswar

and capture it. The hope was that the Egyptian forces that would counterattack west of the canal would be successful

west of the canal, to destroy the enemy and seize the mastabas on the berm along the western shore of the canal, which in this case could help the counterattack forces east of the canal and threaten the enemy's flank east of the canal.

east of the canal and directly threaten the enemy's flank east of the canal.

At the start of the attack, the mechanized infantry battalion of the 18th

Mechanized Infantry Brigade

assigned to attack the village of Al-Jalaa was unable to carry out its mission due to the severity of the air strikes concentrated on it.

was pushed back and joined the rest of the brigade's units to defend the line extending north of the village of

Al-Jalaa

As the 1st Armored Brigade advanced to carry out its mission, it clashed with a large number of enemy tanks

enemy tanks that attacked it from the east and south and managed to destroy 13 Israeli tanks, but

His situation worsened as some enemy tanks on the western shore of the canal fired their artillery at him across the canal.

across the canal and threatened his right flank. As a result of the intensity of Haddo's fire, he was forced to

to retreat to the rear with only 9 tanks remaining.

Due to the intense enemy pressure on the right flank of the unified bridgehead and the lack of tanks, the Second Army commander ordered the brigade commander

the Second Army commander ordered the commander of the 24th Armored Brigade, which was stationed in

Ismailia East, which had previously sent a battalion of its units to join the counterattack force

to move the rest of the brigade to the area northwest of Taliyah.

the 24th Armored Brigade was subjected to intense enemy air and artillery fire, but was able to

to reach the head of the unified bridge, and participated with the rest of the 21st Armored Division in repelling enemy tanks that attacked the flank. enemy tanks that strongly attacked the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division. In spite of the bravery, stubbornness, and bravery and stubbornness and the enemy suffered heavy losses, the enemy forces continued to advance northward from the village of Al-Jalaa advance northward from the village of al-Jalaa towards the coastal pass north of the main feeder. The line occupied by the retreating units of the 21st Armored Division is roughly aligned with Sarabioum on the on the west bank of the canal.

The task of the forces that had been assigned to the counterattack was thus shifted to another task to repel the enemy's penetration. Much of this shift in the plan was due to the failure of the The forces that had counterattacked in the morning on the enemy bridgehead west of the canal failed in their mission and thus the enemy retained control of the former Egyptian mastabas west of the canal from from the Dafraswar Mastaba in the south to the Pumping Mastaba in the north, leaving the 21st Armored Division's front flank Armored Division under direct threat

On the afternoon of October 18, GHQ 10 informed Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi commander of the 21st Armored Division, that aerial photographs taken of the area east of Deverswar and south of the of the main feeder showed that units of the 21st Armored Division had destroyed a large number of enemy tanks enemy tanks. This radio signal helped boost the division's morale after after suffering heavy losses in lives, weapons, and equipment. At around 4:00 p.m.

Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, sent a lengthy position report in to the Generalissimo General Ahmed Ismail, the first section of which was an explanation of the situation west of the canal. an explanation of the situation west of the canal. The second and final section was an explanation of the situation East of the canal . The most important part of the section on the east of the canal was that the enemy had penetrated as far as the pumping (the main feeder) and increased its penetration to the coastal approach, but despite this, the situation The divisions fought in the morning (the 21st Armored Division and the 16th Infantry Division) and destroyed some enemy tanks enemy tanks. The report states that the Egyptian air strikes had good effects. Regarding

The 24th Armored Brigade (stationed in the Ismailia East area on the east bank of the canal) advanced from top to bottom. It was hit by Israeli aircraft. The report stated that the two of the 16th Infantry Division (after the 16th Brigade evacuated its positions under enemy pressure) were holding their positions inside Ras al-Kobri, and General Abdel Moneim requested in his report the return of

Major General Tayseer al-Akkad to the advanced command center of the Second Army

in Ismailia, and that Brig. Gen. H. Ibrahim al-Orabi to take command of the unified Ras al-Kobri. The Second Army Commander explained in a briefing his plan for the next day, October 19, stating that he would ask Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, after to organize the situation east of the canal and to stabilize and eliminate the enemy at first light the next day. He will be assisted from the west of the canal by units of the 182nd Brigade Parachute Brigade after occupying the terraces. In the conclusion of his report, Major General Abdel Moneim explained that the artillery of the Second Army's artillery continues to hit the Israeli bridgehead with nuisance fire on a regular basis. He also asked the Commander-in-Chief to supply him with anti-tank guided missiles (Malotka) as they are needed to form tank-hunting crews.

Ras al-Kobri Unified Command

At 5 p.m. on October 18, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly arrived at the command center of the Second Army in Ismailia after being ordered by President Sadat that afternoon to move immediately from the 10th General Command Center in Cairo to the Second Army, in order to to boost morale and do what he could to prevent the situation from deteriorating. As soon as Lt. Gen. Shazly immediately informed General Abdel Moneim Khalil that any decisions or orders must come from him personally must come from him personally. He began to study the situation and listened to urgent reports from the army commander Army Commander, commanders and heads of branches of the command and recorded the combat efficiency of the formations. And the first was the command crisis at the head of the unified bridgehead east of the canal which included the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions, which erupted as soon as the decision was made General Tayseer al-Akkad, who had been in command of the unified bridgehead, returned to the command of the Second Army west of the canal. Second Army west of the canal. The reason for the crisis was due to the issue of seniority, a thorny and highly sensitive topic for military personnel, as none of them, unlike in the civilian world, can accept being headed by someone more senior than them accept being headed by someone more junior in rank or in seniority in the case of equal ranks. In his radio message to the commander-in-chief at 4 p.m. on October 18, General Abdel Moneim Khalil at 4:00 p.m. on October 18, he requested that Major General Tayseer al-Akkad return to the headquarters of the Second Army and that Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi would assume command of the unified bridgehead. The situation was

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of the forces inside the bridgehead prompted the Second Army commander to make this decision. The bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division was reduced on the one hand after the evacuation of the 16th Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the of the 16th Infantry Division) completely evacuated its positions and retreated to the north, where it was joined by the 18th Infantry Brigade Mechanized Brigade (from the 21st Armored Division) in its defensive positions north of the village of Al-Jalaa. On the other hand On the other hand, the 21st Armored Division, despite its heavy losses, became responsible for

repelling enemy attacks from its positions in Al Jalaa village and preventing it from expanding its penetration gap to the north. In addition, it had the responsibility of protecting the division's right flank. Protecting the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division after the evacuation of the 16 Infantry Brigade evacuated its positions.

However, Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi's command of the unified bridgehead created a crisis that had to be resolved. Brigadier General Al-Orabi was more senior than Brigadier General Anwar Hab al-Raman, the chief of staff of the 16th Infantry Division. Chief of Staff of the 16th Infantry Division, who took over as acting commander after its commander was wounded on October 18 and evacuated to Cairo and evacuated to Cairo, as well as Brigadier General A.H. Bakir Mohammed Bakir, assistant commander of the 16th Infantry Division. To resolve this crisis, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly had to personally intervene to resolve the dispute between the two divisional commanders between the two divisional commanders, sending a radio signal to Brig. Gen. to let Orabi take command and put himself under his command because it was now a matter of Egypt's honor in Egypt. He also sent a radio signal to Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi in which he told him: "You must, Orabi, you should take command of the head of the bridge regardless of the seniority of Love Pomegranate or Bakir. And I told Love Pomegranate that you will take command."

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CHAPTER VII 6

Major Israeli operations west of the Suez Canal

The plan developed by the Egyptian General Command in conjunction with the Second Army Command to liquidate the Israeli combustion gap on October 18 was generally as follows:

On the east bank of the canal: Units of the 16th Infantry Division and the 12th Armored Division counterattack the village of Al-Jalaa (Chinese farm) and the strong point of Al-Defreswar (the former Israeli fortress the former Israeli fortress Mitzmaid) to try to close the road leading to the Israeli crossing yard and to restore the situation at the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division (the right wing of the of the Second Army).

On the west bank of the canal: The 23rd Armored Brigade (excluding a battalion) of the 3rd Infantry Division Mechanized Division (GHQ's strategic reserve) counterattacks the enemy in the area of Al-Defreswar at first light on October 18 with the mission of destroying it and occupying the terraces to a distance of 5 km north of Al-Defreswar north of Al-Dafraswar. The 161st Mechanized Infantry Brigade is tasked with securing the 23rd Armored Brigade as it and prevent the enemy from advancing westward, while the 182nd Parachute Brigade will seize the terraces west of the canal, from north to south, from Jebel Maryam in the north to The captured terraces are to be used to destroy Israeli forces on the eastern bank of the canal. Israeli forces on the eastern bank of the canal and help the units of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions in achieving the tasks assigned to them, as well as preventing the enemy from

crossing to the west bank of the canal.

The Battle of the 23rd Armored Brigade

The instructions for the counterattack were to secure the advance of the 23rd Armored Brigade with a strike

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aircraft for 10 minutes followed by artillery fire from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division's artillery from 6:20 a.m. to 6:30 a.m. when the brigade's units arrived at the line of defense to engage.

Due to heavy fog at the scheduled start time of the attack, the Second Army commander was forced to was forced to delay the start of the attack from 6:30 a.m. to 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.

instead of 6:30 a.m., so that the air force could prepare for the attack according to the plan

. Major General Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamsi, head of the operations staff at Center 011, called General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army. called General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, an hour earlier and informed him that the air force was ready to strike to strike, but the fog was preventing it from coming out, so the artillery should start firing before the attack

and the airplane would come out when the fog lifted. At 7:00 a.m., after a 10-minute artillery preparation, the 23rd Armored Brigade units (except for one battalion) crossed the in a single formation consisting of a tank battalion on the right and a tank battalion (except for company) in the center and the mechanized infantry battalion on the left, with the reserve consisting of a company of tanks from the tank battalion in the center. It should be noted that the armored brigade, in addition to had a tank battalion withdrawn on October 17, its artillery battalion was also withdrawn, and its attack proceeded without its support.

The 23rd Armored Brigade's battle formation passed through the defensive positions of the 116th Infantry Brigade. the defensive positions of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was occupying a key position west of the with a reinforced mechanized infantry battalion (except for a company) and a tank platoon.

and a tank platoon. In the same area was the advanced command center of the 116th Infantry Brigade.

A little further west, Brig. Gen. Ahmad Aboud al-Zamar chose the advanced command post of the 23rd Division

Mechanized Infantry Division after it was moved on October 17 from its original location north of the Ismailia Canal to to the new location, after the General Command assigned him the task of clearing the breach west of the canal and placing all forces south of the Ismailia Canal. and placing all forces south of the Ismailia Canal under his command. Seven kilometers north of the the intersection of the Treaty and Abu Sultan roads was the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Saraboum Link

The 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade held a defensive position with a mechanized infantry company and a platoon of tanks west of the intersection to protect the left flank of the 32nd Armored Brigade as it counterattacked on the D Fareswar area.

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By the time the 23rd Armored Brigade had completed the opening in combat formation in preparation for the counterattack, General Abraham Adan (Bern), having crossed the Suez Canal with his armored division at 4:00 a.m., advanced at first light on October 18 with his two brigades armored brigades led by Colonels Nitka and Gabi from the Ebrar area in Dafraswar in a westerly direction until he reached the shore of the Sweet Teraa parallel to the Suez Canal (Sweet Teraa). When some Israeli tank detachments attempted to advance westward across the Sweet Water to conduct reconnaissance, they came under anti-tank rocket fire from Egyptian ambushes. General Adan ordered the withdrawal of the advancing Israeli detachments and for Israeli artillery to deliver concentrated fire on the Egyptian positions in front of him in preparation for his attack with the two armored brigades that had opened up in combat formation: Netka Brigade on the right and Gabi on the left.

Israeli artillery fire poured in from 155mm and 175mm long-range batteries. and 175mm long-range batteries from their positions on the eastern bank of the canal, rained down on the 23rd Armored Brigade's battle formation. Armored Brigade, positions of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade, advanced command posts and artillery observation points. Egyptian artillery, causing serious damage to all of them. During the Israeli artillery bombardment, Israeli aircraft Israeli aircraft carried out violent attacks on the sub-units of the 23rd Armored Brigade, which confused the brigade's the brigade's combat formation, and made the Second Army commander ask the Operations Center 10 to send out a sortie to provide air protection for the Egyptian armored brigade.

While the 23rd Armored Brigade was advancing east of the Treaty Road, elements of the of the Israeli Armored Brigade under the command of Colonel Gabi had taken some of the points they had occupied west of the of the Suez Canal as fortified and carefully concealed positions for the anti-tank curtains that consisted of 5811,10% guided anti-tank missiles and tanks that had taken cover inside the bunkers from the down position of the Luftwaffe.

Since the area east of the treaty road was completely devoid of any cover or for concealment, and given the obvious lack of reconnaissance at all levels, the The 23rd Armored Brigade launched its counterattack without any valid information about the enemy. Upon entering the battlefield, the 23rd Armored Brigade's sub-units were surprised by of tank artillery fire and rocket-propelled grenades directed from Israeli canopies.

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from the front and flanks. The brigade's reserves were unable to intervene in the battle due to its weak formation. Second Army artillery units tried to salvage the situation by creating a smoke screen in front of the brigade's fighting formation, and by bombarding enemy positions with waterfalls of fire enemy positions, but this could not change the course of the battle.

In the report sent by the commander of the Second Army to the General Headquarters in a
At 4:30 p.m. on October 18, Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil recorded that the 23rd Armored Brigade commanded by Colonel A.H. Hassan Abdel Hamid fought bravely and destroyed tanks, and that the brigade commander was wounded in the battle. At the end of his report, he stated that the brigade that only about 8 tanks remained, and that after the battle they joined the force under the command of Brigadier General Ahmed Abboud al-Zamar at the intersection of the Treaty and Abu Sultan roads, and that a special group from the headquarters of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division is returning the tanks that were displaced westward from the 32nd Armored Brigade to regroup at the intersection where Brig. of Brigadier General Al-Zamar.

The Israeli armored brigade under the command of Field Marshal Nitka, on the right of General Adan's General Adan's division had advanced westward after artillery preparations in the morning on the Sarabioum. Upon discovering the poorly fortified Egyptian defense position west of the intersection of the of the Treaty Road-Sarabioum junction (the secondary position of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade), Israeli tanks Israeli tanks stormed the position and dispersed the reinforced mechanized infantry company occupying it. (The Israelis called the hill near the junction by the code name 1RM). Col. Nitka then turned his tanks south along the axis of the treaty roads, and as he approached the he approached the intersection of the Abu Sultan Treaty Roads where the main defensive position which was occupied by a reinforced mechanized infantry battalion (except for a company) of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. (The Israelis called the triangle point northwest of the intersection Code 25. His tanks came under strong concentrated fire, and he veered off in the direction of Dhubar avoiding an attack on the Egyptian position. By the afternoon of October 18, the 116th Infantry Brigade organizationally consisted of one mechanized infantry battalion (excluding a company), occupying defensive position west of the intersection and adjacent to the advanced command post of the 161st Infantry Brigade as well as the advanced command center of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division, which had
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Brigadier General A.H. Ahmed Abboud al-Zumer, the division commander. In addition, in the area of the intersection there were the remains of the 23rd Armored Brigade's tanks, which, after the battle ended on the afternoon of 18 lost its combat capability, thus losing the strategic reserve of the General Command (3rd Mechanized Infantry Division Mechanized) The armored component within the division's formation

Operations of the 182nd Parachute Brigade

At midnight on October 17/18, Colonel Ismail Azmy, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, arrived Parachute Brigade at the head of the 81st and 98th Parachute Battalions arrived in Nafisha. At 15 minutes on the morning of October 18, General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, sent a

lengthy radio message to
Colonel Ismail Azmi explaining the enemy situation east and west of the canal
and the situation in Twatna.
in which he specified the tasks assigned to the 182nd Parachute Brigade.
Regarding the situation west of the canal, the following:

The enemy managed to penetrate and occupy the strong point in Dafraswar and has
elements in the strong point in
(The strong point was the Egyptian terraces on the earthen berm
adjacent to the canal) It is possible that the enemy will advance north along
the canal road to occupy the terraces
of our forces to strike at our forces in the east, as well as moving north on
the road parallel to the
towards Sarabium and Ain Ghossein. Or moving south in the direction of the
Kadesh camp
and the Abu Sultan area.

The exact location of our forces in the Dafraswar area is not known, but it may
be
Northwest of Dufreswar Airport, the 85th Parachute Battalion (except for a
company). Our forces in the intersection area
Treaty and Abu Sultan roads: The command and units of the 116th Mechanized
Infantry Brigade and an
of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division under the command of Brigadier General
Al-Zamar. At the intersection of the Treaty Roads
Sarabium, a tank battalion from the 23rd Armored Brigade.

The mission of the Parachute Brigade:

1 Secure the maslabs on the west bank of the canal from north to south (Jebel
Maryam-
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Hanideq Tosun Sarabium and Dafreswar pumping) and prevent the enemy from
occupying them
and support our forces on the eastern bank of the canal.

2- Preventing the enemy from expanding its penetration in the area of Al-
Defreswar and clearing this area from
enemy forces.

Prepare to form tank capture groups to destroy the enemy in Ras al-Kobri-3.
. Secure the crossings in Sarabium, prevent the enemy from reaching them and
repel and destroy them 4.
Controlling the area between the south of Ismailia to the area of the Dafraswar
airport in the east 5.

Up to the road parallel to the Sweet Teraa in the west and focus on
intersections, pistils
governing bodies and fords.

Distribution of tasks to the troops.

8th Parachute Battalion: Left moving from Nafisha to the canal road in company
groups.
The battalion (except for one company) occupies terraces: Jabal Maryam, Hanidak,
Tosun, Sarabium-Dikh
The battalion strikes from the Pumping Mastaba on the Dafraswar Mastaba until it
is cleared and occupied. Company
The remaining company of the clerks will occupy the terraces in the Sarabium
area while securing the Bailey Bridge.
pushing reconnaissance elements before the operation to reconnoiter the area.

The 81st Parachute Battalion on the right moves from Nafisha south to Ain Ghossein on the Sweet Teraa. and remains in reserve to assist the 89th Parachute Battalion to eliminate the enemy in the event of any disruption. After clearing the area, one infantry company occupies Hanidak, a second company occupies Jabal Maryam, while the third company secures the Ain Ghossein road. After completing the clearing of the Dafraswar, the The Parachute Brigade is positioned to defend the area with a force in reserve.

On the morning of October 18, the Parachute Brigade had managed to carry out most of the tasks assigned to it in the early hours of the morning assigned to it in the early morning hours. The 89th Parachute Battalion had occupied all The 89th Parachute Battalion occupied all the terraces on the western shore from Jabal Maryam in the north to Mustat al-Hadh in the south. The elements that occupied the pumping station could see the Israeli pontoon ferry bridge that the enemy had built across the canal at Deverswar the day before, which led to corrective fire.

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artillery fire on the location of the bridge. From that point on, the Second Army's artillery The Second Army's artillery poured its fire on the bridge in relentless bursts throughout the night and the next day. When the enemy was alerted to the accuracy of the artillery fire as a result of the Egyptians' occupation of the Dheikh Terrace he counterattacked with his tanks and occupied the mastaba. As a result of the fragmentation of the 89th Parachute Battalion its personnel on all the terraces from Jabal Maryam in the north to Mastabat al-Dheikh in the south (51 terraces²), the counterattack failed. The counterattack by the remaining forces on the pumping station to retake it from the enemy failed three times in succession three times in a row due to the weakness of the attacking force, and it was better to to distribute small forces to the northern terraces away from the enemy and keep the main force of the battalion of the battalion to capture the pumping station and Deverswar, due to their proximity to the landing area and their extreme importance to the enemy and our forces. As for the 81st Parachute Battalion, it moved from Nafisha to Ain Ghossein and advanced south on the on the road parallel to the Sweet Tera'ah and stopped as soon as it reached Sarabioum, where it secured the the crossings and the Bailey Bridge that were assigned to it, and it would have been better to continue advancing south to the pumping line to protect the 89th Parachute Battalion's right flank and help it with part of its force to recapture the pumping station on the western shore of the canal. Operations of the 129th Thunderbolt Group: The situation of the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion after battles with the enemy in the areas of the Dafraswar Airport and Abu Sultan camps on October 17 as follows: . Thunderbolt Company - stationed in Sarabioum after Colonel A.H. Ali Heikal, the commander of the group, ordered it to withdraw north of Dafraswar Airport. ordered it to withdraw from north of Al-Dafraswar Airport to Sarabioum, where it occupied a defensive position that was reinforced A defensive position that was reinforced by another thunderbolt platoon sent by the group commander. On October 18, the Thunderbolt Company and the platoon in Sarabioum engaged in bitter fighting with an Israeli parachute battalion

with an Israeli paratrooper battalion from Colonel Danny Mat's paratrooper brigade that was advancing north on the road parallel to the Khalwa Terrace toward Saraboum. General Chaim Herzog reported on pages 239 and 402 of his book The War of Atonement, London English edition, 1975

an accurate description of this battle, which we summarize as follows:

“The attack on the West Bank is now developing into a serious phase, the paratroopers of

Danny Mat's paratroopers, who had established the bridgehead and from the beginning had faced no challenges, now

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repelled several counterattacks by Egyptian commandos who had entered the battle. On

October 18, a parachute battalion under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Dan moved north between the Sweet Teraa and the railway line

in the direction of Saraboum on the road to Ismailia. The force passed an Egyptian position

It soon found itself in very difficult circumstances, as the battalion commander and

13 men from the main force, which was led by the battalion's second-in-command.

Under the cover of the grass

in that area, dozens of Egyptians approached him from three directions up to a distance of

5 to 10 meters. The Israeli force gathered in a bungalow, and five meters away

five meters away, the Egyptians gathered in a two-story house and began firing a barrage of

bullets, grenades and bazookas, threatening the entire force with annihilation.

For four hours the battle raged on, with Capt. Kadmoni (who after the war became one of the

one of the leading members of the opposition) standing alone in a corner on the north side of the

He was able to stop the advancing Egyptians with fire and grenades.

Two trucks full of soldiers arrived in the area and moved to the corner where he was standing.

But before the soldiers could disembark, he was able to destroy them with his anti-tank weapon.

The Egyptians then brought in some artillery and anti-tank weapons and fired on the Israeli force from a distance of about 100 meters. . But help was on the way

Two rescue forces entered the battle (one under the command of the brigade's second commander, moving

on the Hadidiya railway line, and the second was moving from the direction of the Suez Canal under the command of

Lieutenant Colonel Zvi). After bitter fighting in dense grass and mango gardens, the rescue force was able to

was able to join the besieging force, which had been isolated all day, with Israeli losses amounting to 11

dead and 72 wounded. When darkness fell, the entire unit withdrew.â End of description

Herzog.

A thunderbolt company - clinging to its positions near the Abu Sultan camps. Despite

instructions issued by Colonel Ali Heikal, the group's commander, to withdraw to the

Abu Sultan camps, the company was unable to do so due to the intensity of enemy fire, which

The group commander had to ask the Second Army's artillery to bombard the entire

area occupied by the enemy in Abu Sultan

the entire area occupied by the enemy in Abu Sultan, including the Malassian Thunderbolt Company.

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On the morning of October 18, fierce fighting broke out between the Israeli paratroopers

Israeli paratroopers and Egyptian commandos, during which the group's reconnaissance chief was martyred and its chief of staff was severely wounded. The group's chief of staff was severely wounded, and the enemy also suffered heavy losses.

On the night of October 18/19, under the cover of darkness, the remaining thunderbolt forces in

Saraboum and Abu Sultan under the orders of the group commander to the group's concentration area in Abu Sawir for regrouping

The losses of the Thunderbolts in these battles amounted to 11 officers and 47 other ranks between martyrs and wounded

The lesson that can be learned from this battle is that the

The correct way to use the Thunderbolt is to raid and ambush without holding on to the ground for a long time.

for a long time, as the armament of the Thunderbolt units is not suitable for holding defensive positions

and holding the territory

The situation of the Egyptian forces south of the Ismailia Canal

As a result of the fierce battles that took place between the Second Field Army and Watt

General Abraham Adan (Bern) on the morning of October 18, west of the canal in the sector south of the

The situation on the Melesian front began to deteriorate dangerously and rapidly.

The forces that had counterattacked the enemy forces at Dafraswar had received heavy blows

Most of them lost their fighting ability, to the point that the Second Army did not have any armored forces after noon on October 18

no armored force west of the Canal, south of the Ismailia Canal.

In order to remedy the dangerous situation, the General Command instructed Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel

Commander of the Third Army to assign Brigadier General A.H. Muhammad Abdel Aziz Qabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division

whose division had been responsible for securing the Third Army's tactical perimeter since the start of hostilities on October 6, 73

the tactical area of the Third Army to the Othman Ahmed Othman area, as he has become responsible

before the General Command to secure the tactical range of the Second and Third Armies together (the confrontation was

about 70 kilometers). When the commander of the 4th Division sought clarification on his mission from the

the commander of the Third Army, he was told to contact the Generalissimo directly. There is no doubt that assigning the commander of the

of the 4th Armored Division to head to the Osman Ahmed Osman intersection without being given any information or

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clarifications or specific instructions about the nature of the new mission assigned to him, or the means by which he

how he could execute it on such a wide front, even though he had only one armored brigade at his disposal at the time

only one armored brigade, is a clear indication of the extent of the confusion

that existed within
Center 10 in this period.

The position of the forces involved in the counterattacks against the Mido in the Al-Defreswar area west of the canal, south of the Ismailia Tara'a, from October 16 to 18 as follows:

22nd Mechanized Infantry Division: Second Army Tactical Reserve, commanded by Brig. Gen.
Its forces south of the Ismailia Canal consisted of one mechanized infantry battalion (excluding a company) from the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade after the enemy managed to destroy two mechanized infantry battalions destroyed two of his mechanized infantry battalions. The remaining battalion was occupying a defensive position west of the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Abu Sultan road, and next to it was the advanced command center of the 116th Brigade Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the advanced command center of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division.

The 23rd Armored Brigade is the only armored force in the formation of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division (strategic reserve). On the instructions of the 10th Division, the armored brigade was pushed from Cairo
It was stationed at Othman Ahmed Othman intersection at around 9:00 pm on October 16.

An armored battalion of the brigade was assigned to move to the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Sarabium junction
In cooperation with the 85th Parachute Battalion, the armored battalion would counterattack at 4:00 p.m. on October 17 on the evening of October 17 against enemy forces in the Dafraswar area. The armored battalion while advancing was caught in an Israeli ambush, and the battle ended with its destruction. On the morning of October 18
The 23rd Armored Brigade (excluding a battalion) made the main counterattack on enemy forces in the area of
However, the attack failed after the brigade's units ran into Israeli anti-tank curtains
The brigade lost most of its tanks. The 23rd Armored Brigade was ordered to regroup to restore its combat efficiency in the area west of the intersection of the Ismailia Desert Road and the Abu Sawir.

The 182nd Parachute Brigade with its 85th Parachute Battalion was tasked to have one of its companies on the 17th.
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October to capture and secure the Abu Sultan Marina, while the rest of the battalion, in cooperation with an armored battalion from the 23rd Armored Brigade of the 23rd Armored Brigade would counterattack from the intersection of the Sarabium Treaty Roads on the to destroy the enemy forces at Al-Dafraswar Airport, capture and secure the airport, and recapture the strong points captured by the enemy. that had been captured by the enemy. Although a company of the battalion succeeded in entering the airfield the battalion was forced to retreat in the face of intense enemy pressure, after its losses amounted to to the intersection of the treaty road and the Abu Sultan road at the dawn of

October 18.

at dawn on October 18. At 6 p.m. on October 18, the battalion was moved to Anshas camp to restore its combat efficiency

89th Parachute Battalion: The battalion succeeded in accomplishing its mission, which was to occupy the west of the canal, but failed to hold the pumping station despite a counterattack to retake it three times to retake it three times, nor was it able to approach the Dafraswar mastaba, which had been occupied by the enemy since the crossing on the night of October 15/16, and a company of the battalion was securing the Al-Karbari Al-Baili in Sarabio.

81st Parachute Battalion: Stationed in Sarabium, south of the Khadid railroad station after securing the securing the road to the canal from Ain Ghossein to Sarabium.

129th Thunderbolt Battalion: Two companies clashed with an Israeli paratrooper battalion at Sarabium on the Ismailia road on October 18, and the Israeli battalion was forced to withdraw under cover of darkness after suffering heavy losses. As for the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion (except for one company), which was holding on to its positions in the area east of Abu Sultan camp, was forced to withdraw

under enemy pressure.

The group commander was instructed to withdraw his units to Abu Sawir to regain their combat efficiency its combat efficiency.

This was the general situation of the Second Army forces west of the Canal, south of the Ismailia Canal

when Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, arrived at the Second Army's advance command center

in Ismailia at 5:00 p.m. on October 18.

in his memoirs that the late President Sadat arrived at about 2:00 p.m. on October 18 at

Center 10 in Cairo and listened to a report on the situation from General Ahmed Ismail, the commander

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General. He then asked General Shazly to move to the Second Army in order to

to raise morale among its personnel and to do what he could to prevent the situation from deteriorating. Shortly after arriving

General Shazly listened to General Abdel Moneim Khalil's decision, which was summarized as follows:

1- The 15th Armored Brigade will be withdrawn from the East Bank to the Kharbia Bank (it was under the command of the 18 Infantry Division in the Kantara East sector), and stationed in the area north of the Ismailia Terrace and acts as a reserve for the Second Army.

2) The 182nd Parachute Brigade is actively defending the Kharbia Bank south of the Tirat al-Ismailia

It also secures the rear of the 21st Armored and 61st Infantry Divisions in their positions on the east bank.

3The 21st Armored and 61st Infantry Divisions are pressing south in an attempt to reconnect the Israeli road to the Dafraswar (Tartour Road).

. The 18 Infantry and 2 Infantry divisions hold their positions east of the canal.

5 Second Army artillery is concentrating its fire on the Dafraswar area.

6 - Thunderbolt units carry out raids on enemy forces stationed in the area of Al-Dafraswar

The Second Army Command was most concerned by the successive reports it had been receiving since the morning of October 18

received since the morning of October 18 about the infiltration of large numbers of Israeli tanks deep into the Egyptian defenses west of the canal.

Egyptian defenses west of the canal, attacking rear positions, administrative units, and surface-to-air missile (SAM) bases.

and surface-to-air missile (SAM) bases.

It was during this phase that the danger of not disseminating real information about the enemy to units and sub-units became clear

It was proven that many units west of the canal had no knowledge of the enemy's penetration and crossing

of the enemy's penetration and the crossing of its forces to the west bank of the canal. Administrative units, air defense units, and command centers were administrative units, air defense units, and command centers were surprised by the appearance of tanks firing at them without knowing their identity, and by the time they found out what they were, they had already been destroyed or captured destroyed or captured. Some convoys and individual vehicles moving on the
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roads and individuals were also subjected to tragic accidents when they were suddenly and unexpectedly confronted by Israeli forces opened fire on them, killing and capturing hundreds of people and destroying a large number of vehicles and the destruction of a large number of vehicles.

The situation was made worse by the obvious weakness of the anti-tank defense. Lost before

prior to the start of the fighting, the Malotka anti-tank missile units were withdrawn) from formations that would not to reinforce the formations assigned to it, so there were two Malotka battalions east of the canal, one of them belonging to the 23rd Mech Infantry Division. One of them belonged to the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and the other to the 182nd Parachute Brigade.

After the crossing and the completion of the division's bridgeheads east of the canal, the two battalions were supposed to the two battalions were supposed to return to their units west of the canal, but this did not happen and the two battalions remained east of the canal the two battalions remained east of the canal. In his memoirs, Lieutenant General Shazly stated that in order to strengthen the anti-tank defense west of the canal

anti-tank defense west of the canal, he secretly agreed with General Saeed al-Mahi, the artillery commander, to withdraw these two battalions without the knowledge of the late President Sadat and General Ahmed Ismail, who were

They were opposed to withdrawing any weapons from the east, and despite the opposition of some infantry division commanders supported by these rockets, Lieutenant General Shazly insisted on withdrawing them, and the bulk of them were indeed withdrawn on October 18 on October 18.

Three Israeli armored divisions cross west of the Canal
During the night of October 17/18, General Abraham Adan (Bern), commander of Operation Group No. 162 crossed the Suez Canal at the head of two armored brigades commanded by Captains Nitka and Gabi. Dakan
General Gonen, commander of Israel's Southern Command, had ordered the withdrawal of the armored brigade commanded by Col. Aryeh from the formation of General Adan's Operational Group to serve as a general reserve for the Southern Command.
On the evening of October 18, following General Adan's military operations on the west bank of the Canal
On the evening of October 18, following General Adan's combat operations on the west bank of the Canal, in a situation report he radioed to General Gonen, he asked him to return Arbeit's brigade under his command so that he could make a successful breakthrough to the south the next day.
to this request. At dawn on October 19, Aryeh's brigade completed its crossing to the west
General Adan's formation now included his three armored brigades.
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On October 18, General Sharon's 143rd Operational Group west of the Canal consisted of a parachute infantry brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Mat and an armored brigade commanded by Colonel Hapim.
On October 19, Colonel Amnon was ordered to cross to the west with his armored brigade.
operating on the east bank against units of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions
to widen the penetration gap to the north. Colonel Amnon left an armored battalion of his brigade on the east bank
to support the forces that were attacking the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead
Infantry.

With Amnon's brigade crossing to the west bank, General Sharon on October 19 completed his operations, which now consisted of two armored brigades and a parachute infantry brigade. On the night of October 18/19
October, General Kalman Magen, commander of the 522nd Operations Group, crossed the Suez Canal.
consisting of two armored brigades commanded by Colonels Dan Shimron and Barum and an infantry brigade
Mechatiki under the command of Colonel Pinchas.

With the crossing of the three operational groups, Israel had seven armored brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade west of the canal on October 19
October 19, Israel had seven armored brigades, a parachute infantry brigade and a mechanized infantry brigade. Sharon's
Sharon's operation group was pressing toward the Second Army's rear south of the Ismailia Canal, while
Adan and Magen were pressing toward the Third Army's rear.

Second Army's position west of the canal

1 North of the Ismailia Canal was the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade
General Headquarters' strategic reserve) was in the sector west of Qantara, as

was

118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division), which was ordered by the Second Army Command to occupy positions along the Ismailia Canal to prevent enemy forces from crossing north to Ismailia the enemy from crossing north to Ismailia.

2- South of the Ismailia Canal was the 182nd Parachute Brigade, consisting of three battalions after

The 85th Parachute Battalion joined it as of 9:00 a.m. on October 19 (after having arrived from Camp Inshas after completing the regrouping process).

The 129th Thunderbolt Group, consisting of two Thunderbolt battalions. The 23rd Brigade

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Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division) and the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division) Mechanized Infantry) were in the process of regrouping after heavy losses sustained during fierce battles with enemy forces. during fierce battles with enemy forces from October 61 to October 19.

Third Army's position on the Canal

Following the General Command's order to return the 3rd Armored Brigade from east of the Canal to the Al-Jafra area

north of the Cairo-Suez highway on the evening of October 19 to regroup and regain

combat efficiency, the 4th Armored Division consisted of two armored brigades and one mechanized infantry brigade

Mechanized . As of October 18, the 4th Armored Division was assigned the responsibility of

defending the tactical range of the combined Second and Third Armies (from the Ismailia Tara'a in the north to

Mount Atqa in the south), a front of at least 70 kilometers, and the 4th Armored Division became

operating under the orders of the General Headquarters.

Comparison of armored forces (with each other)

The enemy west of the canal had 7 armored brigades (3 in the Adan Division, 2 in the Sharon Division, and 2 in the

Kalman Magen Division), while Egyptian forces west of the canal had only two armored brigades in the

4th Armored Division. Comparing the forces, it is clear that the enemy outnumbered our forces west of the canal by

our forces west of the canal by a ratio of 7 to 2, more than double.

Which of the two armies was threatened with encirclement?

There was no great danger that the enemy could encircle the Second Army due to the presence of the

Ismailia, a large water barrier that runs from west to east and requires specialized equipment and crossing equipment, in addition to the fact that the land west of the canal in the Second Army's sector

The land west of the canal in the Second Army's sector is agricultural and full of trees, crops, and tangled irrigation pipes, which does not allow the speed of armored vehicles. In addition to the nature of the terrain favoring the defending forces

Egyptian forces in the Second Army's sector west of the canal were able to repel the attack of the

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General Sharon, whose mission was to advance northward from the bridgehead at Deverswar toward Ismailia towards Ismailia. Against the two armored brigades and one parachute infantry brigade that made up Sharon's division, the Second Army had two mechanized infantry brigades (the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade) the 182nd Parachute Brigade and the 129th Thunderbolt Group. A force close in size and capability to a full mixed division. Given that the attacker should outnumber the defender by at least 2 to 1 if success is to be assured, General Sharon could not get his division to Ismailia. Although the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade occupied fortified defensive positions along the Ismailia Canal, the bridges were all set to be blown up as soon as Sharon's troops approached them, by the Second Army's military engineers in accordance with instructions they received from General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the army commander.

But the real danger lay in the Third Army's sector in the south, as the land west of the canal in this sector is ideal terrain for armored vehicles. Most of it is vast desert terrain, giving armored units the opportunity to exploit all of their distinctive characteristics of agility, maneuverability, flanking and flanking movements, and ease of infiltration. They were also able to rush to their targets after avoiding strong positions that might hinder their progress. strong positions that might hinder their progress.

Due to the presence of a number of high heaths controlling the surrounding areas, the enemy took the initiative to occupy the most important of these heaths. The enemy took the initiative to occupy the most important of these heights before the Egyptians preceded them, especially Jebel Geneva. Moreover, the enemy benefited greatly from the presence of some landing grounds in this sector in this sector and the presence of the airports of Al-Defreswar and Fayed, so after capturing them, the enemy used them to transport supplies, equipment, and supplies to airlift supplies, equipment and supplies (by helicopter) to Israeli forces in the West Bank, as well as evacuate Israeli forces in the West Bank, as well as evacuating the wounded and injured to the field hospital east of the Canal .

As a result of the continuous raids carried out by Israeli tanks since the first day they crossed the Suez Canal the first day they crossed the Suez Canal, Israeli tanks raided Egyptian surface-to-air missile sites, which were deployed 15 to 20 kilometers west of the canal, the enemy succeeded in destroying and silencing

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A large number of them, and for the first time since the start of the fighting, the Israeli Air Force was able to provide direct air support to ground forces during offensive operations

against Egyptian forces.
Egyptian forces

The result of the comparison of armored forces in the Third Army's sector west of the Canal did not favor the Egyptian forces. The enemy had two armored divisions (Adan and Magen Division) with 5 armored brigades (3 brigades in the Adan Division and 2 brigades in the Magen Division). against
Against one Egyptian armored division, the 4th Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Abdel Aziz Kabil . Since this division was assigned the responsibility of securing the tactical range of the 2nd and 3rd armies of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions over a frontage of at least 70 kilometers, the calculation of its tank strength should be distributed on the basis of .50 of the division's strength for the sector of each of the Second and Third Armies. Since the division includes two armored brigades, so the Third Army sector is one armored brigade
one armored brigade. By this calculation, the ratio of superiority of Israeli tanks to Egyptian tanks in this sector is 5 to 1. These facts that we have explained about the enemy's superior position in the Third Army's sector west of the canal reveals the secret of the rapid advance of the of the Israeli armored forces in the southern direction, their aspiration to encircle the Third Army, and their unsuccessful attempt to encircle it. Third Army and its failed attempt to occupy the city of Suez.

The Missed Opportunity to Clear the Defreswar Gap
After the counterattack by the 23rd Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division) failed counterattack on enemy forces in the Dafraswar area on October 18 failed to clear the breach, and after General Abraham Adan's tanks broke through the Egyptian defenses west of the Suez Canal, no Egyptian defensive position remained south of the Suez Canal. Egyptian defense position south of the Ismailia Tributary was left holding, except for the main defensive position of the 161st Mechanized Infantry Brigade west of the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Abu Sultan Link, which was occupied by the only remaining mechanized infantry battalion of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade.
with some tanks from the remnants of the 23rd Armored Brigade. Colonel Nitka, commander of the right armored brigade in General Adan's division battle formation, was forced to was forced to avoid this position when he was advancing his tanks toward the ruins at noon on October 18 due to
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due to the strength of its fortification. Next to the defensive position was the forward command post, which housed the the acting commander of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade after its commander was martyred in the battles of October 16. as well as Brigadier General Ahmed Abboud al-Zumer, commander of the 32nd Mechanized Infantry Division. Since the morning of October 19 October 19, enemy armored vehicles occupied this defensive position along the front. At 9:00 a.m. 9 a.m., the enemy attacked the position of the 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division's artillery brigade which was located a few kilometers west of the defensive position with a force of about a tank battalion supported by Mechanized infantry, and the artillery units clashed with the Israeli tanks face

to face in a fierce battle that lasted about three hours.
in a fierce battle that lasted about three hours, in which the field artillery used direct fire against enemy tanks. Although the enemy suffered heavy losses, the battle ended with the destruction of the division's artillery brigade. The division's artillery brigade was destroyed after fierce fighting. In response to a large force of enemy tanks the left flank of the main defense position, some of the forces of this position retreated to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection. The division commander sent a last radio message to Lt. Gen. Saad al-Shazly, who was then at the Second Army's forward command center in Ismailia at 1:00 p.m. It was a brief message telling him that the enemy was attacking the position of the battalion's left company of the battalion's left company and that he was heading to his command center. Immediately afterward All communication between the division command and the Second Army command was cut off, and the division commander was considered was considered missing. It turned out that Brig. Gen. Ahmed Abboud al-Zamar, the commander of the 23rd Division Mechanized Infantry Division remained steadfast in his advanced command center in courage and fortitude until the end, and did not think of leaving his post to save his life. He did not think of leaving his position to run for his life despite the situation being deadly. When Israeli tanks stormed Israeli tanks stormed his command center, he died as a martyr under their tires, thus setting the most wonderful examples of heroism, faith and redemption.

The 4th Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Mohamed Abdel Aziz Qabil, was responsible from the beginning of the war on October 6, 73 of the war on October 6, 73, was responsible for securing the tactical range of the Third Field Army. On October 17 October 17, the division's situation was as follows:

The division command and the 2nd Armored Brigade in the Al-Jafra area south of Jabal Oweid.

The 3rd Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) east of the canal in an area located at the head of the bridges of the two divisions

. Infantry, 7 infantry and serves as a reserve in the hands of the commander of the 19th Army.

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The remaining armored battalion of the brigade is under the command of the 7th Infantry Division instead of the independent 52nd Armored Brigade which pushed north toward the Second Army at first light on October 17 to clear the the penetration gap east of the canal, and was destroyed south of the line at the Abyssinian Dune Tell Salam. The 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade secures the Third Army's intermediate range in the area of Kilometer 109 of the Cairo-Suez road.

- The division's artillery brigade works in support of the 7th Infantry Division in honor of the canal.

The first information message regarding the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal was received from the Third Army to the division command at 11:00 a.m. on October 17 that the enemy had up to 31 tanks west of the canal with paratroopers in the

area of

Al-Defreswar. The Third Army command instructed to push a mechanized infantry battalion supported by the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade to Jabal Janifa and the Kasfreet area with the task of protecting the left flank of the Third Army and preventing the enemy from advancing south of the canal. and prevent the enemy from advancing south on the treaty road. This was carried out at

At 8 p.m. on October 17. At 11 p.m. on October 17, based on the instructions of the General Command, orders were issued by the Third Army Command that the 2nd Armored Brigade

2nd Armored Brigade was ordered to be ready to counterattack in the direction of Dafraswar to destroy the enemy forces in the penetration gap west of the canal.

enemy forces in the breach gap west of the canal. The commander of the 4th Armored Division ordered the commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade

the 2nd Armored Brigade to prepare to move without administrative columns in a northeasterly direction on the

from Jebel Um Kutheeb to the intersection of the treaty road and the Abu Sultan junction, and that the line of defense for the engagement would be

will be 5 kilometers southwest of this intersection and has been assigned the brigade's mission.

to destroy the enemy in the Abu Sultan-Defreswar area, and to secure the crossings in the area between

north of the Bitter Lakes to Al-Defreswar.

The division commander ordered a command detachment from the brigade to establish contact with the command of the 116th Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Brigade to learn the latest information about the enemy in the area where the counterattack would be launched.

At 3:00 a.m. on October 18, the command detachment contacted the Chief of Staff of the 23rd Armored Brigade

Armored Brigade who was at the time in the advanced command center of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade at the intersection of the Abu Sultan Treaty Roads.

He informed the command detachment that the 23rd Armored Brigade had been assigned to carry out this mission.

When the commander of the 4th Division learned of this, he contacted Army Headquarters.

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The 3rd Army reported that the mission for the 2nd Armored Brigade had been canceled by the 10th Center, and that the 23rd Armored Brigade

Armored Brigade would carry out the counterattack. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian the Egyptian General Command had until October 17 to completely eliminate the enemy forces in the area of

The Egyptian General Command had until October 17 to completely eliminate the enemy forces in the Dafraswar area.

between two wills, it is also a race against time to seize opportunities between two commands to assemble a sufficient armored force of two armored brigades on of two armored brigades on October 17 to deliver a strong, concentrated blow against the enemy forces in

Dafraswar to achieve shock value, under the direct supervision of a single command.

To ensure good coordination and tight command and control, this could be achieved by following one of the following solutions

The following two solutions:

Either the independent 25th Armored Brigade attached to the 7th Infantry Division crossed the Suez Canal from east to west during the hours of darkness on the night of 16/17/17

to the west during the hours of darkness on the night of October 16/17, and then push it at first light on October 17

October 17 northward on the west side of the canal to join the 23rd Armored Brigade, which will be pushed from the Othman Ahmed intersection.

to be pushed from the Osman Ahmed Osman junction from west to east, in a single coordinated attack against enemy forces at Dafraswar (the independent 25th Armored Brigade was pushed on the morning of October 17 on the eastern shore of the canal and the lake on the eastern shore of the canal and Bitter Lake to clear the penetration gap from the east, and was destroyed south of the line was destroyed south of the Dune of Abyssinia Tal Salam.

The 2nd Armored Brigade, stationed west of the canal in the Jafra area, south of Jabal Oweid in a single coordinated attack with the 32nd Armored Brigade stationed in the Othman Junction area against enemy forces against the enemy forces in the Dafraswar. Provided that the process of pushing the two armored brigades, whether in the first or second case, is secured in the first or second case with all available capabilities of artillery, aviation and air defense at the level of the General Command in cooperation with the Second Army Command. General Command in cooperation with the Second Army Command.

If either of these two operations had taken place, success would have been achieved for the following reasons:

1 Executing the strike forcefully at an early time - on October 17, before the completion of the fixed bridges across the Suez Canal, and before the Israeli armored brigades flowed to the West Bank and were not inside the Israeli bridgehead in the Dafraswar area as of October 17 was only about 25 tanks (after the losses of the tank force that crossed) and an infantry brigade of paratroopers No more than 2,000 officers and soldiers.

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2 Executing the strike with a large armored force (about 200 tanks), especially since the rank of the 2nd Armored Brigades

and 33rd Armored Brigades were fully loaded with tanks because they had not participated in any battles until the day of the operation

Thus, the ratio of the superiority of Egyptian tanks over Israeli tanks would have been

would have been about 10 to 1, which would have been enough to achieve shock power and even uproot the head of the Israeli bridgehead

of the Israeli bridgehead in the Dafraswar area.

3- It would have been possible to mobilize a large number of Second Army artillery units (east and west of the

Canal) could have mobilized a large number of Second Army artillery units (east and west of the Canal) to conduct the fire preparations for this major operation before the start of the attack, which would have

destroying and silencing most of the Israeli sources of fire in the Dafraswar area.

Unfortunately, the General Command squandered this precious opportunity and did not realize the shock power that would have resulted from two armored brigades participating in a single counterattack, the

The 25th Armored Brigade counterattacked alone on October 17 east of the canal, while the 23rd Armored Brigade Armored Brigade carried out its counterattack alone on October 18 west of the canal, with the result that both armored brigades failed. The armored brigades suffered heavy losses and lost their combat capability. Had the two armored brigades in a single coordinated attack on the enemy west of the canal, the outcome of the attack would have been different of course, and the face of history might have changed.

There is no doubt that a large part of these tactical mistakes made by the General Command is due to the severe inadequacy of reconnaissance work at all levels, as it was no longer possible for the Senior commanders could no longer know the real information about the enemy forces that had crossed to the west and where they were stationed, and they were completely ignorant of all the details of the construction of Israeli bridges across the canal of Israeli bridges across the canal and the size and quality of the forces crossing to the West Bank. West Bank.

The counterattack by the 23rd Armored Brigade on the morning of October 18 against the The unsuccessful counterattack was the last counterattack at the brigade level. After that day, there were no counterattacks against the Israeli armored forces that on the West Bank, except at the level of armored or mechanized infantry battalions or armored or mechanized infantry companies. at the level of armored or mechanized infantry companies, and these attacks were considered in terms of

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tactically, these attacks were considered local counterattacks and were intended only to merely to repel Israeli armored forces and halt their advance, and were not targeted as was the case For the main counter-attacks of Haham eAnahC Sunna. Destroying enemy forces and liquidating the Israeli bridgehead.

After the failure of the main counterattacks at the level of the armies, it was assumed that the General Command was supposed to counterstrike against the enemy according to tactical principles. However, the General Command did not have enough forces to launch such a counterstrike. It distributed a significant portion of its strategic reserves in the belief that it would not have to that it would not have to use this strategic reserve for the duration of the war. As a result of this belief it scattered the main formation in the GHQ's strategic reserve, the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division. the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, which was commanded by Brigadier General Mohamed Najati Farhat. It withdrew the 101st Mechanized Infantry Brigade at the beginning of the war and placed it under the command of the Second Army which placed it in reserve west of the canal in the Kantara region. On October 16, on After news of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal reached the 10th Center, orders were issued to move the 23rd Armored Brigade 23rd Armored Brigade to Wasla Osman Ahmed Osman and placed it under the command

of the Second Army. On the morning of October 18, this brigade carried out the counterattack on the enemy forces at Dafraswar, the details of which we have already mentioned. As a result of the failure of the counterattack and the brigade's heavy losses, it was ordered to reassemble the brigade to restore its combat efficiency.

The strategic reserve in the hands of the General Command ended up being the remaining mechanized infantry brigade of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, in addition to the armored brigade of the Republican.

Procedures of the 4th Armored Brigade to secure the entire tactical area

After Brigadier General A.H. Mohamed Abdel Aziz Kabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division, received his new assignment on the afternoon of October 18, according to which he was assigned the responsibility of securing the tactical range of the second and third armies (about 70 kilometers in front), and after a quick assessment of the situation, the commander issued the following instructions:
The division commander issued the following instructions:
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1 - To secure the tactical range of the Second Army, a reinforced armored battalion from the Second Brigade Armored Brigade to be accompanied by the advanced command center of the brigade to control it.

2 To secure the tactical range of the Third Army, the chief of staff of the division shall take charge of the control of this range. The 2nd Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) is placed under his command.

3- The division's reconnaissance battalion will push reconnaissance elements to obtain information about the enemy.

4- An additional command center for the division is opened 3 km south of the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection so that the division commander can control the forces in this direction, provided that three working groups will be formed at the additional command center as follows:

1 command group led by the division commander to lead the division's forces in the tactical range of the army

Second Army.

B - A control group to control the retreating units of our forces, especially at night, and is commanded by the commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade. commanded by the commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade.

A control group to receive the support forces and elements that were pushed from the General Headquarters. It consisted of 70 crews 6 P, 41 tanks from educational facilities and a large number of mines from the Department of Military Engineers, led by the assistant commander of the division.

At 11:30 a.m. on October 18, the division commander moved at the head of his advanced command center to the Osman Junction area on the Ismailia Road axis. He was followed 20 minutes later

minutes later, a battle group consisting of a reinforced tank battalion under the command of the commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade

caught up with him at the intersection. At 2:30 p.m., the division commander, after completing his reconnaissance

After completing his reconnaissance, he assigned tasks to the commanders on the ground, and the armored battalion occupied the general line northeast of Jabal al-Jabal.

The armored battalion occupied the general line northeast of Jabal al-Jarba and the Kassasin junction. Due to the presence of some

enemy movements in the southwestern direction and in the direction of surface-to-air missile bases 8

The division commander ordered the movement of another reinforced battalion from the 2nd Armored Brigade to occupy the area west of Jabal Am

The mission is to destroy enemy columns that try to avoid the positions of the first battalion and work to

To obstruct the advance of enemy armored vehicles and prevent them from destroying the missile bases. At 3:00 p.m.

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On October 18, on the instructions of the General Command, the division's artillery brigade (except for one battalion) returned from its positions east of the canal

from its positions east of the canal to the Jafra area to restore its combat efficiency

On the morning of October 19, the division commander ordered the armored battalion that had occupied the

to occupy the general line between Al-Jarba and Umm Kutheeb, with the understanding that it would be

ready to destroy any Israeli forces attempting to bypass the right side of the defense line.

defense line. He also ordered the division's artillery brigade to have one of its battalions open up in the Jahraba area to support the work of this armored battalion

the work of this armored battalion. At noon on October 19, the commander of the 6 Mechanized Infantry Brigade to push the brigade's tank battalion (except for a company), a mechanized infantry company

and a field artillery battalion to the area of the intersection of the Cairo-Suez North Road and Wadi Abu Talh

with Wadi Abu Talh to secure this vital area and prepare for counterattacks to destroy any tanks

counterattacks to destroy any enemy tanks leaking southward. The battalion

The armored battalion and the forces attached to it carried out its mission and occupied the intersection.

At 8:00 p.m. on October 19, on the instructions of the General Command, the commander of the

Third Army to return the 3rd Armored Brigade from its positions east of the canal to the Jafra area to regroup and regain its combat efficiency

and regain its combat efficiency. On the evening of October 19, following a telephone conversation between the Commander-in-Chief

with the commander of the Third Army, the division commander was informed that the regrouping of the division's units

of the division in favor of a division-wide offensive operation, and that the division commander should prepare for it

At 12:00 p.m. on October 20, a liaison officer from General Headquarters arrived at the

to the division's advanced command center to understand the division's position in terms of its status and combat efficiency. He gave the division commander a general idea of the upcoming mission and asked for at least 48 hours so that he could regroup the division's units to raise their combat efficiency.

The mission assigned to the division was for the 4th Armored Division to strike 57% counterstrike from the Um Kutheeb and Wadi al-Ashra in the Dafraswar direction, with the mission of destroying the enemy who had crossed west of the line

to destroy the enemy that had crossed to the west of the canal and restore the situation to what it was.

The division was to be ready at 6 p.m. on October 20. The commander's decision was to advance with two armored brigades as the first echelon, using artillery and aviation fire to destroy the enemy who had succeeded in breaking through and capturing the line north of Jabal al-Shihabi, the intersection of the Abu Sultan Abu Sawir as a direct mission and pushing the division's second echelon in the Zaroua area.

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In cooperation with the division's first corps, the enemy remnants are destroyed and the western bank is captured.

and connect with the Egyptian forces in the east as the next mission.

Battle formation: In two coordinates and in reserve, the first coordinate the 2nd Armored Brigade on the right and the Republican Guard Armored Brigade on the left.

Republican Guard Armored Brigade on the left, and the second coordinate the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the reserve

3 Armored Brigade with the main effort concentrated on the right flank. On October 12, the

General Command's orders to cancel the mission.

There is no doubt that the General Command was correct in realizing the grave mistake it was about to make

and canceled the mission that had been assigned to the 4th Armored Division on October 20

October, which was to carry out a counter-strike on 57at 42Asnah to liquidate the Israeli bridgehead, destroy the enemy and capture the West Bank and destroy the enemy and capture the West Bank, as the time for such a counterstrike had already passed.

The 4th Armored Division was tasked with this mission in the face of the three Israeli armored divisions

the three Israeli armored divisions that were then operating west of the canal meant pushing this division into a suicide mission that would inevitably end in its destruction. Suffice it to say that the 4th Armored Division was going to counterstrike

with three armored brigades (after the addition of the Republican Guard Brigade) against seven armored brigades

Israel's tank superiority more than doubled.

Why the 21st Armored Division's attack on the East Bank was canceled

After the Egyptian forces retreated to the north after the failed counterattack, the line occupied by the

occupied by the 21st Armored Division aligned with Sarabioum on the west bank of the Canal, extending east to meet

with the front line of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the center brigade at the head of the 16th Division's bridgehead

Infantry after the right brigade (16th Infantry Brigade) evacuated its positions

under enemy pressure.

Due to the intense enemy pressure on the unified bridgehead, which consisted of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions

Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions, and due to the low number of tanks after the heavy losses suffered by the 21st Armored Division

The commander of the Second Army ordered the commander of the 24th Armored Brigade, from the 23rd Division

Mechanized Infantry, to move to Ras al-Kobri al-Muwahidi (it had been under the command of the 2nd Division

Infantry Division since the beginning of the war and was instructed on October 17 to be stationed in the area of

Ismailia East)

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At around 11:00 a.m. on October 19, Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim

Al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, informed Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, who had been at the

Second Army's advanced command center in Ismailia since the previous evening that reconnaissance elements

reconnaissance confirmed that two enemy columns were moving from east to west, each consisting of

about 100 tanks supported by mechanized infantry, with helicopters flying overhead.

In addition, the enemy has about 30 tanks in the Dafraswar area, while in the Al-Jalaa village has about a tank battalion supported by guided missiles¹¹ and that Israeli aircraft

Israeli planes have been attacking the bridgehead since 8:00 a.m. this morning. He issued

General Al-Shazly instructed Brigadier General Al-Orabi to heavily mine in front of the front line of the 21st Armored Division's

of the 21st Armored Division's defenses to prevent the enemy from expanding the penetration gap to the north, and informed him that

paratroopers under the command of Colonel Ismail Azmy are occupying the terraces on the west bank (from Sarabioum

to Jebel Mariam in the north) making his right flank secure.

At 12:00 p.m., Israeli tanks attacked the position of a battalion of the of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (part of the 21st Armored Division), and the battalion poured a barrage of fire on the enemy forces, destroying 4 tanks and 3 semi-trucks, and the battalion lost 3 tanks.

The battalion lost 3 tanks in addition to losses in personnel and equipment. As a result, the attacks were halted

and Israeli aircraft began bombing the defensive positions inside Ras al-Kobari United

concentrated bombing.

Due to the deterioration of the situation on the west bank south of the Ismailia Canal after the loss of the 23rd Armored Brigade

Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division) and the 116th

Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division)

Mechanized) lost their fighting ability. Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, who was in charge of the Second Army at the time, decided to

in charge of the Second Army, decided to restore the balance on the front by launching an offensive operation on the eastern bank of the canal in order to minimize the Israeli penetration gap

after previous attempts had failed to eliminate it. To achieve this goal.

He sent a brief radio message to Brigadier General Orabi that read, "Orabi.

Storm the village of Al-Jalaa

With any losses⁴. In fulfillment of the Chief of Staff's instructions,

Brigadier General Orabi made his plan to attack the village

with as many tanks as he could muster without disturbing the balance of the

defenses of the unified bridge he was commanding which he commanded. The plan was based on a two-pronged attack: The first - the brigade
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24 Armored Brigade (42 tanks) attacked from two directions: the first with the brigade's strength (except for a battalion) from from its positions north of the main feeder in the direction of Al-Dafraswar, to the right of Highway 1, and The second with the strength of the remaining battalion from its position northwest of Al-Taliyeh towards the village of Al-Jalaa. The task of the The mission of the 24th Armored Brigade was to destroy the enemy forces and secure the area of Al-Galaa village. Second echelon: The 1st Armored Brigade (14 tanks) was tasked with securing the right flank of the 24th Armored Brigade during the attack the attack in cooperation with the paratroopers who will secure the terraces they occupy west of the canal. west of the canal.

The attack was scheduled to begin at 4:00 p.m., preceded by an air strike and concentrated fire from the 21st Armored Division's artillery, with the artillery continuing to support the attack using advanced parachutes and on-call assemblies. When Lt. Gen. the attack plan, he estimated that the 56 tanks allocated for this operation were insufficient for success, so Brig. Gen. El Orabi requested that all remaining tanks at Ras El Kobri be withdrawn about 25 tanks to be included in the attack, even if it meant shrinking the the unified bridgehead. Brig. Gen. Orabi objected to this opinion, as withdrawing the tanks and leaving the infantry alone in defensive positions would inevitably shake the defenses and expose the bridgehead to the risk of enemy penetration especially on the right flank, as the enemy's goal from the first day of the crossing was to on the first day its forces crossed to the west was to widen the penetration gap to the north as far as possible to secure the crossing area at Dafraswar. Despite Lt. Gen. Shazly's insistence on implementing his idea Brigadier General Orabi remained adamant, and sent his point of view to Lieutenant General Shazly in a a radio message that read as follows: 1To reduce the bridgehead would mean its total collapse.

But the anticipated attack on the east bank, for which all this discussion took place, did not take place for reasons related to the situation on the West Bank. Since the Israeli crossing on the night of since the Israeli crossing on the night of October 15/16 to the west of the canal is affecting the other bank directly. The situation on the West Bank south of the Ismailia Canal worsened as a result of Israeli tank attacks on units of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, which led to the fall of the the vital site of Sarabioum into the hands of Israeli forces. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly instructed Colonel Ismail Azmy, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, to retreat his units north to Tosun, while holding the Tosun-Sarabioum line.

This situation, of course, affected the plan to attack the East Bank, so Lt. Gen.

Saad al-Shazly contacted General al-Orabi at around 3:40 p.m. - that is, before the twenty minutes before the scheduled start of the attack and instructed him to cancel the operation as it was no longer necessary as it was no longer necessary. At the same time, he ordered him to hold the current line of the 21 Armored Division's current line (the Sarabium line), and urged him to focus on preparing defenses and laying mines. Brigadier General Orabi contacted his unit commanders to inform them of the instructions to cancel the attack and the need to fortify the defenses.

However, an unexpected surprise awaited Brigadier General Orabi. It was only an hour

only one hour after receiving the order to cancel the attack, Lieutenant General Shazly called him again to inform him that

President Sadat had requested that the previously canceled attack be carried out. He replied

that the engineer detachment had finished laying mines in front of the division's defenses

as instructed, and the time it would take to prepare for the attack would would turn it into a night operation now that sunset was approaching. Since the enemy has an advantage in night operations, Israeli tanks are equipped with advanced equipment for night fighting

Egyptian tanks are expected to be destroyed if the attack takes place at night, leaving the the unified bridgehead without tanks and thus at risk of being breached. Lt. Gen.

Shazly was so convinced of General Orabi's point of view that about ten minutes after the end of his conversation with him he sent

about ten minutes after the end of his conversation with him, he sent a radio signal to General Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamsi

Chief of Operations, Center 10, stating: "Orabi's side is threatened, and if he makes any attack

he will be hit from all sides. The world is at night and conditions do not permit an attack, not even early

We can. To give you an idea of Orabi's position, the number of tanks in the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division

and the 21st Armored Division is 80 tanks, and your hand can hold the bridgehead2 .

There is no doubt that Shazly's radio message to Gamsi reveals two things of the utmost importance of the utmost importance.

First, the magnitude of the catastrophe that was to befall the unified bridgehead in the event that

whether the attack was carried out during the day or at night, Shazly himself admitted that the

The tanks in the unified bridgehead, which includes the 16th Infantry Division and the 21st Armored Division

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80 tanks are barely enough to hold on to the bridgehead, so how could it be ventured to evacuate it

of its armored forces to launch an attack against an enemy with overwhelming superiority in tanks?

this can be confirmed by reviewing the reconnaissance information that Orabi

reported to Shazly in the morning.
morning). Moreover, he has air superiority on the battlefield, especially after Israeli tanks west of the canal destroyed a large number of Israeli tanks west of the canal destroyed a large number of surface-to-air missile (SAM) bases, which which shook the Egyptian air defense network on the West Bank. The attack, which was which was fortunately canceled - in such circumstances would have led to the destruction of the attacking tanks and thus allowing Israeli tanks to realize the hope that had been in the dreams of the of the Israeli leadership since the beginning of the crossing operation to the west of the canal, namely to penetrate and destroy the head of the the unified bridgehead and widen the breach northward to the center road (Ismailia Road) east of the bowl) and threaten the right flank of the 2nd Infantry Division occupying the Fardan sector.

The second is the extent of the danger that could have resulted as a result of the intervention of the political leadership represented by the late President Sadat - in the decisions of the military command. We have already explained this issue in detail.

At about five o'clock in the evening, Lieutenant General Al-Shazly called Brigadier General Al-Orabi and they had the following conversation
The following dialog :

Al-Shazly : Ismail Azmi (paratroopers) bounce from Sarabium to Tosun. Bounce on your side to Tosun to keep your right shoulder in Ismail Azmy's shoulder because Azmy has a lot of pressure and Tosun went back.

My godfather : This means withdrawing without pressure from the enemy.

Brigadier General Al-Orabi was forced to issue instructions for the 21st Armored Division units to retreat from the Sarabium line to Tosun. Sarabium to Tosun, and the enemy was thus able to widen its penetration gap north to Tosun without any fighting (about 5 km).

Gitral Adan's operations on the Gharya Datta
On the morning of October 18, the armored brigade led by Colonel Gabi managed to destroy most of the tanks of the 23rd Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division Strategic Reserve Command
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General) which was advancing from west to east on the Abu Sultan axis to conduct a a counterattack on Israeli forces in the Dafraswar area. To the right of the Adan Division formation The armored brigade led by Colonel Nitka advanced in the direction of al-Farb on the Sarabium link, and was able to overran the weakly fortified Egyptian position west of the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Sarabium junction He then turned his tanks south on the Treaty Road axis, avoiding the position held by the infantry battalion occupied by the Mechanized Infantry Battalion of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade west of the the intersection of the Treaty Road and the Abu Sultan road.

Following the arrival of Nitka's brigade in open ground, and while Gabi's

brigade was still
was still engaged with the Egyptian forces in the area of plantations and trees,
General Adan, the commander of the armored division, received
received a radio message from General Gonen, commander of the Southern Command,
ordering him to direct some of his
his units to conduct raids on Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites in the
rear.

General Adan immediately ordered Colonel Nitka and Gabi to each direct an
armored battalion from Luwah to carry out these raids.
armored battalion from Luwah to carry out this raid, which in the eyes of the
Israeli leadership was an urgent and vital mission
and vital, after Israeli aviation, due to the presence of the Egyptian air
defense network west of the
Canal suffered heavy losses in the first phase of the war.

The armored battalion sent by Nitka advanced in the form of a fan to a depth of
about 20 km
west of the canal, destroyed two surface-to-air missile bases, and returned to
brigade formation after its
while Gabi's battalion pushed southward to a distance of
10 kilometers, clashed with some Egyptian tanks and managed to destroy one of
the Egyptian missile bases
Egyptian missiles . Israeli tank raids on Egyptian surface-to-air missile (SAM)
bases were successful
were successful in achieving their goal, and from the next morning, General Adan
was able to
A comprehensive attack in the direction of the west and south, supported by the
direct aid of the air force
1 of Israel.

On October 18, the Egyptian air force made a major effort to hit the head of the
bridgehead
1 of Israel west of the canal, and its attacks were concentrated on the Pontoon
ferry bridge north of the Bitter Lake
Al-Kubra . Three waves of MiGs carried out successive attacks on the Israeli
bridge
and some bridges over the Suez Canal that had been seized by the Israelis. There
were
fierce air battles in which Egyptian MiG-21 fighter-bombers clashed with
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Israeli Mirage and Phantom 4 planes in the air and large numbers of planes were
shot down
both sides. Israeli sources reported that five Egyptian helicopters at low
altitude
carried out a suicide attack on the Israeli bridge over the canal, dropping
napalm-filled barrels on it
filled with napalm. Although most of these planes were shot down, it was the
only time
during the war that helicopters were used in direct combat.

On the evening of October 18, General Adan radioed Motiv's report to
General Junin, commander of the Southern Command, with the results of his units'
operations
on the west bank of the canal. Since he was looking to make a successful
breakthrough to the south
as of October 19, he asked his superior to send him the armored brigade led by
Colonel Aryeh
(from Adan's division formation), which Junin was holding on the east bank to
serve
as a general reserve for the Southern Command. General Junin agreed to his
request without objection. And on

early on the morning of October 19, Aryeh's brigade had completed its crossing to the west of the canal. General Adan had completed the formation of his division and had more than 250 tanks under his command fit for combat.

Beginning on the morning of October 19, as General Adan's division pushed south in the direction of Suez toward Suez, his forces came face to face for the first time with Third Army forces that consisted mainly units from the 4th Armored Division, which was commanded by Brig. Gen. Mohamed Abdel Aziz Kabil and the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Abul Fath Muharram, the two divisions that were allocated according to the plan to secure the Third Army's tactical perimeter. the Third Army's tactical range, but the General Command distributed the units of the two divisions which led to their weakening and thus to the weakening of the Third Army's tactical reserve. Third Army's tactical reserve, as will be explained in detail later.

On the morning of October 19, General Adan advanced west and south with two brigades (Nitka's and Gabi's) and Aryeh's armored brigade in reserve. The operations of General Adan's brigades on the West Bank proceeded as follows:

The Netka Brigade rushed in the direction of al-Kharb, north of Wasla Abu Sultan (the Israelis called it codenamed Tanasa5) to reach the high heaths northeast of the intersection of

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The two Abu Sultan-Abusweir links (the Israelis used to code-name them %4Lallah. 25 On the way, he engaged the field artillery brigade of the 32nd Mechanized Infantry Division whose bunkers were located west of the Malasri defense position at the intersection of the Treaty Roads - Abu Sultan Abu Sultan, which was occupied by the remaining battalion of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. After a battle that lasted about three hours, and despite the losses suffered by the Israeli tanks, the battle ended with the destruction of the artillery brigade. The artillery brigade was destroyed and its remnants retreated to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection. The brigade Nitka's brigade then veered south on the Abu Sawir junction to the Egypt-Suez road, and soon It soon encountered fierce resistance at the intersection of the Abu Sawir junction with the Fayed road coming from the direction of the Great Bitter Lake The Great Bitter. A battalion of the 2nd Armored Brigade (from the 4th Armored Division) was occupying a strong defensive position a strong defense at Wadi al-Ashra and Wadi Abu Talh on the high ground northwest of the intersection (the Israelis codenamed it 8%65N.) Faced with the strength of the Malassar position, Nitka Nitka called for help from his commander, General Adan, who sent him an armored battalion from Colonel Aryeh's brigade (Colonel Aryeh's reserve brigade Reserve Brigade), which held the Egyptian resistance while Nitka diverted his armored brigade to the east and advanced on the Fayed-Bitter Lake road (which the Israelis called codename Mansah 4Z). During the advance, Nitka folded up the scattered Egyptian resistance that had gotten in his way in his path and was able to capture the landing ground north of Fayed Airport.

Gajabi Brigade: Advancing in a westerly direction south of the Abu Sultan junction and avoiding a battalion of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade that was still occupying the defensive position west of the Abu Sultan Treaty junction, and soon veered to the southeast. As it approached an Egyptian SAM position, it fired a missile on a flat trajectory (a first during the war), the missile flew over the advancing force and landed far to the rear, about 1.5 kilometers from the advanced command center General Abraham Adan's forward command center. The forward armored battalion of Gabi's brigade advanced from the north to the south along the Suez Canal on the axis of the Treaty Road (the Israelis called it the 27th) towards Fayed, but was quickly repulsed by strong Egyptian resistance defending Fayed airport and the city of Fayed.

Aryeh Brigade: After crossing the Suez Canal on the morning of October 19, Gen. Gonen in reserve and assigned him the task of securing the left flank and rear of the division's units.

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On the afternoon of October 19, General Adan ordered the Nitka and Aryeh Brigades to make a flanking maneuver on the right and advance to Jebel Geneva to occupy it and organize its defense before the Egyptian forces have a chance to reach it. The two armored brigades advanced toward Jebel Geneifa on two separate axes, destroying several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites along the way located along the western slopes of Jebel Geneifa.

Kalman Magen's Brigade: General Kalman Magen's division consisted of two armored brigades commanded by Colonels Dan and Barum and a mechanized infantry brigade commanded by Colonel Pinchas. On the night of October 18/19 to the West Bank. The mission assigned to the division by General Gonen as of the morning of October 19 was to clear the pockets of resistance left behind by Adan's division left behind during its rapid southward push.

Objectives of the Israeli armored divisions west of the Canal

On the morning of October 19, Israeli forces west of the Canal consisted of three armored divisions: General Ariel Sharon's division, General Adan's division, and General Gonen's division. These divisions continued their operations to achieve their objectives according to the plan on two main axes:

The northern axis; the Ismailia axis, which was operated by General Sharon's division and its borders Abu Sultan, and the direction of his advance north along the Suez Canal on the Treaty Road and facing from Lake Crocodile in the east to Nafisha in the west. Sharon's objective was to cross the Ismailia Canal and capture the city of Ismailia. The only Egyptian forces facing Sharon's division on this axis, south of the Ismailia Tributary, were the 182nd Brigade Parachute Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ismail Azmy, and two Thunderbolt

battalions. We will explain the battles that took place on the northern axis after completing the study of the battles and serious events that took place on the southern axis that took place on the southern axis.

The southern axis; the Suez axis was operated by the divisions of General Adan and General Magen. Its northern border was the Abu Sultan link, and General Adan's division, consisting of three armored brigades, was considered the main effort on this axis, and the direction of its advance was from the north to

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south on the treaty road west of the western shore of the Bitter Lakes. Its ultimate objective was to capture the city of Suez, the fall of which was expected to cause a huge bang on a global scale globally, and at the same time complete the siege ring around the Third Army's Field.

General Magen's division was moving across the open ground of Masnah and Wahh in a west and south to protect the flank and rear of Adan's division. Its ultimate goal was to cut off the Cairo-Suez North Road (Road 12) and then the Cairo-Suez Main Road, thereby isolating the city of Suez and the Third Army the city of Suez and the Third Army would be cut off from their supply route with Cairo. Facing the forces of the units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Muharram, and the 4th Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General H.H. Muhammad Abdel Aziz Qabil.

How the Third Army's tactical reserve was dispersed

The Third Army's forces west of the canal, which made up the army's tactical reserve, consisted of consisted of the 6th Mechanized Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions. According to proper tactical methods the units of these two divisions were supposed to be grouped and concentrated in preparation for any counterattack. the main counterattack of Asam Asnah Sada'ah at the army level to repel any enemy penetration of the Egyptian defenses east of the canal Egyptian defenses east of the canal. However, the General Command overlooked the basic tactical principles of utilizing tactical reserves at the army level. Instead of retaining sub-units of the armored and mechanized infantry divisions west of the canal were grouped under the control of their commanders to allow the commanders of the of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to conduct a major counterattack at the army level to destroy any enemy force any enemy force that succeeds in penetrating the Egyptian defenses east of the canal and crossing to the west, as happened on the night of October 15/16, during which an Israeli force crossed to the west of the canal at Dafraswar, we find that The General Command distributed and dispersed the tactical reserve units east and west of the canal. So much so that the commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division found himself since the morning of October 9 in the division's command center in the Jafra area, south of Jabal Oweid, alone except for a few elements of the Divisional Command, without any of his divisional units under his command. This action by the

General Command, in addition to its distribution of most of the strategic reserve units stationed under its control in Cairo, which is supposed to be ready for the counterstrike. 456 :

Blow er in the event that the main counterattacks at the infantry level failed, is a clear indication

clear evidence that the General Command never expected the enemy to penetrate the Malasian defenses east of the canal

east of the canal and then cross to the west to establish a bridgehead on the west bank of the canal.

This is completely inconsistent with the farsightedness required of those in charge of the command.

To illustrate the extent of the dispersion of the tactical reserve forces, we will limit ourselves to operations at this stage

The situation of the 6th Mechanized Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions, which made up the Tactical Reserve

of the Third Army's tactical reserve:

6th Mechanized Infantry Division: It consisted mainly of the 22nd Armored Brigade, the 1st Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade, the 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the division's artillery brigade. As a result of the distribution of all

and placed under other commands, the division commander became a commander without a division.

de facto non-existent and effectively turned into independent brigades, thereby defeating the original purpose of its formation with this organization.

The main objective of its formation with this organization, and it lost its characteristics as a mechanized infantry division.

The division's units were distributed in the following way:

22nd Armored Brigade: Although it is the main striking force in the division, it was placed from the beginning of the war

under the command of the 19th Infantry Division, and crossed with it to the east of the canal, where it took its positions

at the division's bridgehead

- 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade: Assigned to attack Ras Sidr on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez

He crossed the canal on the night of October 8/9, and after failing in his mission

it was ordered to be placed under the command of the 19th Infantry Division with the task of securing the areas of Oyoum Moussa

and Ras Masla.

- 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade: With two battalions, it was occupying a defensive sector in the Bir Adib area

to the west of the Gulf of Suez, carrying orders from the Third Army command.

The remaining

The brigade's remaining mechanized infantry battalion was stationed at the entrance to Wadi Hajjoul from the north

at kilometer marker 85 on the Cairo-Suez road.

Division Artillery Brigade: It formed the artillery group of the Oak Mechanized Infantry Brigade and was

in its positions east of the canal at the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead.

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4th Armored Division: It consisted mainly of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Brigades, the 6th Brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the division's artillery brigade.

of the Army's tactical reserve and its main effort in any counterattack

army-wide, the division commander at his command center in Jafra had only the 2nd Brigade under his command

As of October 13, only the 2nd Armored Brigade was under his command, and the

rest of the division's units were scattered east and west of the canal and west of the canal. When the General Command realized the deterioration of the situation west of the canal at a time when when it had no tactical or strategic reserves at the front, it planned to use the 4th Armored Division as a tactical reserve. planned to use the 4th Armored Division as a strategic reserve after reinforcing it with the Republican Guard (its last reserve) to carry out the counterstrike. When when it became clear that the division commander had only one armored brigade at his disposal, she began to move the division's units distributed between the east of the canal and the middle range to return urgently to the On the afternoon of October 20, it sent a liaison officer to the division commander to understand its position in terms of to the division commander to understand its situation in terms of its next status and efficiency. Brig. Gen. A.H. Muhammad Abdel Aziz Qabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division, could not risk using his own units in a command-level counterstrike, on which the future of the war depended, without first without first reassembling them to raise their combat efficiency, so he asked the General Command to give him at least 48 hours. at least 48 hours' notice. The division's lack of readiness to counterstrike immediately due to the misallocation of its units in the previous phase was the reason for canceling the counterstrike operation on October 21 October 21, and it was too late for the counterstrike. The situation of the 4th Armored Division on October 19 was as follows: The division command and the 2nd Armored Brigade in the Jafra area. -Third Armored Brigade (except for a battalion): East of the canal and acting as a reserve in the hands of the commander of the Third Army Third Army. The remaining armored battalion of the brigade is under the command of the 7th Infantry Division.

- 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. . It secures the army's medium range in the area of kilometer 109 Cairo-Suez road, and operates under the orders of the Third Army Command.

Division Artillery Brigade. Operates in support of the 7th Infantry Division and occupies its positions east of the canal inside the division's bridgehead.

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When the General Command realized that it was impossible for the Third Army commander to mount a major counterattack army-wide counterattack to destroy the Israeli armored forces rushing into his range due to the lack of reserves that he could push in this operation, on October 19 it issued urgent instructions to the October 19 urgently instructed the Third Army command to withdraw most of the units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry and 4th Armored Divisions from their positions east of the canal to return to the west of the canal to be placed under command of the two divisions. Despite the withdrawal of these units from the east to the west, the the divisional commanders were unable to conduct any major counterattacks against the enemy, as it was not possible to the regrouping process so that the units could regain their combat efficiency while the Israeli armored forces the Israeli armored forces were rapidly pushing their way into the tactical perimeter. The 6th Infantry Division

The 22nd Armored Brigade remained in place east of the canal. The commander of the 4th Armored Division was stationed in the north at the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection, far from the away from the Jafra area, and under his command the units of the 2nd Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) in their defensive positions after the General Command assigned him on the afternoon of October 18 the responsibility of securing the tactical perimeter of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Armored Brigades together. the tactical range of the 2nd and 3rd armies together, making it limited to counterattacks. with no more than an armored or mechanized infantry battalion. The purpose became limited to repelling, stopping or disrupting the enemy, and not, of course, destroying it. and eliminate it.

Moreover, some operations officers from the Third Army Command were issuing instructions to troops returning from the east of the canal at the crossings to direct them directly to their new and at the same time assigning them combat tasks without the commanders knowing divisions about the status and tasks of their sub-units returning from east of the canal, which led to a clear weakening of command and control. command and control was clearly weakened. The speed and haste that characterized the process of The speed and haste with which units were assembled and assigned to the counterattack led to the mixing of units and the lack of homogeneity homogeneity, overlapping commands, and overlapping sectors, making it difficult to determine acquisitions

Instructions were issued to assemble the units for the counterattack as follows:

6th Mechanized Infantry Division: The 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (except for one battalion) mobilizes from the Bir sector Adib on the night of October 19/20 to relieve the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 4th Armored Division to return

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6th Mechanized Brigade to the Jafra area, thus making the 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was responsible for securing the intermediate position at kilometer marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road. At At 7:00 p.m. on October 20, the 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was instructed to Mechanized Infantry Brigade (except for a battalion), reinforced by an armored battalion from the 4th Armored Division, was instructed to attack the the heights of Jabal Geneifa and the Jamous Dam valley at night, with the infantry working in small groups on foot in front of the tanks in front of the tanks in order to cling to the ground and secure it from anti-tank missiles. anti-tank missiles. On October 20, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade crossed to the west of the canal. A mechanized infantry battalion from the brigade, supported by the brigade's tank battalion, was tasked with capturing the A mechanized infantry battalion was tasked with securing the intersection of the Geneva Road and the Cairo-Suez North Road. while the remaining mechanized infantry battalion occupies a blocking line between the canal road and the treaty road south of Habiballah camp, and when the situation in the 6th Division sector deteriorated Mechanized Infantry, the commander of the 22nd Armored Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Division) was instructed

Mechanized) was instructed to move at the head of an armored battalion from his brigade and cross to the west of the canal at first light on October 22 at first light on October 22 to join the 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade's sector for a counterattack in the direction of Jebel Ghara.

4th Armored Division: On the evening of October 19, General Headquarters was instructed to bring back

4 Armored Division units on the east bank and in the medium range to the Jafra area

to regroup in preparation for the counter-strike operation. Based on these instructions, the 3rd Armored Brigade

Armored Brigade began moving at first light on October 20 to cross the canal to the west. While returning

to the Jafra area, the brigade was instructed to withdraw an armored battalion from the brigade to support the 131st Brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Division) in an attack on Jebel Geneifa. It was

On October 17, the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (4th Armored Division) had sent

Third Army Command sent a mechanized infantry battalion from the brigade to the Kasfreet area to protect the army's left flank and prevent the enemy from advancing on

left flank and prevent the enemy from advancing on the treaty road.

When the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (excluding Katia) returned to the Jafra area after the 113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Infantry Brigade changed its position in the intermediate position, and after the cancellation of the counterstrike operation, the

the 6th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was instructed to move with the remaining tank battalion of the 2nd Armored Brigade in Jafra.

of the remaining 2nd Armored Brigade in Jafra with the mission of destroying enemy tanks attempting to infiltrate between

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gaps in our defensive positions, aiming to destroy Egyptian surface-to-air missile sites.

as well as the tanks that are trying to capture the heights to control our forces in the area of Jabal

in cooperation with the 113th Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division) assigned to the attack.

Mechanized Brigade) assigned to counterattack to the east of the 6th Mechanized Brigade's sector (from the 4th Armored Division).

Battles west of the Canal before the cease-fire

I. General Abraham Adan's division: The division's units advanced in a southerly direction according to the following pattern as follows:

Gabi's Brigade: The armored brigade led by Colonel Gabi advanced south along the western shore of the Bitter Lakes

the western shore of the Bitter Lakes on the treaty road with its main force, and due to the Egyptian resistance

General Adan provided him with the supplies he had received from the Southern Command.

A battalion of infantry and a battalion of military engineers. With this

the armored brigade continued its advance toward Fayed, which was considered one of the most important military objectives on this axis.

military objectives on this axis, as it contained Fayed airport, a large area of Egyptian army camps, and the city of Fayed itself.

Egyptian army camps and the city of Fayed itself, which was inhabited by a number of civilians. The Egyptian force defending Fayed

The Egyptian force defending Fayed, led by Colonel Hussein Hosni, who was assigned Colonel Hussein Hosni, to whom Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly had given command responsibility, succeeded in halting the advance of Gabi's forces throughout the day on October 19. At 7:00 p.m., however, Colonel Gabi succeeded in dislodging the Malassian resistance that had been defending the Fayed airfield that was defending Fayed Airport and had blown up its facilities before retreating to the south. He informed Lieutenant General Shazly, who was in the forward command center of the Second Army that Fayed's forces had withdrawn under Haddu's pressure at 10:00 a.m. on October 20. The Egyptian resistance to the advance of Gabi's brigade west of the Bitter Lakes during this period were weak groups of administrative units or the rear of Egyptian units on the east bank. the rear of Egyptian units on the east bank, as well as some formed by the Military Intelligence Office in Fayed and equipped with weapons and rockets.

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anti-tank missiles, such as al-Sibai and al-Manisi, as well as remnants of Palestinian and Kuwaiti forces that were tasked with Palestinian and Kuwaiti forces that had been assigned since the beginning of the war to protect the western shore of the Bitter Lakes of the Bitter Lakes and withdrew to the south after the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal. With the fall of Fayed Airport to Gabi's brigade, the Israelis had the opportunity to establish an air bridgehead on the west bank of the Canal. air bridge on the west bank of the canal, and the Israeli Southern Command was able to provide its forces on the West Bank with urgent supplies and supplies by helicopter, as well as evacuate the wounded quickly to the eastern bank. quickly evacuate the wounded to the eastern bank. Nitka Brigade and Aryeh Brigade: While Gabi's brigade was advancing southward on the on the axis of the Treaty Road, the two armored brigades commanded by Colonels Nitka and Aryeh, as instructed by On the afternoon of October 19, the two armored brigades under the command of General Adan made a flanking movement from the direction of Al-Farb to the south in the direction of In the afternoon of October 19, the two armored brigades led by Colonels Nitka and Aryeh, in accordance with General Adan's instructions Alhambra. The forward elements of Nitka's and Aryeh's brigades were able to reach the the heights of Jebel Geneva on the morning of October 2. This had a major impact on the course of operations in the coastal sector, due to the tactical importance of this mountain from the point of view of its supervision and control of all roads and land structures in this sector and its extension to to the east and south. It was the duty of the Egyptian command to precede the Israeli forces in capturing this vital objective instead of the delay that occurred which led to the assignment of the 113th Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division) and a battalion from the 3rd Armored Brigade Armored Brigade (from the 4th Armored Division) to attack at dawn on October 21 to capture Jebel Geneifa. Despite their losses, the Egyptian forces were unable to achieve their objective. Before dawn on October 22, General Adan received a radio message from General Junin that there would be a ceasefire after 6:00 p.m. on the same day.

This news galvanized General Adan to make every effort to cross the western shore of the Bitter Lakes as quickly as possible of the Bitter Lakes as quickly as possible to reach the original course of the canal south of the lakes about 23 kilometers from the city of Suez, a goal that General Adan had hoped to reach before the ceasefire. Adan had hoped to reach before the ceasefire. In order to achieve this great goal, General Adan assembled his three brigades and rushed
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southward, using the tactic of swooping tanks to carry the Malassian forces blocking his advance to flee from their defensive positions due to the terror of the the terror of a tank attack. Although this tactic was highly successful during the June War 67, it caused a terrible disaster for the Israelis, especially when used in the first phase of the October War, and led to heavy losses in Israeli tanks as a result of the steadfastness of the Egyptian infantry forces Egyptian infantry forces withstood the Israeli tanks and used Malotka rockets and 7-3 grenades from short distances short distances

According to General Adan's instructions, the three armored brigades, Gabi on the right, Nitka in the in the center and Arbeh on the left, the division launched its full-scale attack on a wide front in the direction of the south. The Israeli tanks used a swooping tactic, rushing toward the Egyptian positions as fast as they could, avoiding Egyptian positions as quickly as possible, avoiding areas of high resistance to ensure rapid progress, but the the swooping tactic was not as successful as it was in the '67 war, as Israeli tanks encountered fierce Egyptian resistance Israeli tanks collided with fierce Egyptian resistance, which slowed down the speed of their advance towards the south significantly clearly. During this phase, poorly armed and fortified Egyptian units were unable to do more than disrupt the armored advance to do more than disrupt the Israeli armored advance to the south, as the enemy was was vastly superior in the number of tanks, in addition to the direct air support that was 0 used to destroy any resistance to its advance, leading to the destruction of entire Egyptian units entire Egyptian units.

Despite his superiority, General Adan was unable to reach the Suez Canal south of the Bitter Lakes the Suez Canal south of the Bitter Lakes when the ceasefire came at 6:52 p.m. 6:52 p.m. on October 22.

Second, General Kalman Magen's corps, whose units pushed westward and southward on the morning of October 20 and south after having captured the intersection of the treaty road and the Abu Sultan road the day before (codenamed Ta'at by the Israelis) and the Abu Sawir-Abu Sultan junction (codenamed code name 3525A3) and the armored brigade under the command of Colonel Dan Shimron the division's right-hand brigade, reached 20 to 25 kilometers west of the Bitter Lakes. And advanced General Magen's forces advanced in a southeasterly direction by way of passes

and across open ground

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CrossCountry and captured Jebel Ghara, a vital position that completely dominates the northern Cairo-Suez road less than two kilometers from the northern Cairo-Suez road, known as Route 12 (the Israeli code name is 5M). It also captured the Wadi Jamous Dam, which has two entrances from the south that lead to Gil Geneifa in the east and Jabal Ghara in the west. To the west, an armored force from the Magen Division advanced and captured the Zalut hill, which is no more than 5 km from the intersection of the Geneifa junction with the Cairo-Suez highway (the codename for the road for several Israelis) at kilometer marker 105.

Security Council Resolution 3228 ceasefire

At around 7:00 a.m. on October 22, Cairo time, the Security Council issued Security Council Resolution No. 338 on the ceasefire, which included the following three paragraphs:

I: Calling on all parties involved in the current fighting to cease fire and to immediately cease all military activity, to be completed no later than 12 hours after the issuance of this resolution
In the positions currently occupied by these parties.

Secondly: Calling on the parties concerned to begin immediately after the ceasefire to implement Security Council Resolution 242 in all its parts.
Security Council Resolution No. 242 in all its parts

Third: Begin immediate negotiations between the parties concerned while the ceasefire is in place
ceasefire under appropriate supervision, with a view to achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Security Council Resolution 338 was the result of significant political contacts that began as early as the first week of the war between the two sides. that began as early as the second week of the war between Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow and US President Richard Nixon in Washington, and the center of communication between them was Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador in Moscow. Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and U.S. Secretary of State for Israel, Henry Kissinger. At Brezhnev's urgent invitation, Kissinger traveled to Moscow on October 20 and began talks with Brezhnev on the morning of October 21 October 21, which culminated in the joint Soviet-American draft resolution that was approved by the Security Council and issued on the morning of October 22

by the Security Council on the morning of October 22 as Resolution No. 338.
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In Tel Aviv on the evening of October 21, Prime Minister Golda Meir called a meeting of the Cabinet meeting, where she presented US President Nixon's letter requesting approval of the to the Soviet-American draft Security Council resolution that he had attached to

his letter
to his letter. During the midnight meeting, the draft resolution was unanimously approved
draft resolution. As soon as the resolution was broadcast on the morning of October 22, Israel immediately announced
immediately announced its approval.

In Cairo, Sadat held several meetings with Soviet Ambassador to Cairo Vladimir Vinogradov
Vladimir Vinogradov . On October 21, the Soviet ambassador presented a lengthy letter from President Brezhnev
Brezhnev in which he detailed his talks with Kissinger in Moscow and attached to the letter
a draft Soviet-American resolution to be adopted by the Security Council, and called on Sadat to
approve it. In the 2:30 p.m. news bulletin on October 22, Radio Cairo announced that President Sadat had agreed to a ceasefire in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338
Security Council . Lt. Gen. Ahmed Ismail, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
sent a statement to all armed forces formations outlining President Sadat's order
Sadat as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to cease fire at 6:00 p.m. fifty-two minutes past six o'clock on October 22, if the enemy commits to a ceasefire at that time
at this time.

A few minutes before the ceasefire and on the order of the late President Sadat Egyptian forces fired two Scud 17 long-range missiles at the enemy in the Al-Defreswar area.

When the cease-fire took effect on the evening of October 22, the divisions of Generals Adan and Magen, in the southern sector of Israeli operations west of the canal, had
had occupied an area extending from Wasla Abu Sultan in the north for about 20 kilometers west of the Bitter Lakes
westward and the line from the southern part of the shore of the Lesser Bitter Lake to the intersection of the Geneva junction
with the Cairo-Suez North Road (Road 12 and the extension of the road thereafter to Kharb.
A small armored force of the Magen Division was threatening fire from the heights north of the
kilometer 105 traffic on the main Cairo-Suez road.

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But Israeli forces were not in complete control of the captured area. There were still Egyptian units within it that the Israeli armored forces had evaded during their
in their rapid push southward. Because of the overlap of Egyptian and Israeli forces in this area
area, both sides were threatening each other's lines of communication.

Following the ceasefire, the Israelis were deeply disappointed
Despite their armored push to the south and the direct air support provided by the Israeli air force
the Israeli air force to destroy Egyptian resistance to their advance, and despite
avoiding significant Egyptian resistance during their advance, they did not succeed in reaching the
the beginning of the main course of the canal south of the Lesser Bitter Lake, about 25 kilometers north of Suez

kilometers north of Suez, meaning that their plan to isolate Suez and besiege the Third Army which they intended to negotiate with Egypt from a position of strength after the cease-fire in order to dictate their terms failed. These intentions are clearly evident in the memoirs of Defense Minister of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, in which he said: "In the early hours of October 22, I urged General Bar-Lev on the need to capture Mount Ataqa in the area west of the Gulf of Suez. This would give us complete military control over the area from Ismailia to the Gulf of Suez. to the Gulf of Suez, and would also thwart any possibility of circumventing Israeli forces west of the Canal. west of the Canal2 .

The Israeli push to the south under the ceasefire

There was no difficulty for the Israelis to achieve their intended goals, as it was easy for them to It was easy for them to find a justification that would allow them to resume their military operations, namely claiming that the Third Army forces had violated the ceasefire and were firing on their forces fire on their troops. Generals Adan and Magen received a directive from the Southern Command on the evening of October 22 on the evening of October 22 to observe the ceasefire if the Egyptians respected it, but if they did not to complete their assigned missions.

It was clear from the style of the directive that the Southern Command had given them the required authorization. and gave them the green light to push their forces south to complete the mission they were eager to accomplish which they were eager to accomplish, namely encircling the Third Army and isolating the city of Suez, the directive did not 466

did not give them the right to respond to Egyptian fire in kind if it was fired at their forces, which is usual in such situations rather, it called on them to complete the tasks assigned to them, and the difference between the two situations.

Since the Israelis had no intention of stopping the fighting before achieving the goals they had set Therefore, on the night of October 22/23, Generals Adan and Magen coordinated on the plan to be implemented on the morning of October 22/23 to be implemented starting on the morning of October 23. They agreed that Adan's division would advance south along the Canal and Treaty Roads with the aim of isolating Suez by cutting off communication between Suez and Cairo to the west and the road to the Gulf of Suez to the south. To give sufficient depth of encirclement, General Magen was to advance his division on the right of Adan's division and pass through the western part of the division's sector in order to reach the port of Adabiya, which is located about 15 kilometers south of Cairo. about 15 kilometers south of Suez. On the night of October 22/23, after after Israel claimed that Egyptian forces had violated the cease-fire, the operations of Adan's and Magen's divisions towards the south as follows:

General Adan's division: General Adan was keen to secure his lines of communication while as his forces pushed south toward Suez. Since some pockets of Egyptian resistance overlapped with his his forces in a way that threatened his march south, he instructed to quickly clear the treaty road and the surrounding cultivated area Treaty Road and the surrounding cultivated area from Egyptian forces, in the sector between Fayed between Fayed and Shalufa (it was 35 kilometers long). During the night, General Adan received infantry supplies sent to him mostly from the Syrian front, where active fighting had ceased more than a week ago were transported by helicopters and buses. By combining the new supplies with the two battalions that had arrived on October 20, Gen. Adan was able to form a five-battalion infantry brigade that moved with multiple modes of transportation, including half-track armored vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and autorickshaws. Adan assigned command of the command of this brigade to the division's second-in-command, General Dovik Tamari, leaving Adan's division with three armored brigades and a light infantry brigade. During the night of 22/23, the engineer battalion of the Adan Division cleared the Canal Road (Israeli code name 4A) up to the Sulphur to the south. Adan intended to complete the clearance of the rest of the western shore of the lakes as far south as Shalufa to make it easier for him to push most of his forces toward Suez

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At dawn on October 23, General Adan's division, with its four brigades, began to complete the clearing the western shore of the Bitter Lakes. Due to the difficult terrain and the tenacity of the Egyptian resistance Egyptian resistance, the rate of movement was slow in all brigade sectors. Fearing a second a second Security Council resolution stabilizing the ceasefire before his forces could isolate the city of Suez, General Adan assigned the task of completing the clearing operation to the Netka and Dovik brigades Tamari and pushed his other two armored brigades southward, placing Gabi's brigade on the right, west of the Treaty Road (codenamed i4 by the Israelis) and Ariebe's brigade on the left, parallel to the Suez Canal. Suez. By avoiding the significant resistance that was blocking the advance and using rapid tank assault tactics, the two armored brigades succeeded in forcing their way forward quickly through Egyptian positions and camps, most of which consisted of Chthon units administrative units, units from the Territorial Army and the rear of units on the east bank of the canal and convalescent camps, which allowed the Israeli forces to seize at this stage large quantities of weapons, equipment, warehouses, and thousands of prisoners, including a large number of civilians. including a large number of civilians. At nightfall, after heavy fighting along the axis of advance, the two armored brigades the two armored brigades reached the outskirts of Suez city from the west at the intersection of the Treaty Road with the Cairo-Suez highway. Colonel Gabi, the commander of the armored brigade

on the
placed a small force of his tanks just west of Suez and at the entrance to the
main road leading to Cairo
to Cairo to isolate it from the west, while an armored battalion from his
brigade advanced along the Gulf of
Suez, where it captured the old oil refineries in Zaitiya, about 5 kilometers
southwest of Suez.
southwest of Suez, thus isolating the city of Suez from the road leading to the
Gulf.

General Magen's division: Magen's division moved from north to south in his
sector of operations
to the west of General Adan's division, and his main forces were able to reach
the Cairo-Suez road
and joined his advanced elements that were occupying some of the governing
positions north of the road. After
Magen stationed a small unit of tanks at the now-famous
kilometer marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road in order to secure his division's
right flank from any counterattacks from the direction of Cairo.
against any counterattacks from the direction of Cairo, Magen moved his forces
eastward on the axis of the Cairo-Suez road
The number of tanks of his two armored brigades had dropped from 180 tanks to
about
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50 tanks, as a result of the losses he suffered in the face of fierce Egyptian
resistance
after his division crossed to the West Bank on the night of October 18/19 and
during its advance from the
Dafraswar area until it reached the Cairo-Suez road on October 23 after the
ceasefire decision
ceasefire.

Just before sunset, Magen's tanks crossed through Gabi's brigade, Adan's
auxiliary brigade
and headed across the open terrain to the northeastern slopes of Jebel Ataqa.
After his tanks turned on their searchlights, Magen's forces made contact with
an Israeli airborne force that managed to occupy the northern slopes of Ataqa.
They were able to occupy the northeastern slopes of Mount Ataqa, which overlooks
the entire area
all the way to Suez City and the Gulf of Niswis. This force was able to seize an
electronic warning station
electronic warning station on the mountain. Magen's Forward Division continued
its advance
in the direction of the eastern flank until they reached the old chemical
fertilizer factory on the Gulf of Suez
about 3 kilometers south of the Zaytiyah area.

General Magen assigned Colonel Dan Shimron, commander of the armored brigade on
the extreme right
of his forces, whose number of tanks had dropped from about 90 tanks to only 17
tanks due to heavy losses
which had suffered heavy losses during the fierce battles with Egyptian units.
He assigned him
to advance to the port of Adabiya, which is located on the Gulf of Suez, about
15 kilometers south of the city of Suez
Suez city. Dan Shimron set off with his tanks with all their searchlights lit up
as if they were in a night parade.
A night parade, none of the Egyptians could have imagined that a column of tanks
traveling
as a single train on the asphalt road was an Israeli tank column because the
tanks were not
shooting at no one and no one was shooting at them.

The Egyptian naval garrison in the port of Adabiya was surprised by the entry of Israeli tanks

At midnight, a short asymmetrical battle broke out between the marines and the enemy tanks.

It enabled some fast boats to escape from the harbor. In the morning, the Israelis cleared the

The Israelis cleared the port from the Malassian resistance centers and managed to capture a large number of members of the naval garrison and some

A large number of members of the naval garrison and some ships anchored in Amina, and some Israeli missile launchers entered the port, thus

The naval supply route linking Suez to the Gulf was cut off and the city has been isolated since midnight on October 24/23

Since midnight on October 23/24, the city has been completely isolated from Egyptian territory west of the canal.

As General Gonen was very concerned that the armored elements would be exposed to

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left behind by General Magen to block the main road between Suez and Cairo to an Egyptian counterattack from the west, the commander of the Southern Command ordered Gen.

Magen to leave a small garrison at Adabi and to return with his main forces back to the Cairo-Cairo road

Suez. When Magen's tanks reached the Israeli post at kilometer marker

101, they turned west toward Cairo to try to gain a few more kilometers of road to secure the division's right flank, but after eight kilometers they ran into an Egyptian position

which was occupied by armored elements of the 3rd Brigade of the 4th Armored Division.

A fierce battle took place throughout the night that ended with the Israeli tanks retreating and refusing to continue advancing in the direction of Al-Ghob .

Egyptian actions after Israel violated the ceasefire

At the time of the ceasefire on the evening of October 22, the 4th Armored Division

Armored Division, whose commander was tasked by the General Command with securing the tactical perimeter of the Second and Third Armies

Its units had occupied a line 5 km east of the general line at the intersection of

Othman Ahmed Othman Wadi Abu TalhJabal Um Kuthayb - White Rim Mashash al-Bahara Oweibed Mountain (about 70 km away), and at 11:00 a.m. on October 23, the

General Command was instructed

October 23, instructions were issued from the General Command through the Second Army Command to Brig. Gen.

1.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi to move only the 21st Armored Division from its position east of the canal to the

Osman Ahmed Osman intersection, to take over the responsibility of securing the Second Army's expressive range from

Brigadier General A.H. Mohamed Abdel Aziz Kabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division, who was to return to his original sector in the Third Army.

securing his original sector in the Third Army as before. Under the command of Brig. Gen.

The 23rd Armored Brigade, which is being completed, and a tank battalion from the 2nd Armored Brigade (from the 4th Armored Division)

Armored Division) a parachute battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, and an engineer battalion from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division.

At 3:00 p.m., Brigadier General Orabi took charge of his new command west of the canal on a

A front of about 35 kilometers, but the enemy did not have any activity on this

front.

In the Third Army sector west of the canal, after the Israelis violated the ceasefire

General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, tried to secure the Cairo-Suez highway

which Israeli positions north of the road were threatening traffic, so he issued instructions

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At 2:00 a.m. on October 23, the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division's commander instructed the

113th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (except for a battalion) under the command of the tank battalion of the 22nd Armored Brigade, at first light on October 23 at first light on October 23 to retake the heights of Jabal Janifa and the eastern entrance to Wadi Dam

A mechanized infantry battalion from the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, supported by a

a thunderbolt battalion to retake the Zaltiya hill, and the 1st Mechanized Brigade to form an armored force to destroy enemy tanks north of the kilometer marker.

enemy tanks north of kilometer marker 105 on the Cairo-Suez road, while the remaining elements of the brigade

the remaining elements of the brigade would push into Suez to secure its entrances. However, these tasks could not be

to be carried out due to the small number of forces that remained after the fierce battles fought by the units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division

6 Mechanized Infantry Division in the previous three days against the enemy's armored forces, which were overwhelmingly outnumbered

overwhelmingly superior in terms of the number of tanks and firepower, with Israeli aircraft

were destroying any resistance to their advance. The erosion of Egyptian units had reached such an extent

that the commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division had to go himself and the division's chief of operations to escort the

the small force that could be organized from the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade to open the Cairo-Suez road

Suez at kilometer marker 105, which consisted of six tanks and two Malotka Nimr anti-tank vehicles, i.e. just an armored platoon.

The most serious events that took place in the Third Army sector west of the canal on October 23

Enemy tanks stormed the Third Army's advanced command center. The command center, located

northwest of Suez had been subjected to heavy air raids since the morning of October 23

throughout the day, which led to the destruction of some parts of the command center, in addition to the threat it was exposed to as a result of

information that Israeli tanks were advancing from the north towards Suez

When the commander of the Third Army informed the 10th General Headquarters of the awkward situation

General Ahmed Ismail ordered the army's advanced command center to be moved to the

to the main command center in the rear, south of Jebel Oweibad, and to cancel the advanced command center.

form a command group to move to the east bank of the canal to command the 7th and 91st Infantry Divisions. He ordered

Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, ordered the formation of a command group headed by Major General

Mustafa Shahin, Chief of Staff of the Third Army, along with some officers from the Army Operations Division

to move to the honorable bank to take command of the two divisions in accordance

with the General Commander's instructions.
However, the command group was unable to move to the East Bank as planned. At sunset
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As the armored brigade led by Colonel Jabi of the Adan Division was advancing in a southerly direction on October 23, its tanks southward, its tanks stormed the Third Army's advanced command center. inside the underground bunker with his assistant and the head of the operations division, as well as the commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division 6 Mechanized Infantry, who had been summoned to the command center, as well as some officers from the Operations Division and Division Command. Although there were heavy casualties among the members of the who were outside the shelter and most parts of the shelter were destroyed by the fire of the invading Israeli tanks tanks, all those inside the shelter miraculously survived, as the Israeli tanks passed within a few meters of them. The Israeli tanks passed within a few meters of them, undetected due to the darkness. The commander of the was forced to evacuate his forward command center immediately, and some of his command officers moved with him to the the main command center south of Jabal Oweibd.

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No Chapter 8a Israeli Attempts to Capture Suez

At dawn on October 23, Israel violated UN Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22 October 73 ceasefire, the two armored divisions led by Generals Abraham Adan and Kalman, with the approval of the Israeli Southern Command, advanced south toward Suez. It became clear that Israel is determined to achieve its objectives that it was unable to achieve before the ceasefire due to the valiant Egyptian resistance, namely to isolate the city of Suez and tighten the siege around the Third Field Army east of the canal, to be used as a bargaining chip during the talks that were to be held between Israel and Egypt in accordance with Security Council Resolution No. 338.

At 9:30 a.m. EDT on October 23, Kurt Waldheim called the secretary of state. Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, called U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Washington by phone, informing him that Egypt had filed a formal complaint about the Israeli violation of the ceasefire and that he was proposing to send an international emergency force to monitor the cease-fire to monitor the ceasefire.

Security Council Resolution 339 of October 23, 1973
Since Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin was still in Moscow after attending President Brezhnev and Kissinger's October 21 talks in the Soviet capital, Kissinger After Waldheim's conversation with him, Kissinger called the Soviet charge d'affaires in Washington.

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and offered him a proposal to convey to Moscow: that the Security Council meet to instruct Secretary-General Waldheim to issue an appeal
Waldheim to issue an appeal to the parties concerned to abide by the ceasefire in accordance with
Council Resolution 338.

Henry Kissinger, who, as a Jew, is a staunch supporter of Israel, used his position as US Secretary of State to
his position as US Secretary of State to provide massive aid to Israel since the beginning of the war
of the war in various fields. During his talks with Brezhnev during his trip to Moscow for a ceasefire
for a ceasefire, he deliberately wasted time and delayed the Security Council meeting in order to give
additional time for Israel to make further progress on the front line.

While he was in Moscow, Golda Meir, Israel's prime minister, telegraphed him asking him to come to Israel before he returned to Washington
to come to Israel before returning to Washington, and Kestler immediately changed his entire itinerary
To respond to the request of the President and Prime Minister of Israel, he arrived at Ben Gurion Airport at 1:00 p.m. on October 22, the day after

at 1:00 p.m. on October 22, six hours after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 338
hours .

By the time Kissinger left Israel, the ceasefire was already in effect. Kissinger recorded in his memoirs that he used his position to give Israel a green light to violate
a green light for Israel to violate the ceasefire: "In Israel, in order to gain their
their support, I indicated to them that I would understand if within a few hours of the
of the ceasefire, and those hours would slip away while I was flying back to Washington.
Kissinger's suggestion to the Soviet chargé d'affaires to commission a council of
of
. Waldheim Security Council to issue an appeal to the parties concerned to abide by the ceasefire. only
Kissinger's suggestion to the Soviet chargé d'affaires to task the Waldheim Security Council with issuing an appeal to the parties concerned to abide by the ceasefire
Israelis the opportunity they crave to achieve their goals.

But in the midst of his devious maneuvers, Kissinger forgot that the Kremlin leaders in Moscow were
were well aware of the truth of his goals and objectives in the service of Israel, and so he was surprised when the Soviet chargé d'affaires
The Soviet charge d'affaires conveyed to him an urgent memorandum addressed to him by Soviet President
Brezhnev, as this had never happened before, as Brezhnev, according to diplomatic conventions
that Brezhnev, according to diplomatic conventions, only addresses his letters to President Nixon. Kissinger immediately understood

that the Soviet president wanted to draw his attention with this letter. that he

realizes
well aware of the role he was playing behind the scenes to serve Israel.
Brezhnev recorded in his letter
that Israeli forces are moving south along the west bank of the Suez Canal, and
that these
Israeli actions are unacceptable and represent blatant deception and deceit, so
he proposes an urgent meeting of the Security Council at noon to reaffirm
urgent meeting of the Security Council at noon to reaffirm the ceasefire and
order the Israeli forces
Israeli forces to return to the positions they held at the time Resolution 338
was passed the previous day
the day before.

As soon as Kissinger received Brezhnev's message, he quickly called the Israeli
ambassador in Washington
Simcha Dinitz to inform him of this development. Within minutes, Israeli Prime
Minister Golda Meir
Prime Minister of Israel was on the phone, calling Kissinger from Tel Aviv.
Kissinger told her that
that the United States would not be able to veto a draft resolution that the
Soviet Union
to the Security Council for the return of belligerent forces to the October 22
line in accordance with Resolution 338, which the U.S.
which the United States itself had drafted and submitted. When Kissinger noticed
her concern, he
He calmed her down and said to her, according to his memoirs, verbatim: 1 I
suggest that you withdraw
Israeli forces in this case a few yards from any positions they may have reached
and then stand up and say that this is the line of October 22. Kissinger added
sarcastically to the Israeli prime minister
Prime Minister of Israel: 1. How can anyone know at all where the October 22nd
line was?
October 22 line in the desert?â 2.
Kissinger thus gave Israel a new green light to proceed with its military
operations
in violation of the ceasefire without fear of punishment, as the solution is
simple if
is for Israel to pull back a few hundred yards and say: This is
October 22nd line
Henry Kissinger was the foreign minister of one of the two superpowers, and it
could easily know
easily with its sophisticated aerial reconnaissance where exactly the October
22nd line was
Kissinger had received an Israeli military report before he left Israel
that warned of the October 22 line, and yet it was the same Kissinger who told
Israel's prime minister
sarcastically. No one knows at all where the October 22nd line was. Kissinger
recorded in
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that in an attempt to buy time, he called the Soviet charge d'affaires at about
11:30 a.m.
11:30 a.m. to tell him that the United States had no objection to convening the
Security Council
to convene at noon, but would not be ready to vote until later, nor would it
agree to Israel's withdrawal to the October 223 line.
Israel's withdrawal to the October 223 line.

At around 12:30 p.m.-that is, within an hour of Kissinger's
Kissinger's message to Moscow, a message from Brezhnev, this time to US
President Nixon
American Nixon. The Soviet leader's letter was strongly worded. He noted in his

letter

that the Soviet Union, in the view of the USSR, a breach of the ceasefire this time is a betrayal under the guarantee of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

of the United States and the Soviet Union, and therefore requests that the most effective measures be taken

jointly and without delay to enforce the ceasefire.

Since Nixon was not involved with his secretary of state in his suspicious maneuvers to support

Israel's continued violations of the cease-fire - it was not in the best interest of the U.S.

he sent his reply to Brezhnev in which he recognized the full responsibility of the United States for Israel's

Israel's compliance with the ceasefire, and agreed that Israel should return to the October 22nd line

October 22nd line. Kissinger had to inform the Soviet chargé d'affaires of Nixon's letter to Brezhnev

Brezhnev, which contradicted what he had previously communicated to Moscow that the U.S. did not agree to withdraw to the October 22 line

to withdraw to the October 22 line.

When Soviet commanders learned that Israeli armored forces west of the canal were rushing

south at breakneck speed, disregarding the ceasefire in an attempt to isolate Suez

and encircle the Egyptian Third Army east of the canal, Brezhnev took an even more aggressive step

sent a new letter to President Nixon, the second in less than two hours

requesting that the Security Council be convened immediately to enforce a ceasefire

and the return of Israeli forces to the October 22 line without delay. After such a hard-line stance

from the Soviets, Kissinger was forced to change his position, as can be seen clearly in his memoirs.

other considerations came into play: the US had no interest in seeing

Sadat to be destroyed by the collapse of the ceasefire that the US was itself a partner in supervising

was a partner in overseeing, and that if Sadat were to fall, it was likely to be replaced by a commander

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radical, Soviet-leaning commander, and Soviet arms would in record time

reconstitute the equivalent of the Third Army's

the equivalent of the Third Army, in which case another war between Egypt and Israel would inevitably break out

Egypt and Israel sooner or later.

In light of these developments, Brezhnev was informed at 5:15 p.m. that

Washington had agreed to advance a joint U.S.-Soviet project

to submit a joint U.S.-Soviet proposal to the Security Council to stabilize the ceasefire

and demanding that the belligerent forces return to the October 22 line.

Accordingly, the Security Council met

on the evening of October 23, and when US delegate John Scully introduced the legislation

Soviet delegate Jacob Malik announced his support for the bill and demanded a vote

The resolution, which was passed with 14 votes in favor and China's abstention, was known as Security Council Resolution 339

known as Security Council Resolution No. 339, which reads as follows: 1The

Security Council, recalling

Recalling its Resolution No. 338 of October 22, 1973.

I. Reaffirms its decision to cease all firing and all military activities and urges that the forces of both sides return immediately to the positions they occupied when the ceasefire came into effect.
Ceasefire.

II. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary measures to send observers from the United Nations
United Nations observers to monitor the observance of the ceasefire between the forces of Israel and the forces of the Republic of Egypt
Utilizing for this purpose the United Nations personnel currently in the Middle East, primarily in Cairo
primarily in Cairo.

Israeli persistence in violating the cease-fire
By midnight on October 23/24, the Israeli forces that had pushed southward since dawn on October 23
to the south since dawn on October 23 had, under the cease-fire, completed the ring of encirclement around the city of
Suez, cutting off the Suez-Cairo road to the west and the two roads leading to Ismailia to the north.
leading to Ismailia from the north, namely the Canal Road and the Treaty Road.
The land road linking Suez to the port of Adabiya and the Gulf of Suez in the south was cut off.
With the arrival of some Israeli naval vessels on the morning of October 24 at the port of Adbiya, the maritime road linking Suez to the Gulf and the sea was cut off
the sea route linking Suez to the Gulf and the Red Sea.
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At the same time that Suez was isolated from the outside world, the enemy succeeded in tightening
its siege of the Third Field Army east of the canal, which consisted of two divisions, the 7th Infantry
19 Infantry, with about 40,000 officers and soldiers and about 250 tanks.
Moreover
all these forces and the city of Suez were beyond the reach of the air defense network
The Israeli enclave stretching from south of the Ismailia Tara'a in the north to the port of
between Egyptian surface-to-air missile battalions in the west and Third Army units and the city of Suez in the east.
and the city of Suez in the east, allowing Israeli aircraft to carry out on Suez and Third Army forces without any chance of deterring the Israeli planes.
Israeli raiders. The Egyptian General Command did not have any reserve forces west of the canal at the time
west of the canal, either tactically or strategically, to meet a major counterattack or
a major counterattack or a counterstrike that would have ended the isolation of Suez and lifted the siege on Third Army units east of the canal.
Third Army units east of the canal.

On the instructions of the UN Secretary-General, Finnish General Enzio Silasvu, commander of the International Emergency Force in Cyprus, visited
of the International Emergency Force in Cyprus visited both Cairo and Tel Aviv following UN Security Council Resolution 339 on October 23.
339 on October 23, and it was agreed between him and representatives of the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships
that the forces of both sides would adhere to the second cease-fire date in accordance with UNSCR 339, which is 7:00 p.m.

which is 7:00 a.m. on October 24.

Despite Israel's announcement of its acceptance of this new ceasefire date, its against the Third Army and the city of Suez continued throughout the period from October 24 to 27

October 24-27, as the Israelis hoped that during this period the besieged Third Army forces would surrender under their intense pressure

the besieged Third Army forces and succeed in storming the city of Suez before the arrival of the United Nations forces.

If they had been able to achieve what they were aiming for, Egypt would have faced one of the worst military disasters

Egypt would have faced one of the worst military disasters in its history.

There is no doubt that one of the most important factors that encouraged the Israeli leadership to continue

The most important factor that encouraged the Israeli leadership to continue its attempts to besiege and destroy the Third Army and seize the city of Suez

that has been flowing to Israel since October 14 to provide it with the latest weapons and equipment.

October 14 to provide it with the latest weapons and advanced equipment in an attempt to turn the balance of the situation

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after the overwhelming success of the Egyptian forces in the first phase of the war

war. The American commitment to ensuring Israel's security and safety, which is a strategic line

was the first factor that encouraged Israel to continue its military operations west of the Canal

Israel to continue its military operations west of the canal despite two Security Council resolutions

Security Council ceasefire resolutions no: 338. on October 22, and 339. on October 23, to which Israel itself declared its acceptance.

Before attacking the city of Suez, and after tightening the siege around it, the aim of the Israeli command was to eliminate the remnants of the units of the 6th Division

was to eliminate the remnants of the units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division that had participated in the

in the violent disruptive battles against General Abraham Adan's forces advancing on the coastal axis

parallel to the Bitter Lakes and the Canal, eventually leading to overlapping Israeli forces.

On the evening of October 23, the remnants of the 6th Mechanized Division's sub-units

were stationed in some defensive positions they had hastily occupied in the area between

the Cairo-Suez North Road (Route 12) and the Cairo-Suez highway. The

The Geneva junction, which intersects with the northern road 6 kilometers south of Habiballah camp

and intersecting with the main road at kilometer marker 109 bordered this area to the east.

The forces of the 6th Mechanized Division were in a dangerous tactical situation because they were surrounded by

surrounded by enemy forces on all four sides: From the east in the area of Ajroud and the entrance to Suez, and from the west in the area of kilometer 101

the west in the area of kilometer 101 of the Cairo-Suez road, and the north in the heights of Jebel Jabal

Geneifa, Jabal Ghara, and Zaltiya, and Jabal Ataqa to the south, and its elimination was only a matter of time.

a matter of time. However, the Israeli leadership was aiming to quickly clear

all of the
and the heights north of the Cairo-Suez road up to kilometer marker 101
from Egyptian forces, so that it could conduct its operations against the city
of Suez without the possibility of any
interference from the Egyptian forces that were still in the west.

On the instructions of the commander of the Third Army, who had moved since the
evening of October 23 to his
to his main command center in the south of Jabal Oweibad after Israeli tanks
broke into his command center northwest of Suez.
northwest of Suez, Brigadier General Abu al-Fath Muharram, commander of the 6th
Mechanized Infantry Division, was
was present at kilometer marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road at 7:00 a.m.
on October 24, after the second ceasefire decision became effective, awaiting
the arrival of

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international observers that General Silasvu had promised to send at that time
to guide them to the
Egyptian assembly areas within the area occupied by Israel following the first
ceasefire resolution
ceasefire so that UN Security Council Resolution 339 can be implemented by
returning Israeli forces to Khartoum.
October 22.

But a cruel surprise awaited Brig. Gen. Abu al-Fath. Instead of the arrival of
observers
Instead of the arrival of international observers, Israeli planes came to the
defense zone occupied by his division's units
to carry out their devastating attacks, followed by heavy and concentrated
shelling from Israeli artillery, and it became clear that Israel's
that Israel's announcement of its acceptance of the ceasefire was a deceptive
smokescreen for its
operations .

Before noon, Israeli tanks advanced to the defensive position north of the
intersection of kilometer
109, which was occupied by the remnants of units of the 1st Mechanized Infantry
Brigade from the east and west along the Cairo-Suez highway
and west along the Cairo-Suez highway, and under heavy artillery and
by direct air support, Israeli tanks penetrated the defensive position at around
3:30 p.m. The Israeli tanks then shifted northward, and were subjected to
concentrated air strikes and heavy artillery shelling, the Israeli tanks
penetrated the
the defensive position of the remaining units of the 113th Mechanized Infantry
Brigade at 5:00 p.m.
The units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division were destroyed west of the
canal after fierce battles, and all Egyptian positions north of the Cairo-Suez
road fell
Egyptian positions north of the Cairo-Suez road up to kilometer 101 west.

General Abraham Adan, commander of the Israeli armored division besieging Suez,
had received
a radio message from General Gonen, commander of the Southern Command, at 2 a.m.
on October 24
October 24, asking if he could occupy Suez in two and a half hours.
between dawn at 4:30 a.m. and the time of the second cease-fire at 7:00 a.m.
ceasefire at 7:00 a.m. When General Adan replied that it depended on how many
the number of Egyptians fighting in the city and how determined they were to
fight, and that he could take part of the city
of the city on the worst-case scenario, Gonen hesitated and then said: "Well,
if it's a bad seed.

If it's Stalingrad, don't go in.â In other words, he meant that if Suez could be taken as easily as it was taken

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the Israelis captured Beersheba on October 20, 1948, he agreed to the attack. But if Adan were to meet resistance like that encountered by German General von Paulus when he attempting to storm the Soviet city of Stalingrad in 1942, he should abandon the attempt. Immediately following this conversation, General Adan ordered his troops to attack Suez on the morning of October 24 according to the following plan:

Gabi Brigade: To enter Suez from two directions: From the west on the Cairo-Suez road axis Cairo-Suez, and from the southwest on the Zaytiyah-Suez road axis. The two forces rush to the city center.

The Aryeh Brigade enters Suez from two directions: North (Janayen Road) and from its direction Northwest, with its main effort on the right, parallel to the Cairo-Suez road. Aryeh's brigade was followed by a battalion of paratroopers led by Lieutenant Colonel Yossi. Aryeh's forces were to Aryeh's forces were to meet Gabi's forces in the city center. In order to secure the city after it was stormed by tanks two infantry battalions from the Dovik Tamari Brigade were assigned to follow the tanks on the on the Cairo-Suez road to carry out the clearing operation. The plan was that the Gabi and Aryeh's attack with heavy artillery bombardment, followed immediately by a concentrated air strike against resistance centers inside Suez. The Netka Brigade and the Dovik Tamari Brigade (except for two battalions) were to continue clearing the green belt between Shalufa and Suez.

The Israelis were confident that their armored forces would soon break into Suez without any resistance and that their flag would fly high over the governorate building within a few hours of the start of the attack The Israelis were confident that their armored forces would storm Suez without any resistance, and that their flag would fly high over the governorate building within a few hours of the attack. some stray soldiers who had taken refuge there after the recent battles, and their morale was Of course, their morale was low. General Adan believed that he would crown his successful march west of the canal by entering Suez, the fall of which would have a huge political impact on a global scale, bringing him fame and glory. He was certain that its entry would be a mirror image of entering Beersheba during the 1948 war. as his reconnaissance elements called it, had been transformed by the cohesion of the army and the people into an impregnable fortress, and that his armored forces would face another Stalingrad.

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From a military point of view, Suez was completely out of danger of an Israeli invasion

after the Egyptian forces succeeded on October 6, and were able to cross the Suez Canal and invade crossing the Suez Canal, storming the Bar-Lev line and creating an impregnable area of bridgeheads east of the canal. The Egyptian forces were able to cross the Suez Canal, overrun the Bar-Lev line, and establish a fortified area of bridgeheads east of the canal. As a result of this situation, no comprehensive military measures were taken for the defense of the city. to face any possible invasion, nor were sufficient forces allocated to defend the city's facilities and important installations. A military commander was not appointed for Suez until after it had already been invaded. For example The order to appoint the military advisor to the governorate as its military commander was issued on the evening of October 23. all the difficult circumstances that Suez faced when it found the invading army surrounding it from all sides its valiant people with their rudimentary weapons and in unison with their armed forces were able to repel the deadly armored hordes that set out on October 24 to penetrate the city's streets.

The situation in Suez before the Israeli attack

Most of the population of Suez had been displaced out of the governorate since the start of the war of attrition in 1968 since the start of the War of Attrition in 1968, so there were only a few people inside the city at the outbreak of the October War 73 only a small number of no more than 5,000 people, most of whom were from the government apparatus, police, civil defense, employees and laborers. Police, civil defense, employees and workers of petroleum and fertilizer companies in Zaytiyah.

As a result of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16 and the advance of General Abraham Abraham Adan at the head of his armored division on October 19 in a southerly direction on the axis of the Treaty Road Suez began to receive large numbers of citizens from the rural sector of Ismailia Governorate. and then Suez Governorate from October 19 to 23, who came on foot to escape from armored vehicles and Israeli air strikes. Authorities in Suez managed to deport some of them to Cairo were able to deport some of them to Cairo and shelter the rest in vacant houses in Suez and provided for their subsistence. On October 23 and 223, large groups of to Suez, totaling about 5,000 officers and soldiers, most of whom were Most of them were the remnants of administrative units and the rear of units that had crossed to the east of the Canal, as well as the remnants of Third Army units that had crossed to the east. as well as the remnants of the Third Army units that formed part of its tactical reserve west of the canal that had previously fought fierce disruptive battles against Israeli armored forces.

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When the ceasefire went into effect at 6:52 p.m. on October 22 on October 22, Israeli forces continued to march south, disregarding in disregard of Security Council Resolution 338, until they were able, under the ceasefire, to block all roads leading to the north. to close all roads leading to the north, west and south. Egyptian military groups were forced to take refuge in the city of Suez to avoid capture.

They were armed with only light weapons, including machine guns and machine guns. Their sudden arrival in Suez caused their sudden arrival in Suez caused confusion among the city's officials, but sincere efforts were able to arrange accommodation for them in vacant houses, especially in the Al-Arbaeen neighborhood in the Arbadeen neighborhood, as well as providing them with the means of subsistence. The arrival of these military personnel was one of the most fortunate.

They played an important role in the defense of the city. October 23 brought the worst omens for Suez, as Israeli planes carried out raids and bombing raids at noon on that day. Israeli planes carried out brutal raids on the Nasr Fertilizer Company at noon on that day. Many of its departments were set on fire, and the main refrigerator building was also hit by air strikes on Ataka Road, and several areas in Al-Adabi were severely damaged, as well as the Al-Awaid traffic station and a gasoline station. Al-Awaid traffic point and the Misr Petroleum Company gas station at the entrance to Suez from the Cairo-Suez road. Cairo-Suez .

The Israeli forces were not satisfied with the land blockade of Suez by cutting off all roads leading to it. roads leading to it, nor the maritime blockade by cutting off the waterway leading to the Gulf and the Red Sea. but also directed the harshest methods of psychological warfare against its inhabitants without pity or mercy to terrorize them and put pressure on their nerves to force them to surrender. That's why I didn't obey the Suez Canal, a branch of the Ismailia Canal that feeds the city with sweet water, and destroyed the the high-pressure network that carries electricity from Cairo to Suez, and then cut the telephone wires connecting the city to the outside world. The Israeli leadership was that the people of Suez would meet its tanks and armored vehicles with white flags as soon as they appeared in the streets after they became in these unbearable living conditions, with no water, no food, no electricity, and no equipment no water, no food, no electricity, no medical equipment or medicines for the sick and injured, and no telephone communications with the outside world. telephone communication with the outside world.

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In addition, its artillery focused its violent shelling on its residential neighborhoods, and its its aircraft flew over the city to pour a barrage of missiles on its vital facilities and installations. Hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded were killed in the bombardment. hundreds of martyrs and thousands of wounded, until the General Hospital became overcrowded with the wounded and injured. The aim of this psychological warfare was to convince everyone in Suez to convince everyone in Suez that resistance is futile, and that the only way out was to surrender to the invaders.

How Suez prepared for the battle

The first official news to reach Badawi al-Khouli, then governor of Suez, about Israeli movements around the city Israeli movements around the city was a telephone report received by Colonel

Fathi Abbas, director of South Canal Intelligence, at 5:00 a.m. Director of South Canal Intelligence at 5:30 p.m. on October 23. He informed him that Israeli tanks had reached the oil companies' area in Zaitiya and were on their way to the Adabiya area. At the governor's invitation, a military conference was held in the governorate at 6:00 p.m. 6 p.m., chaired by the governor and attended by Major General Mohebi Khafaji, Suez Security Director, Brigadier General Adel Islam, the governorate's military advisor, Brigadier General Kamal al-Sanhouri, commander of the Suez Station and the commander of the Regional Defense Battalion, to discuss measures to defend the city and secure its entrances. The meeting was chaired by the governor and attended by Maj. Gen. Adel Islam, the governorate's military advisor, Brig. Popular Defense. Despite the difficult circumstances facing Suez, there was still hope to conquer the aggression that was about to engulf the city. Among its citizens were young men who who believed in their God and their country and were determined to defend their eternal city until their last breath. The Popular Defense Forces consisted of two organizations, one called the Sinai Organization, which was It was formed after the June 67 war, and a number of Suez citizens joined it and received special training through the Military Intelligence Office in Suez to carry out some military operations behind enemy lines Enemy lines . The second organization, called the People's Protection Teams, was established under the supervision of the the Popular Defense Committee of the political organization in Suez and then to carry out defense and guard work in emergencies.

Based on the instructions of the governorate's military advisor, a meeting was held at noon on October 21 at
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Ahmed Orabi School, about 150 members of the People's Protection Teams met at noon on October 21. 50 members were selected and armed with rifles, with the rest remaining as reserves They were divided into two groups that took turns guarding the triangle area at the entrance to the city in order to guard and act as a warning point to report enemy movements. On the evening of October 23 On the evening of October 23, following the siege of the city, Colonel Fathi Abbas, Director of South Canal Intelligence, assigned Some of the youth of the Sinai Organization were assigned defensive duties and provided them with some rifles and machine guns and distributed them in different places inside the city, after keeping some of them in reserve in case of emergencies. There was a group of heroes belonging to the Sinai Organization that did not rest throughout the night of October 24/23. They planned several ambushes at the entrance to Suez to meet the enemy. However, due to their limited resources, they agreed to limit themselves to an ambush at Arbreen Square and another at Mazlakat al-Shuhada. The main issue they faced was was the search for an effective short-range anti-tank weapon suitable for for street fighting, the P6 .7 launcher, and their thinking led them to the armory on the ground floor of the General Hospital.

on the ground floor of the General Hospital, where the weapons of wounded soldiers and martyrs are kept, in the hope that that they might find what they were looking for. Ibrahim Suleiman and Ahmad Abu Hashim were among them

When the storekeeper intercepted them, fearing for his custody, they opened the storeroom by force, and their great joy was when they found

They were delighted to find a 7.PG launcher and three shells. In the hand of martyr Ibrahim Suleiman

in the hand of the martyr Ibrahim Suleiman on a date with destiny, as we will see later.

Brigadier General Youssef Afifi was in command of the 19th Infantry Division, which was occupying a large area of the Third Army's bridgehead east of the canal, and the division's sector stretched right next to Suez. When Brigadier General Youssef Afifi realized the danger to which Suez was exposed

he decided, on his own initiative, to defend the city with which his division had been closely associated for many years

to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy. On October 23, the division commander sent a company of anti-tank guided projectiles led by Lieutenant Colonel Hossam Amara to repel the enemy on the Treaty Road.

The company engaged enemy tanks at Shalofa and destroyed more than a dozen of them

When they ran out of ammunition, the division commander ordered them to head to Suez on the morning of October 24

through Kafr Ahmed Abdah, and to take part in its defense using the company's 7P grenade launchers

in the company until they were resupplied with the necessary rockets. In addition to this company, the commander of the

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Division sent to Suez on the morning of the battle a tank-hunting crew led by Lieutenant Abdel Rahim

from the 7th Infantry Brigade, equipped with RPG-7s and counter grenades.

Although the defense of Suez was outside the division's combat mission, the 19 Infantry Division was allowed to occupy the earthen berms on both banks of the canal, and some field artillery barrels were directed to cover some vital sectors west of the canal.

to cover some vital sectors west of the canal, and an artillery observation post on the berm west of the canal

on the berm west of the canal to manage artillery fire.

The police departments and units prepared for the battle, and the civil defense operations room in Al-Arbaeen Square became

The civil defense operations room became the headquarters of the Popular Defense Command. The fire and rescue services

during the air raids, and the police opened up arms depots to supply the volunteers with weapons and ammunition

weapons and ammunition. When the enemy succeeded on October 23 in cutting off wire communications with Cairo

Cairo, the rescue police's radio network became the only communication link between Suez and Cairo

between Suez and Cairo. Major Mohammed Refaat Shanta was in command of this radio unit.

He was assisted by Lieutenant Abdel Rahman Ghanima, the liaison officer, and under his command were 27 non-commissioned officers

Military support. The work of the radio unit in these difficult circumstances was very risky and demonstrates great courage

It was based in an isolated place west of Suez, located on the Nasser Road,

which connects the entrance to Suez
on the Nasser Road, which connects the entrance to Suez at the triangle area
with the main road
leading to Zaytiyah. Israeli tanks passed through this road in the evening on
their way to the port of Adibiya.
on their way to the port of Adibiya, making the road vulnerable to Israeli
armored vehicles and armored vehicles
at all times, while the patrol force had no weapons other than two pistols for
personal defense
two rifles for personal defense.

The immortal epic of Suez on October 42, 1972

The valiant city did not sleep, and all its sons stayed up all night waiting for
the arrival of the enemies
Enemies . When the muezzin called for the dawn prayer, the mosques were packed
with people. In the Shuhada Mosque
next to the governorate building, Sheikh Hafez Salama, head of the Islamic
Guidance Society, led the congregation
After the prayer, Governor Badawi al-Khouli gave a short speech in which he
explained that the enemy was preparing
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to enter Suez, and asked them to remain calm and restrained, and for everyone to
contribute what they can.
He concluded his speech by chanting âAllahu Akbarâ , and the prayer rose from
the depths of the hearts to the sky.

Beginning at 6:00 a.m., Israeli aircraft began bombing the neighborhoods of
Suez neighborhoods for three hours straight in successive waves with
unprecedented intensity.
The purpose was to destroy any centers of resistance inside the city and
eliminate any determination to fight
of the people of Suez to fight

Resistance members were alerted to an important phenomenon, namely that the
planes during their fierce attacks
avoided hitting the main streets of the city, which represent the extension of
the three axes on which the enemy planned to advance with its armored vehicles.
on which the enemy intends to advance with its armored vehicles, namely:

The triangle axis: the western entrance from the main road coming from Cairo to
Suez
Suez, and its extension is Army Street to Arbaeen Square.

Al-Janayen axis : It is the northern entrance from the Canal Road coming from
Ismailia.
It passes through vast areas of fruit gardens and crosses the bridge over the
Hawis
and heads south to Mustafa Kamel Street and from there to Arbaeen Square.

Zaitiya axis: It is the southern entrance from the direction of Al-Adabiya Road
and Ataq. It extends along
the Gulf of Suez until the road leading to Port Tawfiq.

The first vanguard of the invaders came when an armored battalion of Colonel
Arebah's brigade advanced on the
on the Janayen axis in the north at around 9:30 a.m. on October 24.
When the advance company tried to cross the bridge over the Huwais to reach
Shaya
Mustafa Kamel, it was confronted by a strong ambush of Armed Forces men who

fired their missiles

The first tank was hit and crashed on the narrow bridge, causing the rest of the tanks to turn around.

The rest of the tanks turned around and gathered in the area of Jablaya Hashem, northwest of Al-Huwais.

The battalion did not make any further attempts to advance from this point.

At around 10:00 a.m., an armored battalion from Colonel Jabi's brigade moved from the Zainiya area, and slowly crossed the road along the Gulf until it reached the governorate area without being intercepted by Ahla, and deployed in several groups between the Palace of Culture, the Culture, the governorate operations room, Khader Square, and the Blair Hotel, and tanks from

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Tanks from 497 controlled the Corniche Street and Saad Zaghloul Street, and one tank stood on the corner of the Blair Hotel waiting for the column of tanks that will advance on the triangle axis and then penetrate the Army Road.

At around 10:50 a.m., after the success of the of the armored battalion that took control of the governorate area without any resistance, an armored battalion from the An armored battalion from Colonel Aryeh's brigade, supported by a parachute battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Yossi in half-track armored vehicles in three waves, each wave consisting of 8 tanks and each

tanks followed by an armored vehicle, and it was this force that was chosen to be the main effort

Bffort of. for the attack on Suez. The armored force crossed the triangle and began to shake the

The Israelis were so confident that no one in the city would dare to resist them so confident that no one in the city would resist them that the tank commanders all stood up to look out from their tank turrets

to watch the streets they were passing through. The first wave reached the Arbaeen Square without encountering any resistance. Mahmoud Awad of the first ambush crew of the

of the Sinai Organization fired two rounds from his RPG rocket launcher at the first tank, hitting it

The first one hit it superficially, while the second one flew away. The second ambush, which was

crewed by members of the Sinai Organization also rushed to take position at Saima Royal, and the hero Ibrahim Suleiman

Ibrahim Suleiman grabbed the RPG-7 and squatted down next to the bunker, which was located between the Royal Cinema and the Egyptian Cinema.

between the Royal Cinema and the Misr Cinema, and asked his colleague Mohamed Sarhan to prepare the shell for him. And when

the first tank leading the armored column was about 12 meters away from his position, Soliman aimed

Ibrahim Suleiman accurately aimed the launcher at it and pulled the trigger, and the shell went off and landed under the turret of the

The tank became unbalanced, stopped, and tilted its gun barrel to the ground.

Ibrahim Suleiman moved to the other side of the hideout to fire the second shell at the vehicle that was following the tank

The second shell hit the vehicle that was following the tank, which the paratroopers were riding in, and it burst into flames

fire. These brief moments were the turning point of the battle. While the as the armored vehicles of the first wave came to a sudden halt in front of the Arbaeen police station, thousands of

masses of soldiers and citizens came out to the square and the streets surrounding the police station, chanting
âAllahu Akbar. God is great. They began firing their rifles and machine guns at the tank crews
tanks, while some threw their grenades inside the tank towers, which began to explode
Some of them burst into flames until the area turned into a piece of hell.
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The Israelis soon jumped out of the tanks and armored vehicles, in a state of panic and confusion
panic and confusion, and rushed in groups to take shelter in some of the buildings near the police station
police station. Some of them tried to enter the Royal Cinema but were shot at the entrance to the movie theater.
An Israeli group of about 25 individuals succeeded in entering the Arbaeen police station
and managed to take control of the station, which consisted of two floors and was surrounded by
surrounded by high red-brick walls, with a number of police officers and soldiers inside.
Five Israeli soldiers managed to climb onto the roofs of some of the buildings and started firing
five Israeli soldiers climbed onto the roofs of some of the buildings.

When the tanks of the second and third waves saw the destruction of the first wave's armored vehicles
and destruction, they tried to turn back in confusion to return to the area of the third.
Due to the narrowness of the street, they collided with each other and some of them broke the railroad fence
along the street. Four tanks had infiltrated behind the Sidi al-Arbaeen mosque from the
An ambush from the 19th Infantry Division, led by Lieutenant Colonel Hussam Amara, who was stationed on the
a 19th Infantry Division ambush led by Lieutenant Colonel Husam Amara on the railroad tracks.

As the tanks of the second and third waves were returning via the army road out of the city.
Huge crowds of soldiers and citizens emerged from the demolished houses along the street.
They began firing their rifles and machine guns and hurling grenades and Molotov cocktails at the tanks as they fled.
Molotov cocktails as they fled like frightened rats.

General Herzog, the former head of state of Israel, admitted in his book The War of Atonement that
The shield battalion that entered Suez from the Triangle and had 24 tanks was killed or wounded
Twenty of its twenty-four tank commanders were killed or wounded.

Surprisingly, the armored battalion stationed in the governorate area did not attempt to intervene at all in the battle for the Arbaeen section and remained in place. It tried
five of its tanks tried to advance on the Port Tawfiq road, but the first tank ran into an
an anti-tank bullet that severed its track, and the other four tanks stopped and returned to their position
in the governorate area after withdrawing the disabled tank. During the battle, the governor assigned Lt.
Abdul Rahim al-Sayed of the 19th Infantry Division to go to the enemy tanks that

are besieging the governorate.

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However, the armored battalion in the governorate area withdrew as soon as darkness fell and returned back to Zaytiyah, following the same route it had taken in the morning.

The Battle of Arbaeen Police Station

Large crowds of people surrounded the Arbaeen police station, which was occupied by a large group of Israeli paratroopers.

of Israeli paratroopers. An armored battalion from Colonel Gabi's brigade had previously entered the to the city via the Zaytiyah axis, and advanced along the shore of the Gulf of Suez until it reached the

to the governorate area without encountering any resistance, and surprisingly, this battalion, whose tanks

tanks were able to control the area that includes the Palace of Culture, the governorate operations room, Al-Khodr Square, and the Blair Hotel and the Blair Hotel, as well as the Corniche and Saad Zaghloul Streets, never attempted to intervene in the

the battle in Arbaeen Square, nor did it make the slightest attempt to rescue the Israeli force trapped in the police station

the Israeli force trapped in the police station, despite the distance between one of its tanks

which stood at the corner of the Blair Hotel and the Arbaeen Police Station, did not exceed a few hundred meters meters.

Two heroic attempts were made by the policemen to break into the Arbaeen police station and rescue the officers and soldiers inside the officers and soldiers inside from the Israelis. The first attempt was led by Major Nabil

Sharaf at the head of a force of soldiers from the Suez Police Department and the Security Forces Unit. He led

The second attempt was led by Captain Assem Hamouda at the head of a force of soldiers from the Suez Police Department and some

soldiers from the Arbaeen Police Station. Both attempts were unsuccessful, and the two officers were martyred

along with six non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

The two officers were martyred, along with six non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

the police station they had barricaded themselves inside.

They sought out one of the captured policemen inside to offer the leadership of the Lasserri resistance their willingness to surrender that they were willing to surrender on the condition that their lives would be spared.

On his way out, the policeman met a member of the Sinai organization, Mohammed Sarhan, and when he learned what the Israelis were demanding

When he learned what the Israelis were asking for, he took him to the headquarters of the South Canal Intelligence Director, Col.

Abbas, and the intelligence director had moved his office with his staff and all the papers and documents it contained

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and documents at about 5:30 p.m. on October 23, from his headquarters at the Nasr Petroleum Manufacturing Company in Zeitia to a room in the Suez General Hospital when Israeli tanks began to pass on the road in front of the headquarters. Israeli tanks were passing on the road in front of the company's headquarters. When Col.

met with the policeman brought to him by Mohamed Sarhan before noon on October 24 and learned of the Israeli offer to surrender he immediately welcomed the offer because it would have been of great benefit to the people of Suez and to the intelligence services. for the people of Suez and the intelligence offices. He asked Mohamed Sarhan to accompany the policeman to the Arbaeen section to discuss with the commander of the Israeli force the terms of the handover. However, this could not be finalized, as fighting was raging around the police station and bullets were being fired incessantly and there was no battle commander who could control the crowds so that they would The old policeman's nerves were shaken. and adamantly refused to go back into the hands of the Israelis. The surrender attempt failed.

At about four o'clock in the evening, a group of popular resistance heroes decided

namely : Ibrahim Suleiman, Ashraf Abdel Dayem, Fayez Amin and Ibrahim Youssef decided to storm the police station Arbaeen police station . Ibrahim Suleiman went behind the station and started climbing the back wall with his with his machine gun in his hand in order to surprise the enemies inside, and an Israeli sniper who was hiding on the second floor of the building spotted him. When he reached the top of the wall, an Israeli sniper, who was hidden on the second floor of the building, shot him with his machine gun. The greatest hero of the Battle of Suez fell as a martyr after doing his duty. The shell he fired in the morning at the leading Israeli tank on the leading Israeli tank in the morning was the historic turning point in the Battle of Suez. The body of the martyr remained hanging on the wall of the department until dawn the next day, and those who carried him were surprised were surprised to find a bright smile on his face. By the time Ibrahim Suleiman fell on the back wall of the station, the two martyrs Ashraf Abdel Dayem and Fayez Amin fell on the front entrance of the station when they were at the front entrance of the department when they were trying to break into it from the front. from Israeli snipers on the second floor.

As five Israeli soldiers had climbed onto the roof of a building adjacent to the police station had climbed to the roof of a building adjacent to the police station and started using their sniper fire, so some soldiers and members of the soldiers and members of the Popular Resistance and managed to kill them after a fierce battle in which fire was used fire, bladed weapons and hands.

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Although the people of Suez were fasting on this day of the holy month of Ramadan. 0

No one felt hungry or thirsty, and no one cared to eat or drink except for a small amount of food or drink, as the battle against the enemies was the center of everyone's attention.

The battle against the enemies was the focus of the attention of all citizens,

and when the news of victory spread in the city
When the news of victory spread in the city, the people of Suez took to the streets cheering, cheering, and witnessing with pride
The wrecked enemy armored vehicles that were scattered along Al-Arbreen Street, and their number was
about 15 tanks and half-track armored vehicles. Fearing that the Israelis would think of withdrawing them.
Mahmoud Awad, one of the heroes of the Popular Resistance, poured gasoline on them at midnight and set them on fire
and set them on fire.

Where were the Suez commanders during the battle?

At around 9:30 a.m. on October 24, Badawi al-Khouli, the
the governor of Suez and General Mohy Khafagy, the security director, left the governorate's operations room after
They were warned by Colonel Fathi Abbas, director of South Canal Intelligence, to leave the operations room
because Israeli tanks are only seven hundred meters away from the operations room, making them vulnerable to the enemy's small arms
within range of the enemy's small arms.

When the two reached Ahmed Orabi Street, they headed to Mustafa Mohamed Ali's shop
which is located in the Shamis neighborhood, which was crowded with Egyptian soldiers at the time. From his new position, Malhafiz began calling
to the civil defense room, the supply manager, the water jugs and the power station to check on the safety of the situation.
to check on the safety of the situation. He found that water and electricity were cut off from the city, and that
Fire is burning in many places. When the governor called Alaa al-Khouli, the director of supply, he informed him that
The enemy had taken control of the flour warehouses outside Suez, while the main flour warehouse
inside the city in the Clomax building, which contained 2,500 sacks, caught fire as a result of heavy aerial bombardment. The governor asked the Director of Supply to enlist the help of a number of
refugees from the Shuhada Mosque to help extinguish the fire.
Security, who was with him, to order the firefighters and civil defense to participate with these citizens in extinguishing the fire and saving the flour in extinguishing the fire and rescuing the flour. The governor made several other phone calls
the ambulance and the civil defense room to find out the number of martyrs and wounded who fell as a result of the airstrikes
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air strikes. The governor then asked to move the phone from the shop he was in to one of the neighboring houses
which he decided to move to, accompanied by the security director. As some soldiers of the armed forces
knew the governor's location and asked him for ammunition for their weapons, the governor made a phone call to Brigadier General Adel Islam, the governorate's military advisor.
to Brigadier General Adel Islam, the governorate's military advisor, who had been appointed by a decision issued by General Headquarters in Cairo the previous evening
Cairo the previous evening to appoint him as military commander of the Suez forces, and he was present at the time
in the governorate's operations room, and the governor informed him of his whereabouts and gave him the phone number he was speaking from.
and asked him to send ammunition to the soldiers who had requested it. Brig. Gen. Adel explained that he only had
that he only had small arms ammunition for rifles and machine guns, which is in

one of the warehouses in the security directorate.
in a warehouse in the Security Directorate, but he did not have any ammunition for anti-tank weapons, as these weapons are not part of the Popular Defense Forces' arsenal.

These weapons are not part of the Popular Defense's armament.

At about 12:30 p.m., Brigadier General Adel Islam left with two Popular Defense officers with the rank of captain left the governorate's operations room to supervise the progress of the battle in the city after learning that the defense of the city had turned into a popular resistance. Given that Israeli tanks and armored vehicles were surrounding the operations room from all sides.

and their machine guns were firing at buildings and streets, it took Brig. Gen. Islam from the operations room to the governorate building and from there to the Martyrs' Mosque took about two hours.

Brigadier General Adel was unable to leave the mosque due to the intensity of the Israeli fire

Israelis were firing all over the area. Therefore, he took the second floor of the mosque as a temporary center for his command. Inside the mosque, Brigadier General Adel met with Police Captain Hassan Osama, who told him that he was that he was assisting Khajeh Hafez Salama, head of the Islamic Guidance Society and imam of the Shuhada Mosque, in distributing weapons to volunteers who wanted to fight

to distribute weapons to volunteers who wanted to fight the enemy and who had prior experience with the use of weapons. Captain Hassan Osama introduced Brigadier General Adel Islam to Hafez Salameh.

This was the first time they were introduced to each other.

On the afternoon of October 24, after the end of the battle, Hafez Badawi al-Khouli called

to Police Major Mohamed Refaat Shatta, commander of the radio unit, and asked him to inform Cairo of the news of the battle.

Cairo with news of the battle and the destruction of 13 enemy tanks and tracked vehicles. Following the unit's

to Cairo, Military Statement No. 59 was issued at 4:00 p.m. on October 24, containing the news of the Battle of Suez

on October 24 with the news of the Battle of Suez. The governor, who was named during the

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his phone calls under the name Abdel Hadi as a means of misleading the enemy, called twice afterward to Major Rifaat Shatta to inform officials in Cairo of his need for medical supplies and preserved blood for the hospital, and then his need for RPG 7 anti-tank weapons to distribute to the citizens.

How the Israelis described the Battle of Suez

Israeli books and references on the Yom Kippur War (Yom Kippur War October 733) dealt with the battle of October 24 in Suez, and included a lot of important information about it

and accurate description. Although they differ on some details, they all agree on one thing: the battle of October 24 in Suez

that the Battle of Suez on October 24 was the last major battle

of the October '73 war and that the attempt to storm the city on that day was a deadly mistake that cost Israel dearly.

cost Israel dearly. The following is the basic outline of the battle as I extracted it from various

Israeli references after I excluded events about which I found fundamental disagreement between the authors, making them of little historical value

authors, which makes their historical value weak.

On the morning of October 24, an armored unit of the Gabi Brigade moved through the south of Suez, while the armored brigade led by Colonel Aryeh advanced on the main Cairo-Suez road. It advanced along the Cairo-Suez highway, capturing army camps on the outskirts of the city (Suez Military Station Command Camp). It was followed by a battalion of paratroopers led by Colonel Yossi, brought in by helicopter, and as the tanks crossed the main street. As the tanks crossed the main street, they came under fire from all buildings, and within minutes twenty of their twenty-four tank commanders were killed or wounded. Twenty of the twenty-four tank commanders were killed or wounded by standing exposed in the open tank turrets. Paratroopers in armored vehicles also came under fire, and when some of their vehicles were hit, they jumped out and ran to neighboring buildings and defended themselves from inside. He was among the armored vehicles that were hit was a vehicle carrying the brigade's intelligence group. Its nine occupants rushed into a neighboring building, and this was the last time they were seen alive. The Israeli forces were not psychologically prepared for such a situation, nor were they able to know where the Egyptians' fire was coming from, and it was not possible to call for artillery or air support or aviation because the Israeli forces were intertwined with the Egyptians in the center of the city.

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A group of paratroopers led by Lieutenant Colonel Yossi took refuge in a heavily fortified building that was a two-story building that turned out to be a police station (Arbaeen Police Station) and rushed into the rooms of the police. After a brief clash, two policemen were wounded and eight policemen, including some officers, were captured. Eight policemen, including some officers, were captured, and the second floor was cleared within ten minutes.

The Egyptians outside continued to fire on the Israeli force inside the section until parts of the walls were blown away. Several groups of Egyptian soldiers and citizens tried to counterattack to retake the police station building, but all of their attacks were unsuccessful after a number of them were killed.

Some of the soldiers who could not take shelter in the buildings because they were wounded were lying in the street, moaning and screaming: "Mom, I want to live. But their cries were lost amid the whizzing of bullets and the sound of loud explosions. And they searched for a way out of the police building to escape the siege without success, and two tanks tried to come to their aid, but the heavy rain of bullets made the men of the two tanks run away from the police building. After reaching the junction, they quickly turned back under heavy fire. General Adan, commander of the armored division besieging Suez, ordered his troops to withdraw from the city immediately so as not to increase the scale of the catastrophe.

Colonel Gabi was able to withdraw his tanks which entered the city from the south coastal road (Zaytiyah Road) under the cover of darkness. His tanks reached the area of the refineries (oil companies) in the evening.

A group of paratroopers were hiding inside one of the buildings next to the police station.

At nightfall, this group managed to sneak out of the building after carrying its wounded members

the wounded in the center and sent a force in front and another in the back to secure them from surprise.

after about two hours of slow progress, the group succeeded in getting out of the city. The problem was.

General Adan's main concern was how to get the large force inside the police station

which was surrounded by the crowd on all sides. Since the paratroop commander, Lt. Col. Yossi, who was trapped

was unconscious most of the time because he was severely wounded, the force was led by

Captain David Dodo. A radio conversation took place between General Adan, the commander of the armored division

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and Captain Dodo, who was reluctant to follow his commander's advice to leave the police station building

under the cover of darkness, as Dodo believed that leaving the building with so many

Dodo believed that leaving the building with so many wounded through the surrounding woods would only mean that his force would be annihilated.

annihilation. Dodo requested that a strike force of tanks and armored vehicles be sent in the morning

to rescue them and get them out of the city by force, with air support also being considered.

During the radio communications between Gen.

Adan and Captain Dodo, the two were surprised that General Junin, the commander of the Southern Command, who was

who was on the same radio frequency with them, intervened in the conversation. However

Despite General Junin's stern nature and the fact that he was a sharp debater who was feared by all of his subordinates

feared by his subordinates, he spoke to the young officer Dodo in a calm and gentle manner that surprised his aides who were next to him at the time.

of his aides who were next to him at his command center. Gen. Junin asked Dodo to

Dodo to describe the building he was in and the neighboring buildings. The officer replied that he was

that he was in a police station building located next to an intersection and described the neighboring buildings

surrounding the police station building. As the young officer described the building and the landmarks

General Gonen focused his attention on a large-scale aerial photograph of Suez that hung on the wall of the command center

hanging on the wall of the command center, and asked the officer, "Is the building at an intersection and is it square and has a hole in the roof?"

square with a hole in the roof?"⁴ When the officer answered in the affirmative, Junin said: 1.

Building 0. Hold on.

General Gonen then consulted with General Adan, the head of the intelligence branch of the Southern Command, and the Air Force liaison officer.

Southern Command and the Air Force liaison officer, all of whom, after discussion, felt that the best

the best way to save the force trapped in the police station was for the force to leave the building at night in complete silence under the cover of darkness. Gen. Gonen radioed the officer the route he would take to exit based on his examination of the based on his careful examination of the cranial image in front of him. There you are: You will pass 20 0 0 meters to the south to the end of the third block of the crossroads. After that 250 meters to the west along an alley, and before the end of the street there's another alley to turn into Continue another 20 0 0 meters to the north, you will come to a railroad track, a canal, and a bridge. and a bridge, and from there straight to the crossroads we have in our hands.â Gonen assured the officer that
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would maintain radio contact with him as he moved until he was safely out of the city.

This personal attention from the theater commander restored Captain Dodo's confidence

in himself and his command. At around 2:00 a.m., the Israeli force left the police station building quietly quietly, with members of the force carrying their wounded colleagues on their backs. Captain Dodo followed

followed General Gonen's instructions, which he received regularly over the radio. At an hour

4:00 a.m., before dawn, the force reached the crossroads held by the Israeli army

where ambulances were waiting to evacuate the wounded. The curtain closed on the The deadly sin of entering Suez, which cost Israel 80 dead, many of whose bodies were received

from the Egyptians after the disengagement through the Red Cross.

Did the governor agree to hand over Suez?

Although many years have passed since the Israelis gave their ultimatum to Badawi

to surrender the city within half an hour, or else Israeli planes would destroy it.

will destroy it, the governor's attitude towards the Israeli ultimatum still raises many

questions and causes a number of controversies and debates, especially among the citizens of Suez.

In view of the duty of justice and fairness and the requirement of historical honesty

we have conducted a careful study of this subject, and our reliance was primarily on

Our reliance was primarily on official documents that accurately and faithfully recorded this period

this period accurately and faithfully, and then on the testimonies of some former officials who lived through the events of that period in Suez.

who lived through the events of that period in Suez and were, by virtue of their important positions, privy to most of the subtleties and secrets

We were keen to subject all our opinions and estimates to rational and rational judgment, and away from bias and prejudice.

bias and prejudice. We hope that after this objective research we have succeeded in

to reach the facts that readers are undoubtedly eager to know, and that we have answered

answers to the questions posed by the research, and finally - and this is the

most important thing
that we have satisfied our conscience.
At 9:00 a.m. on October 25, Saad al-Hakka, the acting manager of the
called Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim, head of the civil defense and fire
department at
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based in the civil defense room in Arbaeen Square, and informed him that Israeli
tanks had arrived at the company's headquarters.
and that he was forced to surrender along with 300 workers and employees from
the company and the Suez Canal Authority.
Suez. About 25 minutes later, after the governor and the security director had
arrived at the civil defense room
civil defense room, Saad al-Hakaa called the room again, and when Lieutenant
Colonel Fathi answered, he told him that the commander of the Israeli force that
had occupied the company's headquarters
the commander of the Israeli force that occupied the company's headquarters
wanted to speak to the governor or the security director.
The governor picked up the phone and told Saad al-Hakaa: "The governor is not
available. When asked about
the Maskari commander, he said he was not available either. Then an Israeli
officer took the phone from Saad al-Hakaa
an Israeli officer and asked: "Where is the governor?" He was speaking in
Arabic with a Shiite accent.
Badawi al-Khuli: He asked him to inform the governor that he was required to
surrender the city within half an hour.
and that the governor should come with the director of security and the military
commander of Suez in a car with the flag of Abu Dhabi.
in a car with a white flag, accompanied by all the city's civilians, to the
sports stadium (located south of Suez).
the sports stadium (located south of Suez, at the entrance to Zaytayah Road,
next to the Nasr Petroleum Company
The Israelis pledge to secure them and their lives, and if this is not done
within half an hour, the city will be hit
within half an hour, the city will be hit by airplanes, and all its inhabitants
will be annihilated.
When Hafez was slow to respond to the Israeli officer's words, he shouted loudly
into the phone
on the phone : "Answer, Zalmah, why don't you answer, Zalmah?" (the word
Zalmah in the Levantine dialect means "man").
man). At the end of his warning, the Israeli officer explained that they were
well aware of the city's conditions.
There is no water or electricity, no one has control over the soldiers inside,
and the flour has
The Israeli officer explained that they were fully aware of the conditions in
the city. The governor replied: "The governor is not
I am not responsible for this issue. In any case, the Red Cross
4. The Israeli officer replied: "There is no Red Cross, you are cheating
me." The governor continued
the governor said: "1. Even the Mother's Body has arrived now." 2 He put the
phone down.

The governor immediately telephoned Brigadier General Adel Islam, the military
commander of Suez, who
Since noon the previous day, he had moved from the governorate's operations room
to the Martyrs' Mosque.
the second floor of the mosque, where the Islamic Guidance Society, headed by
Sheikh
Hafez Salama as a temporary command center: 1The Jews asked me to surrender
and warned me to strike Suez if we do not surrender within half an hour, what do
you think as a military commander?
Adel Islam replied: "Give me a chance to think.

The governor then telephoned Police Major Muhammad Refaat Shatta, commander of the radio unit which, after the Israelis cut the telephone lines between Suez and the outside world on October 23 the only communication link between Suez and Cairo. The governor asked Shatta to convey the following message to officials in Cairo: "The Jews have warned me to surrender within half an hour. within half an hour, otherwise we will be hit by airplanes. I have no water, no ammunition and no control over any troops My flour is burning. Your orders?"

Ten minutes later, the governor called Brigadier General Adel Islam back and asked him what he thought. "I haven't decided yet," he said. The governor responded by saying sharply: "Your decision is not final Your decision is not final, and the decision is mine because I am in charge of this country. I want to know your decision and your position. Your opinion on the handover is only an advisory opinion."4 Adel Islam replied: "I will take the opinion I will take the opinion of those who are with me and the consultants with my awareness2 . The governor asked him : "Who are your advisors? Adel Islam replied, "Hafez Salama. The governor became angry and said in anger: What is the value of the opinion of Sheikh Hafez's opinion in this matter? You are crazy, Adel? I want your opinion, Al-Maskari. He replied Adel Islam said: "My opinion is what you see, Your Excellency." The governor ended the heated conversation by saying : 1. Generally, when I make my final decision, will you meet me or meet me while we are waiting for Cairo's decision? Cairo?

No sooner had the governor finished his conversation with the military commander than the phone rang The Israeli officer was on the phone for the second time, and he was hurrying the governor's response. Badawi al-Khouli said: You were here yesterday, and you can try the lecture again. The governor is not present. After he put the phone down, he said: "There is no way to cut the phone line. General Mohebi Khafagy, the head of security, immediately called the head of the center and asked him to to cut the direct telephone line between the Suez Petroleum Company and the civil defense room.

The line was disconnected and the Israelis' direct communication with the governor was cut off. As soon as Major Refaat Shatta received the governor's message, he immediately communicated it by radio to Brigadier General Muhammad al-Nabawi. to Brigadier General Mohamed El-Nabawy Ismail, director of the office of Mamdouh Salem, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Interior at the time. and Minister of Interior at the time. About 20 minutes later, Shatta received Cairo's response to the Suez governor's message, which was undoubtedly shown to the late President Sadat.

Given the importance of Cairo's message, Brig. Gen. Al-Nabawi Ismail personally delivered it to Maj. Rifaat Shatta and asked him, after receiving it, to read it back to him to make

sure that he had received it correctly correct. The text of the reply was as follows 1: No surrender by the governor. Suez is being defended. The governor and the security director must join the popular resistance.â When Major Shatta reported the text of Cairo's message to the governor at nine o'clock and fifty-five minutes, the governor told him Governor : â We will join the Popular Resistance and you will become martyrs.â When Major General Muhyi Khafagy, the head of security, said: 1 Say: â Nothing will happen to us except what God has written for us.â 4 the governor called Brigadier General Adel Islam and told him: â Cairo â Cairo has replied, Adel. No extradition.â And Adel replied: â 1. I was calling you just now to tell you to tell you the same thing.

Since the news that the Israelis contacted the governor and gave him an ultimatum to surrender had spread among many citizens and caused great confusion among citizens, so the governor asked Lt. Lt. Col. Fathi Ghoneim to drive around the city in a car and announce with a megaphone that the governor had rejected the Israeli ultimatum to surrender Suez, that the city would resist, and that everyone should take cover lest the Israelis carry out their threat to strike the city with aircraft. Just before noon, after the governor confirmed that the Israelis had not carried out their threat, he and the security director came out of the civil defense room. from the civil defense room, and as they passed Arbaeen Square, they found Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim in a police car, accompanied by Sobhi al-Sayed, a member of the Socialist Union, broadcasting to the people what the governor had requested what the governor had requested. Since the governor wanted to publicize his refusal of the surrender ultimatum as widely as possible and there was no other loudspeaker other than the one in the Shahzaa Mosque, so the governor personally called Sheikh Hafez Salama the governor personally called Sheikh Hafez Salama and asked him to broadcast to the congregation in the mosque after the noon prayer that the governor rejected the Israeli ultimatum to surrender Suez, and to advise people not to gather for fear of airstrikes. not to gather for fear of air strikes. The governor stated that he had learned from some of the congregation that that Sheikh Hafez Salama had broadcast to the congregation what he asked him to do.

The Israeli warning to the governor on the morning of October 25 that Suez would be destroyed by air if it was not surrendered within half an hour was not a real warning, and was in fact nothing more than a cunning trick by a local Israeli commander who apparently wanted to take advantage of the situation

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to make an attempt of his own to terrorize Hafez and his associates. Perhaps the threat of aerial destruction of the city would scare them into submission and they would come to the stadium with white flags, which would earn him great personal glory. He was not neither the governor nor any of his aides inside Suez were aware of what was going on in the world at the time

The international situation had been overcast since the night before, and tensions between the two superpowers had reached the point of possible nuclear confrontation.
between the two superpowers to the point of possible nuclear confrontation due to the conflict in the
Middle East

Following Israel's continued violation of the ceasefire and violation of Security Council resolutions
Nos. 338 and 393 issued on October 22 and 23, and after its armored forces completed the
around the Third Army to force it to surrender, and after its armored forces closed in on the city of Suez on October 24
the city of Suez on October 24 until the city fell into their hands, Cairo announced on the afternoon of October 24
on the afternoon of October 24 that the Egyptian government had formally submitted to the Security Council a request to send

U.S. and Soviet troops to the Suez area.
At 9:35 a.m. Washington time, an urgent message was received from Soviet President Brezhnev to U.S. President Nixon stating that the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union agrees to Egypt's request to send American and Soviet military forces to the Middle East
to stop Israeli aggression. At the end of his note, Brezhnev threatened that if the U.S.
from sending troops, the Soviet Union might be forced to act unilaterally. After presenting the matter to President Nixon, Secretary of State Kissinger explained the dangerous situation to the Israeli ambassador in Washington the dangerous situation to the Israeli ambassador in Washington, Simcha Dinitz, and then called an urgent meeting of the National Security Council of the National Security Council in the White House Map Room. At 11:00 a.m. Washington time, the meeting, which was attended by Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, CIA Director Colby, Admiral Maurer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig, and other senior
civilian and military officials. It was agreed to respond to the Soviet memorandum with decisive U.S. action
decisive action. During the emergency meeting at the White House, new information was received that eight
Soviet Antonov 22 transport planes were ready to take off from Budapest to
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Egypt within a few hours, and U.S. intelligence estimated that the Soviets were now able to airlift
to airlift 5,000 troops to Egypt every day.

Given the seriousness and significance of these Soviet actions, the 82nd Airborne Division was ordered
82nd Airborne Division was ordered to prepare to mobilize and move additional aircraft carriers
to join the US Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and finally, and this was the most important thing
that the world was on alert at all U.S. military bases around the world. Thus, at dawn on Thursday, October 25, the situation between the two superpowers escalated until
to the brink of nuclear confrontation, due to Israeli aggression west of the canal following the
after the ceasefire decisions. Of course, Israel, having been informed of all these dangerous developments, could not afford to take a chance on October 25

on October 25, amidst the sensational news of the possibility of a high nuclear war due to its actions, Israel could not afford to take a chance on October 25 nuclear war as a result of its actions, to take any large-scale military action against Suez. The Israeli political leadership was not so foolish and short-sighted as to allow the military leadership to make a new attempt to storm Suez with its armored vehicles again or to destroy the city with its planes. by destroying the city with its planes, such a provocative act could be the justification for the Soviet Union to send for the Soviet Union to send its airborne forces to the Middle East. There is no doubt There is no doubt that any uncalculated Israeli action would have led to an explosion of the situation, and consequently to the wrath of the United States on Israthil

After knowing the reality of the international situation at the dawn of October 25, it is easy to realize that the Israeli warning was nothing more than a diversionary tactic, as the warning period of half an hour was of half an hour was logically impossible to complete the surrender of the city in the required manner to assemble all the civilians in the sports stadium outside the city, headed by the governor, the security director, and the military commander. the governor, the security chief and the military commander. Failure to carry out the Israeli threat which was included in the ultimatum, namely the bombing of the city with airplanes in case of non-surrender, clearly indicates that that this was not a serious ultimatum.

Moreover, it turns out that another Israeli officer who occupied the Suez grabbed the phone book and started trying to call the numbers of some senior officials.
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in the Security Directorate, also through Saad al-Hakaa. Among those he spoke to was Lieutenant Colonel Amin Hussein, who evaded him and gave him the number of Major General Mohamed Hamza Amira, the deputy security director. Deputy Director of Security. It has been proven that the Israeli officer called General Hamza Amira at 4:00 p.m. 4 p.m., spoke to him in English and asked him to inform the governor of a new Israeli ultimatum to surrender the city within a quarter of an hour or it will be destroyed by airplanes. And no Logically, this series of mock ultimatums cannot be an organized measure by the Israeli political leadership or the Muskaris. by the Israeli political or military leadership, and so it was most likely nothing more than by some local commanders on their own, or, at best, a method of at best a psychological warfare tactic aimed at seizing Suez without fighting Suez without fighting, since the international situation did not allow the Israeli leadership to re-attack Suez to attack Suez again.

Why revive the governor from the dead?

After we have accurately and honestly presented the sequence of events that took place in Suez on the morning of October 25, 73 on October 25, '73, we quoted official sources and provided the text of the calls made by Badawi

after receiving the Israeli ultimatum at 9:30 a.m. that morning
Whether these contacts were within Suez or with Cairo, we come to one conclusion
that the governor did not exhibit any behavior indicating that he accepted the
surrender of Suez to the Israelis.
that he accepted the surrender of Suez to the Israelis in fulfillment of the
ultimatum he received.

The only thing that should be discussed after we come to this conclusion is the
evaluation of the method used by the governor to reach the correct decision
the governor followed to reach the right decision to be taken in this situation.

From our review of the official documents and the statements of the officials
who witnessed the incident.

We find that after receiving the Israeli warning, the governor made two main
contacts, the first with the military commander of Suez and the second with
officials in Cairo.

the military commander of Suez, and the second with officials in Cairo.

There is no doubt that his contact with the military commander of Suez is a
natural and logical behavior, because

The ultimatum addressed to the governor is a military ultimatum in the first
place, and it was addressed to him by an Israeli military commander
by an Israeli military commander, so the decision to reject or accept it must
involve his active participation in it.

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The Egyptian military commander responsible for the defense of Suez, who has the
correct information

about the extent to which the Egyptian air defense is capable of countering
Israeli aircraft in the event that the Israelis carry out their threat
in case the Israelis carry out their threat and send their planes to destroy
Suez if the ultimatum is rejected
the ultimatum.

The governor's contact with officials in Cairo was also imperative, as the
governor could not

on his own to make a fateful and historic decision on which the life or death of
nearly 20,000 citizens and the survival or destruction of a city
and the survival or destruction of an entire city with hundreds of millions of
pounds worth of housing, facilities, and utilities

hundreds of millions of pounds. Moreover, the political leadership in Cairo was
the only party that

had the correct information about the international situation and the results of
Egypt's contacts with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet
Union

with the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no
doubt that when the political leadership

urged the governor not to surrender despite being certain that there were no
means in the city

for subsistence and the lack of any serious possibilities for its defense, the
political leadership based this decision on the facts it knew

based on the facts it knew about the dangerous confrontation that was taking
place at the time between the two superpowers

superpowers, which threatened to erupt into a highly nuclearized war, making it
certain that the international situation would not allow Israel to carry out an
ultimatum

that the international situation would not allow Israel to carry out its
ultimatum and try to destroy Suez with its planes.

It is funny that some of those who attacked the governor of Suez for his stance
on the ultimatum

when they were unable to point out any mistakes he made in terms of his actions, they had no choice but to that his personal opinion was to accept the ultimatum and surrender Suez. There is no doubt that this criterion is a great injustice, as according to laws and laws, a person cannot be should not be held accountable for the opinions and thoughts in his head, as the Badawi al-Khuli gave a convincing response to those who attacked him with this criterion during the during the joint conference of the executive and popular councils held at the governorate office on March 5, 74 on March 5, 74: "Assuming for the sake of argument that my opinion was that we should hand over the country," he said, "but Cairo, when we turned to it, said no. But Cairo, when I turned to it, said no surrender, and I did not surrender the country based on these instructions. So I didn't actually surrender the country. But that didn't happen, and I wanted to involve Cairo with me in the decision so that I would not be accused of failing to surrender the country if it happened that Cairo saw fit to take to protect the citizens."

Despite the validity of Badawi's position and the correctness of his actions as governor of Suez in the face of
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the Israeli ultimatum he received on the morning of October 25, 73, which is clearly evident to us after this objective study that we conducted without any bias or prejudice, it is regrettable to determine that The campaign of defamation and slander directed against him by some malicious and spiteful people finally succeeded success, and he was retired on April 61, 74, less than three months after the end of the Suez isolation and the re-establishment of communications after the end of the isolation of Suez and the restoration of communication routes to it on January 28, 74 after the first disengagement agreement the first disengagement.

If we want to discover the secret of this unjust campaign that Badawi al-Khuli was subjected to with such force and ferocity and ferocity, we must remember the difficult circumstances in which the city was living and the pressure under which all the men responsible for it, foremost among them the mayor, were working during the The quarantine period lasted one hundred days. It was a difficult task to manage the affairs and governance of a a besieged city surrounded by Israeli forces from all sides, was one of the most difficult operations. Especially if we remember that the city was inhabited by about twenty thousand citizens, most of whom were expatriates and homeless people from different sects and categories, including civilians, military personnel, workers, peasants, merchants, artisans and artisans. peasants, merchants, traders, artisans, and employees. The conditions of life in Suez were not as normal as in other cities Most of the population is unemployed, emptiness is of course the biggest spoiler, and supplies and goods are neither sold nor bought are neither bought nor sold, but are sent from Cairo through the International Emergency Force to be distributed to citizens There is no room in the city for entertainment, amusement, or recreation, which can be nerve-wracking nerves. All these thorny circumstances required strictness and firmness in dealing with people as uncontrolled chaos would inevitably lead to a series of crimes and the spread

of robbery and looting.
crimes and widespread looting, especially with the presence of such a huge
number of
weapons and large quantities of ammunition, whether with soldiers or citizens.
Naturally
that the governor, who had maintained control over the city throughout the
quarantine period, and in cooperation with the police apparatus headed by the
director of the
with the police apparatus, which was headed by Security Director General Muhyi
Khafagi, to maintain security, order and discipline within the city
and discipline in the city, were subjected to bitter campaigns of hatred and
malice from all those who offended them
who were offended by his strictness and firmness. These haters had no choice but
to
who tried to record false heroics for fictitious actions they performed during
the battle and during the
only to aim their arrows of hatred at the governor.

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But the truth, however absent it may be, must be revealed by God, and history
must record
No matter how false the falsifiers, forgeries and deceitful the deceivers.

Declaration of a state of alert in the US forces

At 11:35 p.m. on Oct. 24, Adm.
Admiral Maurer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, received the combat
readiness order for U.S. forces
from Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and immediately communicated it to
commands and subordinate units around the world.
and subordinate units around the world. The order read: "To all commands,
raise
to combat readiness level 23. The only exception to the combat readiness order
was
The only exception to the combat readiness order was the aerial refueling
aircraft of the Strategic Air Command
8 were tasked to continue servicing B-52 heavy bombers for refueling
refueling at a designated rendezvous point in the mid-Atlantic.
on a mission to service airlift planes from the United States to Israel.

At midnight, Admiral Maurer's warning order arrived at the base
in Bellevue, Nebraska, the main nerve center of the Strategic Air Command
worldwide. Immediately, hundreds of Air Force and
Strategic Air Command operational staff officers were awakened and summoned to
the command center
command center in a seven-story building, four of which are underground.
Officers flocked to the balconies
as computers poured in a torrent of information about the weather and potential
targets
and potential targets, as well as the state of readiness of the 162,000
Strategic Air Command personnel
162,000 worldwide.

Strategic Air Command bombers scattered around the globe were
were placed on the runways, while pilots were ready to take off as soon as the
order was given
the order to do so. Sixty B-52 bombers were ordered to return from their base in
Guam back to the United States.

At 1:30 a.m. on October 25, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger returned

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returned to the Pentagon, where he gave further orders to support the situation on the state of readiness

The aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy with its load of Skyhawk bombers was dispatched from the eastern Atlantic.

Skyhawk bombers from the eastern Atlantic to the Mediterranean, and the 82nd Airborne Division was notified

Airborne (51,000 men) headquartered at 1 Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

known as the Rapid Intervention Force, to be ready to move before 6:00 a.m. in the morning.

At 2 a.m., NATO members (865) were informed of the of the U.S. combat readiness. At 2:30 a.m., Kissinger finalized a draft of President Nixon's response

President Nixon's response to Soviet President Brezhnev's memorandum. The substance of the response was that the United States cannot tolerate unilateral action by the Soviet Union in the Middle East. and that any attempt to introduce troops into the conflict zone would harm the cause of world peace

but that the United States was ready and willing to participate in a real escort force

of the United Nations to ensure a cease-fire, and the U.S. response made no reference to the

the ultimatum to put U.S. forces on standby, because it

because it assumed that the Soviets must have already learned about it through their intelligence services and satellites.

electronics and satellites.

At 3:00 a.m., Schlesinger and Admiral Maurer finalized all the details of the warning order, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger returned to the White House, where he

informed President Nixon of the measures that had been taken. Nixon immediately ratified the measures

as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces.

Security Council Resolution 240

On the morning of October 25, the Security Council met amidst the dire news that a confrontation between the two superpowers was expected

of a confrontation between the two superpowers over the Middle East crisis Middle East crisis . This prompted Council members to take urgent action in the hope of

to de-escalate the explosive situation and reach a real ceasefire in the Middle East

Middle East. Eight countries - India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, Guinea, Kenya, Sudan

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Panama and Peru have submitted a draft resolution that provides for the establishment of an international emergency force, excluding the forces of the five permanent members of the Council (the United States the five permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain

France). The Security Council soon agreed to the draft resolution, and on the same day issued

Resolution No. 043 on the same day, with the approval of 14 countries and China's abstention, establishing an international emergency force and authorizing the secretary

an international emergency force and authorize the Secretary-General of the United Nations to dispatch it immediately to the Middle East conflict zone to the Middle East conflict zone, and to report within 24 hours on the measures

taken
for this purpose

On the night of October 26/25, the Security Council formally ordered the formation of the IEF to consist of 7,000 men, with Finnish General Inzio who had been commanding the International Emergency Force in Cyprus. As a matter of urgency, it was decided to withdraw 900 officers and soldiers from the International Emergency Force in Cyprus and move them immediately to the Suez front. This group consisted of detachments of troops from Austria, Finland, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden, and the cost of forming this force was estimated at thirty million dollars for the first six months for the first six months, and the Soviet Union, which had been boycotting the Soviet Union, which had previously boycotted contributing to the expenses of the International Emergency Force, decided to pay its share of the costs of its establishment. It was also decided that troops from Ghana, Panama, Peru, Nepal, Nepal and Indonesia will participate in the emergency force, in addition to the four aforementioned countries in addition to the four aforementioned countries, whose troops are part of the International Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The opinion of the of the Security Council not to include member states of the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic Alliance, but Poland, a member of the Warsaw Pact, and Canada, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, were allowed to participate in the force

Military Situation in Suez

Although the Israelis failed to break into Suez on October 24, they were likely to that they could resume their attack at any time, so Brigadier General Adel Islam, the military commander of Suez, devised a new security plan to block the entrances to Suez. Brigadier General Adel Islam, the military commander of Suez, devised a new security plan to block the entrances to Suez through which they were expected to advance. the city into four sectors, and assigned each sector a commander responsible for its defense, as well as a liaison officer liaison officer from the Popular Defense Officers to serve as a communication tool between the sector command and the Suez command.

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Brigadier General Adel made sure to constantly change his command center to prevent it from being attacked by from any infiltrators or agents, so he moved from the Shuhada Mosque to the Canal Authority's water workshop and then to the pharmaceutical company, especially in the critical days between October 24 and the arrival of the international emergency forces on October 28 on October 28. Brig. Gen. Yousef Afifi, commander of the 19th Infantry Division, had On October 25, he sent about 12 tank-hunting crews, each armed with a 736 launcher. Among them were Suez natives who had expressed their willingness to defend their city. He chose Major Ali Radba, Captain Fawzi Shaker, and Lieutenant Ahmed Ahmed Mustafa Murad.

These crews were transported by boat from east of the canal to Suez, and were placed in positions at the entrance to the city to repel any enemy attacks and destroy their tanks. In addition to these

âŠš ShamalâŠŠ anti-tank company from the 19th Infantry Division, commanded by Lt. Col. Hossam Amara, which took part in the fighting against enemy tanks on October 24, and has remained in the city since then to defend it.

After the anti-tank crews of the 19th Infantry Division completed the occupation of their positions according to the plan Brigadier General Youssef Afifi sent a letter to Governor Badawi in which he assured him that the 19th Infantry Division had taken all measures to protect and secure the city's entrances and important centers and important centers. Brig. Gen. Youssef Afifi took all these effective measures to defend of Suez on his own initiative, as it was not part of his division's mission.

After the failure of the October 24 attack on Suez, the Israelis did not attempt to launch any serious attack on the city, and all their operations were skirmishes for the purpose of gaining more territory. The international situation, the dimensions of which we have already explained in detail, did not allow them to try again did not allow them to try again, especially after the issuance of Security Council Resolution No. 340 on October 25, 73 to establish an international emergency force to supervise the implementation of Security Council resolutions 339, 338, and 403 of the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the parties' forces to the positions they had occupied at 6:00 p.m. that they occupied at 6:52 p.m. on October 22 Eastern Mediterranean Time.

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At noon on October 28, the vanguard of the International Emergency Force (IEF) arrived in Suez. The commander of the force went to the governorate building where a meeting was held with Badawi al-Khouli, the governor of Suez. The meeting was attended by Major General Mohebi Khafagy, the security director, Brigadier General Adel Islam, the military commander, and Colonel Fathi Abbas, the director of intelligence. Military Commander and Colonel Fathi Abbas, Director of South Canal Intelligence

Following the meeting, the IEF commander began distributing patrols of his soldiers to sectors of the city. Each patrol moved in a jeep with a United Nations flag, accompanied by an Egyptian officer an Egyptian officer to guide them to the Egyptian positions, so that they could identify the line separating the Egyptian and Israeli positions between Egyptian and Israeli positions so that the UN fixed points could be stationed there. The Israeli forces took advantage of Israeli forces took advantage of this operation to advance from their positions and gain new territory. a tank to the Huwais point and occupied the Kafr Jawda area and two buildings in the Triangle area. They were able to advance and occupy the irrigation rest house on the Zayyatat road. UN observers ignored United Nations observers ignored these blatant Israeli violations despite the fact that they took place in front of them and despite the protest of Egyptian officers. The Egyptian officers protested, and their response was that they determine the positions according to the forces that occupy them. They told the Egyptians not to open fire and to control their nerves

On October 30, the governor called the commander of the Third Army and asked him to send a commander who is characterized by strength of character and firmness to Suez so that he can control the large number of Muskarians who flocked to the city on October 22 and 32 from different units without any military command to control them. On October 31, the Third Army commander sent Brigadier General A.H. Muhammad Amin al-Kanzi, assistant commander of the 1st Infantry Division, to Suez, accompanied by a platoon of military police. Brigadier General I.H. Muhammad Al-Kanzi took over the Suez military command from Brigadier General Adel Islam on November 1, 73 and joined the Popular Defense Command with its personnel, weapons and equipment joined the Suez Military Command

Thanks to his sincere efforts, hard work and sincerity, Brigadier General Al-Kanzi was able to impose order and discipline on thousands of soldiers order and discipline to the thousands of soldiers that the city was teeming with. After they were reorganized and rearmed into organized units, some of these units were used to reinforce the defense of Suez, and all the units participated in training programs supervised by Brigadier General Al-Kanazi and his staff, the purpose of which was to raise the combat efficiency of these soldiers from
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on the one hand, and so that they would not fall prey to the deadly vacuum throughout the siege on the other hand, which would lead to their delinquency their deviation. In addition, a military police unit was formed and commanded by Col. Ismail Amin, and the building of the Set Amna Preparatory School for Girls was allocated as its headquarters. This unit contributed to imposing security and order in Suez.

The means of radio communication between Suez and Cairo continued to work accurately and efficiently through the radio patrol unit, which was commanded by Police Major Mohamed Refaat Shatta since all telephone communication between Suez and the outside world was cut off on October 23. But this only means of communication was cut off on October 26, as the enemy managed to capture the unit's building the enemy managed to capture the unit's building, which was located in an isolated location outside the city on the Nasser Road between the Triangle and Zaytiyat Roads, and captured Major Refaat Shatta, Lieutenant and 81 non-commissioned officers, soldiers and civilian workers after they performed their duty bravely and faithfully in the most critical periods at a time when enemy tanks were a few meters away from them. a few meters away from them.

But radio contact with Cairo was soon restored on October 30. A Military Intelligence radio crew was dispatched by order of the agency's headquarters to the city of Suez, and was one of the crews working on reconnaissance work behind enemy lines in the Sinai in the Sinai, and immediately joined the South Canal Intelligence Office in Suez. He was After the arrival of the International Emergency Force in Suez, Colonel Fathi Abbas and his

to the original building previously occupied by the Mukhabarat, a five-story building five-story building facing the governorate building. Colonel Fathi ordered the which consisted of an officer and two men in one of the building's rooms, and this crew became the main communication link between the governorate and the official became the main communication link between the governorate and officials in Cairo, in addition to its normal work which is to achieve communication between the intelligence office in Suez and the agency's headquarters in Cairo.

At the same time, Brigadier General Youssaq Afifi sent a radio station from the 19th Infantry Division Infantry, which was assigned a room on the fifth floor of the intelligence building. The work of this station centered on making contacts between the people of Suez and their families outside Suez, which had a great impact in raising morale among citizens.

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Suez under siege

Since October 23, for the first time in its long history, Suez has been under siege siege. Israeli forces surrounded it from all sides and even occupied its famous industrial suburb to the southwest, the Zaytiyat district, where the Zaytiyat Company is headquartered in the southwestern part of the city, the Zaytiyat industrial area, where the fertilizer company and a number of major oil companies are located Fertilizers and some of the most important petroleum companies, and the prospect of opening the roads that connect it to the outside world was a foregone conclusion, while the more likely scenario was the appearance of Israeli tanks in its main streets if the Israeli leadership thought of doing it again and sending troops again.

Once the international emergency forces arrived on October 28 and a real ceasefire took effect Suez began living its life as an independent state, relying only on its own facilities and resources and its own resources. The governor issued an order in his capacity as military governor declaring Suez a military zone The governor issued an order in his capacity as military governor to declare Suez a military zone. the stability and regularity of life in the city. The governor also ordered the formation of a military court to try the perpetrators of crimes, deviants and manipulators of the people's wealth. The Hizar period was divided into two main phases two main phases: The first phase was from October 23 to November 14, 73, which is a very critical period during which the city relied on its own meager resources without receiving any assistance from abroad. any assistance from abroad. The second phase began on November 15, 73, when supplies began to arrive from Cairo the arrival of supplies from Cairo through the International Emergency Force following the signing of the six-point agreement between Egypt and Israel on November 11, 73 and this phase lasted until January 28 74, the date of the reopening of the roads between Suez and the outside world

following the signing of the Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 74 between Egypt and Israel in the talks known as the Kilometer 101

The biggest issue Suez faced during the siege was water. It was After capturing the Zayyatat area, Israeli forces seized the city's water storage tanks of the city's reserve water storage tanks located inside the buildings of the Fertilizer and Chemical Industries Company Fertilizers and Chemical Industries and Nasr Petroleum Company. On October 28, the enemy erected an earthen dam on the The enemy erected an earthen dam on the Sweet Teraa at Jabaliyah al-Sayyid Hashem near al-Huwais, one kilometer from the
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Suez Canal Authority, which supplies water to the city, which led to a decrease in the water level in the the remaining part of the canal inside the city. Following a meeting between the governor, the with the security director and those responsible for water in the city, it was decided to immediately withdraw the remaining water in the canal and store it in the tanks and basins of the water station in the Suez Canal Authority's tanks and basins to ensure that the enemy does not deprive the city from it. Under instructions from Major General Muhyi Khafagi, head of the security directorate, Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim, head of the civil defense and fire department, supervised the operation of the Civil Defense and Fire Department supervised the implementation of the required operation using 7 firefighting machines from the fire unit . The amount of water that was stored in the water station amounted to 14,000 cubic meters of water The technicians at the plant disinfected it and were instructed to transfer 400 cubic meters of this amount to tanks. 400 cubic meters of this amount to the tanks of the Jerko Company in the Arbaeen neighborhood to serve as a reserve to be used in case the enemy hits the water plant. to be used in case the enemy hit the water station.

The plan to address the acute water shortage was to completely stop pumping water into the city's network the city's network, and allocate all the stored water to supply the Third Army east of the canal at a rate of 50 cubic meters per day for each of the 7th and 91st Infantry Divisions, as well as supplying bakeries with five cubic meters per day and the hospital with three cubic meters. and the hospital with three cubic meters, provided that the Armed Forces vehicles are responsible for transporting the quantities and fire trucks will transport the water allocated to the bakeries and the hospital. The the task of searching for the old wells that were used by the people of Suez about a century ago before the arrival of Nile water via the Ismailia Canal. thanks to the guidance of some elderly citizens to find a number of ancient wells, the most important of which were Sidi al-Gharib well, whose water was found to be potable, with a discharge rate of 120 liters per hour. The salty sea water was used for cleaning and flushing toilets from public places. It was transported using mules to save fuel.

The remaining 1400 sacks of flour were only enough for one month's consumption at the rate of two loaves per person per day. In order to provide bread for the

troops of the Third Army east of the canal, the governor issued a secret order to Alaa al-Khouli, the director of supply, who played a prominent role during the privatization. to reduce the weight of the loaf and distribute one loaf per person on Saturdays and Tuesdays of each week under the pretext of maintenance work in the bakeries and the water station. Citizens endured this decision even though most of them knew most of them knew the real purpose of its issuance, as they were ready for any sacrifice in order to to help their armed forces that are defending their city and defending the honor of their country. The issue of

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On October 23, the enemy destroyed the high-pressure grid that carries electricity from the The enemy destroyed the high-pressure network that carries electricity from Cairo to Suez on October 23. On October 23, the enemy destroyed the high-pressure network that carries electricity from Cairo to Suez. emergency stations, most of which were in need of repair and had not been operated in the past in the past except in rare cases when the high-pressure current was interrupted for a limited period of time, but their operation after the interruption of the high-pressure current coming from Cairo became a necessity to operate the operating room, sterilization equipment, and refrigerators the hospital's operating room, sterilizers, and blood refrigerators, as well as bakeries, pastries bakeries and pastries, as well as gas stations and people's workshops. A system has been put in place to run emergency stations after repairing them for 16 hours a day. Thus, the lights of Suez remained on The lights of Suez remained on, causing the enemy to puzzle and wonder.

The Suez General Hospital faced a difficult situation in the first phase of the blockade. The hospital, which had a maximum capacity of 300 beds, became home to more than 1,400 wounded and injured as a result of war operations and air raids, and they needed surgeries, blood transfusions and treatment for wounds, burns wounds, burns, fractures and other types of treatment.

As a result of the overcrowding, most of the injured were lying on the floor and filling the roads of the hospital The efforts of the doctors and nursing staff were instrumental in preventing cases of poisoning or epidemic infections among patients and neighbors. or epidemic infections among the sick and wounded, especially since the hospital has become a permanent headquarters for large numbers of large numbers of citizens who found in the hospital a haven that gave them a kind of safety during the air raids.

International Emergency Force arrives in Suez

In accordance with Security Council Resolution 340 issued on October 25, 1973 began arriving in Suez on October 28. The first detachments that were urgently transferred from the International Emergency Force in Cyprus to the Suez front troops from Austria, Finland, Ireland, Finland and Sweden

As soon as they arrived, the international force began establishing fixed points on the line between Egyptian and Israeli positions at the entrance to the city

The most critical period for Suez during the siege was the period from October 23 to November 14, 1973

October to November 14, 1973 (23 days), as the city spent the first five days under the threat of an Israeli invasion, and was subjected to continuous heavy bombardment from enemy aircraft and artillery and artillery. During this critical phase, Suez was dependent on the sustenance of its civilian and military population, which numbered civilians and military personnel, who numbered about 20,000 citizens, on its own resources

The population suffered from hunger and thirst.

At dawn on October 25, after confirming that the city was clear of enemy forces, the civil defense and rescue began to transport the injured and martyrs from the places where they fell in the city's streets to the general hospital. On October 30, local volunteers moved the bodies of the martyrs that were kept at the General Hospital to the Martyrs' Cemetery in Ruwerd, where they were buried in a solemn scene were buried in a solemn scene in which all segments of the population participated.

As for the bodies of the Israelis that the enemy was unable to drag with it during the retreat of its forces from Suez after the battle on October 24

The governor ordered them to be buried in the Suez cemetery out of concern for public health.

for the sake of public health, and this was done by civil defense personnel under the supervision of Brigadier General Ahmed

under the supervision of Brigadier General Ahmed Al-Roussi, Assistant Director of Security. The bodies were removed from the streets and buried in a mass grave in the cemetery

mass grave in the cemetery. During the talks at kilometer 101 on the Cairo-Suez road, which began at dawn on October 28, Israel demanded

that began at dawn on October 28, Israel demanded the return of 33 bodies, the number of its officers

and soldiers missing inside Suez during the October 24 battle. In fulfillment of Cairo's instructions.

the Israeli bodies were transferred from the cemetery to the Hamayat Hospital to prepare them for delivery to the Red Cross

Red Cross. On November 6 and 7, 18 bodies were handed over to Red Cross representatives at the

18 bodies were handed over to Red Cross delegates at the Fever Hospital to be handed over to the Israeli authorities, and the fate of the remains unknown to this day.

Supplies arrive in Suez

The signing of the six-point agreement between Egypt and Israel at the Kilometer 10 talks on

November 11, 1973, had a significant impact on the conditions of the people of Suez. It was

The third of its six well-known points states: "The city of Suez will receive daily supplies of food, water and medicine, and all wounded civilians are evacuated from the city of

Suez2 . Accordingly, all wounded and injured were evacuated from the hospital, and were

deported to Cairo in two batches: The first batch on November 17, numbering 1,400 and the second batch on November 23 with 280 people, and the hospital has been empty since then. Since then, the hospital has been empty except for some minor cases. In fulfillment of the agreement, Cairo informed the on Nov. 14 that supplies of food, water and medicine would arrive to Suez daily starting on November 15.

In order to deliver these supplies to the city, the Israelis devised an arduous system, which caused great stress on the citizens of Suez, as they feared that military materials would be included in the supply convoys in the supply convoys to the people of the city.

Their vigilance was so great that they prevented the entry of fuel, oil, stones, batteries, and bottles of cologne. batteries and bottles of cologne, to the extent that they opened some cheese cans and searched crates of oranges.

According to the delivery system, the cars coming from Cairo, which numbered 35 10-ton trucks in the Mediterranean, would stop a short distance from Suez, and after their Egyptian drivers their Egyptian drivers would leave them, they would be driven by IEF drivers to the triangle at the entrance to Suez Triangle at the entrance to Suez.

On the opposite side of the point, 35 trucks from Suez are parked, each with with two individuals other than the driver for unloading and loading, and these 70 individuals get out of the They cross the checkpoint at the triangle point and enter the area occupied by the enemy. Accompanied by members of the International Emergency Force, the individuals then unload the on the ground next to the vehicles, which then leave the triangle point and head back toward Cairo. in the direction of Cairo, only to be picked up by Egyptian drivers at their previous drop-off point on the road to continue their journey back to the capital. from Suez, cross the barrier at the triangle point and park in the same order as the Cairo cars. Cairo, and the Egyptian personnel load them from the loads placed on the ground, and after the end of the loading process the cars return to Suez, where they are unloaded into warehouses designated by the governorate the governorate, under strong police guard.

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Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim, head of the Civil Defense and Fire Department, under the instructions of Major General Mohebi Khafagi, the Director of Security, a system that ensures the participation of all healthy citizens of the city in the unloading and loading process. The unloading and loading process that takes place daily at the triangle point on a regular basis, provided that firefighters and civil defense volunteers firefighters and civil defense volunteers alone will be responsible for unloading the supplies from the cars inside Suez and transport them to warehouses designated by the governorate. In order to control the a military order to form a committee that included representatives from the armed forces, the police, the Supply Directorate and the Socialist Union.

the armed forces, the police, the Supply Directorate and the Socialist Union.

Since water was available in the city after the measures taken by the governor and his aides, the governor asked Cairo not to send water trucks. the governor asked Cairo not to send water trucks, and this was after the arrival of ten water trucks as part of the supply convoy that arrived in Suez on November 18.

Despite the arrival of large quantities of supplies from Cairo, it was estimated at the end of the siege that of at least 35,000 tons, Governor Badawi al-Khouli stood by his decision in which the amount of rations to be given to each person in the city was determined free of charge on the basis that this amount is sufficient for the individual's subsistence without extravagance.

Since this limitation resulted in all of the governorate's 37 warehouses being full 37 warehouses were full of ration items, Alaa al-Khouli, the director of supply, suggested to the governor on January 4, 74, to contact Cairo January 4, 74, to contact Cairo to stop the shipment of rations to Suez, but the governor rejected this suggestion, as he feared that the fighting would resume again and that no supplies would reach the city His goal was to keep a large reserve of foodstuffs inside the city just in case.

The governor's cautious rationing policy led to severe criticism especially from the Socialist Union in Suez, claiming that he was shortchanging citizens in the distribution of and selling them some items for cash, while the governorate's warehouses were filled to capacity with with rations sent from Cairo. Governor Badawi al-Khouli later responded to to this criticism during a joint conference of members of the Executive and Popular Councils held at the governorate headquarters on March 5 held at the governorate headquarters on March 5, 1974, he said: "I have a simple comment on the process disbursement of appointments . Indeed, there were citizens who asked me to disburse some items and I did not agree to it because there were signals I received from Cairo asking me to consider the appointments I had

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as a reserve and should be preserved. These signals exist and are confidential. and any one of you can see them.

I have censored some of the items that come to us in small quantities and restricted their distribution in the last two months. When they increased, I agreed to distribute them in cash to those who wanted to buy. As for the quantities that were distributed to individuals and whether they were sufficient or not, I was I considered that it was sufficient, and some people left the city (after the end of the quarantine) with many appointments. The committee that decided these quantities was made up of myself, the city's force commander and the security director and the director of supply, and we appreciated the needs of the citizens. These are points of view. And we did not We didn't know what would happen in the future, so we had to preserve these materials. I was in control of

the water supply for the citizens, the city's forces, and the Third Army. I was asked by many citizens, did you give water to the army? And I said: Yes, because it was necessary. At that time, I had to give water to the army.â

One of the funniest parts of the siege was the establishment of a public institution for slow transportation, to which all of the city's of slow transportation in the city, including karoo carts, dromedaries, handcarts, and bicycles. (to overcome the fuel crisis.

The governor issued five military orders to organize this institution, which would have its own apparatus in the governorate five military orders, including the order to determine the price of each means of transportation and the amount of hay allocated to horses, donkeys and mules pulling carts.

On January 28, the siege of the valiant city practically ended when Israeli forces withdrew from all their positions around the city from all their positions around the city. All roads linking Suez to the outside world were reopened

All roads linking Suez to the outside world were reopened, and telephone communications that had been cut off between it and other cities were restored Republic. This was as a result of the signing of the first disengagement agreement on January 18, 1974 between Egypt and Israel. On January 29, the convoy of Suez citizens coming from Cairo met with

It was a historic meeting characterized by hugs and kisses. Tears of joy at the meeting of loved ones mixed with tears of sorrow for the parting of the martyrs, and everyone stood All stood in awe, while repeating the words of the Almighty: â And do not improve your faith in God's will. They are not dead, but alive with their souls (Al-Imran - verse 869).

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2George MisrAlajiya Samasalem
Hafiznah al-Tardit

Dumpster for Hafizd

Mr. Jamal Hammad.

Greetings and appreciation.

It was a pleasure to have you visit Suez and attend our celebrations of the thirteenth Crimean Suez Day. Our celebrations of the thirteenth Suez Crimean Day.) October 24, 1986 The anniversary of the epic heroism created by the city of Suez with the cooperation of the armed forces and the honorable policemen.

It was a wonderful military historical symposium that you were kind enough to and the inspiring and successful dialog with the people of Suez was a great addition to the to the powerful Feast of Weiss, which left Ninine Ninine as a monument â Suez and Egypt's sonâ resonated with generations and gave the program a popularity that we are proud of. It appeared from the Yuba reactions of the citizens that I received. Jajouriya Mahanat 0

Greetings to you, our honorable professor, with our best wishes for continued success and success for the service of the homeland.

Accept my compliments â 408,
1986,812,812,81 Hant Ajididid

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Chapter Nine Sharon's Attempts to Capture Ismailia

On the morning of October 19, 1973, the enemy had, as mentioned above, west of the Suez Canal
Three armored divisions comprising seven armored brigades, a parachute infantry brigade, and a mechanized infantry brigade.
General Abraham Adan's division (3 armored brigades), General Ariel Sharon's division (2 armored brigade and a parachute brigade) General Kalman Magen's division (2 armored brigades and a mechanized infantry brigade).
These divisions continued their operations to achieve their objectives according to the plan on two axes

two main axes:
The military situation on the Ismailia axis

The southern axis; the Suez axis, on which the divisions of General Adan and General
We have already explained the military operations that took place on this axis in detail.
that took place on this axis in detail.
The northern axis: The Ismailia axis, which was operated by General Sharon's division and its borders
The southern border of Abu Sultan, and the direction of its advance northward along the Suez Canal on the treaty road.
Sharon's objective was to cross the Ismailia Canal and capture the city of Ismailia
the Ismailia Canal and capture the city of Ismailia. The only Egyptian forces facing Sharon's division on this salient south of the Ismailia Canal was the 182nd Brigade
Parachute Brigade under the command of Col. Ismail Azmy and two battalions of the 129th Thunderbolt Group under the command of Col.
Ali Heikal .
Given the presence of about 650 Israeli tanks west of the canal, in addition to the mechanized infantry
using half-track armored vehicles for their movements, the tanks took
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Israeli tanks began to deploy in large groups, threatening the Egyptian defenses to the front.
Egyptian defenses in the front and in the rear. At 9:00 a.m.
on the morning of October 19, Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, sent
who had arrived at the Second Army's advance command center at
at 5:00 p.m. the previous day (as mentioned above), sent a radio telegram to General Ahmed
Ismail, the commander-in-chief at Cairo's Center 10, in which he reported the following: 1The enemy is deployed in groups
Within the area from 40 to 50 tanks in Fayed and Saraboum. His forces are wreaking havoc on the land.

The appearance of such a large number of tanks west of the canal following the

crossing of the three Israeli armored divisions

The appearance of this huge number of tanks west of the canal after the three Israeli armored divisions crossed to the west caused Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly to have a bold idea

to take advantage of the fact that the eastern bank of the canal was empty of most of the Israeli armored forces

of the Israeli armored forces, one of the Egyptian divisions far from the ongoing clashes.

the 18th Infantry Division in the Kantara East sector to attack the Israeli positions in front of it

as a means of relieving the Israeli pressure that had been concentrated on the west bank of the canal

This idea is clearly illustrated by the radio signal sent by Lt. Gen.

Shazly sent to Brigadier General A.H. Abdel Qawi Mahjoub, Chief of Staff of the 68th Infantry Division at 12:00 p.m. on October 19

12 noon on October 19, which read: "Aldo is very strong in the ruins and advancing in different directions. You can make an attack on the enemy, and you can make an attack on the enemy.

enemy. Study the situation with Fouad (meaning A.H. Fouad Aziz Ghali, the division commander) and give me

the decision within 10 minutes." This radio signal clearly indicates the extent to which Lt. Gen.

Lt. Gen. Shazly was experiencing at the time, due to the muskarian situation, which was

was becoming increasingly awkward on the west bank of the canal, it is important to take the enemy's pulse and study such a dangerous proposal

by the division commander and his chief of staff could not have been accomplished in 10 minutes, as stated in the

signal. The lack of a recorded response to this signal from the 18th Infantry Division in the Second Army's signal log

Second Army either indicates that the division command did not take this suggestion seriously

The Israeli defenses east of the canal were not devoid of troops due to the crossing of the three armored divisions to the west of the canal

the three armored divisions to the west of the canal, the Israeli Southern Command had already prepared the equivalent of two

the equivalent of two divisions of reserve forces to occupy Israeli positions east of the canal facing the Egyptian bridgeheads.

Egyptian bridgeheads, and the only adjustment it made to remedy the shortage was in

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was to divide the battlefield into two zones instead of three, as had been the case before the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal

before the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal, with the northern zone stretching from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Middle Road in the south.

from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Middle Road in the south (the Ismailia Road east of Tassa).

Brigadier General Sasson was in command, while the Southern Zone was responsible for the area from the Middle Road in the north to the Shatt in the south.

Brig. Gen. Granit Yisrael was in command, but he didn't stay long.

The command granted him leave after his son was killed on the Golan front to stay with his family during the mourning period.

Brigadier General Menachem Piron took over the command until the end of the war. On the morning of October 19, the position of the units of the 182nd Parachute

Brigade on the west bank of the

Canal was as follows:

89th Parachute Battalion: It was occupying the Egyptian terraces that extend on the western shore of the canal

between the Israeli penetration gap and the Ismailia Terrace, namely: Saraberm, Terson, Sheikh

Hanidak and Jebel Maryam. 1

81st Parachute Battalion: It was securing the Ain Ghossein-Saraboum road parallel to the railroad line

and occupies a position south of the Saraboum railroad station.

85th Parachute Battalion: It was on its way from Inshas to Ismailia to receive its commander

the mission from the Second Army commander after regrouping at the Inshas camps on October 18.

Colonel Danny Mat, the Israeli paratrooper commander who was stationed in the Dafraswar area

had sent a battalion of his brigade north under the instructions of General Sharon, the division commander, with the aim of capturing Saraboum on October 18.

Saraboum on October 18, but failed to reach Saraboum due to stubborn resistance

by the stubborn resistance of the Egyptian Thunderbolts. (from the 129th Thunderbolt Group, as

) 0 Following the crossing of the armored brigade led by Colonel Amnon (from Sharon's division) to the west

- Canal on October 19 after leaving an armored battalion of his brigade on the eastern bank, Sharon was emboldened

and ordered the commander of the parachute brigade to try again and advance his forces across the cultivated land to capture

Saraboum, but the Israeli paratroopers ran into the fortified position occupied by the Egyptian 81st Paratrooper Battalion south of Saraboum.

by the Egyptian 81st Parachute Battalion south of Saraboum, which led to the failure of its attack for the second time.

When General Sharon learned of the failure of the Dani Mat paratroopers' attack, he immediately sent an armored force from the Amnon Brigade

(about 30 tanks supported by mechanized infantry) from the Amnon Brigade to reinforce it. By

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detours around the Saraboum position, Israeli tanks were able to penetrate the Malassian position

At around 2:00 p.m., enemy pressure on the 81st Parachute Battalion continued, forcing it to blow up the bridge.

Israeli tanks, in cooperation with the paratroopers, managed to blow up the bridge over the Khalwa Tributary and retreat to the north.

in cooperation with the paratroopers were able to capture the vital Saraboum site. The Israelis reported

that the site included a large radio listening station. Following the battle, Lt.

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly ordered Colonel Ismail Azmi, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, to retreat

with his under-controlled units north to the Tosun position, while holding the Tosun-Jamaa line

Saraboum. Fearing that Israeli armored vehicles would cross the Ismailia Canal and reach the city of

Ismailia, the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (the remaining force of the 23rd Division

Mechanized Infantry Division north of the Ismailia Canal) to occupy a defensive line along the northern shore of the

on the agricultural road and on the front from Nafisha in the east to the Abu Sawir airfield in the west.

The brigade commander is to take action with the brigade's engineers.

The brigade commander will take the necessary measures with the military engineers to blow up all bridges

in the event of any attempt by the enemy to cross it.

The inability of our forces to confine the enemy to the Dafraswar area west of the canal allowed its armored forces to spread north and south armored forces were able to spread north and south, until an armored force from the Amnon Brigade, in cooperation with was able to force the 182nd Parachute Brigade to retreat north from the Sarabioum line to the Tosun line. As we have already mentioned, given the impact of the military situation on each bank on the situation on the other bank. General Shazly ordered Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, to turn his division north from the line adjacent to Sarabioum to the line adjacent to Tosun on the east bank so that his shoulder would be in Colonel Ismail Azmy's shoulder as he had explained to him. Brig. Gen. Al-Orabi was forced to retreat his division north about 5 kilometers, without any pressure from the enemy without any pressure from the enemy, and thus the enemy succeeded in achieving the goal that had been set in the original Israeli crossing plan to secure the crossing area at Deverswar and the three bridges across the canal from artillery fire. across the canal, from artillery, mortar, tank gun and direct fire from both sides of the canal. from both sides of the canal, so that the flow of troops and supplies to the West Bank could continue safely and securely.

On October 19, an unfortunate incident occurred that was met with sorrow and dismay by all and sundry at all levels. The General Command sent a special group of intelligence
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led by Colonel Ibrahim al-Rifai that morning to the Second Army Command, and Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly instructed Colonel Al-Rifai to work with his group on the axis of the treaty road in the sector from Nafisha north in the sector from Nafisha in the north to the intersection of the Sarabioum junction with the treaty road in the south. in order to carry out raids and ambushes against enemy tanks. Nine o'clock in the morning in the morning to move from Nafisha. According to radio signals recorded by the Second Army command, Col. Colonel Rifai informed Lieutenant General Shazly at 1:45 p.m. that there were enemy tanks on his axis of advance and that he would attempt to engage them. At 1:30 p.m. Colonel Ibrahim al-Rifai was martyred after being hit by a bullet from an Israeli tank's cannon. This was in the Al-Ashgar area in Al-Manayef (south of Tirat Al-Manayef), after he and his group fought a glorious battle against Israeli tanks. his group fought a glorious battle against enemy tanks. The Armed Forces lost one of their greatest heroes and bravest fighters
of its greatest heroes and bravest fighters.

Egyptian paratroopers and thunderbolts south of the Ismailia Tara'a Securing the Israeli penetration gap east of the Canal was the most important concern of the Southern Command If the Egyptians had succeeded in closing this gap, the Israeli forces that crossed to the west of the canal would have been would have been completely cut off from their supply route and bases east of the canal, and Egyptian forces west of the canal would have been able to Egyptian forces west of the canal would have been able to besiege and eliminate them. The Egyptian General Command The Egyptian General Command only made this attempt once. On October 17, the 21st Armored Division

Armored Division to advance from its position at Ras al-Kobri al-Muwahidi (the right flank of the Second Army) to south along the canal to meet up with the independent 25th Armored Brigade, which was tasked at the same time to advance from its position at the bridgehead of the 7th Infantry Division (the left wing of the 3rd Army) to the north along the eastern shore of the Great Bitter Lake. The confluence of the two armored forces was at the at the designated meeting place, the Dafraswar area, meant closing the penetration gap at Mena'ea and isolate the Israeli forces that had crossed to the west bank of the canal. Unfortunately, this bold attempt was unsuccessful due to errors in planning in the organization of cooperation and in the protection of the forces conducting the operation, both on the move and on the move all of which were the responsibility of the General Command, as well as other tactical errors and other tactical errors made by some of the commanders carrying out the operation, the result was the failure of

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The units of the 21st Armored Division were unable to reach Dafraswar, and the independent 25th Armored Brigade south of the line was destroyed. the independent 25th Armored Brigade south of the line (Khatib al-Habashi Tel Salam) at a distance of about 7 kilometers from Dafraswar

The penetration gap did not need to be widened from the south to secure the The area from Dufreswar to the limit of the Third Army's left flank was about 35 kilometers long which is about 35 kilometers long, was considered an area free of Egyptian forces, as the the water surface of the Bitter Lakes is an impassable natural barrier. This erroneous thinking was was one of the factors that led to the penetration gap at Dafraswar east of the canal, as we have already explained in detail. But the situation on the northern side of the Dafraswar was was different, as the Second Army's right flank (the unified bridgehead of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions Armored) was directly threatening the crossing area at Dufreswar at the beginning of the Israeli crossing operation to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16, and as operations in this sector evolved Following the fierce armored attacks by units of General Sharon's division against the 16th Infantry Brigade 16 Infantry Brigade (the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division) and units of the 21st Armored Division in the area of the village of Al-Jalaa (Chinese Farm) and the main feeder with the help of long-range artillery from the caliber (155mm 175mm artillery and concentrated air attacks on Egyptian positions, the Egyptian forces were forced to to retreat north to the Sarabioum line.

On October 19, after the 182nd Parachute Brigade retreated west of the canal to the Tosun Line General Saad al-Shazly ordered Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi to retreat with the 21st Armored Division Armored Division from the Sarabioum line to the Tosun line (about 5 kilometers), thus widening the Israeli penetration gap east of the canal to about 10 kilometers. Israeli penetration east of the canal to about 10 kilometers north of Dafraswar.

However, the Israeli Southern Command was determined to bring the northern limit of the breach to the the southern shore of Crocodile Lake (about 15 kilometers north of Al-Dafraswad) in order to secure the penetration gap and the three bridges built across it.

the breach and the three bridges across the canal, and to ensure a continuous flow of troops and supplies to the west bank of the canal without of troops and supplies to the west bank of the canal without any interruption or interference from the Egyptian side.

To achieve this goal, the Israeli Southern Command ordered General Sharon to leave two armored brigades of his division (the Amnon Brigade and the Tuvia Brigade) east of the canal, and not to cross to the West Bank with the rest of his units.

the West Bank with the rest of his units, in order to attack the head of the Egyptian unified bridgehead stretching at

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the area between Sarabium in the south (before retreating to Tosun), to the shore of Lake Crocodile and the Middle Road (Ismailia East-Tassa Road) to the north. The Israelis called Israelis called this fortified defense zone Misuri Y2L555N, but Sharon did not want to exhaust his forces.

Sharon did not want to deplete his forces, nor did he want to involve them in heavy fighting on the honor of the canal that he did not see as important or necessary

necessity. He longed to realize the glittering hope that would bring him great fame and glory

the capture of the city of Ismailia, so he made a great effort to convince Gen. Bar-Lev, the personal representative of the Chief of Staff of the Southern Command, that the Egyptian resistance inside the the unified bridgehead east of the canal, had become so weak that the Tuvia armored brigade

Armored Brigade alone could achieve the desired objective. On October 19, General Bar-Lev approved

approved the crossing of the Amnon Armored Brigade (except for a battalion) to the west bank of the canal, to join Sharon's division

Sharon. Sharon's forces east of the canal consisted of the armored brigade commanded by Col.

Tuvia and an armored battalion of the Amnon Brigade

On October 19, 1973, General David Eliezer, Israel's Chief of the General Staff, visited the

Sharon's command center in the Dafraswar area after crossing the canal by helicopter

This was the first time General Eliezer had crossed the Suez Canal into Israel. the first time General Eliezer had crossed the Suez Canal to the west since the Israeli bridgehead was erected west of the canal

Canal. Sharon's conversation with him was particularly focused on the goal he was trying to achieve as a matter of urgency

the capture of the city of Ismailia, as its fall would have a major impact on the course of the war as well as

will have a major impact on the course of the war and will tighten the noose around the Second Army's formations east of the canal

as most of the main roads used to transport supplies to these formations from Cairo and the eastern Delta will be cut off.

Cairo and the eastern Delta would be cut off after the fall of Ismailia. At the end of the meeting

Sharon said to his boss Dado (General Eliezer's pet name): "This is a terrible war that had nothing

like it has never been before. The Six-Day War was only one battle."4 The helicopter flew

The helicopter flew the Israeli Chief of Staff back to the east, and the pilot did not realize that he had deviated and entered the domain of the Egyptian Third Army in Sinai only when his helicopter came under machine gun fire and its hydraulic system was hit, but he managed to escape with his plane and return to Israeli lines back to Israeli lines.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan also came the same day to visit Sharon at his command center west of the canal, and Dayan ordered his helicopter pilot to land next to the crossing yard.

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east of the canal, north of the Great Bitter Lake, for fear of landing inside Egyptian lines, after He noticed the pilot's inability to recognize his landing spot.

No sooner had he crossed to the west in a jeep and moved north on the canal road, when the area came under heavy artillery fire The area came under heavy bombardment from Malassian artillery, forcing Dayan to stop and take cover with his After seeing dozens of burned-out vehicles along the road, he was forced to stop and take cover with his escorts in some roadside pits along the road. Despairing of completing the visit, he drove back east of the canal in one of the cars he found to the east of the canal in one of the cars he found by chance, which passed him between the explosions of bombs The bombs rained down, causing him to write in his memoirs that he miraculously escaped with his life this time.

The position of the 182nd Parachute Brigade

The order issued by the Second Army Command to Colonel Ismail Azmy, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, on the afternoon of October 19 Parachute Brigade on the afternoon of October 19, stating that the brigade would secure the area between the Suez Canal between the Suez Canal to the east and the Suez Canal to the west.) in the west. In the sector between Tosun south to Ain Ghossein and then to Nafisha in the north, and that units of the brigade would occupy the two strong points at Sheikh Hanidak and Jebel Mariam, on the western shore of the canal. The At the time, Hanidq was occupied by a mechanized infantry platoon and a tank platoon, and Jabal Maryam was occupied by a mechanized infantry company was occupied by a mechanized infantry company (except for a platoon) and a tank platoon, all from units of the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade. The position of the units of the 182nd Parachute Brigade was as follows:

89th Parachute Battalion, at dawn on October 20, Lieutenant Colonel Ismail Azmy reported to the Second Army Command that the enemy is attacking the position of the 89th Parachute Battalion in Tosun with an armored force consisting of tanks and mechanized infantry. tanks and mechanized infantry, and requested at 7:00 a.m. to authorize him to blow up the of the Suez Canal to flood the area with water to prevent the advance of the enemy's armored forces. But General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, gave him a firm order not to blow up the bridge, so as not to cut off drinking water to the city of Suez in the south, and to all the villages between Tosun and Suez, as the canal is the only source of

drinking water for the inhabitants of this vast area.
of this vast area. Instead of flooding the land with water, the commander of the Second Army insisted on laying mines heavily on the enemy's path of advance.

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But Colonel Ismail Azmy, embarrassed by the situation, blew up the eastern bridge of the canal and flooded the area with water, turning it into a huge puddle of mud that made the Israeli tanks sinking to their turrets. This led to the use of the parachute infantry of Brig. Colonel Danny Mat to advance, as well as mechanized infantry after dismounting from their armored vehicles.
at a quarter to eleven Colonel Ismail Azmy informed the army commander that the position of Battalion 89th Parachute Battalion in Tosun on the canal is surrounded by enemy forces and is under heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. The battalion is under heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, and the losses are heavy, and according to its commander, only 120 men remain. only 120 men. At the beginning of October 21, the brigade commander reported to the Second Army Command Center that communication with the 89th Parachute Battalion in Tosun was cut off due to the running and artillery bombardment concentrated on it. During the day, the remaining force of the battalion was able to retreat north in the direction of Ismailia. Col. Ismail Azmy, commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade, disobeyed of the Second Army Commander's order not to blow up the eastern bridge of the Euphrates, Colonel Azmy was relieved of his command After the ceasefire was issued, on October 25, Colonel Abdel Rahman Bahgat Fiada took over the 182nd Parachute Brigade.

81st Parachute Battalion; the battalion was in a defensive position at Ain Ghossein on October 20, after having been forced to retreat from its fortified position south of the Sarabium railroad station the day before the previous day under pressure from Israeli tanks to the new position at Ein Ghossein, which is located about five kilometers north of Sarabium about 5 kilometers north of Sarabium, on the dirt road parallel to the Suez Canal.

On October 20, enemy tanks and mechanized infantry continued to press northward, and managed to Ain Ghossein, and the remnants of the 81st Parachute Battalion were forced to Battalion was forced to continue its retreat north towards Nafisha.

The remnants of the 85th Parachute Battalion, after the battalion commander regrouped the battalion in Anshas on October 18 to restore its combat efficiency, Brigadier General A.H. Mahmoud Abdallah, the commander of the ordered the battalion commander to move the next morning to Ismailia. At 9:00 a.m. on October 19 9 a.m. on October 19, the battalion arrived at the Al-Galaa camp in Ismailia. In the evening On the same day, the commander of the 85th Parachute Battalion received the mission from the commander of the Second Army, which is for the battalion to occupy and secure the following objectives occupy and secure the following objectives:

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Jebel Maryam with the strength of a reinforced company Sheikh Hanidq with the strength of the battalion (except for two companies) - Station Tosun with the strength of a reinforced company. While working to prevent the enemy from advancing north in the direction of Ismailia . During the reconnaissance carried out by the battalion commander on the afternoon of October 20, it became clear to him that the Tosun site is inaccessible because it is under heavy artillery and aerial bombardment and aviation. Before last light on October 20, it was determined that the enemy had managed to occupy the station Tosun, so the 85th Parachute Battalion commander adjusted his battalion's position to occupy Jabal Mariam Mariam with the battalion's strength (except for a company) and Sheikh Hanidak hill with a reinforced company, and this was done on the night of October 20/21 October. In implementation of the instructions issued by the Second Army Command at a quarter to ten o'clock in the evening the mechanized infantry company and two tank platoons of the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade Mechanized Infantry Company and the two tank platoons of the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade that had previously occupied the Jabal Maryam and Hanidak positions were returned to their original unit before First light on October 21, as the 118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade was instructed to regroup.

To reinforce the strength of the 85th Parachute Battalion, it was reinforced on the morning of October 21 by the Mortar Battalion 120mm mortar from the organization of the 182nd Parachute Brigade (18 mortars), which increased the firepower of the Parachute Battalion of the parachute battalion's firepower. But the enemy, whose tanks and mechanized infantry to the north to overrun the Egyptian defenses with the aim of reaching the Ismailia Canal before the ceasefire attacked the Sheikh Hanidak hill at first light on October 21 under strong artillery and aviation support, and after a fierce battle managed to penetrate the position of the of the parachute company defending the hill, and the remnants of the company retreated to the north.

The 182nd Parachute Brigade's defenses on October 21 were limited to the Jebel Maryam position occupied by the 85th Parachute Battalion (excluding the company). The brigade commander was ordered to regroup 81st and 98th Parachute Battalions were ordered to quickly regroup at the Ismailia Sports Stadium to regain their combat efficiency, with the position of Jebel Maryam to be held until the last shot is fired and the last It became the last position on the Suez Canal before reaching Ismailia. Ismailia .

Position of the Thunderbolt Groups

119th Thunderbolt Group: On the morning of October 19, Colonel A.H. Ali Heikal was ordered was ordered to withdraw his group from the area of operations south of the Ismailia Canal to the Abu Sawir area

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north of the canal, to regroup and regain combat efficiency, following the heavy losses suffered by the group's units The group's units suffered heavy losses during the fierce disruptive battles

they fought against Israeli forces from October 16 to 18. Israeli forces from October 16 to 18 in the areas of Abu Sultan, Deverswar and Sarabium.

On the evening of October 19, Colonel Heikal, the group's commander, received from the Second Army Command A new mission for his group, namely the defense south of the Ismailia Tarea for the sector from the upper bridge (outside) to the village of Lahsma (outside) to the village of Lahsma. On October 20, Colonel Heikal decided to establish three bases south of the canal to cover the designated sector of the group's three battalions, from which to conduct raids and ambushes according to thunderbolt tactics. They were These bases were as follows:

The first base : Southwest of the Upper Bridge, operating in the direction of Al-Manayef Oasis.

The second base : South of Abu Sawir, operating in the direction of the intersection of Abu Sawir link with the

Ismailia Desert Road.

The third base: South of Al Malhasma, and works in the direction of the Ismailia-Cairo road Desert .

129th Thunderbolt Brigade: It consisted of 4 thunderbolt battalions under the command of Col.

Ibrahim, and was stationed in the West Cairo assembly area as part of the strategic reserve

On October 6, a battalion of it was landed behind the Gedi Strait by helicopters helicopters with the mission of disrupting enemy reserves. On October 10, another battalion was sent

to Port Said to take part in attacking one of the Bar-Lev Line forts (Fort Budapest), located southeast of Port Said

located southeast of Port Said. On October 18, Colonel Osama, the group's commander, received a mission

assigned by the General Command and taught to him by Brigadier General A.H. Nabil Shoukry, commander of the Thunderbolt Forces.

The mission was to move with the two battalions under his command on the morning of October 19 on the Cairo-Ismailia Agricultural Road

About 3 kilometers before Ismailia, the group would veer south to cross the Ismailia Canal.

south to cross the Ismailia Canal on the Nafisha Bridge and then advance on the in the direction of the Great Bitter Lake with the aim of attacking and destroying enemy forces in the area of Al-Defreswar, capturing the strong point and then securing it in cooperation with the Second Army forces.

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A group of human frogmen from the naval forces consisted of 3 officers and 31 NCOs and soldiers equipped with a quantity of naval mines to be used to blow up Israeli bridges over the canal Israeli bridges over the canal in the area of Aldferswar.

As the group was moving on its way to its target, the Second Army Command received a signal

a radio signal from the Operations Branch of the Thunderbolt Command stating the following: 1Please notify the Second Army Command that the command of the 139th Thunderbolt Group and two battalions will arrive in the Nafisha area and then head south in the direction of the Great Bitter

Lake

towards the Great Bitter Lake to carry out combat missions. Please notify the 2nd Army units in the area.â

This signal sparked an atmosphere of anxiety in the Second Army's command because of the assignment of a

a thunderbolt group coming from Cairo to carry out a combat mission in the direction of the Great Bitter Lake, whose shores are occupied by the enemy without involving the Second Army Command in the planning or execution of the mission.

In view of this, General Abdel Moneim Khalil issued orders for the military police to stop the group's convoy of vehicles.

The military police should stop the column of vehicles of the 139th Thunderbolt Group at Abu Sawir in a waiting area

and to bring the group's commander to the Second Army headquarters in Ismailia to meet him.

The impossible mission that the 129th Thunderbolt Group was tasked with

On the evening of October 19, Colonel Osama Ibrahim, as instructed, came to the Second Army headquarters in Ismailia

Second Army Command in Ismailia, where he met with General Abdel Moneim Khalil, and the meeting was attended by Lieutenant General Saad

Shazly, the Chief of Staff, who was still present at the army headquarters since his arrival on the afternoon of October 18

On October 18, when Colonel Osama explained to them the reality of the mission he had been assigned, they

were clearly surprised and astonished. The reason for their surprise was that the

139th Thunderbolt Group had been assigned a mission that was impossible to carry out. After all, how could

How could the 139th Thunderbolt Group, which moves by large transport vehicles, and which does not include

armored and armed only with light weapons that are suited to the agility required for its operations

the agility required for its operations, could make its way through the enemy lines to reach Dafraswar.

Although the area from Tosun to Al-Defreswar was fully controlled (about 13 kilometers) and filled the area with tanks, mechanized infantry and parachute battalions?

The area from Tosun to Al-Dafraswar was cleared of Lasserri forces after the withdrawal of the 182nd Parachute Brigade from Saraya

The withdrawal of the 182nd Parachute Brigade from Sarabioum to Tosun under enemy pressure, and the withdrawal of

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129th Thunderbolt Group withdrew from the area of operations with the enemy to the Abu Sawir area north of the Taraa

Ismailia to regroup, so how could the thunderbolt group coming from Cairo from Cairo to reach the enemy positions in Al-Dafraswar alone under these circumstances?

What means does it have to destroy it? Moreover, the route that was determined for the group's movement

east of the Suez Canal was a narrow dirt track, confined on both sides. To the right of the advance

is the Suez Canal, while on the left are farms and fruit gardens that drop a few meters below the

a few meters below the road, making vehicle maneuvering impossible and exposing the group's column of vehicles

to fall into enemy ambushes and suffer heavy losses in lives and equipment. To add to the difficulty of the operation

Adding to the difficulty of the operation, the group's commander and officers had no previous idea of the terrain on which they would be operating, even though their movement would be in the dark.

Also, the information given to the group commander about the enemy while receiving the mission in Cairo was incorrect. The enemy force in the area in which he would be operating was not a company an armored battalion, as he was told, but rather an armored division commanded by General Sharon, consisting of a parachute infantry brigade and two armored brigades.

The Frogmen's position was worse than that of the Thunderbolt Group. moving vehicles carrying heavy naval mines inside enemy lines to reach Dafraswar, where the group would then blow up Israeli bridges. Colonel Khalifa remained in Ismailia with his group after informing his command of the impossibility of carrying out the operation the impossibility of carrying out the operation.

It would have been more appropriate and safe to order the General Command in Cairo to place the 139th Thunderbolt Group immediately upon its arrival in Ismailia under the command of the Second Army. This command is familiar with the use of the group in operations that are consistent with its capabilities and in accordance with the with the actual military conditions of our forces and the enemy forces.

In view of these circumstances, Major General Abdelnoum Khalil ordered Colonel Osama not to carry out the task assigned to him the mission assigned to him, and to head with his group to Al-Fursan Island in Ismailia in preparation for the new tasks that will be assigned to him in accordance with the new tasks that will be assigned to him according to his abilities and in accordance with the goal he was assigned to achieve to achieve. In order to obey the orders of the Thunderbolt Command, Colonel Osama informed his command in Cairo with a radio signal that his mission was canceled on the instructions of the Second Army commander. The reply came quickly

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Colonel Osama was summoned to the army headquarters around midnight to read Cairo's reply, which read: "Osama will carry out his mission tonight. It is clear from the extent of the conflict that existed between the two commands in Cairo and Ismailia over the affiliation of the 139th Thunderbolt Group, whether it should be placed under the Second Army's command or whether it should remain under the General Headquarters Center 10 as a unit of the Strategic Reserve of the General Staff

Before last light on October 20, the 139th Thunderbolt Group, after confirming its affiliation from Al-Fursan Island on the narrow dirt road east of the Suez Canal in two groups, each consisting of two battalions Two groups, each consisting of a thunderbolt battalion, while the group's command moved in the center. To obtain information about the enemy, the group commander pushed in front of his column of vehicles four combat patrols each consisting of an officer and 51 men in different directions. At the same

time

At the same time, each of the two battalions, as a means of securing the movement, pushed an advance consisting of an infantry company. The two companies moved a short distance ahead of the group's column. One on the road to the right of the canal, and the second on the road to its left. When the main force of the reached the village of Abu Atwa (4 kilometers southeast of Nafisha) some renegade groups appeared on the road in front of them from south to north, and it turned out that they were Members of the 81st and 98th battalions of the 182nd Parachute Brigade) who were occupying Tosun and Ain and Ain Ghossein, and had retreated under enemy pressure. Of the four Thunderbolt patrols that had pushed only one officer and eight men, and the rest were considered missing.

No sooner had the vehicles of the 139th Thunderbolt Group approached Ain Ghossein than they were caught in an ambush. The two leading companies clashed violently with the ambush, after destroying some of its vehicles and wounding some of its members. Some of its vehicles were destroyed and some of its members were wounded. The group's column came to a halt. The soldiers jumped out of the vehicles and ran away. The soldiers jumped out of the vehicles and ran to gardens and farms to take cover from the enemy's heavy fire. The group was forced to retreat back until it reached the vicinity of the village of Abu Atwa. Colonel Osama's greatest difficulty was moving the vehicles back. The greatest difficulty Colonel Osama faced was moving the vehicles back due to the narrow road and its confinement between the canal on one side and the low-lying gardens on the other. on the other side.

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In view of the seriousness of the situation, Colonel Osama asked for artillery assistance, but due to the enemy's interference in his his radio network and some Israelis addressing him in Arabic, Israeli artillery fire rained down on the Thunderbolt Group's positions with precision. Israeli artillery fire rained down on the Thunderbolt Group's positions with great precision and focus. Despite the intensity of the shelling Israeli artillery shelling, casualties were few due to the density of mango trees that limited the spread of shrapnel. At this time, Colonel Heikal, the commander of the 129th Thunderbolt Group who was in contact with the group's radio network and was at the Second Army Command Center Second Army Command Center to do liaison work, made a call to Colonel Osama and asked him to come immediately to the army headquarters due to the change in the king's mission. When Colonel Osama arrived at the army headquarters around 2 a.m. on October 21, he learned that General Abdel Moneim Khalil had succeeded in taking off General Headquarters officials, after a long conversation over the phone, to place the 139th Thunderbolt Group Thunderbolt Group under the command of the Second Army to be used in the defense of Ismailia, which is now Sharon's forces are at its gates after capturing Tosun and Ain Ghossein, instead of destroying the group in vain. The group wasted away, trying to carry out an impossible mission. The new mission that Col. was to participate in the defense of Ismailia, in the sector between Nafisha and Abu Atwa, each of which was to be assigned a thunderbolt battalion.

The commander of the 139th Thunderbolt Group returned to his group south of Abu Atwa, and before first light on October 21, the group had been repositioned according to the new mission.

Sharon's march to Ismailia

On October 20, 1973, General Ariel Sharon, commander of the 143rd Operations Group, which was operating on the northern axis after the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal - began directing his final battle towards Ismailia after being informed by the army command that the ceasefire was about to be lifted. From early in the morning, Israeli aircraft began launching fierce attacks on the cities of Ismailia, Port Said and Port Boufouad. The attacks were concentrated on surface-to-air missile sites and anti-aircraft weapons, with the aim of destroying or silencing them with the aim of destroying or silencing them, as well as places where troops were gathered, including the Al-Galaa camp in Ismailia and the Jebel Mariam area (on the Jabal Mariam road). Ismailia, the Jebel Mariam area (on the canal road and just south of Crocodile Lake) and the bridges built on the Sweet Taraa (Suez Canal). The planes dropped time and napalm bombs

and napalm bombs to cause fires and panic among the troops.

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Some of the bombs hit the bridge of the Sweet River in the Ras al-Ash area (15 kilometers south of Port Said) kilometers south of Port Said) This led to the flow of water into the Suez Canal.

To remedy the situation, Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, ordered the chief of the Army Engineers to shut down the water of the Sweet Terrace at the Qantara control point, in order to lower the level of the Terrace until the damaged bridge at Ras al-Ash is repaired so that the water can be reopened to the city of Port Said. to the city of Port Said.

The commander of the Port Said sector at the time, Major General Saad Eddin Sabri, asked the Second Army command to support him with air defense units instead to support him with air defense units to replace the rocket battalions that were destroyed, and requested air support to relieve the pressure on his sector. The borders of the Port Said sector extended from the north along the Mediterranean the Mediterranean Sea from Port Boufouad in the east to Damietta and Ras al-Bar in the west, and from Al-Jazoub to Al-Tina in the east (25 kilometers away). in the east (25 kilometers south of Port Said) to San al-Hajar in Sharqiya Governorate in the west. The sector included Lake Manzala within its borders. Since the Second Army Command did not have to supply the Port Said sector with troops, fire support, or air support. The commander of the Second Army requested that this sector be removed from his command and report directly to the General Command directly so that it could provide it with the supplies and aid it required, but the command was unable to to comply with this request given the difficult circumstances it was facing.

When Amnon's brigade crossed to the west bank of the canal on October 19,

Sharon's
consisted of two armored brigades (Amnon Brigade and Haim Brigade) and a
parachute infantry brigade
parachute infantry brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Mat. Sharon's forces
advanced the furthest on the
was to reach the Toson area on October 20, about 12 kilometers south of Ismailia
south of Ismailia.

On the morning of October 21, a detachment of his tanks and mechanized infantry
attacked
about one and a half kilometers north of Tosun and captured it before the last
light of the same day.
âThe parachute company of the 85th Parachute Battalion that was defending it
was forced to
was forced to retreat northward.

As soon as Sharon heard the news that a ceasefire was imminent, he pushed all
the forces under his command northward
forces under his command to the north, determined to quickly reach and cross the
Ismailia and cross it, so that he could then fulfill the hope that he had

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his dreams since his troops had crossed to the west bank of the Canal, namely to
capture the city of Ismailia
and thus cut off the main supply routes from Cairo and the eastern Delta to the
Second Army forces east of the canal
Second Army forces east of the Canal.
Sharon was certain that the fall of Ismailia would cause a major political
uproar
on a global level, which would earn him great fame and military glory.
But Sharon's hopes and dreams were soon dashed by two vital factors: The first
is the nature of
the nature of the terrain over which his forces advanced from the Tosun Line in
the south to the Ismailia Tara'a in the north
in the north. The second factor was the intensity and violence of the resistance
offered by the Egyptian forces on the
forcing his forces to halt south of the Ismailia Tributary, without being able
to
to cross it to its northern bank
The land in the northern sector south of the Ismailia Tributary is generally
considered agricultural land.
The land in the northern sector south of the Ismailia Tributary is generally
considered agricultural land.
(Suez Canal), many drains, irrigation canals, small villages and homesteads, as
well as
some cultivated fields and a large number of gardens full of fruit trees,
especially mangoes and oranges.
mango and orange trees, which made them unfit for armored vehicles. There are
Within this sector, there are two main waterways: the Ismailia Taraa, which
branches off from the Nile River
at Cairo and runs in a northeasterly direction parallel to the Damietta branch.
from west to east until it ends in Lake Crocodile, south of the city of
Ismailia.
Ismailia . The second water barrier is the Suez Canal, which branches off from
the Ismailia Canal a few kilometers southwest of Ismailia
a few kilometers southwest of Ismailia city and extends southwest of the canal
and the bitter lakes to the city of Suez.
and the Bitter Lakes to the city of Suez. Crossing the two canals with tanks and
vehicles requires the use of bridges
bridges or, if the bridges are blown up or destroyed, military bridges.
destroyed. In addition to these two large barriers, there are dozens of smaller

irrigation canals, drains and drains
small irrigation canals, but they do not constitute real obstacles for vehicles
of all kinds, as they can be crossed when
or by filling in parts of them with stones
Due to the nature of this rural agricultural sector, the progress of armored
vehicles and armored vehicles is restricted
The necessity of using the four roads that penetrate it, which we explain below:
Canal Road: It is an underground road that runs directly along the canal. It is
difficult to use

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armored vehicles and vehicles cannot use this road in the distance between the
Sheikh Hanidq hill in the south and Jabal
Maryam in the north (about 4 kilometers), as the road lies between two bodies of
water: the Suez Canal in the east and a set of ponds
The Suez Canal in the east and a group of ponds and marshes in the west (Abu
Jamurs pond
and Al-Yarka Al-Hakhlua) This leaves no room for armor and vehicles to move
outside the road freely or
deploy on either side of the road. After reaching Jebel Mariam, the road runs
along the
the western end of Lake Crocodile, then crosses the Ismailia Tara'a at the Abu
Jamous Bridge
(Al-Galaa Bridge), which is directly opposite the entrance to the Armed Forces'
Al-Galaa camp
which is located on the western side of Ismailia city.

Suez Terrace Road: It is a dirt road that runs directly east of the Suez Canal
from south to north
to the north, suitable for armored vehicles and armored vehicles. About three
kilometers
about three kilometers south of the Ismailia Terrace, the dirt road changes
course along the Sweet Terrace to head to the northeast
to the northeast, where it passes through the village of Abu Atwa and then meets
and merges with the asphalt canal road west of Lake
Crocodile Lake and merges with it. After about a kilometer and a half north, it
crosses the Ismailia Terrace
on the Abu Jamous Bridge. Directly to the south of the Suez Canal, the railroad
bridge extends
over which the railway line from Suez runs and crosses the Ismailia Tributary
over
An iron bridge for trains only.

Treaty Road: It is a first-class asphalt road that runs from Suez to Ismailia.
It runs parallel to the canal and the Bitter Lakes at a distance ranging from
two to eight kilometers).
The land on both sides of the road is generally desert, suitable for armored
vehicles, except for the northern part
the northern part, which lies between the Mahsma Drain in the south and the
Ismailia Tara'a in the north.
This part includes some crops, fruit trees and a number of manors and small
villages.
Nafisha village (about 3 kilometers southwest of Ismailia) and crosses the
Ismailia on the Nafisha Bridge to continue east to the city of Ismailia.

Desert Road: It is a first-class road that starts from Cairo to Ismailia, and
runs in a northeasterly direction to the east of the Ismailia Terrace.
in a northeasterly direction to the east of the Ismailia Terrace, and this road
meets the link
coming from the east direction from Abu Sultan town at the intersection of Osman
Ahmed Osman and then with the link

coming from the north direction from the town of Abu Sawir at the Abu Sawir intersection, and then crosses the Manayef on a stone bridge. About two kilometers south of the Ismailia Tarea
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the road changes direction and goes straight from south to north. About a kilometer before the road reaches the about a kilometer before the road reaches the Ismailia Canal, it branches off and runs east parallel to the canal to Nafisha. From there, the road crosses the Nafisha Bridge and then reaches Ismailia. As for the road the original route crosses the Ismailia Tributary at the upper bridge (about 5 kilometers west of Ismailia) kilometers west of Ismailia) It is an elevated iron bridge with a gentle slope so that armored vehicles and vehicles can easily cross it, and after crossing the upper bridge, the desert road turns about a quarter of a circle in a northeasterly direction, about three and a half kilometers away from Ismailia three and a half kilometers, where it meets the Treaty Road coming from Ismailia. The two roads then merge into a single road that runs parallel to the canal to Kantara West and from there to Port Said. Most of the land on both sides of this road is desert and suitable for armored vehicles.

As a result of the nature of the terrain in the northern sector through which Sharon's forces were advancing. Sharon's forces were forced to move on two main axes: The road The dirt road east of the Sweet Tarea (Suez Tarea) and the Treaty Road, as the most suitable roads for the advancement of their armored vehicles and armored vehicles. for their armor and vehicles and the shortest distance to Ismailia. The The Canal Road was not used because it was not possible for armored vehicles to move north from Sheikh As we have already explained, the desert road was not used as the main axis was not used as a main axis of advancement due to the threat posed by the presence of large Egyptian forces that were conducting a regrouping operation regrouping in the Othman Ahmed Othman and Wasla al-Malak areas in the rear of any Israeli forces advancing on this road in the direction of the Ismailia Tarea'a. Furthermore, the enemy discovered that the the strongest anti-tank defense along the Tarea was concentrated at the upper bridge. However Although the main attack was on two axes, Sharon pushed strong detachments on roadblocks along the front between the Suez Canal in the east and the upper bridge in the west (about 10 kilometers).

How did the Second Army defend Ismailia? Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, organized the defense of the city of Ismailia despite the critical conditions facing our forces west of the canal was well organized. The first objective was to prevent the enemy from crossing the Ismailia Canal to prevent them from succeeding in encircling the city of the city in preparation for coalescence.
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The Second Army forces that participated in the implementation of the defense

plan for Ismailia

played an honorable role and managed to repel the enemy forces south of the Ismailia Canal, and no Israeli forces were able to cross the canal to the north. Israeli forces were unable to cross the Canal to the north in any of its parts. The position of the Second Army forces that participated in the Battle of Ismailia was as follows:

Artillery: The Second Army's artillery, commanded by Brig. Gen.

Abu Ghazaleh played a key role in repelling the enemy and preventing them from crossing the Ismailia Tributary and capture the city. On October 20, the Army Artillery Commander issued his order

to all battalions of Army Artillery Group No. 1, which had occupied south of the Ismailia Canal immediately after the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal.

to move to the northern bank of the canal after it became too dangerous to remain in place following

Sharon's northward march. The Army Artillery Command succeeded in regrouped the battalions north of the canal, quickly occupied their new positions, and

efficiently pushing the observation posts to the front line, despite the continuous airstrikes and heavy Israeli artillery Israeli artillery shelling, especially after the relocation of long-range Israeli artillery units

(155m) long-range Israeli artillery units were moved to the west bank of the canal. With the inclusion of the battalions of

Army Artillery Groups Nos. 1 and 2 together, which amounted to about 10 artillery battalions.

The Second Army's artillery north of the Ismaili Tara'ah had a huge firepower. In addition, the Second Army's artillery commander could use the fire of the artillery groups of the

of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions from the eastern bank of the canal, which amounted to about 8 artillery battalions

artillery, making it possible for him to use the fire of 12 to 16 artillery battalions in a single bombardment

(about 280 guns). Brig. Gen. Abu Ghazaleh developed the fire planning for the battle

and mobilized artillery fire on the targets and concentrations of the attacking enemy forces. Due to the success of

success of the Army Artillery Command both in controlling units and sub-units, and in achieving

centralization of fire at the highest level, it was able to carry out numerous fire missions (massing

fire and rallies), utilizing artillery units on both shores. It also planned fire missions on the enemy's approach routes, headquarters, and tank staging

areas, especially in the Sarabioum and Ain Ghossein, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy as they

attempted to advance northward

in the direction of the Ismailia River. Israeli commanders recognized that the massive artillery concentrations

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and the strength of its firepower had a major impact on the failure of General Sharon's forces' attack on Ismailia.

Moreover, the Second Army's artillery commander organized the anti-tank defense of

important bridges and axes of advance on the Ismailia Canal, coordinating the firing positions of eight

anti-tank rocket launchers (Malotka) for the defense of the upper bridge, as well as the positions of

of six rocket-propelled grenades (Malonka on Bardam vehicles) to defend the Abu Jamous Bridge

to prevent the enemy from crossing in this direction, which leads to the evacuation camp and the headquarters of the Second Field Army headquarters.

The anti-tank defense plan was based on hitting the Haddo tanks at long distances and preventing them from approaching the and prevent them from approaching the Ismailia Teraa, while at the same time disrupting the advance of the enemy's armored reserves enemy armored reserves from the rear.

â€¢118th Mechanized Infantry Brigade: From the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division and its three battalions were distributed as follows:

1- A battalion placed since the beginning of the war under the command of the 2nd Infantry Division in the Fardan sector.

B-Battalion assigned to protect the crossings on the Suez Canal from north of Ismailia to

Balah 0

C - A battalion assigned to defend the city of Ismailia and the evacuation camp.

D - Brigade command in the area of Camp Zakaria, northeast of Ismailia.

The commander of the brigade's tank battalion was tasked with involving some of his tanks in the defense of the

the bridges on the Ismailia canal in coordination with the Second Army's artillery that was assigned to this task

mission.

A mechanized infantry company (excluding a platoon) and a tank platoon were allocated to serve as reserves

in the hands of the brigade commander, and a mechanized infantry platoon supported by an anti-tank element

south of the Nafisha Bridge in the area of the farms to carry out ambushes.

182nd Parachute Brigade: The Second Army Commander ordered the regrouping of the 81st and 89th Battalions

and 89th Parachute Battalions at the Ismailia Sports Stadium to regain their combat efficiency after they bounced back.

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from Tosun and Ain Ghossein, and assigned the commander of the 85th Parachute Battalion before last light on October 2

October 2, the task of occupying Jabal Maryam with the battalion's strength (except for a company) and Sheikh Hanidak hill with a company of reinforced paratroopers

reinforced parachute company. However, Hanidiq's company soon withdrew from its positions before last light on October 21

light on October 21 under enemy pressure. The 85th Parachute Battalion was reinforced

on the morning of October 21 with a 120mm mortar battalion (from the 182nd Parachute Brigade formation), increasing the 85th Parachute Battalion's 85th Parachute Battalion's firepower was significantly increased, and Jebel Mariam became the only position

with a parachute unit, and at 10:05 a.m. on the morning of October 21, the Second Army commander

on the morning of October 21, the Second Army commander sent a radio signal to the commander of the 182nd Parachute Brigade

which read as follows: â€¢1. Hold Mount Maryam to the last bullet and the last man.â€¢ 4 In fact, Mount Maryam is the key to the city of Ismail.

In fact, Mount Maryam is the key to the city of Ismailia, as it completely overlooks and controls

of the surrounding area. Therefore, the Second Army commander issued

instructions to mine the paths leading to it from the

and Ain Ghossein, and to set up ambushes on the approach roads, and to form a brigade reserve to retake it.

and to form a reserve of the brigade to retake Jabal Maryam in case it falls.

139th Thunderbolt Group: It consisted of two thunderbolt battalions under the command of Lt. Col.

Ibrahim, was sent from Cairo to Ismailia on the evening of October 19 with the mission of raids and ambushes on enemy forces, expelling them and occupying our positions in the area of Al-Dafraswar. As a result of the group's failure to fulfill its mission and falling into an ambush due to the enemy's overwhelming superiority the enemy's overwhelming superiority in its area of operation, instructions were issued from Center 10) to place the group under the command of the Second Army, and one battalion was stationed in the Abu Atwa area. The other battalion (except for a company) in the Nafisha area and the remaining company in reserve. The task assigned to the group's units was to carry out ambush work along the along the assigned front south of the Ismailia Taraa from northwest of Jebel Mariam. The most complicated issue the group faced was the influx of large numbers of farms east of the Manayef Oasis was the influx of large numbers of farmers fleeing the Israeli advance on the with their animals, furniture and belongings, which almost blocked the road.

The Battle of Ismailia

On the night of October 22/21, Second Army artillery units began conducting nuisance bombardments on enemy positions throughout the night. In the morning, Israeli aircraft carried out air attacks

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on the positions of our forces, concentrating their bombardment on Camp Al-Jalaa, Jabal Maryam, Abu Atwa and Nafisha, and managed to destroy the Abu Jamous bridge. The commander of the Second Army sent at 8:55 a.m. 8:55 a.m. on October 22 to the Commander-in-Chief at Center 10 a radio signal informing him that the commander of the 8th Air Defense Division had informed him that there were no SAMs ready to operate in the Second Army's sector. Almodo attempted to to advance with armored detachments (tanks and mechanized infantry) on the Treaty Road in the direction of the Nafisha Bridge and on the desert road in the direction of the upper bridge. But rocket-propelled grenades (Malotka) anti-tank missiles engaged them and forced them to retreat.

At around 10:00 a.m. on October 22, the enemy renewed its attempt to advance in the direction of Ismailia Terrace, and its movement was on two axes: the Sweet Suez Terrace Road and the Treaty Road. In order to dislodge the Thunderbolt forces that blocked his advance, he bombarded their positions with artillery and mortars their positions with artillery, mortars and tank guns, and his airplanes hit their positions concentrated. Due to the narrowness of the road, enemy paratroopers and reconnaissance elements moved in front and reconnaissance elements, while a column of tanks and armored half-tracks slowly followed. tracked by a column of tanks and armored half-track vehicles.

At around noon, the front of the enemy forces clashed with the Thunderbolt reconnaissance elements in the front. Two Israeli tanks and a tracked vehicle were destroyed. At 1:00 p.m., a force of A paratroopers force estimated at an infantry company advanced in the direction of (Abu Atwa) on the Suez Tara'a Al-Helweh axis, and due to not having done a good reconnaissance of the ground and knowing the situation of

our forces, they were surprised by small arms fire
Small arms fire rained down on them from all sides, inflicting more than 50
casualties. As a result
The enemy attack halted, but the enemy continued to bombard the Abu Atwa area
with artillery and mortars in a concentrated manner
with great intensity.

At the same time, on the Nafisha axis, a force estimated at one tank company and
one infantry company advanced
under air cover from aircraft, which bombed the Nafisha area and destroyed the
Nafisha bridge on the Ismailia Taraa. The Thunderbolt Battalion in Nafisha
managed to stop the enemy's advance despite the bombardment
was able to stop the enemy's advance. The total enemy losses on the Nafisha axis
were 3 tanks
tanks, two semi-armored vehicles and a large number of personnel, while the
losses of the Egyptian Thunderbolt Battalion in Nafisha amounted to
losses amounted to 24 martyrs (including 4 officers) and 24 wounded (including 3
officers).
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When darkness fell and the cease-fire came into effect at 6:52 p.m. on October
22
fifty-two minutes past midnight on October 22, and because there were many
wounded Israelis on the battlefield
on the battlefield that had not yet been withdrawn, and it was not possible to
carry out another losing battle in order to
Sharon asked for a number of helicopters to help his men with rescue operations.
rescue operations. General Bar-Lev did not agree to his request, as it was a
dark night
and it was difficult for the planes to land close to the battlefield to avoid
being hit. Therefore
Sharon ordered his men to rely on themselves, and the rescue operations lasted
more than
four hours until most of the dead and wounded were evacuated from the
battlefield. When dawn broke
Israeli paratroopers found themselves only about 20 meters away from the
Egyptian
Egyptian thunderbolts

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Kheshkhayez

Makanab Rathis Ladhiya and Walander Khadi

Uh-huh.

8714118

Mr. Jamal Hamsad
Actuar Magazine 111 9 Kurleed El Nile al-Qa Masra

Greetings, Mr. Jamal

With great appreciation, Mr. Walla San, we read your article in Actuar Magazine
No. 538
dated 15/2/1987, your article about the national
The canal authority of Al-Siris Canal Authority in the service of the free
effort.

Al Jabta during the run-up to the October 1, 1973 war, which had a great impact.
Nafisna Jemima's art.

Raleh, it gives me and the Suez Canal family great pleasure to thank your
Excellency Mr. Takam
and to reiterate our pledge that the Suez Canal will do everything in its power
The Suez Canal is a source of prosperity for Egypt and the world.

0 gsg1

Please accept the assurances of my respects â 87

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Chapter Ten

Why the rift between President Sadat and Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly

The Egyptian General Command's insistence on staying inside Cairo's Center 10 throughout the duration of the
during the October 1973 war, without any of its members leaving, except for special missions and for limited periods of time.
It is an important topic that undoubtedly deserves to be studied and researched, as it is customary for
The command apparatus that manages the war, as the course of operations progresses, moves to advanced command centers close to the front so that to advanced command centers in close proximity to the front so that they can directly supervise the progress of battles and troop movements on the battlefield.
on the battlefield. We have seen how the Israeli Southern Command, which which was managing the war on the Egyptian front in the Sinai, moved from its main command center in Beersheba
to its advanced command center in the Umm Marjam area next to Al-Maliz Airport in Sinai, at midnight on October 7, i.e. after
at midnight on October 7/6, no more than ten hours after the start of the Egyptian crossing to the east of the canal
ten hours after the start of the Egyptian crossing east of the Canal

Center 10's insistence on staying inside Cairo

It was necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the General Command and the rapid transmission of information and reports of the situation
information and situation reports to it, creating the opportunity for it to make decisive decisions and issue quick orders at the right time and raise the morale of the troops
and raising the morale of the troops, it was necessary to move the General Command from its main center
(10) in Cairo, to an advanced command center close to the battlefield. There was already
an advanced command center behind the Canal Zone, which was established before the war for this purpose, and was prepared with all engineering equipment and means of communication
prepared with all the necessary engineering equipment and means of communication, but the Egyptian General Command inexplicably dismissed the idea of moving to it, despite the fact that such a move was

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a vital military necessity, especially after the success of the first phase of Plan Badr, which ended with the establishment of bridgeheads on the eastern shore of the Suez Canal, at a depth of 10 to 12 kilometers.

Supervising the development of the Egyptian offensive to the east, which took place on October 14, 1973
October 1973 and countering the crossing of Israeli forces to the west of the canal, which began on the night of
October 16/15, 1973, indisputably required the presence of the general command staff in an advanced command center close to the battlefield to supervise close to the front line, to directly supervise the battles that took place during this critical phase of the war.
in this critical phase of the war.

The serious flaw in the management of the battle, which was clearly evident during the last phase of the war
was due to the rapid pace of the battle as a result of its transformation from static defensive operations in front of the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the canal, to
mobile confrontational operations following the crossing of Israeli armored forces to the west of the canal, which required
from the Egyptian side a high degree of speed in communicating information, making decisions, issuing orders, and moving forces
orders and troop movements. However, this was not done to the required degree due to many factors, the most important of which was undoubtedly the isolation of the General Command
the most important of which was undoubtedly the fact that the General Command in Cairo was largely isolated from the course of events on the
and its reliance on the usual routine channels that begin with the escalation of information from lower levels to the
information from lower to higher levels, which usually takes a long time
a long time. When this information reaches Center 10 in Cairo, another new phase begins.
which is the recording of this information on situation maps, followed by a discussion of the latest situation of our forces
and enemy forces in preparation for the decision to confront the new situation, after which the operations organization
to issue combat orders. In the same way that information is escalated upwards, orders are descended in reverse
orders descend in reverse through the usual routine channels from higher to lower levels
lower levels. Since the battlefield, especially in mobile warfare, does not wait for this
does not wait for this slow, routine pattern of battle procedures, what happens most of the time is that
By the time the mission reaches the unit that will be tasked with executing it, the situation has changed completely.
The mission is no longer feasible, cannot be carried out, or is too late

In this regard, it may be useful to choose a real-life example of one of the greatest commanders who
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of World War II, the famous German commander Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. The battlefield on which his battles were fought in North Africa is very similar to that of the
of the October War, the desert, to see the extraordinary way in which he fought and won his battles.
His battles and victories earned him the well-deserved nickname of the Desert Fox?

In order to come out of this comparison with lessons learned and lessons learned.

Rommel was the first to liken desert warfare to naval warfare, which is why he gave his wisdom aphorism: "No admiral in history has ever won a naval battle while sitting in his naval base on the shore. This is why Rommel did not lead his troops from a main command center in the rear, or even from an advanced command center near the front, but rather commanded his armored and mechanized forces from inside his command vehicle, which moved with his troops. His orders were to his unit commanders on the battlefield, which were characterized by brevity, precision, and clarity by radio, verbally and in plain language, i.e. without the use of a code to ensure speedy execution, when he believed that the enemy would not have enough time to take advantage of them if they were to pick them up due to the rapid continuous movement of his troops. However, he quickly confirmed his orders with short written messages as soon as time permitted. A key factor in Rommel's victories in the Desert War was that he did not wait for information to reach him through he did not wait for information to reach him through the usual command channels, but went himself to see the situation on the ground, whether by airplane or in his tank or armored vehicle, and sometimes even on foot. This is why Rommel was able to turn his his major reconnaissance operations in April 1941 and January 1942 into successful counterattacks successful counterattacks against British forces that ended in the withdrawal of the British Eighth Army from Barfa.

The famous British war analyst Captain Liddell Hart criticized Field Marshal Rommel for his recklessness on the battlefield, for rushing too far forward, and for being too disconnected from his with his command center. While there is some truth to this criticism, Liddell Hart himself later went on to admit that Rommel had an uncanny sense that he could suddenly appear in vital places and in dangerous situations in vital places and in dangerous situations, to give impetus to his troops, and to make quick decisions at critical moments.

at critical moments that changed the course of the battle in favor of his troops.
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Evaluating Shazly's visits to the front

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly made a field visit to the Second Army's advance command center in Ismailia on the afternoon of October 18 at the request of the late President Sadat after arriving at the center (10) and listening to a report on the situation from General Ahmed The purpose of the visit, as General Shazly recorded in his memoirs, was to work to raise morale and prevent the situation from deteriorating to raise morale and prevent the situation from deteriorating.

This was not the first visit, as Lt. Gen. Al-Shazly had previously made three field visits to the front on October 8, 11, and 41, but they were short visits. Each of them did not exceed a few hours of the day, after which he would return in the evening to Center 10 in Cairo. Although these visits had some benefit in terms of morale, they had no effect on the course of military operations, and the few hours that Lt. Gen.

Shazly's few hours at the front did not allow him to study the military situation on the ground or to inspect the troops in their positions. to inspect the troops in their positions. For example, on October 14, he was unable to visit

October 14 visit to the Second Army Command Center at 4:00 p.m. after the failure of the offensive development operation, he could not do anything to raise the morale of the soldiers

was unable to do anything to raise the morale of the soldiers, which was the main purpose of the visit, as he himself recorded in his diary.

As he himself recorded in his memoirs, the few hours he spent at the Second Army Command Center did not allow him to

He visited General Saad Maamoun, the commander of the Second Army, in his room after learning of his illness.

to visit General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, in his room after learning of his illness.

Finally, he called all division commanders to convey the president's greetings and encouragement.

During the last visit, which began on October 18, he visited the Second Army Command at 5 p.m.

which was his longest visit to the front, Lieutenant General Shazly did not leave his place in the headquarters

from his arrival until he left to return to Center 10 in Cairo. Although the main purpose for which the president sent him to the front, as stated in his memoirs, was to prevent the situation from deteriorating

was to prevent the situation from deteriorating, he was not able to achieve this goal at all, but rather the situation continued to deteriorate

the situation continued to deteriorate without him being able to intervene to save the situation. The only change

The only change in the situation was that General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army

in the presence of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces at his headquarters, he was forced to relinquish

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temporarily relinquish the command and sit next to him, silently watching him exercise his command responsibilities

in his place, using the same aides and command apparatus, using the same means of telecommunications

and telecommunications, without being able to add any fruitful new additions or take any action that would

change the deteriorating military situation. Lt. Gen. Chadli could not

was unable to make any substantive changes in the situation, as he did not have the necessary authorization

to make any strategic decisions that would change the nature of the military situation at the front.

In fact, during his time in the Second Army's command center, his powers did not go much further than

that of Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of this army.

Surprisingly, there was a dispute over when Lt. Gen. Shazly returned from Second Army Command to Center 10 in Cairo. Although Lt. Gen. Shazly himself recorded on page 264 of his memoirs that he returned to Post 210 on the evening of October 19 after

after spending about 24 hours with the Second Army, and although the late

President

Sadat corroborated this date when he stated on page 273 of his book that General Shazly returned collapsed from the front on October 19, the truth and reality confirm that Saad al-Shazly returned from the front on October 2, not October 19, i.e.

his last visit to the front took 44 hours, not 24 hours as stated in his memoirs.

In addition to the testimony of Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, and Major General A.H. Tayseer al-Akkad, its chief of staff

his chief of staff, who confirmed that Shazly's return to Cairo was scheduled for October 20.

The Second Army's signaling record establishes that General Shazly sent several radio signals

in his name from the headquarters of this army to some commanders of formations and special units (Thunderbolts

and paratroopers) on the morning of October 20, and at 1:05 p.m. on that day he sent a radio signal in his name to General Ahmed Ismail at Center 10 in Cairo.

in Cairo, beginning with the following words: With your permission, I am coming to present the situation to your Excellency.

Since the radio signal was sent at about 1:00 p.m., we can can confidently determine that Lieutenant General Shazly arrived after his last visit to the front at Cairo's Center 10 Cairo at about 4:00 p.m. on October 2.

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Sadat and Shazly's recriminations

The violent crisis between President Sadat and Lieutenant General Shazly in the final phase of the

the final phase of the October War, which ended with General Shazly's official dismissal as Chief of Staff on the evening of December 12, 1973

Chief of Staff on the evening of December 12, 1973, nearly six weeks after the end of hostilities

and the cease-fire took effect, both inside and outside Egypt. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that

that both the late President Sadat in his book "The Search for Self2," and Lt. Gen.

Shazly, in his memoirs of the October War, have both criticized the other with a barrage of harsh criticism and serious accusations

and serious accusations in an unprecedented manner, which caused a great uproar and confusion

in the minds of the people, and made them puzzled by this sharp exchange of accusations between two men

They are two of the most prominent figures who played a vital role in the October 1973 war.

To complement our lengthy and objective study of the October War, we have decided to address the

in spite of the sensitivity and awkwardness of this topic - believing that the facts should be

and that history must be recorded honestly and faithfully.

no matter how much it costs us to do so.

What Sadat said

The late president recorded in his book "In Search of Self" on page 273

The following verbatim:

On October 16, I sent my chief of staff, General Saad al-Shazly, to deal with the breach.
 It was very easy to deal with it on that day, the race was for time. If he had carried out what General Ahmed Ismail and I asked him to do, and at the time I specified for him to surround the shore of Bitter Lake with a dam that imprisoned them inside and stopped them in place, it would have been easy to eliminate them.
 He could have finished the whole operation hours after his arrival, but he wasted the whole night gathering information and establishing a command to rival that of his rival General Ismail. The troops of the Thunderbolts had advanced to Dafraswar and had already reached the disembarkation point, and the Israelis recognized the fierceness of the fight of the Thunderbolts and the troops that the Israelis recognized the ferocity of the SAS and Special Forces' fighting. The Israelis recognized the ferocity of the fight until he could gather information, and the result was that the Jews expanded the breach.

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On October 19, Al-Shazly returned, devastated, and said that we must withdraw our forces east of the canal because the west was threatened. This was what the Israelis wanted. Ahmed asked me Ismail asked me at midnight (October 19/20) to go to the command to make an important decision as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. I went to the command and reviewed the situation and found We have five full divisions east of the canal, we have 1,200 tanks in the east as well, and in the west we have an armored division in the west we have an armored division facing the Israeli forces and a division in Cairo that can be withdrawn. not to mention my Republican Guard, which went into the war, fought gloriously, and came back complete with all its tanks.

After the situation became clear to me, I gathered all the commanders, and with me was Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General El-Gamsi, the Director of Operations, General Hosni Mubarak, and General Mohamed Ali Fahmy, commander of the missile corps, and they were all of my opinion that nothing had happened. I gave the order, which I consider more important than the October 6 decision, that not a single soldier, not a single rifle, not a single not a single soldier, not a single rifle, not anything at all from east of the canal, and that we have to deal with the West according to the existing conditions. deal with the West according to the existing situation. Then I started communicating myself with the Ladra Division in the west, which was led by an officer named Qabab. which was commanded by an officer named Qabil, one of the heroes of October, and I said to him: Stabilize the Israelis and don't let them expand, and don't engage them until you get supplies. That night, I instructed Ahmed Ismail to remove Shazly from the chief of staff but not to announce this decision to the troops, so as not to provoke a reaction from us or the Israelis

Israelis. That same night I summoned El-Gamsi and appointed him as our chief of staff.

What did Saad al-Shazly say?

. In Chapter 7 of his memoirs, Lieutenant General Al-Shazly recorded his position on Sadat's accusations against him

(which we have already mentioned), on pages 264 through 269.

a lot of technical military details that are not of interest to readers, we will extract from it

the paragraphs that contain Shazly's response to the accusations made against him, as well as those in which he explains

his point of view, as follows:

I returned to the 101st on the evening of October 19 after spending about 24 hours with

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Second Army . It was clear that the distribution of our forces was not at all in line with the requirements of the battle. The

It is the responsibility of every commander to mobilize his forces and resources for the battle, not to leave part of his forces to fight under poor conditions while the rest stand by

under poor conditions while the rest of the forces stand by and do nothing. The enemy's plan has become

The enemy's plan is crystal clear. He aims to encircle the Second Army and the Third Army.

He is widening the gap in the Dafraswar area every day, and we should not expect miracles from our forces fighting west of the canal

fighting west of the canal. An Egyptian paratrooper brigade is fighting a bitter battle (meaning the 182nd Paratrooper Brigade

Parachute Brigade) against an armored division of two armored brigades and an Israeli paratrooper brigade (meaning Sharon's division)

It may be able to resist for another 4-315 days, but it can't last forever.

The force comparison table between us and the enemy screamed criticism. One look from a

civilian who does not understand military affairs is enough to convince him that this distribution is wrong, and that if it is not

is not immediately corrected, catastrophe may occur, yet I was unable to convince either the Minister of War or President Sadat

or President Sadat to change the situation.

I discussed the situation with Ahmed Ismail and told him: If we don't

redistribute our forces to meet the threat

there could be a catastrophe in three or four days. The enemy could push a new a new armored division tonight to the west without any danger to his position in the

east. There is no great danger that the Second Army could be encircled because of the presence of the

Ismailia, the 15th Armored Brigade north of it, and the Parachute Brigade, which can fight

for another 237E%2 days, but the greatest danger lies to the south for the Third Army.

The terrain is suitable for armor, and the enemy can now use its air force against our ground forces today, for the first time since the fighting began. If

the enemy moves another armored division

to the west, he will have two armored divisions in the southern sector west of the canal, supported by

by the air force against one armored division on our side. For this situation we must withdraw four

armored brigades from the east to meet the threat at tomorrow, within the next 24 hours

This will not affect the integrity of our lines and positions in the east and will increase our ability to

to meet the enemy threat in the west.

After failing to convince the minister of my point of view, I confided to some of my aides that if we did not that if we do not withdraw part of our forces from the east to the west, there will be a catastrophe of God knows what proportions.

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General Said al-Mahi, the commander of the artillery, suggested that I call the president and explain the situation. I did not I was not initially enthusiastic about this suggestion, because I knew President Sadat's point of view since the disagreement that took place between him and me in the operations room on October 16, and because I believe that Ahmed Ismail a military man before he was a politician, would not have accepted such a position, had he not been under political pressure.

After some thought, I decided that summoning Sadat and explaining the situation to him would put him his historical responsibility. I went to Ahmed Ismail in his room and told him: The situation I went to Ahmed Ismail in his room and told him that the situation was serious and that the president should come to hear the leaders' point of view. I didn't leave the minister's office only after he promised me that he would call Fouad.

I agreed with the minister that this meeting with the president would be attended by: Ahmed Ismail, Saad Shazly, Mohamed Ali Fahmy, Hosni Mubarak, Abdel Ghani El-Gamsy, Said El-Mahy, Fouad

Nassar. The president arrived with Engineer Abdel Fattah Abdallah, Minister of Presidential Affairs arrived at Center 10 at around 10:30 p.m. on the 19th and immediately went to Ahmed Ismail's room to Ahmed Ismail's room, where he stayed with him for nearly an hour, while I was meeting with the rest of the in the conference room adjacent to the operations room, exchanging views on the situation the situation. Finally, the president entered the room with Ahmed Ismail and Abdel Fattah Abdallah.

The president asked for the floor one by one, and each of them explained the situation

the position of the troops with complete honesty. After listening to all of them, he did not ask me to speak, but commented: "We will not We will not withdraw any soldiers from the East." I did not speak or comment. Engineer Abdel Fattah

and whispered in my ear: "Say Cheetah," but I ignored his advice. What can I say when the president has made

I want to withdraw four armored brigades from the east, and he He is against withdrawing a single soldier. He didn't make this decision out of ignorance, but out of full knowledge of the situation. He can't claim afterward that he thought the enemy had 7 tanks in the west

West. He knows all the facts, and this is his decision.

Sadat claims in his memoirs that I returned from the front collapsed on October 19, and that you demanded to withdraw our forces east of the canal, because the west is threatened." I regret to say that this

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cheap lie. There were nine of us, one dead and the other eight still alive. I challenge whether any of those who are still alive can testify to the truth of Sadat's claim.

I did demand the withdrawal of part of our forces from the east to the west, and my demand for this

operation on October 19 was the fifth attempt to save the situation. The honor of the Egyptian Armed Forces

the honor of the Egyptian Armed Forces and the history they wrote with their blood in October 1973 require us to determine who is

who was really responsible for the breach, what was not destroyed at the time, and who was really responsible for the siege of the Third Army.

The siege of the Third Army is an unforgivable crime, and I accuse Sadat that he is primarily responsible for it. Sadat refused a ceasefire when we were in a position of strength

when we were in a position of strength, and asked for a ceasefire when we were in a position of weakness. My proposal to

to withdraw 4 armored brigades from the east on the night of October 19/20 was the last chance to save

Egyptian military honor. We lost the initiative after that until the end of the war.

Thus, it is clear from the statements of the late President Sadat and Lieutenant General Shazly, that both of them

that their actions during the war make him the first culprit for the breach and the events that followed.

The following pages, God willing, will show that the late President Sadat and Lieutenant General Al-Shazly are responsible for the breach.

In the following pages, God willing, we will analyze and study these statements and discuss them in a scientific and objective manner in order to finally reach the full truth that everyone wants to know

that everyone wants to know.

Sadat's statements in the balance

Before we delve into the factors that caused the violent crisis that erupted between the late President Sadat and

between the late President Sadat and General Saad al-Shazly in the final phase of the October War.

The most prominent effects of which were the harsh criticisms and serious accusations made by

. It is important to note that one of the main factors in the outbreak of this crisis and its escalation

of the main factors in the outbreak and escalation of this crisis was due to the poor personal relationship between

General Ahmed Ismail, Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces during the October War

and Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

in chapter six of this book. This bad relationship and hatred

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between the two parties, which has its roots in 1960, when they happened to be in Leopoldville, the capital of the Congo, undoubtedly affected the working atmosphere at the

Center 10) and was never in the interest of the Armed Forces. For how could things

normalcy at headquarters when there is such a serious rift between the two between the two leaders who hold the two most dangerous positions in the war, the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff?

If we trace the series of clashes that took place between Ahmed Ismail and

Shazly in Center 21 0)

especially in the last phase of the war, we find that it was reflected to an influential degree in the relations between the late President Sadat and Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly. between the late President Sadat and Lieutenant General Saad Shazly. Whenever there was a sharp difference of opinion between the between the Commander-in-Chief and the Chief of Staff on the conduct of the war, Sadat, when summoned summoned to Center 10, Sadat immediately sided with the Generalissimo and attacked the Chief of Staff's the opinion of the Chief of Staff, until, as he explained in his memoirs, Al-Shenazli finally believed that that Ahmed Ismail's views, which he was holding on to and which were causing friction between them were in fact none other than Sadat's own views.

There is no doubt that Ahmed Ismail was extremely loyal and faithful to Sadat. He would never have thought of opposing him or standing up to his views. Sadat was the after Nasser ousted him and retired him on September 10, 1969 1969, following the Israeli amphibious raid on Zafarana on the Gulf of Suez. It is clear It is clear that during the war, Ahmed Ismail pursued a style that was in line with Sadat's policy Sadat, and that the two men were in full agreement on the way the war was being conducted, and were were partners in all the vital decisions made during the different phases of the war. This is why Ahmed Ismail would not budge from his position even when faced with strong opposition from the commanders to any of his decisions, no matter how valid their opinion or the strength of their argument. As witnessed, for example, when the decision was made to develop the attack in the direction of the Straits on October 14, 1973 When Lieutenant General Shazly, General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, and General Abdel Moneim Wassel, commander of the Third Army, voiced their strong opposition. and General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, strongly opposed this decision and explained its serious detrimental consequences. Ahmed Ismail was unable to convince them of the necessity of implementing it, until he stated that this decision is a political decision aimed at relieving pressure on Syria, so it should be adhere to it without discussion or debate.

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1- When did Shazly head to Ismailia?

It is clear that the late President Sadat was keen to record in all his that he sent Shazly to Ismailia on October 16 on October 16. This date is of great importance, as it is the first day that the Israeli force was stationed in the Dafraswar area west of the canal after crossing from east to west on the night of October 15/16 October . Regardless of the testimonies of commanders and war records, all of which prove that Shazly did not leave Cairo for Ismailia on October 16 did not leave Cairo for Ismailia on October 16, what we can confirm is that Sadat himself knew for sure that Shazly was present on that day, at the headquarters of the General Command in Cairo Not only because the president had visited Center 10 on the evening of October 16, and of course met with but also because a violent clash had taken place between the two of them that

night in the operations room of Center 10, witnessed by a number of commanders and operations officers, and the president's voice was so loud to the extent that the officers outside the operations room were astonished by what they heard. Therefore Sadat's insistence that he sent Shazly to deal with the breach on October 16 - despite knowing the truth - has only one meaning: he wanted to hold Shazly responsible for the Israelis' expansion of the breach and the failure to liquidate it, despite the ease of this operation at that time.

The disagreement that led to the clash at Center 10 was not originally between Sadat and Shazly. The subject of the dispute was the direction of the strike against the breach. While Shazly was of the opinion that the main attack against the breach from the west of the canal to close it at Mulsab, with two armored brigades withdrawn from the Third Army sector east of the canal and moving toward it from south to north. Ahmed Ismail's opinion was to direct the main attack against it from the east of the canal to close it at the upstream, with the independent 25th Armored Brigade advancing from south to north, to meet up with the 21st Armored Division advancing from the north to Jakhoub. Despite Shazly's attempts to convince Ahmed Ismail of his idea, he flatly rejected it, as he was adamant that no troops should be withdrawn from the east to the west.

On the evening of October 16, Sadat arrived at position 10) and Shazly thought as he recorded

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in his diary to use him to reverse Ahmed Ismail's decision and agree to his own idea

No sooner had he presented him with his proposals than he became furious, lost his temper, and shouted

Nervously: 1 I don't want to hear from you again these suggestions for withdrawing troops from the East. If you raise this subject again, I will prosecute you."⁴

The instructions for the offensive operation on October 17 were issued in accordance with the decision made by the Commander-in-Chief and President Sadat to close the breach from the east. However, the operation was not successful

The units of the 21st Armored Division were unable to reach Dafraswar, and the independent 25th Armored Brigade south of the line (Dheeb al-Habashi Tel Salam) about 7

In other words, the operation to clear the breach on October 17 failed.

2 What were Sadat's instructions for dealing with the breach?

While Sadat insisted that Shazly reached Ismailia on October 16, the established fact, supported by the commanders who attended Shazly while he was at the Second Army's headquarters and supported by official documents, is that he arrived at the advanced command center of the Second Army in Ismailia

at 5 p.m. on October 18. When he met with Maj. Gen. Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army upon his arrival, he told him: "President Sadat asked me to come to the Second Army and take charge. General Abdel Moneim had no choice to temporarily relinquish command to him, and to sit next to him in the command bunker to help him in his mission. his mission . When Shazly met with the chiefs and branch commanders of the Second Army Command, he informed them that he had that he had assumed command responsibility, that all decisions, orders and instructions would be issued only by him, and that and that all communications, whether with the General Headquarters of the 10th Brigade or with the commanders of the formations, would only be done through him. through him personally.

When we examine the mission that Sadat said he assigned to Shazly to deal with the breach, which was to surround the shore of Bitter Lake with a dam that would imprison the Israelis as he wrote in his book *Searching for Self*², and another time it was to form a cordon around Deverswar, so that the Jews would go in and not come out, as he wrote in his interview with We find that Sadat has injected himself with these statements into tactical and technical issues that are not within the purview of the political leadership. and gave Shazly the opportunity to comment on this statement.

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harsh and full of sarcasm and cynicism. On page 297 of his memoirs, he stated the following: "I have no I have no comment on this, except to say that it is the kind of thing an old grandmother might say to a child to help him fall asleep, just as the president's grandmother used to tell him as a child the story of Dahran. This is not how war is fought, and this is not how muskrat inspiration is allocated. I am ashamed and ashamed with me every intellectual to attribute this statement² to the President of Egypt.

We have already explained in Chapter 6 of this book that the responsibility of the head of state is limited to drawing the supreme strategy of the state, and therefore it is not within his competence to intervene in war plans, as this is the responsibility and competence of the military leadership. We warned of the danger of that the head of state, especially if the president is a military man - to the extent that he issuing tactical decisions related to the ongoing battles, as this would mean the interference of the political leadership in the work of the military command. which, according to the lessons and lessons of history, has serious consequences for the course and outcome of wars. serious consequences for the course and outcome of wars.

In this regard, we cannot hold Sadat alone responsible for interfering in military decisions for interfering in military decisions at the center (10) or to blame him alone, but the blame should be directed first General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, and General Saad al-Shazly, the Chief of Staff. They are the real culprits for dragging the president into military decisions and plans, having made him

a political leader who lacked some of their technical expertise and military culture

They made him, a political leader who lacked some of their technical expertise and distinct military culture, an arbitrator between them in the smallest details related to military operations and the most important tactical issues. the most important tactical issues. This was all due to the personal differences that crushed them in the last phase of the war

in the last phase of the war, which undeniably disrupted the working atmosphere in Center 10

indisputably . This is evidenced by Shazly's own admission in his memoirs when he recounted that after

his disagreement with Ahmed Ismail on October 16 about the direction of the strike against the breach.

No sooner had he learned that the president had reached the 10th position than he presented his proposals to him.

hoping that the president would adopt his idea and reverse Ahmed Ismail's decision.

the president had a violent outburst and had no one to blame but himself.

Now that we have conclusive evidence that Lieutenant General Shazly arrived at the headquarters of the Second Army in Ismailia at 5:00 p.m.

Second Army headquarters in Ismailia at 5:00 p.m. on October 18, not 16:00 a.m. Sadat's claim that he could have completed the entire operation hours after his arrival

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is a fantasy. The military situation in the Second Army sector south of the Ismailia Canal

at the time Shazly arrived at the command of this army in Ismailia did not allow for any military commander, no matter how brilliant he was, to complete the liquidation of the breach

The situation of the Israeli forces west of the Canal on the evening of October 18

On the evening of October 18, the position of the Israeli forces west of the canal became very strong.

the previous day, the pontoon ferry bridge between the two shores of the canal had been built and military engineers were about to were about to complete the prefabricated bridge about 200 meters north of the ferry bridge

north of the ferry bridge. On the west bank of the canal, south of the Ismailia Canal

two Israeli armored divisions, the divisions of General Ariel Sharon and General Abraham

Adan, whose armored elements were able to penetrate deep into the Egyptian defenses and destroy

and silenced a number of Egyptian SAM battalions, opening a corridor for Israeli aircraft to penetrate the West Bank.

for Israeli aircraft to reach the West Bank to provide direct support to the ground forces. This took place

This took place at a time when the Second Army no longer had any armored forces in its sector west of the canal

south of the Ismailia Canal, as the only armored force in this sector, the The 23rd Armored Brigade of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division (Strategic Reserve of the General Headquarters)

which was sent from its Cairo staging area to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection at 9:00 p.m. on October 16, did not

9 p.m. on October 16, it was not ordered to attack to destroy the enemy in the area of

until the morning of October 18, after the Israelis had completed the construction of the

and the armored division under General Abraham Adan had crossed to the west.

The result was the destruction of the 23rd Armored Brigade at noon on October 18, and the order to reassemble it was ordered to be reassembled to restore its combat efficiency in the area west of the intersection of the Ismailia Desert Road and Abu Suwair junction.

3 - Did Shazly establish a command in Ismailia?

According to Sadat, Shazly spent the entire night of his arrival gathering information and establishing a command to compete with that of his rival General Ismail. There is no doubt that Shazly or any other commander with the competence to lead a field army would waste an entire night gathering information, as this process should not take more than two hours at most, and it has an academic method known to commanders at all levels. Shazly was not, by virtue of his

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his position as Chief of Staff needed little time to know the reality of the situation and the status of the enemy and our forces in the Second Army sector. and our forces in the Second Army sector, he was very familiar with the reality of the situation and the military situation at the level of the entire front. as chief of staff and second-in-command of the entire front, by virtue of his position as chief of staff and second-in-command of the Center 10), which means that all the information and situation reports coming from various sources and commands are sure to pour in from various sources and commands. As for the statement that he established a command after his arrival in Ismailia. This is undoubtedly very surprising, as it is well established that Chadli came to Ismailia in a military jeep Ismailia in a military jeep, accompanied only by his military secretary, Lt. Col. Mazhar Issa, his driver and a soldier from the military police, and did not stay in Ismailia exactly 414 hours, so how and when was he able to set up the new command center? How was he able to establish a command center to compete with the Cairo command center (10), for which the best of the Armed Forces' peacetime of the Armed Forces' peacetime capabilities, including engineering equipment and extensive underground bunkers underground shelters, equipped with all the means of communication, transportation, and comforts needed for the command center. Is it reasonable to think of establishing a new command center while battles are raging air strikes are in full swing and the city of Ismailia itself is threatened with invasion, now that with enemy forces at its gates?

This allegation of obedience has no basis in fact. It is well documented that after arriving took his place in the underground command bunker, next to General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army and began to exercise his command responsibilities in his stead, using the same aides and command apparatus. using the same means of telecommunications. He did not leave the advanced command center of the Second Army until he headed to Cairo, and before leaving the command center, he telephoned to General Ahmed Ismail at Cairo's Center 10 at 1:05 p.m., asking him for permission to come down to present the situation

for permission to come down to present the situation to him. At 1:15 p.m., he asked Maj. Gen. Abdelnem Khalil to come to him in the restroom next to the stadium. Shazly's preparation to return to Cairo, which was not preceded by any preliminaries and found him spreading a map of the situation in front of him the situation in front of him. When he saw him, he said: "What do you think? The situation is very serious and I am coming down to meet the president to brief him on the situation in order to find a solution to the ceasefire." At 1:20 p.m. at 1:20 p.m., Shazly left the Ismailia headquarters and headed to Center 10 in Cairo. Cairo 591

The last important point in this paragraph is Sadat's admission that that Shazly wanted to compete with his rival Ahmed Ismail, which is a very serious admission, as how the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces allowed two rivals, one as Commander-in-Chief and the other as Chief of Staff to work together in the same headquarters to manage a war that was a life-and-death battle for Egypt. Egypt was a life and death battle? The general command apparatus that manages the war should be a homogeneous apparatus should be a homogeneous apparatus in which love and harmony prevail and a real desire to cooperate, not a field of disagreements and conflicts an arena for disagreements, conflicts and settling old accounts.

4 - Did Shazly order the Thunderbolts to withdraw?

According to Sadat's statements, the commando forces had advanced to Dufreswar and actually reached the disembarkation point to the disembarkation point, and the Israelis recognized the fierceness of the fight of the Thunderbolts and Special Forces But Shazly ordered them to withdraw until he could gather information, and the result was that the Jews expanded the breach of the breach. It is clear from these statements that Sadat did not intend to hold Shazly responsible for the Israeli expansion of the breach responsible for the Israeli expansion of the penetration gap in Dafraswar, as he is the one who, according to his account ordered the withdrawal of the Thunderbolt forces that managed to reach the Israeli landing point on the canal and fought the enemy on the canal and fiercely fought the enemy without any reason to do so, except for the strange excuse of gathering information information. It cannot be imagined that a commander - no matter how ignorant and stupid he may be - would order his troops to to retreat after reaching its vital objective in the heart of Al-Madou under the pretext that he wants to gather information about this enemy information about this enemy; since combat communication with the enemy - according to the primary tactical principles is in itself one of the most important means of obtaining information about the enemy.

As for the truth of what happened in the Thunderbolt battle, Colonel Ali Heikal the commander of the 129th Thunderbolt Group (from the Second Army Reserve) was stationed at Abu Sawir Airport Abu Sawir, based on the mission he received on the morning of October 16 from the Second Army Command. sent the 733rd Thunderbolt Battalion (excluding a company) to a staging area at Ain Ghossein (on the Hakhloua Taraa) about 12 kilometers south of Nafisha), and the mission he gave the battalion commander was was to advance south in the direction of Dafraswar and Abu Sultan to destroy

seven Israeli tanks that had succeeded in infiltrating the West Bank of the Canal.
to infiltrate the West Bank of the Canal.

According to the mission, a thunderbolt company advanced from Ain Ghossein on the dirt track east of the canal
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Hakhloua towards Deverswar, and when it approached the northern side of the Deverswar airfield, it was met with strong resistance from Israeli paratroopers. strong resistance from Israeli paratroopers who were hiding in the airfield, and the clash continued
Throughout the night . Unable to advance and in dire need of ammunition, the company was ordered by
on the morning of October 17 to withdraw to Sarabium, where it took up a defensive position
a defensive position reinforced by another thunderbolt platoon sent by the group commander. On the same day
An Israeli paratrooper battalion from Colonel Danny Mat's brigade advanced from Dafraswar in a northerly direction, between
between the Sweet Teraa and the railroad line, and when it approached Sarabium, a fierce battle took place between it and the Egyptian commandos
with Egyptian commandos that lasted for four hours, with Israeli losses amounting to 10
tanks and tracked vehicles as well as 11 dead and 72 wounded. On the night of October 17/18
the company was ordered by the group's command to withdraw to Abu Sawir to regroup.

The other company of the 73rd Thunderbolt Battalion had advanced from Ain Ghossein on the tracks
in the direction of the Abu Sultan camps and the railroad station to reach the the northern shore of Bitter Lake, south of Deverswar. A platoon managed to infiltrate the
but the company was discovered by the enemy on the morning of October 17
Israeli tanks attacked the company from their positions southwest of Al-Dafraswad Airport.
Despite the company's heavy losses, especially in officers, it managed to destroy 5 Israeli tanks and tracked vehicles
Israeli tanks and tracked vehicles. Although the company received an order from the group's command
to withdraw to the Abu Sultan camps, the company was unable to do so due to the intensity of the enemy's fire
It was forced to cling to its positions, which prompted the group commander to ask the artillery of the Second Army to bombard the area occupied by the enemy. The Second Army artillery shelled the entire area occupied by the enemy in Abu Sultan, including the company
Egyptian Thunderbolt .

On the morning of October 18, fierce close combat broke out between Israeli paratroopers and Egyptian commandos
during which the group's reconnaissance chief was martyred.
The group's chief of staff was severely wounded and the enemy suffered heavy losses. On the night of
October 18/19, under the cover of darkness, the rest of the company withdrew under the orders of the group's command from
Abu Sultan to Abu Sawir for regrouping, and the losses of the thunderbolt in these battles amounted to 11
officers and 47 other ranks.

Thus, it is clear to us that Sadat's statements regarding the thunderbolt battle in Dafraswar are nothing but

allegations that have no basis in reality, and are intended, as we have already explained, only to hold Saad

Al-Shazly is solely responsible for the mistakes that occurred in dealing with the Gap, as the battle of the Thunderbolt forces with the enemy had with the enemy was over before Shazly reached Ismailia.

When was Shazly removed from the position of Chief of Staff⁵

It can be argued that the events that took place at Station 10 on the night of October 20/21 were the

a watershed in the normal relations that had previously prevailed between the late President

Sadat and Lieutenant General Saad Shazly as Chief of Staff. On this night, the crisis reached its peak

between them reached its peak, after which official and personal ties between the two parties became almost severed

severed. Sadat expressed the extent of the shift in his feelings and the discontent he felt at the time

of his discontent with his chief of staff, stating on page 273 of his book "In Search of the Self

The following verbatim:

"This night I gave my instructions to Ahmed Ismail to remove Shazly from the Chief of Staff.

but not to announce this decision to the troops so as not to provoke a reaction from us or the Israelis.

On the same night, I summoned El-Gamsi and appointed him chief of staff."

In fact, this statement lacks accuracy and truthfulness, as Shazly was not removed from his position on October 21, but continued to exercise his responsibilities

on October 21, but continued to exercise his responsibilities as chief of staff until December 12

December 12, 1973, as evidenced by his attendance at two meetings of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on October 25 and November 12, 1973.

October 25 and November 12, 1973 and continued to work in his office at the Center.

The only change in the situation was that he withdrew into his office and did not interfere in

the work of the command unless he was asked to do so. Al-Shazly denied Sadat's claim that he was removed from his post on October 21

from his post on October 21, recording on page 295 of his memoirs the following ludicrous statement:

"If Sadat had said instead that I intended to remove him, it would have been closer to the truth than to a lie

because impeachment means that the person does not perform any work after his removal, but the truth was

otherwise. I continued to work until December 12. 4. It is well established that Sadat

After the crisis that took place in Center 10 after Al-Shazly returned on the evening of October 20 from commanding Al-Jahish in Ismailia

and asked to withdraw some troops from east to west of the canal to confront the

the Israeli threat, he did not stop attacking Shazly and criticizing his actions during the war, whether

in private and in some of his press interviews, even when Shazly was still officially
was still officially the Chief of Staff.

His post-war speeches and hints were a clear indication that he wanted to hold him personally responsible for the wrong handling of the war.
personally responsible for the faulty handling of the Israeli penetration in Dversua, as evidenced by his
This is evidenced by his constant keenness to record me in all his published press interviews, in his official speeches that were broadcast
that he sent Shazly to Ismailia on October 16 to deal with the breach
to Ismailia on October 16 to deal with the breach, even though he knew full well that Shazly
was in Cairo on that day, and that he only left for Ismailia on October 18.
But his ulterior motive was to prove that Shazly's misbehavior had enabled the Israelis to widen the breach
the Israelis to widen the breach, and to hold him solely responsible for the failure to liquidate it on October 16
October 16, despite the ease of this operation at that time.

On this occasion, we would like to clarify to readers that the Israeli force that crossed from the Canal to the West Bank on the night of October 15/16 to the West Bank on the night of October 15/16, was a weak force consisting of a parachute infantry brigade
led by Colonel Danny Mat and (03) tanks and some half-track armored vehicles from the armored brigade
armored vehicles under the command of Colonel Haim, all under the Armored Division commanded by General Ariel Sharon. It was
eliminating them was easy at first, as the Israeli force west of the canal remained isolated from its bases east of the canal
isolated from its bases east of the canal for nearly 40 hours, and without any additional reinforcements
The Israeli force west of the canal was isolated from its bases east of the canal for nearly 40 hours, without any additional reinforcements, as instructed by General Chaim Bar-Lev, pending the construction of fixed bridges.
Due to the poor tactical position of this force, some of the responsible Israeli commanders considered several times
several times to withdraw it and send it back to the eastern bank of the Canal, fearing that it would be annihilated

Our denial of General Shazli's presence at the Second Army headquarters in Ismailia on October 16 does not mean that we are correcting history
October 16 to correct history, we mean to prove that he was not among those responsible for the
the Israeli penetration gap, which was widened by the mistakes of the Egyptian commanders.
and worsened to a degree that was unthinkable to any of the Israeli commanders, even in their most optimistic dreams.
Shazly and other commanders, whether in the headquarters of the Second Army in Ismailia or in some of the formations
Second Army in Ismailia or in some of the formations and units under its command, or in the headquarters of the

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General Headquarters in Cairo's Center 10, are, by virtue of their commanding positions, responsible for the success of this
of the Israeli offensive, whereas if it had been handled in a proper manner and in accordance with the correct tactical principles
and in accordance with the correct tactical principles, it would certainly have failed.

What did Sadat say to Shazly?

It was only four days after the clash that took place in the 10th Center on the night of 21/20

October, until another violent clash occurred between General Shazly and General Ahmed Ismail.

On October 25, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, headed by Ahmed Ismail, met for the first time since the outbreak of the war

for the first time since the outbreak of the war, and the main topic discussed at the meeting was

the possibility of opening the Suez Road corridor as a supply route for the two divisions of the First Corps of the Third Army besieged east of the Canal

(the 19th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Youssef Afifi and the 7th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General

and the 7th Infantry Division commanded by Brig. H. Ahmed Badawi) In addition to the residents of the city of

Suez. As no practical solution could be reached, the meeting adjourned on the basis of

to conduct the necessary studies in an urgent manner, as the siege of the Third Army and the city of Suez

The siege of the Third Army and the city of Suez was the most serious crisis facing the political and military leadership after the cessation of hostilities.

At 11:00 a.m. on October 26, Brigadier General A.H. Abdel Aziz Kabil, commander of the 4th Armored Division

the commander of the 4th Armored Division, came to Post 10 to present the result of his study. The conclusion reached by Brig.

in his report was the impossibility of opening the road due to the lack of sufficient units, which

for this operation, since it requires securing an area of 5 kilometers south and north of this road

and north of this road, as whenever the division's forces seize a ground body that controls an area

it must be handed over to other forces to occupy and control it, which requires to allocate a full infantry division in addition to the 4th Armored Division to

take control of these terrain heights up to the Suez Canal

all the way to the Suez Canal. When Brig. Gen.

Ismail was unconvinced by the study contained in his report, he told him

âI and the officers and soldiers of the division are all ready to carry out this suicide operation.

But I don't think we will succeed in opening the way to the besieging forces after all. And if

If this division is destroyed, the road to Cairo will be open to the enemy.

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When Ahmed Ismail realized the reality of the situation, he came up with an idea that was even more bizarre

that the 4th Armored Division would protect the Idarbeh columns

moving from Cairo to the Third Army through undeveloped secondary roads and paths. And it was

The new idea was unrealistic, as a one-day supply for the besieging forces would require at least 100 tracked vehicles to be able to move across the rugged

open terrain and

to move across the rugged open terrain and flooded streams, which would eventually have to pass through

enemy-controlled areas west of the canal. Given Israel's air superiority, it was expected to detect these movements and destroy the administrative columns and

tanks protecting them

protect them.

Despite Shazly's objection to this idea proposed by the Generalissimo, which he considered

an adventure that is certain to fail and will only lead to the destruction of

the 4th Armored Division.

Ahmed Ismail not only insisted on implementing his idea, but also asked Shazly to issue a written order to the division commander to carry out this mission in writing to the division commander to carry out the mission. When Shazly refused to issue such an order, Ahmed Ismail angrily replied

Ahmed Ismail responded angrily: "I don't understand what you want, do you want these men

to surrender?" Shazly immediately replied: "I don't want that, of course, but

at the same time I don't want to lose the 4th Armored Division without any choice in the situation.

"4. Ahmed Ismail replied defiantly: 5 If you don't sign the order for the 4th Armored Division to carry out this

"If you don't sign the order for the 4th Armored Division to carry out this mission, I will notify the president," Shazly replied calmly: "You can

"Of course you can. Ahmed Ismail had no choice but to sign the order himself and hand it over to Brig.

and hand it over to Brigadier General Qabil.

Fortunately, this suicide mission was canceled because it was finally convinced of the impossibility of carrying it out on the one hand, and because on the other hand, the two superpowers intervened in the matter

and put pressure on Israel until it was finally forced to acquiesce. On November 11

73, following the signing of the six-point agreement between Egypt and Israel at the Kilometer 101 talks

It was decided that supply convoys not carrying military material would be allowed to reach the Third Army

east of the canal, and to the city of Suez.

In addition to this clash between al-Shazly and Ahmed Ismail, Sadat began to

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one month before the ceasefire, Sadat began to reveal his intentions towards Shazly, namely

trying to hold him solely responsible for the faulty handling of the breach, which led to the siege of the Third Army and the city of Suez

of the Third Army and the city of Suez. On page 932 of his memoirs, Shazly recorded

proving this view:

10 On November 21, 73, during the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces headed by

Sadat, during the meeting and in a spontaneous manner, the president, while reviewing the events of the war, said

"It is one night that is the cause of all the troubles that happened, that is the night of 18/19

October 19/18. If we had acted decisively and forcefully during that night, we would have eliminated the breach. It is that night

I quickly understood what the president meant by this, and I wondered why he would choose this night

I wondered why he chose this particular night. I quickly intervened, saying: Mr. President.

The men of the Second Army did their best during that night! He replied:

"After the

"After the war is over, we will conduct an investigation to determine responsibility for the penetration of the Dufreswar. I said

in a voice in which I could not hide my confidence and defiance: "1 Indeed, we must determine who is

responsible! After the meeting ended, Anna and the minister escorted him to his car, as usual.

After the president left the command building, as we were walking back inside, the minister said to me:

âHow can you address the president like that? What do you take the president's words as an accusation against you?

the commander of the Second Army? If there is a responsibility, it is the responsibility of the Second Army.

My mere presence in the Second Army makes me responsible for everything the army does. I have

I approved and participated in every decision made in the army, during the twenty-four hours I lived with her with her.

After the meeting adjourned, I summoned General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army, and told him

to him: âAbdel Moneim, I smell the odor of betrayal and treachery. They seem to be looking for someone to blame for all their mistakes

for all their mistakes. Be careful and preserve the army's documents so that no one can steal or falsify them.

or falsify them⁴. Al-Shazly's statement ended.

Why the insistence on falsifying history?

The dark secret that is still waiting to be unveiled today is Sadat's agreement to falsify history.

Sadat in his book âSearching for Selfâ and Shazly in his âMemoirsâ that Shazly returned from

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Ismailia on the evening of October 19, '73, even though they are both certain that his return

on the evening of October 20. Of course, coincidence alone could not have played a role

in this unintentional error on both sides. It stands to reason, therefore, that both of them were aiming

to achieve a hidden goal that would give them a certain advantage that only they know for sure.

Although the error in changing the date was the same for both parties. However, it is certain that the two gifts

are different. Lt. Gen. Chadli, who is known for his precision and orderliness, cannot be believed

He did not know whether he had spent one or two nights in Ismailia.

He no longer knows whether he commanded the Second Army for 24 hours, or for 44 hours, especially in light of the serious facts and bitter events

in light of the serious facts and bitter events that took place during his command of this army

which will surely remain etched in his memory until the last day of his life.

As long as he recorded in his diary the correct date of his going to Ismailia, which is October 18

October 18, why would he make a mistake in recording the correct date of his return?

Shazly had a habit, especially during the war, of carrying a small notebook with him in which he recorded the most important

the events he encountered, the contacts he made, the meetings he had, and the thoughts he had

in order to later use it to write his own memoirs. It has already been proven that he wrote

these memoirs, because he released them about seven years after the October War in a book through

one of the Arab publishing houses, in Paris in 1980

Al-Shazly admitted on page 286 of his memoirs that on December 12, '73, in view

of
his doubts about what was going on around him, he took with him before leaving
Center 10 all his papers
and his private diary, and took them to his home. It became clear to him
afterward that his suspicions were correct
were correct. That night, Ahmed Ismail summoned him to his office at the
ministry and informed him of the
of the president's decision to remove him as chief of staff and appoint him
ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Shazly expressed his elation when he went to his office in Center 10 a few days
later to collect what
what remained of his papers, which were of no importance to him, only to
discover that they had been seized.
With this revelation, Shazly cannot claim that he made a mistake in scheduling
his return from Ismailia
Ismailia, because his personal diary or papers have disappeared.

The Hakhreb's records and documents, as well as the testimonies of commanders
who were present with Shazly during his stay at the Second Army's headquarters
in Ismailia

the Second Army's headquarters in Ismailia, all agree that he left Ismailia
around
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at 1:30 p.m. on October 20, so why is Shazly so adamant
that he left on October 19? Could it be that he wanted to minimize the
the period of time during which he was in charge of the Second Army, and
accordingly minimize his
the historical responsibility he bears for the events that took place during his
presence, to 24
instead of 44 hours? As we have seen, when Ahmed Ismail said to him, after the
end of his
at the end of the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on November
21: "Why do you take
Are you the commander of the Second Army, if there is a responsibility to negate
responsibility for the Second Army, he replied: "My mere presence in the Second
Army makes me
I approved and participated in every decision made in the army during the
twenty-four hours I lived in the army.
during the twenty-four hours I lived among them."

The fact that Lt. Gen. Shazly arrived at the advanced command center of the
Second Army in Ismail.
arrived at the Second Army's advanced command center in Ismailia at 5 p.m. on
October 18, he told the army commander, Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil:
"President Sadat asked me
to come to the Second Army and take charge. Immediately, General Abdel Moneim
relinquished the reins
and sat next to him in the command bunker to assist him in his mission. A review
of the Second Army's
from October 18 to 20, it is clear that Shazly was the de facto commander of the
Second Army during this period
the de facto commander of the army during this period, so he did not, as Ahmed
Ismail stated, approve and participate only in the decisions made during
and participated only in the decisions made during his presence, but it is true
that he was the one who
issued orders and instructions and made decisions not only during the twenty-
four hours he lived in the Second Army, but also during the four
not only during the twenty-four hours he lived in the Second Army, but also
during the forty-four hours he lived there.

Strangely enough, the dramatic events that took place in Center 0 1 after Shazly returned from Ismailia on the evening of October 20 on the evening of October 20, the late President Sadat also insisted on rescheduling it
He recorded in his book, Searching for Self, that they took place on the evening of October 19. We do not
We do not need to recount these events again, as we have already published their details quoting
statements of Sadat and Shazly. It is only one paragraph that we are interested in republishing from Sadat's statement
Sadat's statement, as it may reveal to us the secret we want to find out about this strange phenomenon we witnessed.
that we have witnessed. The phenomenon of changing dates and switching dates. Sadat says in this paragraph
The following : As soon as the situation became clear to me, I gathered all the commanders, and with me was Lieutenant General Ahmed Ismail.
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Commander-in-Chief, General El-Gamsi, Commander of Operations, General Hosni Mubarak, and General Mohamed Ali
Fahmy: Commander of the Missile Corps, and they were all of my opinion, which was that nothing had happened to cause concern.
I gave the order, which I consider more important than the October 6 decision, that not a single soldier, not a single rifle, not a single
rifle or anything at all from east of the canal, and that we have to deal with the West
according to the existing conditions⁴ . The secret of Sadat's change in the date of Shazly's return from Ismailia
Shazly's return from Ismailia had nothing to do with Shazly himself, but rather the events that took place in Center 110 after Shazly's arrival from Ismailiya, which Sadat, for his own sake, wished to record
Sadat, for his own purposes, to record that they took place late in the day on October 19.

It is only one phrase in this paragraph that unravels the mystery that we are all eager to get to the bottom of. That phrase is that the order that
Sadat gave after his meeting with the commanders at Center 10 (that not a single soldier or rifle should be withdrawn from east of the canal
rifle from east of the canal, and that we deal with the West according to the existing conditions, was, in his view, more important than the decision to go to war
more important than the decision to go to war on October 6. There is no doubt that those who know how proud Sadat
Sadat feels for his decision to go to war on October 6, which is undoubtedly the bravest decision any Egyptian president could have made
decision that any Egyptian president could have made, can immediately realize how proud Sadat was
Sadat's pride in his decision not to withdraw a single soldier or rifle from east of the canal
from east of the canal.

Because of this courageous decision, which Sadat considered more important and greater than the decision to go to war on
October 6, Sadat of course took great care not to taint this decision with any flaw that would diminish its greatness or weaken its importance
its greatness, weaken its importance, or diminish its value. The fact that it was issued on October 19
October 19, undoubtedly fulfills all these lofty meanings, and records for Sadat in history a second glory
after the first glory, which he deservedly received with the war decision on

October 16. But if the truth is told and people know that this decision was issued on the night of October 21/20, then the matter is different. The glory will fade and the greatness will diminish, because it means that Sadat made this decision knowing that Dr. Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, is in Moscow at this time in Moscow. On the morning of October 20, Kissinger flew from Washington to the Soviet capital, at the request of Soviet President Brezhnev to U.S. President Richard Nixon. Richard Nixon on October 19 to send his secretary of state to Moscow. He had

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Nixon agreed to the request, and sent Kissinger the next day to meet with the Soviet president. The Soviet ambassador in Cairo informed President Sadat on October 20 about the talks. Brezhnev and Kissinger were holding in Moscow to agree on a joint U.S.-Soviet joint cease-fire to be submitted urgently to the Security Council for promulgation. The Council met. The Security Council did meet on the evening of October 21 and passed Resolution 338 at 7:00 a.m. EDT on October 22 on October 22 at 7 a.m. Eastern Mediterranean Time with a ceasefire at 6:52 p.m. the same day.

Sadat recorded on pages 275 and 274 of his book Searching for Self⁴ the important steps he took after his meeting with the leaders, and after his return from Center 10 to the Tahira Palace, he said the following: "On this night I made the decision to cease fire. I had ten days to fight America alone. On October 19, after my meeting with the leaders, I returned to the Tahira Palace and immediately began to implement my decision. I asked them to summon the ambassador. Until he came, I wrote a telegram to President Assad in which I said that I accepted with a bleeding heart the ceasefire, because I am ready to fight Israel for as long as it takes, but I am not at all ready to fight America. I am not prepared at all to fight America, and I do not allow my armed forces to be destroyed again or that my people and their facilities will be destroyed. At the end of the telegram, I told him: I am responsible for this decision. The people of Egypt will hold me accountable for it and the Arab nation will hold me accountable for it.

The Soviet ambassador came and I told him: "I have accepted the ceasefire on the current lines. I resumed my conversation with the ambassador and told him: 1The two superpowers must ensure a ceasefire and the immediate implementation of Resolution 24.22

The statements contained in the previous paragraph leave no doubt about the impossibility of occurring on October 19. as Sadat recorded, as the decision to cease fire is not a domestic internal decision that only requires an order from Sadat, as is implied by his statement that he made the decision and began implementing it such a decision is linked to the international situation and the position of the two superpowers, and the extent of Israel's Israel's willingness to submit to the decision. It did not make sense for Sadat

to rush and send a telegram
to his partner in ruin, Syrian President Hafez al-Assad - before the arrival of
the Soviet ambassador - to notify
President Assad's acceptance of the ceasefire only when he was fully confident
that the Security Council was about to
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to issue a ceasefire resolution, and that Israel would accept this resolution,
otherwise what would have been his position vis-à-vis the Syrian president
what would have been his position vis-à-vis the Syrian president if he had sent
the cable and his efforts for a ceasefire had failed?
ceasefire?

Sadat's words to the Soviet ambassador clearly explain the situation. He told
him as soon as he arrived
that he accepted the ceasefire on the current lines and that the two superpowers
should guarantee it
this. This can only mean that Sadat is agreeing to an earlier offer of a
on a joint project agreed upon by the two superpowers for a ceasefire. All of
these events
could not have occurred until after Kissinger arrived in Moscow, and since
Kissinger did not arrive by plane in Moscow until the evening of October 20
to Moscow until the evening of October 20, all the events that took place in
Center 10 and then
at the Tahera Palace must have taken place on the night of October 20/21 with
certainty.

What troops did Shazi Lee demand to be withdrawn?

The main point of contention that caused the severe crisis that erupted between
President
between the late Sadat and General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, on the night
of October 21/22, was
the proposal that Shazly made to General Ahmed Ismail upon his return from
Ismailia on the evening of October 20, when
from Ismailia on the evening of October 20, when they met at Station 10 to
discuss the deteriorating situation west of the canal.
to discuss the deteriorating situation west of the canal, and its content was to
withdraw some forces from east of the canal to the west
to confront the Israeli threat west of the canal.

The heated disagreement that took place at Center 10 was in fact nothing more
than a conflict between two different points of view
between two different points of view: One was a military point of view,
represented by General Shazly, and its aim was to deal with the situation from a
military perspective.
whose goal was to deal with the situation from a purely military perspective,
namely the rapid formation of a reserve west of the canal
canal to carry out an urgent counterattack on the enemy armored forces west of
the canal to destroy them, thereby
the Israeli penetration gap would be liquidated or, at worst, restricted and
narrowed.

The second was a political viewpoint represented by the late President Sadat.
dealing with the situation from a purely political perspective, namely that
every soldier and every weapon that
crossing to the east of the canal should remain in place, no matter what happens
west of the canal, so that the Malasian forces east of the canal
to be a trump card in the hands of the Egyptian negotiator during the impending
political negotiations.

to solve the Middle East issue, in accordance with the American promises received by the President.
This theory was fully in line with the President's favorite saying, which he often repeated
to the Egyptian leaders during his pre-war meetings with them, that if they could cross the Canal
and control even just one meter east of it, he could move the frozen situation and solve the issue
politically.

Unfortunately, this disagreement between the two points of view turned from a mere disagreement between
two opinions, each of which believed they were right, into a fierce personal feud, which eventually turned into
and eventually turned into an unprecedented exchange of accusations.
Accordingly, Sadat tried to
in all his broadcast and published speeches about the October War, Sadat tried to accuse Al-Shazly of wanting to withdraw all Egyptian forces to the east
wanted to withdraw all Egyptian forces east of the canal to the west. This is clearly seen in
on page 273 of his book, Searching for Self², where he states the following verbatim:

10 On October 19 (the correct date is October 20, as we have proven with conclusive evidence
in the previous pages) Shazly came back broken, and said that we must withdraw our forces east of the canal
because Khadrout was threatened, and this was what the Israelis wanted. 2. Shazly denied this accusation
on page 268 of his memoirs, stating the following about dementia: "Sadat claims in his
in his memoirs that I returned from the front collapsed on October 19, and that I demanded the withdrawal of our forces in the east of the canal because the west is threatened.
The West is threatened, and I regret to say that this is a cheap claim. There were nine of us.
(Sadat, Ahmed Ismail, Abdel Fattah Abdullah, Saad Al-Shazly, Mohamed Ali Fahmy, Dahsni Mubarak, Abdel Ghani El-Gamsy, Saeed El-Mahy, and Fouad Nassar) died
One (he meant the late Ahmed Ismail, but he also died following the publication of Shazly's memoirs
In 1980, the late President Sadat and the late Abdel Fattah Abdallah, then Minister of Presidential Affairs
who attended the meeting with Sadat).
who is still alive can attest to the truth of Sadat's claim. I did call for the withdrawal of part of our forces in the east to the west
of our forces in the east to the west.

Al-Shazly clearly and precisely identified the forces he was asking to be withdrawn from the east of the canal to the west
In two paragraphs of his memoirs, on page 266, he said the following: I was of the opinion that the withdrawal of
these four armored brigades from the east within the next twenty-four hours would not affect
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the integrity of our lines and positions in the east, and would increase our ability to meet the enemy's threat in the west.
to us in the west². On page 297 of his diary, he specified more precisely which

four brigades he had in mind

â If Sadat had agreed to my proposal to withdraw these four brigades three from the Second Army in the east and one from the Third Army in the east - on the night of

on the night of October 20/91, the effect would have been felt in the fighting on the morning of October 21, and we would have been able to hit the the gap on October 21 and 22 and, at worst, narrow it. If the fighting and those four brigades around the breach, the enemy would not have been able to violate the cease-fire

on October 23, and if it had violated it, we would have been able to repel and destroy it. The responsibility for the siege of the

on October 23 falls first and foremost on President Sadat, and he is trying to escape

from it, but there is no way out.

If we discuss the statements that Sadat and Shazly made in their memoirs in their memoirs, we will immediately discover the extent to which the enmity and personal rivalry

and personal rivalry between the two of them has done great damage to both parties. The two of them were quick to hurl at each other a barrage of accusations and bitter criticisms of their actions during the October War, especially in the final phase

of the war, especially in the final phase of the war, after the breach in the Dafraswar breach and the Israeli crossing to the West Bank of the Canal the West Bank of the Canal. There is no doubt that some of these accusations are baseless and unsubstantiated

and are nothing more than unjust fabrications. It is inconceivable that Shazly, despite his

despite his technical expertise and military culture, to withdraw all Egyptian forces from their fortified positions east of the canal to the west overnight from their fortified positions east of the canal to the west, only to be thrown out in the open on the west bank of the canal to become easy prey for the Israeli armored forces, and to become easy prey for the Israeli air force.

the Israeli air force, which was filling the skies of the region at the time, to be destroyed and dispersed.

Any individual, civilian or military, with any amount of logical thinking, must realize that

Withdrawing the entire Egyptian forces (personnel, tanks, vehicles, ammunition, weapons and equipment)

from east of the Canal, under the critical military conditions at the time, and under Israeli air control

would only have meant exposing these forces to the risk of total collapse, and turning their withdrawal from east to west into a

their withdrawal from east to west into a state of panic and chaos, which would inevitably end in a

an infamous defeat even heavier and more devastating than that of June 1967

At the same time, we believe that it would be unfair and unjust for Chadli to 605

the siege of the Third Army on Sadat's shoulders alone, and to hold him solely responsible for it

as stated in his statements. There is no doubt that Sadat, as a representative of the political leadership, bears part of the responsibility

part of this responsibility, but the military command cannot be relieved of its grave responsibility.

Sadat, as the representative of the political leadership, bears part of the responsibility, but the military command cannot be relieved of its grave responsibility

and instructions to commanders and formations.

It remains to discuss the proposal made by Al-Shazly upon his return from Al-Ismailiya on October 20

October 20, which was the cause of the acute crisis that erupted at the Center 10), which ended with his removal from the Chief of Staff which ended with his removal from the Chief of Staff. According to his memoirs, Shazly proposed to withdraw four armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west, to confront the Israeli armored forces, which Israeli armored forces, which rushed from the Deverswar breach and headed north on the Ismailia axis and south on the Suez axis on the Suez axis. The idea of withdrawing some armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west from a tactical point of view from a tactical standpoint is undoubtedly sound in principle - regardless of whether it is realistically achievable or realistically achievable or impossible to implement - as it is a method of using of armored forces and an attempt to exploit their main characteristics, namely agility and maneuverability maneuverability. Its withdrawal to the west should not be considered a withdrawal, as long as it is done under full control and without interference from the enemy under full control and without interference from the enemy.

One of the main factors in objecting to Shazly's proposal was the fear that the withdrawal would turn into a panicked withdrawal, due to the reduction in the morale of the other forces in the morale of other forces, and the possibility of misunderstanding the purpose of the withdrawal. other forces to emulate it and try to cross to the west, which would inevitably lead to chaos and collapse. lead to chaos and collapse. But this objection is unfounded, as you have already withdrew some units from the Third Army sector from the east to the west to fight against the enemy west of the canal with their original formations, yet there was no collapse or chaos in the because the withdrawal process was carried out in an orderly and controlled manner. The 1st Infantry Brigade Mechanized Brigade, which was stationed in the 19th Infantry Division sector, crossed to the west of the canal on the morning of October 20 October to join its original formation (the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division), and on October 19 and 20 October, the 3rd Armored Brigade, which had been operating in reserve under the Third Army commander, also crossed also crossed east of the canal to the west to join its original formation (4th Armored Division), and on 606

October 22, an armored battalion of the 22nd Armored Brigade, which was under the command of the 19th Infantry Division, crossed to the to the west to join its original formation (the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division). evidence, explanation or statement?

It turned out that the Israeli Southern Command had also resorted to the same tactic. that Shazly was proposing, namely the withdrawal of some troops from one bank of the canal to the other the other bank. Oddly enough, this took place at about the same time, i.e., after the after the breach and the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal, with the only difference, of course, being the direction of troop withdrawal the direction of the troop withdrawal, which for the Israeli command was from west to east of the canal. On October 20, General Gonen, commander of the Israeli Southern Command, issued an order to General Ariel

Sharon, commander of the Armored Division, which was operating west of the canal on the Ismailia axis to withdraw one of his armored brigades (the Amnon Brigade) from west of the canal and to cross the armored brigade to the east, to take part in the attack against the bridgehead of the Egyptian 16th Infantry Division with the aim of widening the penetration gap north to the Middle Road (Ismailia Road) East of the Tassa)

The position of the armored brigades at the unified bridgehead When the 16th Infantry Division (the right wing of the Second Army) was commanded by Brig. Gen. Brig. Gen. Nabi Hafez crossed the Suez Canal on October 6, among the units placed under its command was the the 14th Armored Brigade (one of the two armored brigades of the 21st Armored Division, the other being the 1st Armored Brigade). The 21st Armored Division, commanded by Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi was stationed west of the canal, south of the Ismailia Terrace, acting as the second echelon of the Second Field Army. On the night of October 7/6, the 14th Armored Brigade crossed the Suez Canal and occupied its position east of the canal north of Sarabium within the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, which extends from Dafraswar south to the Middle Road (Ismailia Road, east of Al-Tasa). Middle Road (Ismailia Road east of Tassa) in the north. On the night of 12/13/12, the 1st Armored Brigade crossed the canal to the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division Infantry Division, having been ordered by General Headquarters to push the 21st Armored Division on the morning of October 14 To develop the attack eastward on the axis of the Middle Road to reach Tassa, the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades were engaged The 1st and 41st Armored Brigades participated in the development of the attack as the first echelon of the 21st Armored Division.

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Following the failure of the development after the two armored brigades lost about 50 of their tanks. On the evening of October 14, the Second Army Command ordered the units of the 21st Armored Division to return to the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, to reinforce the defense of the bridgehead and conduct a regrouping operation regrouping so that the division could regain its combat efficiency. Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi ordered the 1st Armored Brigade (now with 66 tanks) to be stationed in the area of Station 3 Ismailia East, with the duty of repelling the penetration and the 14th Armored Brigade (now with 39 tanks) tanks) In the area west of Abu Wafaqa with the duty of supporting the Left Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division.

Since the enemy had planned to cross the Canal on the night of October 15/16 from the area of to the West Bank, the forces of the 16th Infantry and 13th Armored Divisions were exposed inside the Ras al-Kobri, which became known as Ras al-Kobri Consolidated, was subjected to heavy shelling from 155mm and 175mm field artillery and long-range artillery and concentrated airstrikes throughout the day on October 15 from 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on October 15 from 5:00 a.m. until last light. The losses in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment personnel, weapons, and equipment, the two divisions (infantry and armored) were

crammed into one narrow. The Israeli crossing area east of the canal at Dafraswar was located close to the to the right flank of the unified bridgehead where the defensive positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade of the of the 16th Infantry Division, so it was part of the Israeli plan to focus attacks on the positions of the 16th Infantry Brigade Infantry Brigade to destroy it or force it to withdraw and vacate its positions in order to secure the crossing area and expand the penetration gap to the north of the village of Al-Jalaa and the main feeder.

After fierce battles, the enemy succeeded in implementing its plan, as Israeli tanks managed to penetrate the position of the 16th Infantry Brigade the 16th Infantry Brigade's position and occupy the village of Al-Jalaa (Chinese Farm).

The counterattacks, in which units from the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions participated, failed to retake the village Al-Jalaa. As a result of the intensity of the attacks and the air and artillery bombardment of the 16th Infantry Brigade Brigade was forced to evacuate its positions on the night of October 17/18 and join the defensive line at the main feeder occupied by units of the 21st Armored Division north of Al Jalaa village, resulting in The unified bridgehead was reduced and its commander, Brigadier General A.H. Abdul Rab al-Nabi Hafez, was forced to modify the defensive positions within it.

At dawn on October 17, on the instructions of the General Command, the Army Command issued
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ordered the 1st Armored Brigade to move from north to south along the canal to meet up with the 5th Armored Brigade in the Dafraswar with the independent 5th Armored Brigade, which was ordered to be pushed from the Third Army sector from the south to the north east of the lake. from the south to the north, east of the Great Bitter Lake, with the aim of closing the penetration gap at Dufreswar and destroy the enemy force inside it. However, this plan was not successful

The 1st Armored Brigade failed to reach the Dafraswar area and was forced to to retreat under enemy pressure to its original position north of the main feeder, while the 25th Armored Brigade 25th Armored Brigade from the Third Army sector was destroyed south of the line (Dheeb al-Habashi Tel Salam).

On October 18, General Headquarters (10), in conjunction with the command of the Second Army

On October 18, the 10th General Command, in conjunction with the Second Army Command, developed a plan to clear the breach on both the east and west banks of the canal at the same time simultaneously. The plan east of the canal was for units from the 16th Infantry Division and the 21st Armored Division Armored Division would counterattack the village of Al-Jalaa (Chinese Farm) and the strong point at Al-Dafraswar. to try to block the road leading to the Israeli crossing and restore the situation to what it was to the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division (the Second Army's right flank).

The hoped-for counterattack failed, however, due to the fierceness of the Israeli air attacks and the intensity of the fire

Israeli air attacks, the intensity of field artillery and long-range artillery fire, and the presence of a large concentration of enemy tanks in the village of Al-Galaa.

of enemy tanks in the village of Jalaa. Moreover, the failure of the counterattack west of the canal caused some Israeli tanks to occupy a number of former Egyptian terraces west of the canal

and began firing their artillery across the canal at the Egyptian forces counterattacking east of the canal

east of the canal. As the counterattack failed, the forces of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions

Armored Division were forced to retreat northward, and the line occupied by the 21st Armored Division became aligned with

Sarabium on the west bank of the canal and extending east to meet the front line of the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade

Mechanized Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division (after the evacuation of the right brigade (16th Infantry Brigade)

to its positions as mentioned above. As a result of the continuous fierce battles fought by the 1st Brigade

and 41st Armored Brigades fought for five consecutive days (from the beginning of the development of the attack on October 14 until

counterattack on October 18), the two brigades suffered heavy losses amounting to more than .85 of their tanks.

of their tanks, causing them to lose their combat efficiency.

Brigadier General Al Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, recorded in his report on the situation

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his division to Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, after arriving at 5:00 p.m. on

October 18 to the command center for the advance of the Second Army in Ismailia that the number of tanks of the First Armored Brigade

1st Armored Brigade 16 tanks and the 14th Armored Brigade 14 tanks. The position of the head of the

of the unified bridgehead, which was commanded by Brigadier General Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, after

Brigadier General A.H. Abdul Rab al-Nabi Hafez, commander of the 16th Infantry Division, was wounded on October 18 and evacuated to Cairo

Concerns in the Second Army command, after the two brigades of the 21st Armored Division lost

lost their combat capability due to their heavy losses in tanks. Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army

Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army, ordered the 24th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division)

which was stationed at the time in the Ismailia East area as a reserve in the hands of the commander of the

Second Army east of the canal, to move immediately to the unified bridgehead, to ensure that the

the unified bridgehead remains strong and cohesive and ready to repel any enemy counterattacks.

three armored brigades, the 1, 41, and 2-44 armored brigades, were positioned inside the

while the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division's bridgehead in the Fardan sector was devoid of any armored brigade.

The only armored brigades of the Second Army outside the unified bridgehead were The independent 15th Armored Brigade was stationed inside the bridgehead of the

18th Infantry Division, which was

commanded by Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali in the Kantara East sector (the left flank of the Second Army)

Second Army).

Could any brigade have been withdrawn from the unified bridgehead?

The 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Canal, north of the Ismailia Canal, acting as a reserve for the 2nd Field Army. The 24th Brigade Armored Brigade was placed under the command of the 2nd Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General A.H. Hassan Abu Saada in the Fardan sector.

The 24th Armored Brigade crossed the canal on the night of October 6/7 and took up positions inside the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division as its second echelon.

Following the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal from the Dufreswar area and the intensification of Israeli attacks on the Israeli attacks on the unified bridgehead to widen the penetration gap to the north, Maj. Gen. A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil ordered the 24th Armored Brigade to move south from its position at the head of the 2nd Division Bridge
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Infantry to the Ismailia East area to act as a reserve in the hands of the army commander east of the canal to push him in the direction of the unified bridgehead to the south or the 2nd Infantry Division sector to the north to repel any breakthrough in the event of a breakthrough or to counterattack in either direction. On October 17 October, the Second Army Command ordered an armored battalion from the 24th Armored Brigade to move to Ras Unified Bridge, to be placed under the command of the 21st Armored Division. As enemy pressure intensified enemy pressure on the right flank of the unified bridgehead after the failed counterattack on October 18 October, the Second Army commander ordered the commander of the 24th Armored Brigade, which was stationed in the in the Ismailia East area to move the rest of the brigade to the area northwest of Taliyah (inside the unified bridgehead) to be ready for a counterattack to destroy an enemy that The brigade was to move the rest of the brigade to the area northwest of Taliyah (inside the unified bridgehead). Although there are three armored brigades inside the unified bridgehead, the armored brigade The only armored brigade that could be debated whether it should be withdrawn (at the time of these battles) from the east of the canal to the west the 24th Armored Brigade (of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division), as the The 1st and 41st Armored Brigades (of the 21st Armored Division) have, as a result of careful study of their position that they should be excluded from our discussion on the withdrawal of armored brigades armored brigades from east to west, having lost their combat efficiency due to heavy losses The number of tanks of the two brigades together did not exceed 30 tanks. The command of the Second Army Command gradually began to send members of the two armored brigades (without tanks) to the west of the canal to join the command of the 12th Armored Division, which was ordered on October 21 to be stationed at the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection to regroup and rearm the division with tanks and new weapons and equipment to restore their combat efficiency.

After excluding the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades from our calculations, it is clear that the
The only armored reserve that remained inside the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division was the 24th Al-Madea Brigade.
The tactical situation of the 16th Infantry Division had become extremely dangerous, as
The division was reduced to only two brigades after the 16th Infantry Brigade (Al-Janab Al-Ayin Al-Ayin Harka) was forced to evacuate its positions on the night of October 18/17 under enemy pressure. In fact, without the
the presence of the 24th Armored Brigade with its tanks (67 tanks) inside the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, the bridgehead would have fallen
The bridgehead would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, which was the goal of General Junin, commander of the
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was so anxious and determined to achieve that he issued his order on October 20
On October 20, he ordered General Sharon west of the canal to move one of his armored brigades (Amnon Brigade
Amnon) to cross the canal from west to east, as mentioned above, to participate in the
the Israeli forces, supported by artillery and aviation, on the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division's
(codenamed Missouri by the Israelis). Incidents proved the importance of the 24th Armored Brigade's presence
the importance of the 24th Armored Brigade's presence, at 5:00 p.m. on October 21, the enemy
October, the enemy counterattacked with two tank battalions and managed to penetrate the defensive position
and reached Taliyah (one of the vital points of the position, and the command center of the 16th Infantry Division was located next to it
) , but the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions and the tanks of the 24th Armored Brigade were able to
were able to mount a strong counterattack, recapturing Taliyah and forcing the enemy to retreat after destroying
30 tanks and semi-trailer vehicles were destroyed, and 12 NCOs and soldiers from Israel's 600th Armored Brigade were captured.
600 Israeli armored brigade.

In addition to the vital importance of the presence of the 24th Armored Brigade in the Ras Kobri sector of the 16th Division
Infantry Division, it was not realistically possible for this brigade to be withdrawn
and cross the Suez Canal from east to west, as the Second Army Command immediately after the start of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal ordered the dismantling of all the bridges and crossings of the 16th Infantry Division
Infantry Division, all of which were south of Lake Crocodile, and that they should be stockpiled in the lake so as not to be destroyed by the enemy
the enemy would strike them from the positions it now occupies on both shores, and for fear that it might
the idea of using them to cross to the West Bank.

Thus, as a result of this objective study of the position of the three armored brigades that were stationed east of the canal
of the three armored brigades that were stationed east of the canal within the unified bridgehead of the Second Army.
that it was not possible to withdraw any armored brigade from them to the west of the canal, while Shazly
in his memoirs was demanding the withdrawal of three armored brigades from the Second Army. And this
is the conclusion that Ahmed Ismail and Saad al-Shazly would have reached, had

they
if they had put aside the factors of disagreement and division between them, and followed the method of scientific research and objective study when considering the proposal made by Shazly upon his return from Ismailia on the evening of October 20 on October 20th.

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Where are the armored brigades that could have been withdrawn to the west?

We have already explained the position of the three armored brigades that were stationed east of the canal within the Second Army's unified bridgehead, which was located just north of the Israeli penetration gap at just north of the Israeli penetration breach. These brigades were the 1st and 14th Armored Brigades of the 21st Armored Division) and the 24th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division). As a result of our that no armored brigade could be withdrawn to the west of the Canal.

We will complete our study of the position of the Second Army's remaining armored brigade east of the canal. The independent 15th Armored Brigade, which was stationed in the sector of the 18th Infantry Division in Qantara as well as the position of the three armored brigades of the Third Army east of the canal. We have completed the study of the seven armored brigades that were stationed east of the canal in Sinai along the along the line of confrontation with Israeli forces.

Our main purpose in conducting this study is to answer in a scientific and objective manner the important question that has remained unanswered for more than 15 years, namely: Was it was it realistically possible to implement the proposal made by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff to General Ahmed Ismail on the evening of October 20 at the headquarters of the General Headquarters 10 after his return from Ismailia, namely the withdrawal of three armored brigades from the Second Army. and an armored brigade from the Third Army from the east of the canal to the west to hit the breach. The following examines the position of these armored brigades:

I. The position of the independent 15th Armored Brigade
The 15th Armored Brigade, commanded by Colonel A.H. Tahsin Shannon, was under the command of the 18th Infantry Division, which crossed the canal The 18th Infantry Division, which crossed the canal on October 6, 73 and succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the east bank of the canal in the Qantara Shuq sector. The 15th Armored Brigade crossed the canal during October 7 and the night of October 8/7 on the division's crossings, and was stationed in the area of Kantara East with the task of reinforcing the division's bridgehead and destroying the counterattacks of the tactical reserve in cooperation with the division's units.

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At 6:30 a.m. on October 14, the 15th Armored Brigade participated in The development of the eastern offensive planned by the General Headquarters (Center 11 along the confrontation. The orders were to push the 15th Armored Brigade and its support units as a forward detachment of the 18th Infantry Division on the northern axis with the mission of reaching the Balouza area. Following the failure of the At 6 p.m. on October 14, the commander of the 18th Infantry Division ordered the return of the 15th Armored Brigade Armored Brigade back to its position inside the division's bridgehead to regroup and regain its combat efficiency. Its losses from the start of the fighting until then amounted to about 30 tanks Ret 0262

When Maj. Gen. Abdel Moneim Khalil arrived at the advanced command center of the Second Army in Ismailia at 4:00 p.m. on October 16 to assume command, it became clear to him after studying the situation that the Second Army commander did not have any armored reserves on hand west of the canal to be used to to repel penetration and counterattack, because the 21st Armored Division, which was to the east of the canal to develop the eastward attack on October 14 towards Tassa, and retained it after the failed attack at the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division east of the canal without returning it to its original position west of the canal without returning it to its original location west of the canal. After General Abdel Moneim assessed the the situation in light of the facts and information he had, he made the decision to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade independent armored brigade from the 18th Infantry Division's bridgehead in Qantara East to the west of the canal. to be stationed in the area north of Abu Sawir Airport to serve as a reserve for the Second Army north of the Taraa Ismailia . On October 17, Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil contacted Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali, commander of the 18th Infantry Division, informed him of his decision and asked him to issue a warning order to the 15th Armored Brigade 15 Armored Brigade to prepare to move to its new location as soon as it was ordered to do so.

The ultimatum never reached Colonel Tahsin Shannan, commander of the 15th Armored Brigade. The division commander was unhappy with the withdrawal of this brigade from his division's sector. The direct communications between the formation commanders and the officials at the 10th Center behind the scenes played its role. Before General Abdel Moneim could contact Center 10 to obtain confirmation of his decision, General Ahmed Ismail his decision, it was General Ahmed Ismail who telephoned him from Center 10 to inform him that he canceled his decision to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade from the 18th Infantry Division sector, and to instruct him to 614

not to withdraw any troops from the east to the west, and at the same time to hear his warnings after assuring him that these were the President's orders.

In view of the serious situation that the Second Army was facing west of the Canal, which he explained
1 to General Abdel Moneim due to the lack of any armored reserve in the hands of the army commander, the commander promised him
1 promised to send an armored battalion from the Republican Guard Armored Brigade, which was commanded by
Colonel Mustafa Sadek to serve as a reserve for the Second Army.

On October 18, the Hakhras armored battalion did indeed arrive in the Malhasmeh area, but
Before 24 hours had passed since its arrival, it was withdrawn from the Second Army's sector. It turned out that the
General Command had moved it to the Third Army sector in the south, where the plan had been
to prepare the 4th Armored Division, reinforced by the Republican Guard Armored Brigade.
to carry out the counter-strike to liquidate the breach and eliminate the enemy forces that had crossed to the west of the
1 Canal. However, this plan was canceled on October 21

As a result of our study of the four armored brigades of the Second Army east of the canal
It is clear to us that the independent 15th Armored Brigade was the only one of these armored brigades

: The proposal to withdraw it to the west of the canal could have been discussed for the following reasons 1

1 The bridgehead of the 18th Infantry Division was strong and cohesive and the furthest sectors from the battles
that were taking place at the time of the Gap, and the withdrawal of the 15th Armored Brigade to the west would not
to the west would not affect the balance of the division's defenses, as the three tank battalions of the
of the infantry brigades plus the division's tank battalion had 82 tanks (according to a report by the commander of the
of the 18th Infantry Division to General Shazly on October 18). This number of tanks
in addition to the large number of anti-tank weapons distributed in the division's units
was more than enough to repel any enemy counterattacks. This is evidenced by the fact that the 2nd Division
Infantry Division (the right-hand neighbor of the 18th Infantry Division), which was in almost identical circumstances, remained strong and intact despite the withdrawal of its brigade
remained strong and intact despite the withdrawal of the 24th Armored Brigade from its sector and its descent south to Ras al-Kobri
which was facing a serious threat from the enemy.

2- The 15th Armored Brigade was one of the most heavily armed armored brigades (its T-62 tanks with

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115mm cannon and one of the best trained. It had been stationed for several years before

as a reserve of the Second Army, which made its members very familiar with the terrain and the tasks assigned to the reserve

They have participated in many maneuvers and training projects.

training.

There was no combat contact at the time between the units of the 18th Infantry Division and the enemy, which made it

easy to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade from east of the canal, and there were no issues in terms of crossing the canal

in terms of crossing the canal because the 18th Infantry Division's crossings on the canal were intact

There is no doubt that the decision made by General Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the Second Army on October 17 to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade from the east to the west and stationed in the area north of to serve as a general reserve for the Second Army west of the canal was a sound tactical decision and should have been implemented.

Apparently, General Shazly did not know that General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, had General Abdel Moneim's decision, and believed that the 15th Armored Brigade was present

west of the canal. On page 256 of his memoirs, while describing the Second Army's position on the evening of October 19, he states

on the evening of October 19, as follows: "To the west and north of the Ismailia Canal there is an armored brigade!" 21.

Shazly's proposal to push this brigade toward the breach could not be implemented, as it would have

would have meant crossing the Ismailia Canal after crossing the Suez Canal, advancing south toward

Al-Defreswar to face alone General Sharon's division, which was outnumbered 3 to 1, as well as

The brigade was hit by deadly anti-tank curtain missiles (Type 657 brought in by the American airlift

1.5k), especially since the terrain is heavily wooded.

and crops, which helps in ambushes, as well as the air superiority that the enemy was gaining over the battlefield, which was enough

The enemy's air superiority over the battlefield was enough to expose the 15th Armored Brigade to the same unfortunate fate that the 23rd Armored Brigade

of the 23rd Armored Brigade on October 18, when its attack on the Dafraswar area west of the

Canal ended in its destruction

Second: The position of the Third Army's armored brigades

The Third Army's bridgehead east of the canal included three armored brigades: the 22nd Armored Brigade

Armored Brigade, the independent 25th Armored Brigade and the 3rd Armored Brigade. Since Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly

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suggested on the night of October 21/20 to be able to hit the breach by withdrawing an armored brigade from it, according to

on page 297 of his memoirs, therefore, we will briefly present the position of these three brigades

so that we can then make a correct judgment as to the extent to which this proposal could be implemented

realistically at the time:

23rd Armored Brigade: Part of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, it was commanded by

Colonel A.H. Mustafa Hassan was placed since the beginning of the war under the

command of the 29th Infantry Division, and crossed the Suez Canal on the night of October 8/7
the Suez Canal on the night of October 8/7 on the division's crossings.
He took his position inside the bridgehead of the 19th Division with the mission of participating with it in repelling any enemy counterattacks from two directions
At the same time, the 22nd Brigade was
was assigned by the Third Army Command to operate during this phase as a reserve in the hands of the army commander
East of the Canal.
Following the Israeli breach at Dafraswar and the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal
The armored division under the command of General Abraham Adan (Bern) advanced from October 19
in a southerly direction, on the Treaty Road axis west of the western shore of the Bitter Lakes with the aim of
to reach the city of Suez. Adan's armored division consisted of three brigades was the main effort on the southern axis, and to its west was another
Another armored division under General Kalman Magen was advancing across the open ground in the direction of 5D5E.
. To the west and south, to protect the flank and Adan's rear, its ultimate goal was to cut off the Cairo-Suez road
Cairo-Suez to isolate the city of Suez and the Third Army.
Facing General Adan's forces was the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Abul Fath.
Muharram Naman (Third Army Tactical Reserve), and given the deteriorating conditions at the division's headquarters
the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division did not have its strike force within its formation, the 22nd Brigade, which was stationed at the beginning of the war which had been stationed since the beginning of the war in the 19th Infantry Division east of the canal.
General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, ordered the withdrawal of the Diabat Battalion from the 22nd Armored Brigade
and crossed the canal to Kharb at first light on October 22nd.
The commander of the 22nd Armored Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Hassan and the brigade's chief of operations were martyred while supervising the crossing of the battalion's tanks to the west.
west. As their bodies have not been found since then, they are considered unaccounted for.
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missing, possibly because their vehicle was hit by a 1,000-pound direct hit bomb or a rocket from one of the
or a missile from an aircraft that destroyed the vehicle so completely that its features disappeared.
The reason may be that their vehicle fell into the canal and disappeared at the bottom. As for the tank battalion
Once it crossed, it fought fierce battles and its tanks were subjected to concentrated air attacks, and as a result
As a result, it lost most of its tanks and thus lost its combat efficiency, although it succeeded with the rest of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division
other units of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division succeeded in disrupting the advance of enemy armored forces for nearly
48 hours.

25th Independent Armored Brigade: It was commanded by Brigadier General A.H. Ahmed Helmy Badawi.
as part of the General Headquarters' reserve units in the Central Region. The brigade moved on September 30 in
in the form of a training project, and was stationed on October 2 in the area of the intermediate position, north of the

kilometer 109 in the area of the Geneifa link on the Cairo-Suez road. The brigade was under the command of the 7th Infantry Division, crossed the canal on October 7 and 8 on the division's crossings, and took its defensive positions inside Ras al-Kobri, tasked with participating with the units of the 7th Infantry Division in repelling counterattacks that were expected to be carried out by the enemy's tactical reserve.

An armored company from the 25th Armored Brigade participated in securing the division's left flank by capturing the intersection of Highway 1 and the Jedi Road on October 8. And at

At 1:15 p.m. on October 9, the 603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (from the 130th Amphibious Brigade) supported by a tank company from the 25th Armored Brigade captured the enemy strongpoint located on the Lesser Bitter Lake (Israel's Butzer Fortress from the Bar-Lev Fortresses).

At 6:30 a.m. on October 17, on the instructions of the General Command the 25th Armored Brigade was pushed from the left flank of the 7th Infantry Division's sector to advance from the south to the north east of the Great Bitter Lake

to the north, east of the Great Bitter Lake, to meet the units of the 21st Armored Division in the Dafraswar area.

21 Armored Division, which the Second Army had been ordered to move from north to south along the Canal with the aim of closing the penetration gap at Dufreswar and destroying the enemy force inside it.

The 1st Armored Brigade (of the 21st Armored Division) failed to reach the Dafraswar breach.

21 Armored Division) failed to reach the Dafraswar area and was forced to retreat north under pressure to its original position north of the village of Al-Jalaa.

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General Abraham Adan set up an elaborate trap for the 25th Armored Brigade, whose three armored brigades surrounded it surrounded by his three armored brigades on three sides (front, rear, and right flank) while the the Great Bitter Lake on his left to complete the siege. An uneven battle took place

south of the line (Dheeb al-Habashi and Tel Salam), in which the 25th Armored Brigade lost about 65

R62 tanks and only ten tanks managed to survive and take refuge in the at 1 Kabrit East, where it took shelter.

On the afternoon of October 19, Major General A.H. Mustafa Shahin, Chief of Staff of the Third Army arrived at the Kabrit Sharq position and asked Colonel Mahmoud Shuaib, commander of the 130th Infantry Brigade

Amphibious Mechanized Brigade, which was in command of the position, to bring back the tank company (belonging to the 25th Armored Brigade Armored Brigade) that had been previously reinforced by the 603rd Mechanized Infantry Battalion (of the Amphibious Brigade) which had been reinforced on October 9

October, with the ten tanks that had taken refuge at the site to be used as anti-tank guns.

as anti-tank guns due to their poor condition and the inability of some of their tracks to move.

Thus, the only reserve armored force at the 7th Division's bridgehead was

The T26 tank company that returned from the Sulphur East position.

3rd Armored Brigade: Part of the 4th Armored Division, it was commanded by Col. Nouredine Abdel Aziz, the division's mission was to secure the Third Army's tactical range west of the Canal. In the development of the eastward attack on October 14, the 3rd Armored Brigade was tasked with

To destroy the enemy west of the Matla Corridor and capture and secure the western entrance to the corridor. In fulfillment of the task

The brigade crossed the Suez Canal on the morning of October 13 to a forward waiting area east of the canal. At

At 6:30 a.m. on October 14, the 3rd Armored Brigade began to develop the attack eastward toward the Matla Pass. Although the armored brigade was able to reach a line about 6

kilometers from the western entrance to the pass, the brigade suffered heavy losses of

About 60 tanks (T-55) and 9 armored vehicles (Bak) and all the artillery in the Colonel Ah Nouredine Abdel Aziz, commander of the brigade, was killed in the battle.

The Third Army commander ordered the brigade's chief of operations, who took over the brigade's command as acting commander to retreat into the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead.

Following the push of the independent 25th Armored Brigade (7th Division Reserve) on October 17 at

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towards Dafraswar as previously mentioned, an armored battalion from the 3rd Armored Brigade was ordered to move

Armored Brigade was ordered to move to the 7th Infantry Division's Ras Kobri to replace the 25th Armored Brigade. On October 19.

When the General Command decided to prepare the 4th Armored Division, reinforced by the Armored Brigade of the Republican Guard

for the counterstrike, the commander of the Third Army was ordered to assemble all

4th Armored Division units in the Jafra area in preparation for this operation. In fulfillment of the command's instructions.

the 3rd Army commander ordered the 3rd Armored Brigade to withdraw from east of the canal and cross over to the Jafra area

Al-Jafra. On October 19 and 20, the 3rd Brigade (except for a battalion) was withdrawn from Ras Kobri

of the 19th Infantry Division and then the brigade's tank battalion was withdrawn from the bridgehead of the 7th Infantry Division

(This was the reason for the request to move a tank company from Kabrit Sharq on October 19 to the

7 Infantry Division sector to replace the tank battalion from the 3rd Armored Brigade that was withdrawn).

Could an armored brigade have been withdrawn from the Third Army?

Before answering this important question, we should keep two facts in mind:

First, Lt.

General Shazly made his proposal to withdraw three armored brigades from the Second Army and one brigade from the Third Army on the night of October 21/20, i.e.

from the Third Army on the night of October 21/20, meaning that implementation could not begin until the morning of October 21

October. The second fact is that Egyptian armored units did not have the opportunity to replace

the tanks lost in the battles to return to their full organizational size.

as was the case with the Israeli armored forces, especially after the influx of

American airlift shipments

as the Egyptian Armed Forces warehouses did not contain tanks

and the Soviets did not provide Egypt with any tanks to compensate for the loss of tanks during the war

to compensate for its heavy losses in tanks, and this situation was a reason for Sadat attacked the Soviet Union after the end of the war.

Based on our careful study of the position of the three armored brigades that were stationed in the Third Army sector

stationed in the Third Army sector, we can draw the following conclusions:

1- Given that the 3rd Armored Brigade was already withdrawn by orders of the General Command from the east of the canal to the west

to the west on October 91 and 20 and joined its original formation (4th Armored Brigade) in the area of

Jafra, and this was done before Shazly made his proposal, so this brigade should be excluded from our calculations

our calculations.

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2- It was not realistic to consider the independent 25th Armored Brigade as a stand-alone armored combat unit

after the October 17 battle south of the Abyssinian Dune-Tal Salam line, as it lost

most of its tanks and thus lost its combat efficiency, and was no longer present inside the head of the Third Army's bridgehead

of the Third Army is only a tank company.

-3 The only armored brigade whose position should be discussed is the 22nd Armored Brigade (from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division)

Mechanized Division), which was stationed since the beginning of the war in Ras Kobri of the 19th Infantry Division and was the

the least armored brigade in terms of the number of losses of its tanks, so its combat efficiency remained high.

It did not make sense to withdraw this brigade from the east to the west for the following reasons:

Was it the only reserve brigade in the hands of the commander of the Third Army east of the canal to repel

penetration and counterattacks.

After the destruction of the 25th Armored Brigade on October 17, and after the withdrawal of the 3rd Armored Brigade from

east to west on October 19 and October 20, the 22nd Armored Brigade became the only armored force

the only remaining armored force in the Third Army's bridgehead east of the canal, which included the 19th and 7th Infantry Divisions

19 and 7 Infantry Divisions and their support units. Its withdrawal would undoubtedly have resulted in the loss of the

Army bridgehead would have lost its defensive balance.

If the 22nd Armored Brigade had crossed the Suez Canal to the west on October 21, the force

The Israeli force it was expected to face was the armored division commanded by General Adan, which was

advancing on the Treaty Road axis in the direction of Suez, which at that time consisted of three armored brigades

armored brigades (its original formation) and two infantry battalions supplied to General Adan on October 20, i.e.

The ratio of superiority was more than 3 to 1 in favor of the Israelis. In addition, the

Israeli aviation was providing direct support to the ground forces by eliminating and destroying all resistance

in the way of their advance. This followed the capture and destruction of most of the Egyptian missile battalions
SAMS west of the canal, south of the Ismailia Canal.

d. Although the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division's position was severely compromised by the fact that its 22nd Armored Brigade
Armored Brigade, which is considered its striking force, the Third Army commander did not approve the withdrawal of any element of the 22nd Armored Brigade
the withdrawal of any element of the 22nd Armored Brigade until the last minute on October 22 - and then only
only one armored battalion. Given Israel's overwhelming superiority on the bank

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West Bank, this battalion was destroyed within 48 hours, which is a serious indication of what was expected to happen to the 22nd Armored Brigade.
What was expected to happen to the 22nd Armored Brigade if it crossed completely to the west

4- The conclusion we draw as a result of this careful and objective study of the position of the armored brigades
in the Third Army sector east of the canal, there was no way to withdraw any armored brigade in this sector from east to west
in this sector from east to west

Accordingly, we can decide with confidence and conviction in the light of the facts we have learned about the situation

-that General Shazly's proposal, although tactically sound, was not feasible realistically feasible. Had the discussion between him and Gen.
Ismail in this objective manner, and in this logical sequence, there would not have been any disagreement between them
because scientific facts have no room for disagreement or dispute. As for disagreements

It is the personal ones that overthrow every research or study and overshadow every science or logic.

Prelude to the regrouping of the 22nd Armored Division

On October 20, Israeli aircraft carried out concentrated airstrikes on the headland areas east of the Suez Canal.
bridges east of the Suez Canal, and the enemy began using napalm bombs to cause fires and spread panic
and panic. Rockets and anti-aircraft weapons managed to shoot down two enemy planes in the division sector
two enemy planes in the sector of the 18th Infantry Division in Qantara East, which led to high morale
among the troops, especially in the nervous conditions that prevailed at the time.

At around 9:30 p.m. on October 20, Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil informed the General Command (Center)¹⁰ of the decision he had taken inside the head of the unified bridgehead east of the
which at the time included the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions and the 24th Armored Brigade.
in implementation of the instructions of the General Command.

The decision was that Brigadier General Anwar Hab al-Raman, commander of the 16th Infantry Division, would take command of the bridgehead
Kobri with supporting his command with some elements of the command and control units from the 21st Division
Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Al-Harabi, commander of the 211th Armored Division, will move with his command center over two nights to the Waslat Al-

Malak area.

two nights to the Waslat al-Malak area, which is located in the second defensive zone south of the Ismailia Terrace and west of the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection (the area where the 21st Armored Division was stationed before the start of operations

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War on October 6), and that the 1st Armored Brigade would move with him after surrendering their remaining tanks to the their tanks to the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade and the 24th Armored Brigade. The General Command's goal was to to reunite the units and unify the command at the unified bridgehead east of the canal

on the one hand, and to pave the way for the regrouping of the 21st Armored Division in its original area of concentration, so that its units could then be equipped with new tanks, weapons, and equipment, restoring its combat efficiency

on the other hand. At the same time, Brig. Gen.

of the units being regrouped in the area, namely the 23rd Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Infantry Division

Mechanized) and some other sub-units, with the aim of confining the enemy south of the

Ismailia and prevent its forces from spreading to the west and north. The reorganization decision

also included placing the remaining units of the 21st Armored Division at Ras al-Kobri Unified under the command of the 16th Infantry Division.

Recovering Taliyah and the Israeli attack

On the evening of October 19, Lieutenant General Shazly, Chief of Staff, issued an order to Brig. Gen.

Ibrahim al-Orabi - as previously mentioned - to retreat with his forces from the Sarabioum line to the Tosun line

(about 5 kilometers north), so that his positions east of the canal would be aligned with the line to which the 182nd Parachute Brigade had retreated to which the units of the 182nd Parachute Brigade under Colonel Ismail Azmi had retreated west of the canal.

General Shazly justified this operation by saying to Brigadier General El Orabi: "So that your right shoulder stays on Ismail Azmy's shoulder.

Ismail Azmy? On October 20, Brigadier General Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, withdrew

his troops from Sarabioum to Tosun without any pressure from the enemy in accordance with the order of the Chief of Staff.

Chief of Staff . Since Brig. Gen. Anwar Hab al-Raman, commander of the 16th Infantry Division, had not been notified of this withdrawal

of this withdrawal, the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division became a prominence in the defense line

and a weak point of the bridgehead, which the enemy quickly exploited to attack the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division

of the 16th Infantry Division with a company of tanks, but the 16th Division quickly counterattacked

It managed to expel and destroy the enemy tanks that tried to infiltrate its defenses, and the situation was remedied.

The situation was remedied by the 16th Infantry Division adjusting its defensive positions to match the new positions of the of the 21st Armored Division.

In a telephone conversation that took place at 1:45 a.m. on the morning of

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October 21, between the commander of the Second Army in Ismailia and the commander-in-chief at Cairo's 10 Center.

Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil informed General Ahmed Ismail of the incident at the head of the

The General Commander expressed his surprise and asked General Abdel Moneim:

“Are Orabi and Pomegranate love each other?” 4. General Abdel Moneim replied: “No, Fendum.

It seems that General Ahmed Ismail thought that the not notifying the commander of the 16th Infantry Division that some units of the 21st Armored Division had withdrawn from

Sarabium to the Tosun line was due to the sensitivity that had arisen between the two divisional commands

as a result of Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi assuming command of the unified bridgehead, despite the fact that he was more senior

in terms of seniority than Brigadier General Anwar Hab al-Raman, who took command of the 16th Infantry Division after its commander was wounded and evacuated to Cairo.

after its commander was wounded and evacuated to Cairo.

Based on the Second Army commander's new orders, the Ras al-Kobri Unified Command issued the following instructions

The following instructions:

1 16th Infantry Division: Secure the points of contact between itself and the 2nd Infantry Division (Left Jakhar)

and organize cooperation with it, and regroup the 16th Infantry Brigade in the area of Al-Tal Al-Kabir to restore its combat efficiency.
its combat efficiency

2) 18 Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 21st Armored Division): Completes the preparation of its defensive sector and preparing fire plans to repel and destroy enemy attacks from the direction of Jabal Habita and Al Jalaa village.

The brigade has to stay on the berm east of the canal in the Tosun area.

3- The 24th Armored Brigade (Reserve): Stationed in the area north of Taliyah, it is ready to

to repel the penetration and counterattack to destroy any enemy forces that succeed in penetrating

Ras al-Kobri and restore the accuracy of the situation.

At approximately 4:00 p.m. on October 21, the enemy attacked the right flank of the 16th Infantry Division with two battalions of tanks, and succeeded in: penetrating the defensive position and reaching

The 16th Infantry Division, units from the 21st Armored Division and the tanks of the 34th Armored Brigade

a strong counterattack that resulted in the recapture of Taliyah and the enemy's withdrawal after destroying 14 tanks and 61 armored vehicles

14 tanks and 61 armored half-tracks, and 12 tank crew members, including officers, were captured.

including officers. At six o'clock in the evening, the enemy resumed its attack on the left flank of the division

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With a force of 30 tanks, but he was forced to withdraw after destroying 4 tanks, and at about

8:30 p.m. on October 21, a congratulatory telegram from General Ahmed Ismail to Brigadier General Hab al-Raman and Brigadier General al-Orabi, which read as follows:

“The valor and courage that characterize the actions of the 16th Infantry

Division and the 21st Armored Division are the example set by the Armed Forces in our fateful battle.

My heartfelt congratulations to the commanders, officers and soldiers for this wonderful steadfastness and financial fighting spirit
And victory to you, God willing.

Junin and Sharon's crisis in the Southern Command

It is a curious coincidence that at a time when the dispute between Lt. Gen. General Ahmed Ismail, Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, and Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff at the headquarters of the General Command (Center 10) on the night of October 21/20, regarding the proposal made by Shazly to withdraw some brigades Shazly's proposal to withdraw some armored brigades from east of the canal to the west.

between General Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern Command, and General Ariel Sharon (Arik).

Ariel Sharon (Arik), commander of the 143rd Operations Group. The timing of the The timing of the crisis and the reasons for the disagreement between the two Israeli commanders were almost identical to the circumstances of the crisis that in the Egyptian General Command. The dispute erupted on October 21, and its cause was

was due to General Gonen's order to Sharon to withdraw an armored force from his forces

west of the canal to cross to the east of the canal to support the forces attacking the bridgehead of the

16 Infantry Division with the aim of widening the penetration gap east of the canal.

Surprisingly, the developments in the Gonen-Sharon dispute were strikingly similar

very similar to the Ahmed Ismail-Shazly dispute. General Sharon enlisted the help of

General Sharon enlisted Defense Minister Moshe Dayan to support him in his position and overturn the order issued by Gonen's order to withdraw the armored force from the west to the east, just as General Ahmed

Ismail used the late President Sadat to support his position and support his view that no armored forces should be withdrawn

any armored forces from the east of the canal to the west. Just as the crisis in the Egyptian senior leadership ended

General Shazly was relieved of his post shortly after his clash with the Generalissimo, and General

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Abdel Ghani al-Gamsi, Chief of the Operations Staff, as Chief of Staff, the crisis in the Israeli Southern Command also ended with the dismissal of General John Johnston.

The crisis in Israel's Southern Command also ended with the removal of General Gonen from his post shortly after his clash with

Sharon, and General Yisrael Tal, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, took over as commander of the Southern Command.

Southern Command . The following are the most important events that took place on October 21 on the Israeli side

on the Israeli side, which ended with the crisis between Gonen and Sharon to which we have referred.

At dawn on October 21, the sixteenth day of fighting, General David Eliezer Chief of the General Staff from Tel Aviv telephoned General Gonen and informed him that Israel would accept

the Security Council cease-fire resolution expected to be issued the next day, after U.S. Secretary of State

with Soviet leaders in Moscow on a joint U.S.-Soviet draft

and Soviet leaders in Moscow on a joint ceasefire. Since the Israeli General

Command was interested in implementing its
its plan for the positioning of its forces west of the canal before the
ceasefire decision
took effect, an urgent meeting was called at Southern Command headquarters on
the morning of October 21
to discuss the situation. In the operations room at the forward headquarters in
Am Merjem, the meeting was attended by
Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense, General David Eliezer, Chief of the General
Staff, and General Chaim
Bar-Lev, personal representative of the Chief of Staff of the Southern Command,
and General Gonen, commander of the Southern Command
General Bar-Lev moderated the meeting.

In the course of the discussion, it became clear that there were two different
points of view regarding the focus of effort
of the main effort of the Israeli forces in the short period ahead. Chief of
Staff Eliezer, along with
Bar-Lev and Gonen were of the opinion that the main effort should be
concentrated in the southern direction to reach
Suez and the presence of the Third Army, as the odds of success in the south are
much more likely than in the north
in the north, which is why they opposed the attempt to capture Ismailia and
besiege the Second Army
The agricultural land in the north makes it difficult to use tanks, which
hinders achieving the desired objectives in the remaining time.
in the remaining time, unlike the desert terrain in the south, which is
is an ideal ground for the use of tanks, and thus the great hope that Israel is
looking forward to can be realized
of capturing Suez and laying siege to the Third Army to force it to surrender
surrender. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was the only one who encouraged the
northward movement
towards Ismailia because of the city's major political importance, as well as
the serious morale impact
the siege of the Second Army, the largest field formation in the Egyptian
forces.

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The commanders' conference, which was attended by a number of Southern Command
branch commanders and senior operations officers, concluded
to adopt the first point of view, which was to concentrate the main effort in a
southerly direction toward the city of
Suez .

As a result of the Commanders' Conference's decision that the Israeli attack on
Ismailia in the north
Ismailia in the north as a secondary axis, the attention of the Israeli Southern
Command was immediately focused
to the east of the canal, where the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division was
located just north of the breach gap
just north of the breach gap. Its northern boundary was as far south as the
center road, which was considered the boundary
between it and the bridgehead of the 2nd Infantry Division stationed in the
Fardan sector. The occupation of
of the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division (codenamed Missouri by the
Israelis) was one element of the
of Israel's original plan for the crossing of Israeli forces to the west of the
Canal, and Von's aim was to
to secure the crossing area at Dufreswar. The 16th Infantry Brigade (the safe
flank of the
of the bridgehead) was able to cut off the two advance routes from the east to
the crossing yard (Akavish and Tartour roads) with artillery fire

and Tartour) with artillery, machine gun and anti-tank fire, delaying the construction of the bridges as planned the construction of the bridges according to the plan for more than 36 hours.

Israeli forces were only able to erect the bridges after capturing the village of al-Jalaa (Chinese Farm), after fighting fierce battles with the 16th Infantry Brigade and units of the 21st Armored Division 21 Armored Division, and after they succeeded in moving the bridgehead east of the canal to a distance of about 5 kilometers to the north. General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, was very concerned about this was constantly pressuring Bar-Lev and Gonen, and the question he used to ask them was "Why don't you occupy Missouri?" 4. As a result of the Israeli leadership's determination to this position was the focus of air attacks after the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on an unprecedented scale, and more bombs and missiles were dropped on the (Missouri) site than on any other Egyptian formation along the front, and the ground inside the bridgehead became was full of craters as a result of falling bombs and missiles, but the brave Egyptian units inside the Ras al-Kobri, held their positions and were determined to stay there until the end.

Sharon did not pay much attention to the bridgehead east of the canal (Missouri), as he was sure that the air strikes and artillery bombardment concentrated on it would soon force the Egyptian units inside it to evacuate it, and the

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armored brigade commanded by Colonel Tuvia (of Sharon's division), which he had left behind east of the canal, was was, in his view, capable of storming this position with the help of artillery and aviation. Sharon's attention Sharon's attention was focused west of the canal, heading north toward Ismailia, which he was leading the advance with all the units of his West Canal Operations Group, namely The armored brigade commanded by Colonel Haim, the armored brigade commanded by Colonel Amnon, and the parachute infantry brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Mat.

Sharon was desperate to fulfill the hope he had been harboring since crossing the to the west of the canal, which was to storm the city of Ismailia to conclude his military operations in the October War with a unique victory that would bring him great fame and glory, and leave no chance for his counterpart, Gen. Adan to overtake him if his operations in the Suez direction continued. But a cruel surprise awaited him awaited him. At about 10 a.m. on October 21, he received an explicit order from Gen. Gonen, commander of the Southern Command, to halt the advance in the west and move an armored force from either the Amnon Brigade or the Haim Brigade to the east to attack Missouri, which should be occupied as soon as possible, and informed him that the air force would prepare for the attack by concentrated bombardment of the Egyptian position.

Sharon did not see any sound military logic in attacking the Egyptian bridgehead east of the canal and stopping the advance west of the canal the advance west of the canal, so instead of attacking Missouri as instructed by Gonen, he called him on the phone, where they had the following conversation:

Sharon: Instead of exerting effort at Missouri, we should advance directly north to cut off the supply route to Egyptian forces east of the canal. supplies to the Egyptian forces east of the canal. I prefer to go north rather than east.

Gonen: Listen, we want Missouri, it's of the utmost importance to us, it's received more air attacks than in the whole war.

Sharon: Maybe, but I think attacking Missouri is a mistake, it's better to go north isolate Ismailia and cut off the roads leading to it, not east.

John, the orders are to go to Missouri, not north.

Sharon: We're following orders. It doesn't make sense, but we're going to do it.

John: If you want to object, Haim Bar-Lev will be there in half an hour. hour.

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During this discussion, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was in the operations room of the Southern Command Southern Command, but he did not intervene. General Bar-Lev moved shortly thereafter to Sharon's headquarters on the West Bank Sharon on the West Bank, and Sharon tried to convince Bar-Lev that attacking Missouri was like like banging your head against a wall, while Ismailia is an important target and its siege will cause a huge psychological shock to the Egyptian forces an enormous psychological shock to the Egyptian forces. Although Bar-Lev agreed with Sharon on the importance of the siege of Ismailia the importance of the siege of Ismailia, he explained that the ceasefire was about to end, and it was dangerous to leave the crossing area east of the canal open dangerous for the transit area east of the canal to remain so threatened by the Egyptian formation that adjoins it adjacent to it, as well as the threat that its units posed to Israeli forces west of the canal by firing at them Israeli forces west of the canal, with their effective fire across the canal from behind the earthen berm on the eastern shore. berm on the eastern shore.

Why Gonen asked for Sharon's removal

At around 4 p.m. on October 21, as mentioned above, an armored brigade from the of Sharon's division that he had kept east of the canal (commanded by Colonel Tuvia) attacked the sector of the 16th Infantry Division (Missouri) with two tank battalions in the first echelon on the division's right flank. The tanks managed were able to penetrate the Egyptian position and reach Taliyah (near the 16th Infantry Division's command center) Infantry), but Egyptian forces inside Ras al-Kobri launched a strong counterattack and recaptured

and forced the Israeli tanks to withdraw after destroying a large number of them 14 wounded Israeli tanks remained on the battlefield, some with crew members inside, but no one was able to extricate them
The Southern Command received the news of the failure.

The Southern Command received the news of the failure with great disappointment, and General Gonen was determined to
to resume the attack, after Sharon moved some of his forces from west of the canal to the east to reinforce the attacking force
to reinforce the attacking force. He tried to telephone Sharon to give him instructions, but
Sharon evaded him with various excuses. When they called each other at at midnight, they had a long conversation, which we summarize below:

Gonen: Reinforce the Tuvia Brigade in preparation for the attack.

Sharon: I have nothing to reinforce.
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Junin: Reinforce it with a battalion from the Amnon or Haim Brigade.

Sharon: No, under no circumstances.

Junin: Do you know that this means not following orders?

Sharon: And on your life, don't do that.

Jonin: I order you. Reinforce

Sharon: I have nothing to reinforce.

Gonen ended the call angrily, turning to Bar-Lev and saying: "You represent the Chief of Staff. The
Sharon refuses to carry out orders and if the force attacks Missouri again without reinforcement we will
fail again. When General Bar-Lev called Sharon, he informed him that he had sent five tanks
to cross the canal to the east to reinforce the assault force. Given Sharon's close relationship
with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, Sharon telephoned the minister in Tel Aviv and explained
his position and the order to move troops from his division to the east, which would impede his advance on Ismailia.
Ismailia, and complained to him about the poor treatment of his superiors in the Southern Command. Moshe
immediately called General Eliezer, the Chief of Staff, and explained Sharon's point of view, which he also supported
that the attack on Missouri was a suicidal adventure and that it was a wrong, not subject to the rules of logic or sound tactical principles, as it is
useless in terms of advancing the military operations at this time.
in terms of advancing military operations while disrupting Sharon's successful advance in the direction of
Ismailia. The Chief of Staff was soon persuaded by the Defense Minister's opinion and agreed to his proposal
to rescind the order to attack Missouri. At Najr on October 22, General Yisrael Tal, Deputy Chief of Staff, telephoned General Gonen and informed him of the Defense Minister's order to cancel the
the attack on Missouri.

Gonen had not yet learned that the cancellation of the attack order had been approved by the Chief of the General Staff
He called General Eliezer and demanded that Sharon be removed from his post for

refusing to

He informed him that General Bar-Lev supported his request. This was the second time

the second time Gonen demanded Sharon's dismissal, as he had previously made this request on October 9

when Sharon defied his orders and continued to waste tanks in unsuccessful attacks to save some

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Bar-Lev fortifications, causing the destruction of more than 20 tanks. In fact, General Sharon was

one of the main issues in the Southern Command, as there was a lack of trust between him and his

with his superiors Eliezer, Bar-Lev and Gonen. While Sharon accused them of being intolerant of him and not

and not giving him the opportunity to implement his bold ideas and plans in order to prevent his visibility and fame. For their part

for their part, emphasized that he always rebelled against their orders, and that he was inspired by personal motives

to highlight his personality, and that most of his actions violate the basic principles of the

of the military regime: He gives interviews and statements to the press, calls his friends and political figures in

to friends and political figures in Tel Aviv to involve them in military affairs.

On the morning of October 22, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan visited the Southern Command headquarters.

General Bar-Lev was not present because he was in Tel Aviv to meet with Prime Minister Golda Meir.

The minister's harsh words and insinuations to Gen. Gonen clearly indicated the extent of his adoption of Sharon's view

He emphasized that the attack on Missouri is a union, and that there are those in the Southern Command who are resisting.

and that there are those in the Southern Command who resist all of Sharon's proposals, despite their merit. He explained

that the siege of Ismailia was more important than the siege of Suez and the Third Army

was more important than the siege of Suez and the Third Army.

Gonen responded by explaining that the occupation of Ismailia and the isolation of the Second Army

was a new war, while the siege of the Third Army was almost over. Junin enumerated

The difficulties facing the advance on Ismailia were the crossing of two water barriers (the Suez Canal

and the Ismailia Canal) and traversing terrain filled with swamps, sand dunes, crops

and trees, hindering the advance of tanks, while in the Second Army's sector North of the Ismailia Tributary are large numbers of surface-to-air missile

batteries, as well as strong artillery units

artillery units. Furthermore, Gonen stated that the complete isolation of the Second Army is impossible to achieve

is impossible to achieve, as it can receive supplies and supplies from the north towards Port Said

Said. Dayan did not seem convinced by Junin's point of view, which was diametrically opposed to his own

He stormed out of the headquarters. This was the last time Dayan visited the headquarters

Southern Command in the presence of General Gonen, who was removed shortly thereafter and replaced by General

Yisrael Tal, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.

No Chapter XIa Operations in the Port Said Sector

During the October War, the Port Said sector was de facto considered a separate sector from the rest of the front Sectors of the front . Although it was officially subordinate to the Second Army Command, this subordination was almost nominal due to its location and the nature of its composition, as the sector forms a defensive island surrounded by water From the north, the sector is bordered by the Mediterranean Sea, from the east and south by the Malahat, and to the west and south is Lake Manzala. The sector extends east 11 kilometers east of Port Fouad, and west along the coastal road (Damietta Road) to Ezbet El Borg. The sector penetrates the Suez Canal from its northern entrance and extends The area between Port Said and Port Fouad in the north to Al-Tinah in the south is known as the "goose neck" to the south is called the "goose neck2" . Lake Manzala is located in the western limit of the sector, with an area of 750 acres, and is separated from the Mediterranean Sea only by a narrow strip of land. from the Mediterranean Sea except for a narrow strip of land with a single opening that connects between the Mediterranean Sea A bridge has been built on this opening and a road has been constructed connecting it to the Mediterranean Sea. and a 75-kilometer-long road linking Port Said and Damietta. The eastern edge of The eastern edge of Lake Manzala almost touches the Suez Canal between Port Said and Ras al-Ash, then The lake's coastline begins to diverge from the Suez Canal in a southwesterly direction. There are many islands in Lake Manzala Lake is full of islands where some fishermen live and was used to station warning and surveillance points of the Coast Guard (now called the Border Guard). Its waters are generally are generally shallow and penetrated by two navigation channels: The first is between Port Said and Atariya (a village belonging to Dakahlia Governorate), and the second between Matareya and Damietta. The southern and eastern coasts of Lake

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Manzala are almost undefined due to the prevalence of low-lying marshy areas that are submerged during winds or during tides during windy conditions or during high tides.

The area that includes Port Said and Port Fouad is the main center of the sector in terms of Location and importance. This area is connected to the surrounding lands only by bridges By virtue of being surrounded by water on every side, Port Fouad is connected to San Rummana to its east by a bridge It is connected to the area south of it by the Lallah Canal Bridge, and Port Said is connected to the south by two bridges at Raswa and to the west by two bridges at Ashtoum El Gemayel (one of which is Bailey Bridge). This shows how easy it would be to isolate the Port Said and Port Fouad areas in the event of a if these bridges were hit. This necessitated the need for floating interchange

bridges and fords

to be used in case the bridges were destroyed. But thanks to this situation, the Port Said and Port Fouad regions

Port Said and Port Fouad gained an impregnable military position due to being surrounded by natural water obstacles on every side

the Mediterranean Sea to the north and the Suez Canal to the south: The Mediterranean Sea to the north and the Suez Canal, which stretches between Port Fouad to the east and Port Said to the west

It is 200 meters wide at the quarantine building (7 km south of Port Said).

and then widens as we head north until it reaches more than 400 meters at its northern entrance

from the sea. The bodies of water, namely the mallahat in the east and Lake Manzala in the west, are considered natural habitats around the Strip around the Strip.

Due to the presence of the Suez Canal and the numerous water channels within the Strip, it was necessary to

Providing equipment and means of crossing to achieve the speed of maneuver and the ability to conduct supply and evacuation operations and evacuation between units in the sector.

The defense of the sector was made difficult by the absence of earthquakes on the one hand, and due to the high water table, which makes it impossible to carry out dugouts

on the other hand. Therefore, it was necessary to establish strong points to defend vital sites above ground

with engineering equipment brought in from outside the Gaza Strip. The nature of the

the wide confrontations and large distances in the Strip required the defense to rely mainly on a number of

strong points distributed along the length of the confrontation with the strength of companies or platoons while securing the intervals between them with patrols, ambushes, and

with patrols, ambushes, observation points, fires and obstacles, while maintaining

strong, lightly mobile reserves supported by tracked elements for rapid counterattacks.

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with high shock power in the direction of the threatened positions. Artillery and air defense fire was also distributed to cover the sector's main assembly points (Port Said and Port Fouad areas).

Due to the possibility of isolating the outer edges of the sub-sectors, local reserves were provided for each sub-sector

local reserves for each sub-sector as well as providing it with the necessary administrative needs to achieve administrative self-sufficiency administrative self-sufficiency.

The possibility of isolating the city by hitting the bridges around it at any time made it necessary to

The necessity of having sufficient quantities of all military and administrative needs within the city, as well as the need to increase the level of medical and technical services.

The need to increase the level of medical and technical services, whether by pushing advanced sections of army workshops

civilian hospitals, or by supplying Lake Manzala and Port Said harbor with a few boats to carry out

when necessary for supply and evacuation work. This situation also necessitated the need for

to be as close as possible to Port Said, so the city of Damietta and the village

of
Matareya were well suited for this purpose

Pre-attack preparations

Following the end of the June 1967 war, the enemy was able to occupy the entire Sinai Peninsula except for

A small part of the land east and south of the city of Port Fouad, where small units of

Thunderbolts. On July 1, 1967, the enemy tried to advance from Qantara East to Port Fouad

North with a tank company supported by a force of infantry and engineers and a squadron of fighter-bomber planes.

The thunderbolt force stationed at kilometer 14 east of the canal clashed with it. It was

This was the first confrontation between Israeli and Egyptian forces after the battles of the June '67 war.

The enemy stopped for six hours in front of the site and was unable to storm it, and three tanks were destroyed

and some of its personnel were killed. On the orders of the command, the Thunderbolt Force retreated to a better defensive position

at kilometer 10, Ras al-Ash, and the enemy was stopped in front of this area permanently. The enemy did not dare

After that, the enemy did not dare to try to remove this position, but thanks to the steadfastness of its fighters, this position became Egypt's

Egypt's only foot in Sinai. As a result of the battle of Ras al-Ash, and in order to protect the cities of Port Said

and Port Fouad, the 14th Armored Brigade was pushed to support the defense of the two cities, and orders were issued to defend them

The 14th Armored Brigade was later withdrawn from the Port Said sector.

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On September 1, 1967, the sector was reinforced with integrated elements of combined arms.

In light of the new grouping, the implementation of the engineering equipment plan and preparation for the expected battle began.

The sector's responsibility extended to the entire city of Damietta and Lake Manzala. As of September

1969, Major General Omar Khaled Hassan Kamel took command of the sector, who made a constant effort to accomplish

The most important work required to prepare the sector for war, the most important of which was the training of troops on the work of crossing and attacking strong points

crossing and attacking strong points in training fields that resemble the expected areas of operations, as well as

Completing the necessary engineering constructions and equipment in the sector, especially in the area of the Port Fouad sector and kilometer 10

Port Fouad sector, the area of kilometer 10 east (Ras al-Ash) and the area south of Port Said.

In addition, all air defense elements, whether for air defense battalions or surface-to-surface missile battalions, have been equipped with engineering equipment.

pipes and surface-to-air missile battalions) SAM. One of the most important engineering works

securing the shores of Port Said and Port Fouad against naval landings and equipping a main command center for the sector and an interchange center.

A main command center for the sector and an interchange center, as well as a fortified joint command center for air defense

as well as two interchange centers.

The Port Said sector was divided into four sub-sectors: Port Fouad Sector

The 135th Independent Infantry Brigade and its support weapons under the command of Brigadier General Mohamed Salah El-Din Abdel Halim
Brigadier General Muhammad Salah al-Din Abdel Halim. The Port Said sector, in which the 30th Infantry Brigade and its support weapons were stationed under the command of
Brigadier General Mustafa Gawdat al-Abbasi. The Port Said-Damietta road sector, where the
The 14th Coast Guard Battalion. The Manzala sector, in which the 15th Coast Guard Battalion is stationed.
Based on the Second Army's operational instructions issued in March '73, which organized the regrouping of
the regrouping of Second Army units and formations, which included the regrouping of
units in the Port Said sector over three nights, the internal regrouping took place in both the
Port Fouad and Port Said sub-sectors to occupy the initial area of attack, in accordance with the decisions of the
of the commanders of the 30 Independent Infantry Brigades and 351 Independent Infantry Brigades, which have already been ratified. Kamatem
The occupation of the advanced command centers of the sector and sub-sectors. By the end of this phase
the entire sector units are ready to execute the mission assigned to them from their positions in the
the initial area in accordance with the decision of the Sector Commander approved by the Second Army Commander. The mission
The mission assigned to the sector was twofold:

1- Destroying enemy forces on the east bank of the canal facing the sector, while attacking

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Destroying and liquidating the three strong enemy points at kilometer 19, kilometer 10 and east of Port Fouad
Fouad, holding the captured areas and organizing the defense, while preparing to repel and destroy
enemy reserves attempting to rescue the strong points.

By organizing the defense and securing the coast up to the Port Fouad sector against naval and airborne convoys
and enemy artillery, while securing the eastern bank of the canal in the area of (Goose Neck)
By troops and other means.

The role of the Suez Canal Authority in serving the war effort

The duty of fairness and historical honesty requires us to record the honorable national role that the Suez Canal Authority
The Suez Canal Authority's contribution to the war effort at the front, which had a great impact
in achieving victory.

Engineer Mashhour Ahmed Mashhour, Chairman of the Suez Canal Authority, was keen to put all
The potential of the Authority: Workshops, equipment, facilities and technical expertise at the service of the armed forces.
both during the war of attrition and during the preparatory phase for the October '73 war.

The Authority participated in the construction of defenses, fortifications and terraces along the western bank of the canal from Port Said in the north to Port Said in the south.
from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south. In order to allow units of the

Second and Third Army units west of the canal to conduct efficient and capable reconnaissance work, the signal stations distributed along the canal (12 in number), which were used before the closure of the canal for used before the closure of the canal for ship transit purposes, to be used by the reconnaissance elements of these units to obtain the required information about enemy forces on the eastern bank of the canal. utilizing the excellent communications network between the stations and between them and the headquarters in to link the reconnaissance elements with their headquarters in Ismailia. In addition Placing other reconnaissance elements inside ships detained in the canal and in the lakes to serve as advanced observation posts to closely monitor enemy actions and movements.

In order to prepare for the crossing operations, Heatha workshops manufactured a number of barrels (according to the Soviet design) and supplied them to the Corps of Engineers to fill the shortage in the number of hoses needed for the breaching bridges that were used to cross vehicles and heavy equipment to the shore.

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the eastern shore of the Canal when the fighting broke out. In addition, the Authority's workshops manufactured a number of floating hoses to overcome the steep slopes of the canal's flanks by providing suitable slopes on the shore of the canal to allow amphibious vehicles to get into and out of the canal easily to the other shore. the other shore. The Authority's water plants in Port Said, Ismailia and Suez after the June '67 war continued to work at full capacity to supply the armed forces and the citizens of the canal cities the armed forces and the citizens of the canal cities with fresh water, despite the fact that their workers were subjected to destructive air strikes and artillery shelling destructive air strikes and heavy artillery shelling, which led to the martyrdom of some of them.

In the Port Said sector, the Canal Authority made great efforts to serve the war effort. In view of the The bridges are of great importance to the cities of Port Said and Port Fouad, as they are the only means land connection between them and the roads extending to them from abroad, the Authority's workshops metal bands, which were placed around the beams and columns that carry these bridges from all sides at their bases in the ports on all sides at their bases in the water, to protect them from mines and floating explosives that the enemy may try to float in the direction of the bridges. that the enemy may try to float towards the bridges in order to blow them up and destroy them. Engineers and workers of the engineers and workers operated ferries to transport personnel and equipment across the canal between Port Said and Port Fouad despite air raids and artillery shelling, and a number of them were martyred while performing their duty performing their duty.

When these ferries were unable to transport heavy military equipment from Port

Said to

Bud Fouad, as they were overloaded, the huge cranes of the transferred tanks, medium artillery, and field artillery to the Port Fouad area before the scheduled start of the attack.

The naval arsenal in Port Said contributed to assisting the armed forces in the sector with all its capabilities, equipment and expertise its capabilities, equipment and technical expertise. It carried out the repair and maintenance of weapons and equipment and the manufacture of spare parts for communication devices, both telephone and radio. It also It also carried out maintenance and repair work on naval vessels anchored in the port of Bood Said, and some naval vessels that were specially brought from Alexandria to be repaired at the naval arsenal in Port Said Naval Arsenal in Port Said. In addition, the arsenal's engineers and workers manufactured weapons and structural equipment and properly outfitted them at unit sites throughout the Gaza Strip as a means of throughout the sector as a means of deceiving enemy aviation and reconnaissance elements, and when
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The Raswah Bridge, which connects Port Said to the land road in the south, was subjected to aerial bombardment in 1970, which resulted in severe damage to the bridge and rendered it inoperable, a crew from the naval arsenal in Port Said from the naval arsenal in Port Said repaired it and put it back into operation in record time, to ensure continued military movements between Port Said and the area. military movements between Port Said and the area to its south.

Just before the outbreak of the war, Engineer Mashhour Ahmed Mashhour, head of the Suez Canal Authority of the Suez Canal Authority to mobilize all the Authority's resources, including personnel, equipment, workshops, ferries, cranes, shipyards, and hospitals, in preparation for the battle. in preparation for the coming decisive battle, and put all the Authority's energies and resources, both human and technical human and technical resources at the disposal of the military command. The Suez Canal Authority The Suez Canal Authority, with its president, engineers and workers, set the best examples in supporting the war effort and supporting the armed forces. Armed Forces, making them all worthy of the nation's appreciation.

Planning the offensive operation

Enemy positions facing the Port Said sector: In front of the Port Said sector, the enemy was defending

with a system of strong points on the front line of the defenses, while maintaining close tactical reserves

at the battalion and brigade level. The strongpoints facing the sector consisted of three strongpoints

as follows:

1 The strong point at kilometer 10 east of the canal (codenamed Orca1 by the Israelis 521 of the Bar-Lev Line forts), and it was occupied by an infantry company and a tank platoon

and some support weapons, it included 9 bunkers, and was surrounded by a minefield and wires

It was surrounded by a field of mines and wires about 150 meters deep.

2 The strong point at kilometer 19 east of the canal (codenamed by the Israelis Lahtzanit 4 of the Bar-Lev Line forts), and was occupied by an infantry platoon A tank platoon and some support weapons, it had 7 bunkers and was surrounded by a field of

mixed minefields and wires 600 meters deep.

3- The strong point at Cutting Rummana, east of Port Fouad (Israeli code name Budapest 45PaB of the Bar-Lev Line forts), and was occupied by an infantry company.

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and two tank platoons, it had 9 bunkers and was surrounded by a minefield of mines and wires

600 meters deep.

The enemy's tactical reserves were located in the rear in the areas of Tal al-Hir, Rummana

Rabaa and Qatiya, and consisted of an infantry battalion and a tank company.

Open approach routes for our forces towards the enemy: The approach routes open to our

Our forces facing the sector east of the canal were limited to two roads:

1 San Rummana Road, an underground road about five meters wide, extending from Port Fouad

east by the sea, crossing the Tine Plain for a distance of 40 kilometers, where it deviates in a southeasterly direction to Rummana

in a southeastern direction to Rummana (about 5 kilometers south of the beach).

Although the road is covered by water in some places, it is passable for armored vehicles and armored vehicles.

2- Kilometer 19, which starts from kilometer 19 east of the canal and runs almost straight from west to east

from west to east, penetrating the Tina Plain to a distance of about 25 kilometers, where it meets the compass

which runs from Baluza in the south to the San Rummana road in the north. The road is narrow and does not allow

vehicles are not allowed to move outside of it due to the presence of water and swamps.

The plan of attack on the strong point at kilometer 19 was the mission assigned to the 30th Brigade

Independent Infantry Brigade and its support weapons, was to attack the strong point at kilometer 19 and destroy the enemy's manpower, weapons, and equipment the enemy's manpower, weapons and equipment and capture it as an immediate mission, and then secure the intersection of the eastern approaches as the next mission.

as the next mission, while defending the Port Said sub-sector to prevent the enemy from capturing the city of Port Said.

Port Said.

The commander of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade, Col. to his sub-units as follows:

1 infantry battalion, together with support weapons, to break into the Suez Canal in the area from

kilometer 20 500 to kilometer 17 50 in three crossings, isolating the enemy strong point at kilometer 19

the enemy strongpoint at kilometer 19 from the south, east, and north, after

which the rest of the force enters the strongpoint from the front and flanks.

the strongpoint from the front and flanks, destroying the enemy's manpower, weapons and equipment and captures the point.

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2 infantry battalions with support weapons defend the area south of Port Said up to Lake Manzala.

To prevent the enemy from crossing the Suez Canal and developing its attack northward toward Port Said.

Meanwhile, elements of the 135th Infantry Brigade's independent attack from the west bank of the canal

Under direct fire from direct hit weapons

3 infantry battalion (excluding a company), with a tank company defending the defense zone between the

between the western breakwater and the sewage farm to prevent the enemy from naval landings and penetration into Port Said

Port Said. The remaining company acts as the brigade's reserve to counterattack and repel

penetration .

4 Thunderbolt Company (excluding a platoon) of the 203rd Thunderbolt Battalion enters the Suez Canal at kilometer

20500 and rushes on the eastern approach to capture the cross-approach area (about 8 kilometers east of the canal), destroy any enemy elements in the area and prevent any enemy reserves from advancing from deep in the direction of the canal.

Battle of Kilometer 1 (Fort La Hatzatet)

At five minutes to two in the afternoon on October 6, a reconnaissance group crossed

behind the lines led by the Assistant Chief of Reconnaissance of the 30th Infantry Brigade swam south of the strong point

from the Kilometer 21 crossing and deployed two crossing ropes to facilitate the crossing of the rest of the troops on the same crossing

crossing. At 2:05 p.m., the preliminary fire on the enemy strongpoint at kilometer 19 was initiated by fire from the brigade's company

Kilometer 19 with only the brigade's 8mm anti-tank company's fire, since the air corridor for the air strike was

The air corridor for the air strike was over this area, thus preventing the firing of any high line artillery.

At 2:15 a.m., the groups assigned to isolate the point from the south, east and the north and the Thunderbolt Detachment, a company (except for a platoon) of the 203rd Thunderbolt Battalion began crossing the canal

by boat at the crossings at kilometer 21 and kilometer 1750 and managed to reach the

to the berm on the eastern shore of the canal ten minutes later. It began to draw the enemy's fire

enemy fire to the south and north, achieving the goal of concealing the direction of the main attack on the

At two o'clock and forty-five minutes, the group assigned to isolate the point from the east to the terrace previously prepared by the enemy, and

raised the Malasian flag on it.

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This had a great effect in lowering the enemy's morale in the strong point and

immediately afterward.
the thunderbolt detachment reached the mastaba as well.

During this time, the enemy tried to rescue its forces at the strong point by pushing a tank reserve consisting of 8 Patton tanks (48), which collided with the eastern isolation force at the mastaba, and one of them was destroyed at a distance of 300 meters and a tank succeeded in penetrating the position and headed north on the tarmac towards the strong point at kilometer 10 the strong point at kilometer 10 (Fort Orkal), but was hit by a shell from the It was stopped in place at kilometer 14, and the rest of the enemy tanks retreated east in the direction of Baluza. At 2:50 p.m., the B10 guns and opened a gap in the enemy's wire barriers in front of the point and destroyed some important targets important targets, including the main telescope at the observation post of the heavily fortified point.

At this point, the frontline assault groups began crossing the canal while while elements of the engineers opened gaps in the fort's positions with a torpedo, the Bangalore under a barrage of enemy fire and grenades, resulting in some casualties. Following the opening of the After the gaps were opened, the storming groups that crossed the canal flowed into the trenches.

At 3:05 p.m. on October 6, the southern section of the point was captured The southern section of the point was captured and the Malassar flag was raised on the observation tower, but an enemy force was still resisting in the northern section of the point resisting in the northern section of the point.

At 3:10 p.m. on October 6, the storming groups pushed north and seized the northern section of the point. seize the northern section of the point. Within fifteen minutes, the complete control of the point from all sides, and the nearby isolation groups joined the telephone lines and electrical wires to the point were cut, the electrical generator was destroyed, and the point's entrances and exit points were secured. The generator was destroyed and the entrances and exits of the post were secured. Sector Command was informed of the complete capture of the post and the capture of the prisoners.

According to the records of the war, the strong point at kilometer 19 (Lahtzanit Fortress) Israeli) was the first of the Bar-Lev Line forts to fall into the hands of Egyptian forces along the entire front along the entire front.

Israeli sources on the battle of this fortress state the following: âœœmm the start of the crossing, and.
She passed
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A report from this fort (south of Ras al-Ash) in the northern sector that the Malasian soldiers are attacking him. The sounds of fighting came from the radio, and the soldier's voice signal several times, and at about 4:00 p.m. the soldier's voice was completely silent and no one knew what had happened there.

No one knew what had happened there.

Following the capture of the fort, the process of clearing the bunkers with flame throwers began
A wounded man was captured and was able to be used to take out the rest of the terrified enemy.
inside the second bunker.

The enemy tried to regain the position by pushing its local tank reserves on the but the thunderbolt group from the 203rd Thunderbolt Battalion succeeded in destroying two tanks east of the factory.
succeeded in destroying two tanks east of Mastaba, and the rest of the tanks retreated east.

A tank group and a half-track armored vehicle attempted to attack the southern isolation group
but was turned back south in the direction of al-Tinah after one of its tanks was destroyed
of its tanks.

At 4 p.m., two tank-hunting groups led by
The brigade's assistant chief of reconnaissance joined the thunderbolt group, and Col.
Mustafa al-Abbasi, the brigade commander, ordered them to develop the attack east towards the crossroads
about 8 kilometers east of the canal.

At 5:00 p.m., enemy aircraft attacked the strong point after confirming that it had fallen
that it had fallen, and concentrated its strikes on the brigade's observation post at kilometer 17 km 5 and the strong point of our forces west of the canal at kilometer 17 km 5
Our forces west of the canal at kilometer 14, and a SAM 7 missile platoon at kilometer 17 succeeded in shooting down an enemy Mirage aircraft. During the period from 6:00 to 7:00 p.m.
7:00 p.m., the clearing of bunkers and inspection of shelters was completed by assault groups
supported by military engineers and light flamethrower crews. After confirming the point was cleared of enemy forces, the 26 prisoners were transferred to the Port Said intelligence office.

At 8 p.m., the observation post of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade moved to the east of the canal

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in the area of kilometer 17, north of the strong point, and enemy artillery shelled the point
The losses of the 30th Infantry Brigade, from the beginning of the operation until 8:00 p.m., were
23 martyrs (including one officer) and 7 wounded (including two officers).
The enemy's losses in this battle were 60 killed and 62 prisoners.

At 9:30 p.m., the commander of the Tank and Thunderbolt Capture Group reported reported that an enemy armored column was advancing from the direction of Baluza, and was hit by the fire of two Type 65 tanks
Type 65 tanks from a mastaba at kilometer 19 west of the canal, forcing the Israeli tanks to
to retreat eastward.

The tank and thunderbolt sniping groups continued to advance eastward until they reached the crossroads area 8 kilometers east of the canal, without any resistance

The brigade commander ordered patrols to secure the approach routes to the south, north, and east
north and east, and to organize the defense of the acquired territory.

The secret of the great success of the Kilometer 19 battle

The fall of the Israeli strongpoint at kilometer 19 (the Israeli fortress Lahtzanit) at 3:30 p.m. on October 6 in the hands of the 30th Infantry Brigade Independent, about one hour after the start of the operational phase to storm this fortress.

was a record time for the entire front, and a successful example of good planning and proper execution of the plan
of the plan. To complete our study of this battle, we will explain the most important factors that led to its success
that led to its success in this unique way, in the following points:

1 Isolating the Israeli fortress from all sides before starting the main offensive against it. This was done
This was done by the arrival of the block groups to their designated positions in the north, south, and east
successfully, which allowed the infantry battalion to be allocated as the main assault force to carry out its mission
according to the plan without interference from any Israeli force from the enemy's reserves in the
In addition to the demoralization of the fort's garrison after discovering that the fort was
surrounded from all sides.

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2- The speed with which the Eastern Cutting Group was able to reach the mastaba that the enemy had prepared
and raised the Egyptian flag on it - before the start of the main attack on the fort - despite its location in a sparsely populated area.
Despite the fact that it was located in a steppe area with limited axes, due to the fitness and stamina of the group's personnel
endurance of the group's members.

3- Insistence on carrying out the mission regardless of the sacrifices. The rush of junior commanders in front of their sub-units
officers in front of the members of their sub-units strengthened their resolve and doubled their effort, and at the same time
At the same time to tighten the commanders' control over their soldiers.

4 Boldly using individual flamethrowers and firing flamethrowers at the entrances of
The use of individual flamethrowers boldly, and the firing of flamethrowers at the entrances of bunkers and shelters led to terrorizing the Israelis inside and convincing them
to quickly surrender.

5 Cutting off all means of communication between the fortress and its leadership in depth by cutting the wires
electrical wires, wired telephone lines, and radio antennas, which led to a sense of isolation
the fort's personnel to feel isolated and despair that any
The destruction of the telescope destroyed morale.

6- The destruction of the fort's main telescope, which detects all movements of Egyptian forces on the West Bank

The destruction of the main telescope in the fort, which detects all movements of the Egyptian forces on the West Bank, by direct hit weapons in the first moments of the battle

The destruction of the main telescope in the fort, which reveals all the movements of the Egyptian forces on the west bank, by direct hit weapons in the first moments of the battle

west of the canal to the east without any interference from the enemy.

7- Light anti-tank weapons, especially the RPG7, proved to be one of the of the most effective and lethal weapons against enemy tanks at close ranges, especially

if used by individuals characterized by boldness and strength of faith.

While the battle for kilometer 19 was raging between a battalion of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade

infantry battalion of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade and the Israeli fortress garrison, the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade

brigade and its support weapons, commanded by Brigadier General A.H. Mohamed Salah El-Din Abdel-Hakhelim and stationed in the Port Fouad subsector in the Port Fouad subsector, was carrying out the mission it had been assigned, which was to attack the Israeli strongpoint at kilometer 10 east of Israeli strongpoint at kilometer 10 east of the canal (Israeli code name

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Orkal L5 of the Bar-Lev Line forts), and at the same time attacking the Israeli strongpoint east of Port Fouad on the east of Port Fouad on the San Rummana road (Israeli code name Buda Best 25PcaB of the Bar-Lev Line forts), in cooperation with the naval forces Air Force and Air Defense Forces while securing the Port Fouad sub-sector against any landings landings from either the sea or the air.

The plan was to exploit the air strike, whose objectives included

to bomb the Budapest fortress east of Port Fouad, as well as the artillery fire, which was scheduled for

for 53 minutes, to attack the two Israeli strong points at kilometer 10 and on the road to

San Rummana road east of Port Fouad at the same time according to the following method:

1- A battalion supported by the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade will attack the strong point east of Port Fouad (Budapest Fortress) from the west, in conjunction with a naval landing with the force of a thunderbolt company (from 128th Thunderbolt Group) It is landed in the area one kilometer east of the enemy position

the enemy position, and attack the Israeli fortress from the east, in a coordinated operation

A coordinated operation between the two forces under the cover of artillery fire with the aim of destroying the enemy's manpower, weapons and equipment and equipment and capture the Israeli fort, while preparing to repel and destroy the enemy's reserves

The enemy reserves that try to rescue or retake the fort.

2- At the same time, another reinforced battalion of the 135th Infantry Brigade,

attacking the enemy strong point at kilometer 10 (Fort Orkal) from the north and west directions with the aim of Destroying the enemy's manpower, weapons and equipment and capturing the Israeli fortress. Prepare to repel and destroy enemy reserves attempting to rescue or retake the fort.

The two strong points are captured before first light on October 7, with the 135th Brigade
The 135th Independent Infantry Brigade will be responsible for securing the area from the Beyli Bridge east of the Port Fouad cutoff to kilometer 14 east of the canal.
Kilometer 14 east of the canal, and the 135th Infantry Brigade will then be ready to develop the attack on the coastal strip in the direction of Rummana with an infantry battalion force supported by orders from the Second Army commander.
After a tactical pause or without a tactical pause. A 130mm medium artillery regiment was allocated to support the 135th Infantry Brigade to support the 135th Infantry Brigade in the operations assigned to it.

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Battle of Kilometer 10, Fort Orkal

According to Israeli sources, the Israeli fortress was a large defense area consisting of
A large defense area consisting of three forts, Orkal (A, B, and C). When the fighting on October 6, 73, a force of 20 soldiers was stationed at Orkal under the command of
Captain Gad Sumeikh Tala 5SD, who was in command of the fort's forces in its three sectors.
In Orkal A, he was accompanied by Lt. Ezra 28. In Orkal B, six soldiers were stationed under the command of Lt.
Under the command of Lieutenant David Abu Durham, 18 soldiers were stationed in Orkal C.
under the command of Lieutenant Desberg. At 2:00 p.m. on Yom Kippur 61 (October) Egyptian aircraft bombed the site and Egyptian artillery focused on it, and Israeli soldiers rushed to hide in shelters.
Israeli soldiers rushed to take cover in the shelters. On the Egyptian side, during the preliminary fire
artillery fire and in accordance with the plan, a detachment of thunderbolt soldiers crossed the canal to the eastern shore
and isolated the Israeli fortress at kilometer 11 (from the south).

From the Port Fouad sector in the north, the main effort forces (an infantry battalion plus a company
from the 135th Infantry Brigade) attacked by road in a southerly direction according to plan.
They were led by a few tanks (equipped with mine-detonating pins). However, the attack was soon
The attack was halted after two tanks were destroyed after the tanks were embedded in the marshy ground before reaching the minefield north of
before reaching the minefield to the north of the Israeli fortress, which was about 150 meters deep
meters deep. At the same time, the battalion's remaining company (excluding a platoon), which had
positioned on the western shore of the canal facing the fortress to attack it from the west
crossed the canal, but in the face of heavy enemy fire, it was only able to reach the berm at the water's edge
at the water's edge, where it stopped. The remaining platoon of the company

(reserve) could not cross behind the two forward platoons, due to heavy enemy artillery fire on the crossings, resulting in the The platoon's crossing boats were swept away by the current to the south. Thus, the The two platoons that had crossed from the west were almost isolated on the berm on the eastern bank. Although the battalion of the 135th Infantry Brigade north of the fort halted in front of the minefield, and its two halted on the berm west of the fort after crossing the canal, the Malasian force Despite being held in place, the Malasian force engaged the Israeli force with fire from the north and west.
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(Orkal A and Orkal B), which was facing it, in a fierce clash that caused the Israelis significant losses. In order to mobilize the situation and strengthen the momentum of the attack, the commander of the Port Said sector Major General Omar Khaled instructed Colonel A.H. Mustafa al-Abbasi, commander of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade Independent Infantry Brigade, to push a company from his battalion, which was stationed in reserve south of Port Said at kilometer 11 west of the canal, to cross to the eastern shore to attack the southern sector of the Israeli fort. the southern sector of the Israeli fortress, and at 4 p.m. on October 6, the The infantry company of the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade) crossed the canal in assault boats from the south of the Israeli fortress . Upon reaching the eastern shore of the canal, it rushed toward the the southern sector of the fortress (Or Rakal C), and while penetrating the trenches surrounding the position, the between the attacking Egyptian soldiers and the defending Israeli soldiers in a fierce, close combat that ended with the Egyptians entering the At around 6:00 p.m., the Egyptians were able to clear two bunkers were able to clear two enemy bunkers and find the enemy's code instructions and the keys to the code used in the Israeli bunker. of the code used in the Israeli fortress, which were handed over to the Military Intelligence office in Port Said Port Said at 9:00 p.m. on the same day. At 9:30 p.m. the infantry platoon that failed to cross with its company on the afternoon of October 6 (from the battalion of the 135th Infantry Brigade) (from the 135th Infantry Brigade Battalion) crossed to the eastern shore of the canal and joined the rest of the company in its position on the berm on the east bank west of the Israeli fort. Israeli fortress.

Israeli references recorded the story of the fall of the Orkalj post to the Egyptians.

The following is a summary of the story: "Darkness fell and Orkal 1 (the northern site of the fortress) that his position had become critical. After Lt. Abu Durham handed over command of Orkal B to Sgt.) to Sergeant Aryeh (a former paratrooper), Abu Durham made his way to Orkal 1 by the light of a hand battery. When he entered the fort, he found the firing positions empty and the soldiers in a state of collapse. When he inspected the fort, he found the fort's commander, Capt. Gad Somich, dead in one of the positions and Lieutenant Ezra dead in another. Abu Durham took control of the situation4

He realized that the soldiers were in despair due to the death of their officers. After reorganizing the strength of the position (2) Abu Durham contacted the commander of the Orcalj post, Lieutenant Desberg. This officer informed him that the Egyptians had already penetrated the fortress area and that close combat was taking place.

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in the trenches. On Sunday morning, Abu Durham saw Israeli soldiers carrying a white flag in the distance
He realized that Fort Orcal G had finally fallen to the Egyptians4 .

At midnight on October 6/7, the commander of the Port Said sector, Major General Omar Khaled, decided to push part of his of his reserves (a company from the 203rd Thunderbolt Battalion), which was stationed west of Port Said on the Damietta, to help capture the two remaining sectors of the Israeli fortress, as the The 135th Infantry Brigade's battalion (except for a company) was stopped in front of the minefield north of the fortress and despaired of being able to participate in the battle. to participate in the battle. Lieutenant Colonel Farouk Mohammed al-Hafni, head of operations in the on the instructions of the Sector Commander, went to the location of the Thunderbolt Battalion on the Damietta Road, where he was to bring him the Thunderbolt Company, which was to be pushed to participate in the attack on the fort. After receiving the Thunderbolt Company commander received his assignment and conducted his reconnaissance, the company crossed the canal at 4:00 a.m. on October 7 from the south of the sector October 7 at 4:00 a.m. from the south of Sector C, where it joined the infantry company force (from the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade) which was at the time clearing Sector C of the fort from the remnants of the enemy forces. At 7:30 a.m. on October 7, the two companies completed In the process, six enemy soldiers were killed and two were captured, including a doctor. The company commander of the 30th Infantry Brigade handed them over to the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade west of the Canal

The Israelis failed in their escape attempt

At around 8:00 a.m. on October 7, the infantry company of the 03rd Infantry Brigade Infantry Brigade in conjunction with the Thunderbolt Company began attacking Sector B from the direction of Jaghoub. the two companies managed to capture a bunker in this sector where an Israeli soldier was captured captured. After fierce fighting, at 10:00 a.m., the two companies managed to storm another bunker in Sector B another bunker in Sector B, killing three and capturing two more enemy soldiers. Major General Omar Khaled, the sector commander, had issued an order at around 8:30 a.m. to Brigadier General H.H. Salah Abdel Halim, commander of the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade, and Colonel H.H. Mustafa Al-Abbasi, commander of the 30th Infantry Brigade, to immediately move to kilometer 1 0 to supervise to personally supervise their forces with the aim of quickly capturing Sectors B and 2 after the

The delay that occurred from the time specified in the plan.

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At 11:00 a.m. on October 7, at kilometer 10 west of the canal Canal, the commander of the 30th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade, the commander of the 203rd Thunderbolt Battalion and the commander of the Field Artillery Battalion (of the 30th Infantry Brigade). After the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade and after the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade presented the latest developments of the Mutv and the loss of contact with his forces east of the canal, and after the commanders moved to the observation point to familiarize themselves with the situation of the troops on the ground, the following decisions were made:

- 1- Pushing the infantry company (from the 135th Infantry Brigade) that was still lying on the berm east of the canal outside the fort since crossing it the day before, to move from its place and join the force of the infantry and thunderbolt companies south of Sector B to participate with them in attacking and clearing it attack and clear it. Since there was no communication between the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade and this company a captain from the infantry company (from the 30th Infantry Brigade) acted on his commander's instructions traveled by boat from the east bank south of the fort to the position of the infantry company () from the brigade (135th Brigade) lying on the berm on the east bank west of the fort, to inform the commander of this company to inform the commander of this company of the new decision to join the storming forces south of Fort B.
- 2- Pushing elements of the flamethrowers (from the 03rd Infantry Brigade) in two boats to move near the eastern shore of the canal from kilometer 19 the eastern shore of the canal from kilometer 19 east of the canal in view of the fall of Fort Lahtzan in the hands of of the 320th Infantry Brigade in the previous album) to kilometer 10 east of the canal to support the attacking Sector B.
- 3- Focusing the fire of the 30th Infantry Brigade's Melidan Artillery Battalion on Sector A in the fort to silence the the enemy force inside it to prevent it from interfering with the storming of Sector B.

At 1:00 p.m. on October 7, a fierce battle took place inside Sector B, and three enemy soldiers were captured
Three enemy soldiers were captured. At 3 p.m., the commander of the 30th Infantry Brigade informed the commander of the Port Said, that the capture of Sector B had been completed and that the remaining enemy personnel in this sector had joined Sector A in the north Sector A in the north to try to escape out of the fortress, and after reassuring the safety of the situation that the enemy was preparing to flee southward, the Sector Commander ordered the 30th Infantry Brigade Commander the 30th Infantry Brigade commander to return to the brigade's observation post at kilometer 17 east of the canal
At 3:30 p.m., the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade, along with the commander of Battalion 203 Thunderbolt Battalion, crossed the canal to take control of the breakout forces in the east. As the remnants of the enemy's

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assembled in Sector A were unaware that the Israeli fortress (Lahtzanit) at kilometer 19 had fallen to the Egyptians the day before, they made an unsuccessful attempt

to try to escape
in the direction of this fortress to the south, all piled on top of two tanks
and a semi-truck.
and rushed with machine gun fire onto the road leading to the Israeli fortress
to the south at kilometer
But they didn't get very far, and at 4:10 p.m., they ran into the northern block
group.
at 4:10 p.m. with the 30th Infantry Brigade's northern block group north of
Lahtzanit, destroying a tank and a semi-trailer. Although the other tank managed
to
to escape and rush desperately to the south of the fort, the southern block
group that was
stationed south of Lahtzanit Fort was able to destroy it. The death toll of the
fleeing Israeli soldiers
of the fleeing Israeli soldiers amounted to 18, and 4 members of the crew of one
of the tanks were captured. At an hour
4:45 p.m. on October 7, the Egyptian flag was raised over Fort
Orkal, and its three sectors (Ob and C) were captured.

Why didn't the Israeli fortress of Budapest, east of Port Boufouad, fall?
The mission assigned to the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade and its support
weapons under the command of Brig.
A.H. Salah El-Din Abdel-Khalim, stationed in the Port Fouad subsector, was to
take advantage of the
air strikes and artillery fire to attack the two strong Israeli positions at
kilometer 10
Kilometer 10 (Fort Orkal) and on the San Rummana road east of Port Fouad (Fort
Budapest)
at the same time. The plan was to attack the strong point east of Port Fouad
(Fort Budapest 455B) was for a battalion supported by the 135th Infantry Brigade
to attack the
the Israeli fortress from the west, in conjunction with a naval landing force
with a thunderbolt company (from
128th Thunderbolt Group) landed a few kilometers east of the enemy position
and attacked the Israeli fortress from the east in a coordinated operation
between the two forces, under the cover of artillery fire
under the cover of artillery fire with the aim of destroying the enemy's
manpower, weapons and equipment.
and capture the Israeli fortress while being prepared to repel and destroy enemy
reserves that
attempting to glorify or recapture the fortress.
The Israeli leadership was paying close attention to the Budapest fortress as
the key to the
of the coastal road Port Fouad-Arish, and therefore paid extraordinary attention
to the fort, both in terms of
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in terms of engineering equipment, in terms of the strong obstacles that
surrounded it from all sides, and in terms of
weapons and equipment. This is in addition to the security and rescue measures
by
ground and air forces in the event of any attacks against the fortress. The
nature of the
of the land helped increase the fort's immunity. To its immediate north lies the
Mediterranean Sea, and to its south
the vast marinas of Port Fouad, while the coastal strip on which the fort is
located is a narrow strip of land
It is a narrow strip of land that reaches 170 meters at its widest part, and it
is impossible to perform any maneuver outside it
to maneuver outside it with vehicles or tanks. Therefore, the approach methods
available to reach it
other than the coastal strip, either by dismounted elements wading into it from

the south, but navigation to reach it from the south, but the disadvantage of this route is that the advancing force is characterized by very slow, and fully exposed to various types of fire from land and air, and the use of boats to do the

The use of boats to conduct a naval operation to reach the fort from the north or a nearby area

However, this method has the disadvantage of having to submit to the roughness of the sea, and the need for a sufficient number of boats

the need for a sufficient number of boats with special specifications in terms of type and cargo, in addition to their exposure to enemy naval pieces.

They are exposed to enemy naval vessels, especially missile launches, or to enemy aircraft, which may lead to their sinking

sink them.

To aid the assault on the Budapest Fortress, Major General A.H. Saad Maamoun Commander of the Second Army ordered to reinforce the force assigned to attack the fortress with the following units and equipment

And the following equipment :

1) 6 precision mine detonators to be installed on the T34 tanks of the 135th Infantry Brigade

Infantry, after being equipped with special arms in the sector's armored workshop for use in opening gaps in the minefield west of the fort.

Gaps in the minefield west of the Israeli fortress, which is 600 meters deep.

B-8 armored vehicles.

C - 240mm mortar company.

D - Thunderbolt Company (from the 128th Thunderbolt Group), to be landed by sea in two groups east of the Israeli fort

the Israeli fortress (one of which is a cutting group 4 kilometers east of the point

to isolate it from the east, and the second was an attack group one and a half kilometers east of the point to attack it from the east.

to attack it from the east to support the main attack from the west of the point).

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The Second Army Command was supposed to support the sector with 24 Zodiac rubber boats

to transport the thunderbolt company to its assigned positions, but this number was soon reduced to

10 boats. Three days before the start of operations on October 6, the informed the sector commander that they did not have any boats, and that he would have to arrange this on his own.

The sector commander, Major General Omar Khaled, was forced to hire two large fishing boats

to transport the landing party from Port Said port to its area of operation 4 kilometers east of Fort Budapest

east of Fort Budapest. The plan was modified accordingly, with the naval expeditionary force limited to isolating the point to the east

to merely isolate the point from the east, and the portion of the plan to land the assault group one and a half kilometers away to attack the fort was canceled.

one and a half kilometers to attack the fortress from the east to support the main attack from the west

west.

The first attempt to storm the Budapest Fortress

At 2:00 p.m. on October 6, 73, more than 200 Egyptian fighters and fighter-bombers crossed the Suez Canal eastward at low altitude to carry out a concentrated air strike deep in the Sinai, including some L-28 tactical bombers and focused their bombing on the Israeli Fort Budapest

east of the city of Port Fouad.

Port Fouad. It turned out that some of the bombs fell inside the fort, while others fell

outside. At 2:05 p.m., artillery fire began in the Port Said sector

Port Said sector according to the plan in four bombardments, lasting 53 minutes by direct and indirect fire on enemy points.

direct and indirect fire on enemy strongpoints, nearby reserves, artillery emplacements, and command centers. command centers.

In the middle of the artillery preparation period and in implementation of the plan, the thunderbolt company began

Sailing from Port Said harbor in two fishing boats (Balnus) to reach the designated location

which is located 4 kilometers east of the Budapest Fortress to carry out the task of isolating the fortress from the east

and prevent enemy armored forces from reaching him to help him.

At the appointed time and on the coastal strip, the infantry battalion group of the

of the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade and its support elements from their positions east of Port Fouad in the direction of the fortress

in the east. The order of march was as follows: In the front, three tanks

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to open gaps in the minefield, followed by the gap-opening elements of the military engineers, then the advance firebase elements, and finally an infantry company from the battalion's

of the battalion's first echelon in amphibious armored vehicles supported by some T-34 tanks.

As soon as the precision tanks reached the minefield west of the fort, the garrison began to concentrate fire on them.

The fortress garrison began to concentrate fire on them, destroying and disabling them completely and consequently

All elements stopped behind it.

Based on the decision of Brigadier General Salah Abdulhaklim, the Brigade Commander, an attempt was made to open Al-Thafra

by the Muskarian engineers, but this attempt did not last long, as at the same time

This attempt did not last long, as enemy aircraft appeared at the same time, which were flying at a low altitude

which focused their missiles on the tanks and amphibious armored vehicles, and started

machine gun fire on all the forces advancing on the coastal strip between the beginning of the

enemy minefield and the first position of our forces east of Port Fouad, which was about 170 meters wide and about two kilometers long

meters wide and about two kilometers long. The aerial bombardment continued in successive waves for more than two and a half hours

for more than two and a half hours without meeting any resistance from the Israeli planes, which led to the destruction of all the tanks involved in the operation

All the tanks involved in the operation were destroyed, as well as five amphibious armored vehicles.

in addition to heavy casualties. The garrison of the Israeli fortress participated with the

with the aircraft in firing from their fortified positions at the advancing Laser force, paralyzing its effectiveness and rendering it ineffective.

its effectiveness and lost its ability to move and maneuver, and consequently the attack came to a complete halt from this direction

The elements that made the attack began to retreat westward to our positions east of Port Fouad
Port Fouad under enemy pressure.

The thunderbolt force, transported in two fishing boats (Balnus), had succeeded in reaching the place

4 kilometers east of the Israeli fortress without receiving any attacks while sailing in an easterly direction, since they were using two fishing boats Mudhadan . The maritime landing group (Thunderbolt Company) remained in place for four days

It was able to capture 6 enemy personnel and inflict losses on their tanks and vehicles sent to help the fort, thus accomplishing its mission of isolating the fort

It successfully accomplished its mission of isolating the fort from the east.

The commander of the 135th Independent Infantry Brigade ordered the commander of the infantry battalion group that was to hold his defensive position east of Port Fouad after the recoil and work to retake

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its defensive balance immediately and repel any enemy counterattacks. Given the failure of the
the first attempt to capture Al-Hasnin failed, a second attempt was scheduled for October 8

Lieutenant Colonel Ali al-Mazahi, commander of the infantry battalion that made the first attempt, began

regrouped his battalion and its support elements in accordance with the instructions of Brigadier General A.H. Salah Abdel Halim, commander of the The 135th Infantry Brigade was prepared for a repeat attempt, and the sector rented two fishing boats (Balnus) to transport elements of the infantry battalion group

elements of the infantry battalion group to the east of the fort, but the enemy concentrated the bombardment on the night of October 8/7

on the night of October 7/8 on the cities of Port Said and Port Fouad, especially the naval arsenal in Port Fouad

Port Fouad, where fishing boats were docked. As a result of the losses, the Sector Commander Major General Omar Khaled to postpone the second attempt to a date to be determined.

Major General Saad Maamoun, commander of the Second Army, agreed to this request, pending the supply of the Port Said sector

Said sector with naval landing craft by the Armed Forces. Given that the group of pieces (Thunderbolt Company

Thunderbolt) which was landed 4 kilometers east of the Budapest Fortress

During the four days it spent in its position, it was subjected to heavy bombardment from aircraft and tank guns.

which caused heavy losses in personnel and equipment, the sector commander issued orders to return to the defensive position east of Port Fouad.

The defensive position east of Port Fouad.

Planning for the second attempt against the Hassanar

The Port Said Sector Command had the opportunity to make a second attempt to break into the Israeli fortress

following the reinforcement of the sector with the 103rd Thunderbolt Battalion (from the 139th Thunderbolt Group), which arrived from Cairo on October 11
Cairo on October 11, and ten new fiberglass boats arrived from Alexandria on October 14.

Alexandria on October 14, but their main drawback was that they were sent to the Port Said sector

without performing the necessary maintenance and without lubricating their engines.

The plan developed by Brigadier General Salah Abdel Halim, commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade

The plan was to attack the Israeli fort as follows:

1 Isolating the fortress from its supply and rescue route from the east by occupying a thunderbolt company from Battalion 103 Thunderbolt Battalion, supported by an anti-tank missile platoon (Malotka), occupying a position about 4 kilometers east of the Israeli fortress.

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2- A main attack by a company from the 103rd Thunderbolt Battalion and a company from the infantry battalion of the 135th Infantry Brigade from the east as the first coordination with a thunderbolt company in reserve.

-3 Secondary attack by elements of the infantry battalion from the 135th Infantry Brigade from the west, with An infantry company of the same battalion remains in the defensive position east of Port Fouad in reserve.

4 A naval landing carried out by the command of the infantry battalion of the 135th Infantry Brigade at the head of a reinforced infantry company (except for a platoon) with the aim of landing from the sea on the Israeli fortress directly

The basis of the attack plan

The bases on which the attack plan was built were as follows:

1- The need for air protection for the attacking force to prevent enemy aircraft from interfering during the attacking the fortress, especially for the main attack force east of the fortress due to its distance from the The air defense of the sector in order not to repeat what happened on October 6 during the first attempt the first attempt.

2- Amending the plan of attack on the fort to be from more than one direction (from the west, east, and from the north by sea) in order to be able to exploit and from the north by the sea) so that the success of any direction can be exploited by pushing the reserves towards it.

-3. The attack elements should conduct a night approach to the initial positions of the attack in order to achieve surprise and avoid the impact of enemy aviation surprise and avoid the impact of enemy aviation.

4 - Isolating the fort from the east at a distance of 4 kilometers to prevent enemy tanks and infantry from His glory.

5 Allocate a reserve (at least a company) in both directions of the attack (east and west of the fort) To reinforce the attack and exploit success.

6- Using the same attack force that made the first attempt because of its previous experience in this mission (except for Except for the five tanks and armored vehicles that were destroyed during this attempt).

7-To conduct a 30-minute artillery preparation before storming the point.

8-Hour X (i.e., the hour of the attack on the fort from the three directions) was set at four o'clock in the morning on October 15 in the morning on October 15.

Brigadier General Salah Abdel Halim, commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade, presented the decision to

to Major General Omar Khaled, the sector commander, on the morning of October 13, and after discussion, it was

It was approved and a copy was sent to the Second Army Command. The period from the night of

from the night of December 13 to October 14, the attack elements, especially the 103rd Thunderbolt Battalion, which arrived from Cairo on October 11

which arrived from Cairo on October 11, reconnoitered the area and ways to approach it through the

by sending reconnaissance patrols, setting up ambushes and conducting visual surveillance

In addition to studying the available aerial photographs of the Israeli fortress and the surrounding obstacles.

The commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade and the commanders of its sub-units during October 14/13

completed all the procedures for organizing the battle and preparing the troops for the offensive operation. By the last

light on October 14, all elements were ready to carry out the mission, and the sub-units

sub-units to take their places in the initial positions for the attack.

At seven o'clock on October 14, elements of the battle formation began to move from Port Fouad

to take their positions for the attack during the period of darkness as follows:

1 Secondary Attack Force: Moved to the first position of our forces east of Port Fouad, and took fully positioned.

103 Main Attack Force: moved from our positions east of Port Fouad under the command of the commander of the 2nd Battalion

Thunderbolt Battalion in four groups in stages through the Port Fouad navigations, and reached

their designated positions east of the point, after an arduous approach due to the nature of the loose soil in the

and the degree of salt concentration in its water, it was inevitable that the force would have to walk barefoot.

. In order to be able to navigate these salinas

15 Naval Expeditionary Force: It started sailing from Port Said port at 3:00 a.m. on October 3

October under the command of the commander of the attacking infantry battalion, and arrived at 4:30 a.m.

about half an hour late due to poor sea conditions

As a result, it was landed about one kilometer west of the fort instead of landing directly on the Israeli fortress, according to the plan.

4 Beginning late on October 14, the bombardment of the fortress began throughout the night according to a nuisance program which included artillery of all calibers and Katyusha rockets from one of the of the Port Said naval base.

The Battle of Buda Best

At 3:30 a.m. on October 15, a half-hour artillery prelude began
The artillery of the 135th Infantry Brigade and a medium artillery battalion participated. At
At 4:00 a.m., the operation to storm the Israeli fortress (Budapest) began according to the plan
according to the plan. From the west, the secondary assault force began to open fire on the fort to draw the attention of its garrison
its garrison and divert their fire to the west. From the east, the main attack force began to advance
on the coast in a westerly direction, led by the Thunderbolt Company. After a sudden approach to the
the fort, elements of the Thunderbolt Company, led by the commander of the company, were able to enter the fort.
and immediately engaged the fort's garrison. As the naval landing force had to disembark west of the fort
due to poor sea conditions, it joined the secondary assault force, and the combined force began
advance up the coast to reach the north of the point from the sea, but was soon They came under heavy fire from the direction of the fort, inflicting heavy losses, and the commander of the infantry battalion fell.
Lieutenant Colonel Ali Al-Mazahi fell as a martyr after showing great courage and rare heroism. Despite the
despite the heavy fire pouring from the fort in all directions, elements of the main attack force coming from the east managed to
elements of the main assault force coming from the east managed to get inside in the face of a torrent of enemy fire
The commander of the Thunderbolt Company, who was the first to storm the fort, was hit by several bullets, but he remained
in control of the company as it was stormed. Some elements of the secondary assault force also succeeded in
reached the berm from the north. Fierce fighting took place between the advancing elements
and the Egyptian garrison. The commander of the Israeli fort informed the commander of the enemy's northern sector
via an intercepted radio signal that he was embarrassed by the fact that some of the Egyptian assault elements had succeeded in penetrating the fort
and asked him to quickly provide him with reinforcements, especially running weapons, despite the initial success of some of the Egyptian assault elements. The initial success achieved by some Egyptian elements of the main and secondary assault forces
which was supposed to be followed by the flow of the rest of the forces behind them into the fort, the situation

soon changed to the opposite. The light of dawn was beginning to break, and the enemy aircraft came to the aid of the fort's garrison, and a flight of two Phantoms dropped their bombs
on the secondary attack forces west of the fort, and soon swooped down on them, firing a torrent of
of machine gun fire.

As for the main attack forces east of the fort, they were subjected to fierce attacks from the air in which the enemy used a number of helicopters that halted their advance. The cutting force

A Thunderbolt company supported by a rocket-propelled grenade (Malotka) platoon from its position four kilometers east of the fort

four kilometers east of al-Hasan with two companies of Israeli tanks that had advanced from the east to save the fort.

The commander of the thunderbolt company and the commanders of the thunderbolt company were killed.

The commander of the Thunderbolt Company and platoon leaders were martyred, and a large number of personnel were injured as a result of the lack of any berms in this area.

the lack of any cover in this area, but the Thunderbolt Company destroyed about 20 Israeli tanks and armored vehicles.

Israeli armored half-tracks, and a large number of enemy personnel were wounded.

The battle continued to rage between the Egyptian assault elements that were trying to advance towards the fort from the east, north, and west

the fort from the east, north and west, some of which had already succeeded in reaching its inner courtyard

the inner courtyard, and the fort's garrison, which was firing at the Egyptians from within its

and its fortified bunkers, which led to the cessation of attempts to attack the fort

Attempts to attack the fort, and thus the flow of our troops into it, stopped.

As a result of the concentration of enemy air attacks and tank fire, the enemy armored force coming from the

from the east was able to dislodge the cutting force (Thunderbolt Company) east of the fort from its positions and advance towards the fort

pressuring the main assault force as well, forcing all Egyptian forces east of the fort to retreat south.

Egyptian forces east of the fort to retreat south toward Port Fouad to reach our defense positions east of the city.

defenses east of the city. To hinder the retreat of our forces through the mallahs, four Israeli

four Israeli Skyhawk aircraft dropped fog capsules on the malahat, which led to blurred visibility

A large number of personnel were injured as a result of stumbling while walking.

Due to the deteriorating situation and the failure of the attack, the Sector Command made a phone call to Lt. Gen.

Saad Al-Shazly at Center 10 in Cairo, during which the situation was explained to him and insisted on the necessity of the parachute

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authorized to protect our forces, which did not reach the battlefield on time during the attack.

during the attack, which led to the failure of the operation. At around 8:00 a.m. on October 15

October 15, an Egyptian sortie consisting of two Sukhoi aircraft headed to the to the battlefield, and when they arrived over the Israeli fortress, the enemy's air defense shot down

One of them was shot down by the enemy's air defense, and the other returned to its base without changing the situation

After the final failure of the attack, our defensive positions east of Port Fouad came under aerial bombardment.

The sector commander asked the commander of the 135th Infantry Brigade to hold these positions until the end and to destroy any

enemy armored forces attempting to approach them. Throughout October 15, the return of personnel continued by wading through the sluices in the south to join our defensive positions east of Port Fouad where regrouping and casualty counting began. During the course of the battle, the artillery group During the course of the battle, the artillery group provided continuous support to our forces and then in the direction of Port Fouad, as well as destroying any attempt by enemy tanks to advance any attempt by enemy tanks to advance towards our defensive positions east of Port Fouad.

The Port Said regimental command did not try to repeat the attack on the Budapest fortress Budapest after the battle on October 15, so this fortress remained the only one of the fortresses of the that did not fall into the hands of Egyptian forces until the end of the war.

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Chapter Twelve Military Operations in the Red Sea Region

The name of the Red Sea Governorate was given to the vast expanse of the eastern desert that It extends from Abu al-Daraj in the north at kilometer 110 south of Suez to the Egyptian-Sudanese border Sudan in the south at 22 degrees north latitude, and from the Red Sea coast in the east to the Nile Valley in the west. to the Nile Valley in the west. The length of the governorate from north to south is about 1080 kilometers. and its width varies between 180 km and 003 km. This part of the country has remained a semi-closed area subject to a system of entry permits under the supervision of the Border Corps, until Law No. 88 of 1961 as an open area under the name of the Red Sea Governorate, and the implementation of the local administration system local administration system. In September 1968, a military zone was established for the first time Hurghada, the capital of the governorate, became the headquarters of the military zone command. The region was commanded by From its establishment until the October 1973 war, five commanders were Maj: Saleh Amin, Bahi Saleh Amin, Bahi al-Din Nawfal, Saad al-Shazly, Muhyi Ibrahim and Ibrahim Kamel Mohammed.

The Red Sea region was by virtue of its size and location before the October 1973 war was the largest military region in Egypt in terms of area and breadth of confrontation, but at the same time it was but it was also the weakest in terms of the size of the forces stationed there. Its frontage stretched from Bir Adib in the north on the Gulf of Suez to Bir Abu al-Fusun in the south on the Red Sea (about 800 kilometers), while its depth extends westward towards the Nile Valley with an average of about 100 kilometers. As for the breadth of the area, it was divided into five sub-sectors: Northern sector - Ras Ghareb Sector - Central Sector - Safaga Sector - Qena Valley Sector. In addition to these sectors, the island of Shadwan, located at the southern entrance to the Gulf of Suez and at

about 35 km from the coast, was considered a strong defensive point. The region is semi-arid.

Most of its land is mountainous desert, and the mountain ranges extend along the Red Sea coast

Moving away from it in some areas and approaching it in others. Near the coast there are

There are flat areas suitable for hostile naval landings, airdrops, or parachute drops. Rocky areas abound in the region, making it difficult to set up engineering installations or create defensive fortifications near the shore except by using explosive materials.

The region is characterized by a lack of water sources and scarce agricultural production and relies on what is brought in from the Nile Valley on what is brought in from the Nile Valley. This was made difficult by the lack of

the lack of roads connecting the Red Sea Governorate to the Nile Valley, and the absence of a railroad

Railroad between them. The governorate occupies a privileged position among the governorates of the Republic in the production of petroleum

The most important wells are located in Ras Ghareb, Ras Bakr, Amer, Karim, Shaqir, and Hurghada.

This has placed a burden on the Red Sea Military Command to preserve this national wealth

This has placed a burden on the Red Sea Military Command to preserve this national wealth and secure the oil well areas to ensure the continuation of production, which represents a major economic importance for the country Great economic importance for the country.

In the Gulf of Suez within the region, there are many islands that differ from each other

in terms of their size and distance from the shore, the most important of which are Shadwan and Giftun (northeast of Hurghada)

Hurghada) But all of them are characterized by their calcified rocky nature, which makes it difficult to equip them

engineering and defending them efficiently, so their needs should be accumulated within them to achieve self-sufficiency

of water, supplies, and ammunition. The region has several commercial ports, the most important of which are Ras Ghareb

Hurghada, Safaga, Qusair, Marsa Alam and Bernice.

Tasks assigned to the Red Sea region

Due to the great breadth of the region's confrontation with the difficulty of the availability of forces to be stationed in all threatened vital areas, it required that the method of defense of the region be based on the following principles on the following bases:

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1 Focusing the defense on vital targets, while accepting the principle of leaving large empty gaps between the islands defense.

2) Maintaining lightly mobile reserves to push against any enemy forces that succeeded in penetrating or infiltrating between the defense islands.

penetrating or infiltrating between the defense islands with the aim of eliminating them.

3-Creating conditions for the speed of pushing the reserves by choosing the most suitable routes and providing appropriate means of transportation to ensure the timely arrival of the troops to the threatened places. Threatened places .

. The necessity of continuous means of communication to achieve control over the forces 4

5 Increasing the level of self-sufficiency in appointments, water, ammunition, military engineering tools and medical needs.

6 Creating an integrated air defense system in the region, through the availability of various means of warning from surveillance points and radar stations at appropriate dimensions, to ensure that there are no gaps that are not covered by radar detection Radar detection. As well as the stationing of highly capable air defense forces (anti-aircraft guns anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles) to quickly deal with raiding aircraft.

When the Egyptian General Command's operations staff developed the modified Plan Granite II (later Plan

Badr Plan), which called for five infantry divisions to storm the Suez Canal, facing

about 160 kilometers from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south, overrun the Bar-Lev line and create a zone of bridgeheads at a depth of 12-10 km east of the canal.

on the southern Sinai region, as the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, which extends about 300 kilometers

The eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, which extends about 300 kilometers from the Shatt area in the north to the port of Al-Tur in the south, is considered an extension of the Egyptian offensive front on the

Suez Canal. It was necessary to plan military operations on this important part of the theater of the theater of operations, to protect the right flank of Egyptian forces east of the canal, and to relieve pressure on the Egyptian bridgeheads in the east, by drawing enemy reserves southward in a direction

that had not been previously planned.

In order to achieve these objectives, the operational instructions issued in March 1973

for the Red Sea Military District assigned the following tasks:

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1 With the beginning of the storming of the Suez Canal, the forces of the Red Sea Military Zone, in cooperation with Naval Base in Safage, Air Defense Forces and Air Force will be ready to carry out defensive missions in the Gulf of Suez and the coast of the Red Sea. Defense missions in the Gulf of Suez and the Red Sea coast, and securing vital targets in the region

against hostile naval and airborne landings.

2 From the first night of the Egyptian attack, the region, in cooperation with the navy and the Air Force, with the strength of two lightning battalions on the eastern shore of the Gulf in the areas of the eastern shore of the Gulf in the areas of Shratib Abu Rudeis-Abu Znaima, with the mission of destroying the enemy's vital targets, cut its lines of communication in these areas, hinder the advance of its reserves, and secure the straits in South Sinai, with the aim of achieving control of the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez between Abordis and Ras Sidr.

3- The 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division of the 3rd Army Grouping from the Shatt area towards the Ras Masla area to seize it, and then develop the attack in the direction of Abu Rudis to achieve control of the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez. in cooperation with the Thunderbolt units previously landed in South Sinai, and seize Abu Rudeis as an immediate mission (to be placed under the command of the Red Sea Military District of the Red Sea Military Zone once pushed from Ras Masla) .

Dedicated to the combat effort for the sea and air landing of thunderbolt units: 30 boats (Zodiacs) and 12 helicopter sorties (Mi8) in two waves.

4 After a mobilization pause, the Red Sea Military Zone forces (1st Infantry Brigade Mechanized Infantry Brigade in cooperation with the Thunderbolt Force and the Navy) attacked south from Abu Rudeis along the coast of the Gulf of Suez in the direction of Al-Tur and capture the Al-Tur area as a final mission as a final mission, after which the forces will shift to defense, while continuing to secure the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez of the Gulf of Suez.

5 The Red Sea Military Command controls the execution of the modified Operation Granite II by establishing a joint command center, paid in an advanced location according to the decision of the zone commander, is formed under the command of the chief of staff of the zone and includes a naval operations group. Led by the Chief of Staff of the region and includes a military operations group, a thunderbolt platoon and an air liaison officer. air liaison, with the task of controlling defensive actions in the area and carrying out landings.

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air and sea landings on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, then crossing behind the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade Mechanized Infantry Brigade on the east bank of the canal to lead its operations from the time it was pushed into engagement.

Preparations for the offensive operation
5 Description of South Sinai:

The designated area of operations for the Red Sea Military Zone forces was the Sinai

South Sinai, a triangular-shaped area whose apex is in the south at Ras Mohammed, where it meets the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba

where the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba meets the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez. The base of the triangle

in the north at the southern border of Central Sinai, with the western side of the triangle being the Gulf of Suez

while its eastern side is the Gulf of Aqaba
Southern Sinai is divided into three sections:

1The Gulf of Suez coastal area: It is bordered on the west by the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez.

and from the east the western border of the South Sinai Mountains, where an underground road runs along the sea

between Al-Shat in the north and Sharm El-Sheikh in the south, with a length of about 325 kilometers

It is about 325 kilometers long and passes through many locations, including Ayun Musa, Ras Sidr, Abu Rudis, and Al-Tur

The road runs from Al-Tur to Sharm El-Sheikh through the Sinai Mountains in the far south through Wadi

Khashabi, which is a narrow corridor about 10 kilometers long, sandwiched between mountains on the north and south sides

north and south, so it is considered one of the corridors within which movements are limited. It differs

This area varies topographically in its different parts. It is sometimes wide and flat and other times

crowded with scattered mountainous structures, making the path of mechanical campaigns limited to the asphalt road

asphalt. The most important oil fields in South Sinai are located in this area, namely Al Bala'im

Abu Rudeis, Sidr, Assal, Matarama and Firan.

2The Gulf of Aqaba Coast: This coastline starts from Ras Mohammed in the south, and extends north to Bir Taba

North to Bir Taba, and the nature of this coast is topographically different from the coast of the Gulf of Suez

as the land on the Gulf of Aqaba is limited, and there are bays and bays

The most famous of which are Marsa Breika and Sharm El Sheikh

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Sharm El Mieh, Marsa El Atat, and Marsa El Dahila at Ras Nasrani, and these marinas and bays flow into these marinas

Some of the valleys coming from the Sinai Mountains. The most important cities and locations : Sharm El Sheikh

Ras Nasrani, Dahab, Wasit, Nuweiba, and Taba.

3- The mountainous region: The highest mountain peaks in the entire Sinai are spread in this region, and it is called

called Tor Sinai, and it is one of the most rugged places in Sinai and the world, and it consists of several mountain peaks

about 15 mountain peaks, the most famous of which is Mount Moses, with a height of 2,285 meters above sea level

2285 meters above sea level, Mount Manajat, which is about 1854 meters above sea level

and Mount St. Catherine, whose summit is 2637 meters above sea level, which is the highest peak in Sinai.

the highest peak in Sinai

Preparations :

The forces placed under the command of the Red Sea Military District consisted of:

Two infantry brigades (independent), the 132nd Thunderbolt Group, two air defense brigades, three battalions border vehicles, 3 security and guard battalions, and an independent tank battalion. The area was reinforced prior to 136th Thunderbolt Group to carry out sea and air landing operations on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez
eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez.

Preparing for the sea and air landing operations in South Sinai was an arduous task

It was different from any other operations of the Thunderbolt Forces along the front.

In addition to the fact that they were separate and distant operations from our forces separated from them by a large water barrier

the Gulf of Suez, which is between 25 and 50 kilometers wide, it would have taken place in a

a theater of operations characterized by its difficult nature, rugged mountains and harsh living conditions.

A lot of study and many preparations were required.

The Red Sea Command began immediately after receiving the instructions of the Operations Authority in March

1973 to study the operation to be carried out thoroughly, to find out the best means and methods

to cross the Gulf of Suez and land on its eastern shore. For the landing

The aircraft take-off areas were identified on the western shore of the Gulf. In the light of

careful study of aerial photographs, large-scale maps, reconnaissance and information reports, the

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on the eastern side of the Gulf of Suez and identified

Helicopter routes to maximize the safety of the helicopters while carrying out their missions

without being exposed to radar detection or enemy fire. As for the naval landings, the

in cooperation with Brig. Gen. Gomaa Ibrahim, commander of the naval base,

identified sailing areas for our forces on the western shore of the Gulf

for our forces on the western shore of the Gulf, and the selection of naval landing areas on its eastern shore

as well as determining the routes of naval boats across the Gulf.

In addition, studies were made of the loading area for our forces and the timing of

for takeoff and sailing so that the forces would be over their targets on time.

Since the Joint Command Center was to be located in the Marsa Thalmut area, engineering preparations began with the construction of pits

engineering preparations began with the construction of pits, shelters, head covers, and filling points, and these preparations were completed on September 11, 1973.

on September 11, 1973. At the same time, the Chief Signal Officer

secured control communications with the command center by establishing a telecommunications network

and telecommunications between the center, the area command, the sub-sector commands with take-off and sailing areas, and the command of the

and sailing areas and the command of the Thunderbolt Group.

In accordance with the instructions of the Area Command, the sailing areas were equipped with engineering equipment to protect personnel and boats when occupying them, and securing wired and wireless communications between the sailing areas the initial assembly areas and with the joint command center in Thulmat. Instructions were issued on September 27, 1973 to secure the sailing and take-off areas as follows:

1 Northern Sector:

The air takeoff area in Thalmat is secured by a force consisting of an infantry company, an anti-aircraft squadron and a field artillery company. anti-aircraft and field artillery companies.

The sailing area at the Thalmat anchorage - secured by a force consisting of an infantry company, an anti-aircraft company and a field artillery company. An anti-aircraft company and a field artillery battalion (except for a company).

2 Ras Ghareb Sector:

Sailing area in Ras Ruhmi - secured by a thunderbolt company (from the 132nd Thunderbolt Group). Thunderbolt) An anti-aircraft company and an 82mm mortar company.

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On September 26, 1973, the 136th Thunderbolt Group, led by Colonel A.H. Kamal Attia, and was stationed in the Talimat area in the northern sector of the region.

The operations group was formed to manage the Joint Command Center under the command of Brig. Gen. Ibrahim Rashid, Chief of Staff of the Red Sea Region, and was joined by an operations group from 136th Thunderbolt Group under the command of Colonel Kamal Attia and a naval operations group under the command of Brigadier General Ali Ghanem, Chief of Staff of the Naval Base in Safaga, along with 9 officers, 06 NCOs and soldiers. NCOs and soldiers, as well as a liaison officer from the Air Force. Training was conducted. The operations group leadership was trained in conquest and relocation from September 25 to September 30 September 25 through September 30, 1973.

The success of the naval and airborne landings depended primarily on the element of surprise. Surprise, so it was essential to maintain complete secrecy during the preparatory phase. It was This necessitated the non-use of radios in communications. Since the locations of the of the elements involved in the operation, such as sailing assembly areas, sailing areas, and the airfield were separated by long distances, sometimes more than 50 kilometers, and it was not easy to arrange for direct communications. It was not easy to arrange direct communication by telephone due to the unavailability of wire lines. Therefore, the commander of the operations group instructed the group's signal chief to utilize civilian overhead telephone lines to achieve communication between the various elements involved in the operation. This was achieved well before the end of October 5.

Transition to offensive operations

5 Procedures for organizing the battle.

In accordance with the operational instructions issued on September 26, 1973, the readiness of the was raised to redundant status at 8:00 a.m. on September 28, and to full status on October 1.

on October 1, and the battle organization process was conducted at the battalion level until September 30

on September 30, and company and platoon levels on October 1 and 2.

from the first minute on October 5, and units were positioned to secure sailing and landing points.

to secure sailing and take-off points as of 5:00 a.m. on October 6.

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On October 3, 22 rubber boats arrived from Alexandria

(Zodiacs and four Bertram boats 11 boats were pushed to the northern sector

(Zodiacs and two Bertram boats from Safaga to the Ras Ghareb sector on the same day

in preparation for landing operations.

On October 4 and 5, the Sea Operations Group moved to the Joint Command Center in Ras Thalmat in groups. Ras Thalmat is located about 7 kilometers south of Zafarana

Zafarana. The joint command center was located in the mountainous area about 3 kilometers from Marsa

about 3 kilometers to the west. The command center was set up in complete secrecy, which made the enemy unable to discover its location until the enemy was unable to discover its location until the end of the war.

To achieve administrative security, all types of needs such as fuel, appointments, and water were stockpiled on the specified dates before the start of the war.

and water were stockpiled on time before the start of the war operations, and all the quantities of ammunition

and military engineer materials required for the entire period of operations, and this was done on October 4, 5, and 6

October 4, 5, and 6, and they were stockpiled and distributed in different areas to provide concealment and protection, while utilizing some of the engineering equipment that existed before.

As soon as the operations group arrived at the joint command center in Ras Thulmat, Brig. Gen.

Brigadier General Ibrahim Rashid, the commander of the group, indoctrinated the naval and air landings plan to the commanders

Weapon groups, and a process of organizing cooperation for all phases of the battle including

The supply of troops after landing on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez under various conditions.

At 4 p.m. on October 5, Major General Ibrahim Kamel, commander of the area, sent to the commander of the

Operations Group commander at Ras Thalmut, a liaison officer, with a top-secret envelope in which he recorded

inside which was the hour the armed forces were scheduled to begin offensive operations on October 6, 1973

The commander of the operations group, having determined the X hour, issued his final orders to the commanders of the joint groups.

of the joint groups, specifying the final timing of the sea and air landings and the takeoff areas

for helicopters and sailing areas for boats.

sea and air landings:

The plan was to land the two thunderbolt battalions (from the 136th Thunderbolt Group) at
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the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, two companies were to be airlifted and four companies were to be airlifted

by sea landing, according to the following system:

7 airlift: A thunderbolt company supported by an anti-tank platoon and 1 October, so that 7/6 from Talimat Airport on the night of 8 by seven helicopters (Mei at 5:15 p.m. over the center of the Gulf, with the drop zone to be north of Abu Rudeis. The other thunderbolt company, supported by a counter-platoon, will be transported by helicopters from the same airport on the same night, with 5 tanks to be determined by the timing of the takeoff by the operations group, with the drop zone to be east of Wadi Firan

2- Naval landings: 4 thunderbolt companies are transported as follows:

1- Thunderbolt company from the Ras Ruhmi area on the night of October 7/6 by 11 boats (Zodiac) and two boats (Bertram) for escort to the area north of Ras Shratib (the distance is about 33 kilometers).

B - Thunderbolt Company from Marsa Thulmat on the night of October 7/6 by 11 boats (Zodiac) and a boat (Bertram) for escort (Bertram) to the area south of Abu Znaima (a distance of about 40 kilometers). The company is reinforced by an anti-tank platoon transported to the area on the night of October 7/8 By 6 Zodiac boats and 1 Bertram boat for escort.

c. A lightning company from Marsa Thulmat on the night of October 6/7 by 11 Zodiac boats and a Bertram boat (Bertram) guard boat to the area south of Ras Stadium (Jebel Hamam Pharaon), a distance of about 25 kilometers About 25 kilometers.

D - Thunderbolt Company from Marsa Thulmat on the night of October 8/7 by 11 boats (Zodiac) and a boat (Bertram) for escort (Bertram) guard boat to the area north of Ras Lajiyeh (Ras Lajiyeh) The distance is about 23 kilometers.

3 Landing operations that were abhorred:

The airdrop of a thunderbolt company was completed at 5:15 p.m. from Al-Talimat Airport to the area north of Abu Rudeis with a force of 5 helicopters (Mi 8 helicopters

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Reconnaissance to the Ras Shratib area with the strength of one helicopter. 5 helicopters returned helicopters . The commander of the air unit reported that the airdrop in the Abu Rudeis area was carried out under

enemy pressure, making it difficult to make a second flight to the same area. And at

7:45 p.m., the airdrop of the other company was carried out to the Ras Shratib area with a force of 5 helicopters.

B- At the last light on October 6, it was not possible to carry out the maritime landing of the four thunderbolt companies that was planned to be carried out due to the inoperability of most of the rubber boats

(Zodiacs), despite repeated attempts to overcome their technical failures. The commander of the operations group proposed replacing the landing vehicle with a helicopter.

This proposal was endorsed by the Area Commander and the Operations Authority. This required modifying the original of the original landing sites to accommodate airlift, as well as modifying the loading schedules and locations of the positioning of the Thunderbolt units (in coordination with Colonel A.H. Kamal Attia, commander of the 136th Thunderbolt Group Thunderbolt Group).

At 8:40 p.m. on October 8, eight helicopters eight helicopters landed a thunderbolt company in the area south of Abu Znaima, and at 8:30 p.m. on the same day the same day, two helicopters made an air supply flight to the thunderbolt units in Ras Shratib

and Abu Rudis. Five minutes before midnight, a thunderbolt company was landed in the area north of

Lajiyeh with six helicopters, thus four Thunderbolt companies and some support platoons were successfully airlifted

were successfully airlifted after being limited to helicopter transportation only. Our losses were

were two helicopters, one of which was shot down on October 6 and the other on October, and that was after the completion of the evacuation operation.

The development of operations on the axis of Ayoun Moussa Abu Rudeis

The General Command's planning for the military operations to be conducted under the

Red Sea Military District Command in the Sinai region is summarized as follows:

1 Landing two thunderbolt battalions of the 136th Thunderbolt Group on the night of October 7/6 on the beach

on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez in the areas of Sharatib - Abu Rudais - Abu Znaima, with the mission of destroying targets

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The mission was to destroy the enemy's vital targets, cut off its lines of communication in these areas, hinder the advance of its reserves, and secure the straits in South Sinai.

the straits in South Sinai, with the aim of achieving control of the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez between between Ras Sidr and Abu Rudeis.

2 After the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division crossed the Suez Canal

on the night of October 7/6, it will be placed under the command of the Third Army and will be ready to push for engagement as of

from 5:00 a.m. on October 7 with the aim of capturing Ras Masla (17 kilometers south of the beach). Beginning at first light on October 8, the brigade will push to engage from the area of Ras Masla (to be removed from the Third Army's command as of this time and

placed
under the command of the Red Sea Military Zone).

Its mission is to develop the attack at Abu Rudeis to achieve control of the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez of the Gulf of Suez, in cooperation with thunderbolt units previously landed in South Sinai.

He captures Abu Rudeis as a direct mission. After a tactical pause, the attack is developed in cooperation with the Thunderbolts and the Navy to seize the Al-Tur area as a final mission.

3-The Red Sea Military Command controls the execution of the modified Operation Granite 2

By establishing a joint command center managed by an operations group, the operations group was formed

commanded by Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Rashid, Chief of Staff of the region, and joined by a

A naval operations group led by Brigadier General A.H. Ali Ghanem, a Thunderbolt operations group led by Colonel A.H.

Kamal Attia and an air liaison officer, tasked with carrying out air and naval landings on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez

on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez. Once this is completed, the operation group crosses the Suez Canal

to the east bank to the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade's operational command from the time it was pushed to engage

from Ras Masla.

The naval and airborne landings on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez were not carried out

According to the plan, two thunderbolt companies were to be transported by airlift and four thunderbolt companies were to be transported by and 4 thunderbolt companies by airlift and 4 thunderbolt companies by sea-lift, as the sea-lift operation was completely canceled due to the unsuitability of most of the boats.

due to the unserviceability of most of the rubber boats (Zodiacs), which led to the replacement of the

the means of delivery to be airborne by helicopter. Consequently, only 4 Thunderbolt companies only. On the night of October 6/7, two companies and a reconnaissance platoon were landed in the area of Ras

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On the night of October 9/8, two companies were airdropped, one in the area south of Abu Znaima and the second in the area north of Lajhiyah. At 8:30 p.m. on October 8, two helicopters

two helicopters made an air supply flight to the thunderbolt units in Ras Shratib and Abu Rudeis.

The transfer of the operations group to the Third Army sector

According to the plan, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was scheduled to cross the Suez Canal

on the night of October 7/6, but due to delays in the construction of the bridges of the 19th Infantry Division-which

on which the 1st Brigade was scheduled to cross, due to the difficulty of opening passages in the berm

east of the canal in this sector, this delayed the 1st Brigade's crossing by about 48 hours

It was not able to cross until the night of October 9/8. At 10:00 a.m. on October 9

October 9, the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was pushed from its assigned line of defense inside the bridgehead of the of the 19th Infantry Division, and no more than 75 minutes into the move, the forward detachment (consisting of a mechanized infantry battalion with B3 armored vehicles and the brigade's brigade tanks) managed to capture the Israeli fortified position at Ayoun Moussa (about 10 kilometers south of Al Shatta). about 10 kilometers south of Shatt) without a fight. The Israeli garrison fled when it sensed the approach of the Egyptian brigade due to the collapse of the morale of its personnel after they learned that the Bar-Lev line had fallen and that their position had become isolated. The Israeli position at Ayoun Moussa included six long-range 155mm howitzers mounted on concrete bases, which were a constant threat to the city of Suez during the Istishlal War. a constant threat to the city of Suez during the War of Attrition. The forward detachment continued continued to advance south towards Ras Sidr, followed by the two rear battalions. At 4:30 p.m. the forward detachment encountered an Israeli force estimated at about a company of tanks supported by 106mm rocket-propelled grenades and an artillery battery that was occupying Jabal al-Maraza (about 7 km south of Ayoun Musa). about 7 kilometers south of Oyoun Musa). The forward detachment was forced to halt due to the the Israeli force controlled the axis of advance, and the 1st Brigade's formation stopped advancing. The brigade command and the two rear battalions occupied positions in the vicinity of the Oyoun Musa area.

Although, according to the plan, the 1st Brigade was not supposed to be placed under the command of the Red Sea Military District until after it had been pushed into engagement from the designated push line south of Ras
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Masala, the brigade's poor tactical and moral conditions due to its exposure to air bombardment

prompted the General Command to issue instructions to the Red Sea Command to quickly

to send the operations group, whose tasks, according to the plan, included crossing behind the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade to the east bank of the canal to lead its operations in the direction of Abordis (details of the first phase are described in Chapter Three). At about 2:00 p.m. on October 9, the on October 9, General Ibrahim Kamel, Commander of the Red Sea Region, issued an order to Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Rashid, commander of the operations group, to prepare to move to the sector of the Third Army sector

At 3:30 p.m., the group's march began after it was separated from the

Navy and Thunderbolt groups, and the group reached its position in the area of kilometer 98

Cairo-Suez road at 8:00 p.m. on October 9, consisting of the group's commander

Lieutenant Colonel A.H. Mohammed Youssef, the operations officer, a signal officer, a reconnaissance officer, and a supply and logistics officer.

reconnaissance officer, supply officer, and logistics officer.
radio vehicles. At 4 a.m. on October 10, Lt. Gen.
Chief of Staff telephoned the Commander of the Operations Group at the Third
Army Command and informed him that a representative from the
from the Operations Staff was on his way with instructions for the 1st
Mechanized Infantry Brigade's mission
He would also give him some important verbal advice to keep in mind when
executing the brigade's mission
the brigade's mission. At 7:50 a.m. on October 10, the
Colonel Hassan al-Zayyat arrived at the main command center of the Third Army
Third Army's main command center. He informed the commander of the Operations
Group that the orders of the General Commander, General Ahmed Ismail

stipulates the following:

- 1 The mission of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade in battle groups after last
light on October 10
from the line south of Ras Masla in the direction of Ras Sather and the western
entrance to the Sidr Strait.
Contact is made with the thunderbolt force that was landed in the strait.
- 2-These areas will be captured before first light on October 11.
- 3-The Third Army secures the advance of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade as
recorded in the plan.
- 4 The 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade is placed under the command of the Red Sea
Operations Group

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which in turn is placed under the command of the Third Army, until the brigade
is re-propelled from the line

south of Ras Sudr.

Col. Hassan al-Zayat added that Lieutenant General Shazly recommended that the
brigade's combat actions be conducted during the night and in groups
at night and in groups. The commander of the Red Sea Operations Group wanted to
wanted to clarify with the operations staff representative what mission his
group could perform during the
in the run-up to the brigade's push from Ras Sudr, as there are no forces other
than the 1st Brigade
under the group's command, while the brigade has a full brigade command with all
its branches, but
Colonel Zayyat could not explain this strange combination (i.e., placing a group
command
with limited capabilities above a brigade command with full command and control
capabilities.)
All he could justify was that it was a morale issue because the General
Headquarters felt
that the brigade had low morale and lacked the determination to fulfill the
mission.

At 9:45 a.m., the commander of the operations group met with Maj. Gen.
Abdel Moneim Wasel at his advanced command center, attended by Colonel Hassan
al-Zayyat.
The Third Army Commander's instructions to the Operations Group Commander were
The instructions of the Third Army Commander to the commander of the Operations
Group were as follows:

1-The crossing of the Operational Group to the east of the Canal will take place on October 10.

2-The crossing of the operation group on one of the Third Army crossings is given precedence after the crossing of the ammunition of the units of the

First echelon

2-The group's car will be tightened before the movement of all specialized data

At noon, a group commander and Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed Youssef, the group's operations officer

They crossed the canal in a radio-controlled vehicle and were careful, due to the crowded crossings, to

In order to reach the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade quickly, the vehicle came under heavy Israeli artillery fire

The vehicle was heavily shelled by Israeli artillery in the area of the crossing, and then later in the area of the 7th Infantry Brigade of the 19th Infantry Division.

At 2:00 p.m., Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Rashid, the group commander, arrived in the area

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to the rear of the 1st Brigade, where he met with Colonel Majed Dunya, the brigade's chief of staff, who was heading

He said he was on his way to meet with the Third Army commander to clarify the First Brigade's position in terms of losses and poor morale

in terms of the extent of losses and the poor morale of the brigade as a result of the hostile aerial bombardment.

The brigade commander did not approve of this action by the brigade chief of staff and ordered him to return with him to the brigade command

Brigade command . At 3:00 p.m., the group commander arrived with the chief of staff at the brigade headquarters

Upon arrival, he immediately informed Brigadier General A.H. Salah Zaki, the Brigade Commander, of the mission assigned to his brigade

Brigadier General Salah Zaki informed the Brigade Commander of the mission assigned to his brigade.

After the brigade commander clarified his mission, he presented the brigade's position to the commander of the operations group

The brigade's position was summarized as follows:

1. The brigade's combat efficiency does not allow it to carry out the assigned mission or any part of it, due to

Low morale and lack of key elements in the brigade as a result of the aerial bombardment

on October 9 and October 01.

2) His control over the brigade is limited due to the loss of communication with some units.

due to the presence of a percentage of stragglers in the various sub-units and the inability of the commanders

his units could not control them.

3The failure of some administrative elements to join the brigade, which affects the brigade's combat efficiency, especially the ammunition situation

Ammunition situation.

4 Lack of accurate and detailed information about the enemy on its axis of advance.

After the brigade commander finished presenting his position, Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Rashid issued the following instructions to the brigade commander The following instructions :

1) The losses are to be accurately counted immediately by the sub-unit commanders.

2- On the night of October 11/10, the brigade will carry out a battle group attack on the Ras Masala area, with the aim of raising the morale of the brigade's units.

In order to raise the morale of the brigade's units and instill confidence in their ability to fight

and minimize the exposure of the brigade's forces to air strikes, as close contact with the

with the enemy will prevent the Israeli air force from launching attacks on the brigade. The attack will be developed

The attack will be developed the following night to achieve the brigade's mission.

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3 The necessary elements from all brigade units will be allocated to collect stragglers during the night of

October 11/10.

4 The brigade's sub-units are immediately repositioned and repositioned in such a way that they can meet any threat from the enemy

. Arrange for wired communications by telephone with subunits to achieve control 5

October 11/10 to the Ras Sidr area to obtain 11/10 Afd-6 night reconnaissance group

information about the enemy.

At 5:10 p.m. on October 5, Brig. Gen.

Rashid with a signal to Major General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, carried by Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Qader

Al-Hamahmi, the liaison officer of the Third Army Command, to avoid transmitting it by radio for fear of being picked up.

: by the enemy. The text of the signal was as follows, according to official records

: The brigade's position is as follows

The brigade was subjected to heavy aerial bombardment yesterday and today.

-.25 anti-aircraft artillery and one and a half companies - personnel .20 Topaz vehicles .50 tanks

Engineer equipment, chemical equipment, a company of guided projectiles and a company of self-propelled anti-tank guns.

Movement 09.- Morale is low. The brigade commander requests support with tanks, reimbursement of the

for guided projectiles and paying his administrative demands quickly, as well as supporting the rest of the elements. Motion to postpone

: The brigade's operation until its morale is restored, which requires the following

. Trying to minimize enemy air activity over the brigade area in any way 1

. -Reinforcing the brigade with some elements that have suffered heavy losses 2

Any missions of any other forces adjacent or behind this brigade to eliminate the feeling of Haydut-2

. Working on a separate axis

-Army command's communication with the brigade command is through the brigade's transportation, due to the lack of 4.
. Joining the rest of the group's column in the crossing due to the congestion of the crossingsâ

At 3:00 a.m. on October 11, an officer arrived at the 1st Brigade's staging area.
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contact from the Third Field Army Command, with a signal to the Red Sea Operations Group

It included the following:

- 1) The 1st Brigade will be stationed in the area of Oyouun Moussa, and will remain in this area until the brigade is restored.
- 2- The brigade will be completed and the losses will be compensated in coordination with the different branches of the Third Army Command.
Third Army.
- 3- The defense of the positioning area is organized with attention to digging, concealment and camouflage.
- 4- Attention is paid to raising the morale of the soldiers.
- 5 -Communication with the Third Army Command is achieved with a detailed report.

The secret of the signal that caused discomfort in Center 10

It became clear from the course of events and what was revealed after the war, that the signal sent by the the Red Sea Operations Group commander to General Abdel Moneim Wasel, which was carried by Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Qader al-Hamahmi, the liaison officer of the Third Army Command, at around 5:00 p.m. on October 10 on October 10, in which he noted the losses of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade and concluded with his suggestion to postpone the brigade's operation until its morale was restored.
of anxiety and discomfort in the General Headquarters, Center 10, in a way that was not expected at all.
The reality of what happened inside Center 10 as a result of this signal is clear from what Lt. Gen. Shazly on page 243 of his memoirs, where he said: 1During the day of October 10, elements of the Elements of the 1st Infantry Brigade advanced south and occupied the positions of Ayoun Moussa. During the night of October 11/10 October 11, we received a dangerous signal that caused concern and alarm. The signal said: â The 1st Infantry Brigade has lost â The 1st Infantry Brigade has lost 90 men, weapons and equipment. The information coming to us from the Third Army and the 19th Infantry Division indicated that the 1st Infantry Brigade had completely lost contact with all the commands, so no one knew for sure what had happened to the brigade. I sent a senior liaison officer to the front with the task of gathering facts about this brigade2 .
Analyzing Shazly's statements on this subject, the following facts are clear:
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1 - The signal that reached Center 10 on the night of October 11/10, which was described as dangerous. which stated that the 1st Infantry Brigade had lost 90 of its men, weapons and equipment, included This is undoubtedly incorrect and can be confirmed by reviewing the text of the signal sent by the Commander of the Operations Group to the Commander of the Third Army, which we have already recorded.

2- It is strange that Al-Shazly mentions that the information they were receiving in the 10th position from the from the Third Army and the 19th Infantry Division indicates a complete loss of communication between the First Brigade with all the commands, since it is proven that the communication between the First Brigade and the Third Army's command was strong and continuous, both before and after the arrival of the Red Sea Operations Group arrival. The brigade commander sent several radio signals to the Third Army Command, including one that arrived at 8:30 a.m. One of them arrived at 8:30 a.m. on October 10, while the the operations group commander and the operations staff delegate (Colonel A.H. Hassan al-Zayat) at the Third Army's main command center It reported that the brigade was under heavy aerial bombardment.

3- The communication between the Red Sea Operations Group and the Third Army's headquarters continues to be the same after the arrival of the group commander to the brigade's positioning area, although the means of communication the means of communication was limited to a method that is considered the most secure in terms of maintaining secrecy confidentiality, the use of liaison officers to hand-deliver signals. From the records of the of the war, it is clear that the commander of the Red Sea Group, Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim Rashid and General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, exchanged four signals on October 11/10 through liaison officers. At 5:00 p.m. on October 10, the commander of the operations group sent on October 10 to the commander of the Third Army, a signal carried by Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Qader al-Hamahmi, the Third Army's liaison officer, and sent him another signal at 10:00 a.m. on October 11 at 10:00 a.m. on October 11, carried by a liaison officer from the operations group. On the other hand, General Abdel Moneim Wasel sent two signals to Brigadier General H. Ibrahim Rashid on October 11. October 11, the first at 3:00 a.m., which included his decision on the mission of the was brought to the brigade's command by a liaison officer from the Third Army. was at 2:00 p.m. and contained the Third Army Commander's instructions to the commander of the operations group, which was brought to the brigade command by Lieutenant Colonel Abdelkader

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Al-Hamahmi, the liaison officer of the Third Army. How can it then be said that communication was between the First Brigade and all the commands?

4 Analyzing the two signals exchanged between the Operations Group and the Third Army Command on the night of October 11/10, the very night that Al-Shazly mentioned that they received at the 10th position

the dangerous signal that caused concern and discomfort, two very important things become clear to us
importance: The first is that after the Operational Group Command sent the signal recording the losses of the First Brigade to the Third Army Command of the 1st Brigade's losses to the Third Army Command, the Army Command responded with a signal that
that included the decision taken by the Third Army Commander. A review of this decision, which we have already mentioned
it is clear that this decision does not reflect any anxiety or discomfort, nor does it indicate that any confusion has occurred in the Third Army Command as a result of the signal
in the command of the Third Army as a result of the signal that included the losses of the brigade.
in fact, the decision was logical and confronted the bad situation the brigade had become in with sound tactical measures
sound tactical measures. Secondly, the speed with which the response to the signal from the commander of the
The time difference between the recorded time of the group commander's signal, which was 5:00 p.m. on October 10, and the
5:00 p.m. on October 10 and the Third Army commander's recorded response time of 3:00 a.m. on October 11
of 3:00 a.m. on October 11, ten hours is a short time for the
operational conditions, especially if we deduct, as we must, the travel time it would have taken for the two
for the two liaison officers to get from Ayoun Moussa to the army headquarters and vice versa.
This shows how much attention the Third Army Command paid to responding to the signal.

5 The distance between the right border of the 19th Infantry Division and the Ayoun Moussa area is no more than 8 kilometers.
can be traveled by car in a time calculated in minutes, so can it be said that communication was completely lost
between the 1st Brigade and all the commands at a time when it was possible to send any representative
from the 19th Infantry Division command could have been sent to the meow area and returned an hour later at the latest
with all the required information, assuming that all means of communication had been cut off.
In fact.

6- If we accept that a dangerous signal was sent to Post 10 on the night of October 11/10 with this disturbing news about the first brigade
this disturbing news about the First Brigade, would it have been better to send a high-ranking officer from
to travel the distance from Cairo to Ayoun Moussa in

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about 12 hours, as was indeed the case, or was the speed required to get to the
the truth would have required that a senior official in the Third Army be assigned the task of going

to go immediately to the location of the brigade and investigate the matter in a few hours at most, (this task could have been
For example, Major General A.H. Abdel Ghaffar Hegazy, Assistant Commander of the Third Army, could have been assigned this task
if such a senior officer had to be sent), and he was, of course, better able by virtue of his
by virtue of his position to understand the situation and quickly get the required information.

It is interesting to note that Lieutenant General Shazly did not mention in his memoirs the source from which Center 10 received this dangerous signal, and there is no doubt that it is unlikely that the command of the Third Army Command, which was responsible for the First Brigade's operation, was the source of this signal. All its actions, communications, and decisions regarding the First Brigade are completely contradictory to the information Al-Shazly reported in his memoirs.

At 10:00 a.m. on October 11, the commander of the operations group sent the a report that included the real losses suffered by the 1st Mechanized Brigade as a result of the It was clear from it that the demoralizing effect of this bombardment exceeded the physical impact by far. This is related to the training level of the brigade and the success of its inoculation for battle.

At 1:00 p.m. on October 11, Major General Al-Adawi Nassef arrived at the brigade's Brigadier General Al-Adawi Nassef arrived at the brigade's position as a representative of the 10th Center, accompanied by Brigadier General Abul Fath Muharram, commander of the 6th Infantry Division Mechanized Division, to which the 1st Brigade is attached. General Al-Adawi asked the brigade commander why why he stopped advancing the previous two nights and did not take advantage of the hours of darkness to continue moving The brigade commander assured him that the reason for the halt was due to the intensity of the rocket shelling of Al-Adar and the lack of defense The brigade commander assured him that the reason for the halt was due to the intensity of the air bombardment of Al-Adar, the lack of effective air defense within his units, and the lack of an air effort to help him.

At two o'clock in the afternoon, in the presence of the representative of the General Command and the commander of the 6th Division Mechanized Infantry, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Qader al-Hamahmi, the liaison officer of the Third Army, arrived carrying new combat instructions issued by the General Headquarters in Cairo, which stipulated the cancelation of the mission of the the 1st Brigade's mission to capture Ras Sudr and place it under the command of Brig. Gen. Afifi, commander of the 19th Infantry Division, and placing the Red Sea Operations Group under the command of

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Third Army, and to blow up the 6 howitzers at the strong point in Eyouun. Moussa due to information that the brigade's position is threatened by an attack by an Israeli armored brigade expected to arrive in two to three hours. This information was later proven to be that this information had no basis in reality.

At 4 p.m. on October 11, the General Command delegate and the commander of the 6th Division Mechanized Infantry and the Red Sea Operations Group left the Oyoun Moussa area, and the The operations group joined the Third Army's headquarters at 8:00 p.m. At at 10:00 a.m. on October 12, the group commander was informed that instructions had been issued from Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, that the Red Sea

Operations Group would join its original
its original command. At 11 a.m. on October 13, the group returned
operations back to the joint command center in Ras Thulmat.

Why the operation to capture the Gulf of Suez failed
Despite the best preparations made by the Red Sea Area Command in Hurghada
and the Operations Command in Ras Thalmut, to carry out the tasks assigned to it
in Plan Granite II
in accordance with the instructions issued by the War Department in March '73,
the results realized were disappointing.
realized were disappointing. The primary mission of the plan
was to conduct a coordinated operation in the southern Sinai involving the 1st
Brigade
Mechanized Infantry (from the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division) and two
battalions of the 136th Thunderbolt Group.
Its immediate objective is to capture Abu Rudeis (140 kilometers south of El
Shatt)
Its ultimate goal is to control the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez, which is
about
300 kilometers.
The execution of this mission served two main purposes: The first was military,
to protect the right flank of Egyptian forces east of the canal
to protect the right flank of the Egyptian forces east of the canal and relieve
pressure on the bridgeheads they had erected
after crossing the canal, by drawing enemy reserves southward in a direction
that was not part of its planning
in his planning. The second was to seize the rich oil well areas located on the
eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez.
on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez, namely Bala'im Berri, Bala'im Bahri,
and Abu Rudeis.
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Sidr, Asal, Matarama and Firan, thus restoring this wealth that Egypt lost after
the June 67 war.
June 67 and deprive the enemy of it, which leads to its economic loss and
affects its capabilities
Muskrat .

The planning for this operation was based on the fact that while the 1st
Infantry Brigade
Mechanized Infantry Brigade to engage from its assigned line of defense in the
sector of the 19th Infantry Division (the right wing of the
of the Third Army) from 5:00 a.m. on October 7 to advance south on the
Two battalions of the 136th Thunderbolt Group, which was commanded by
commanded by Colonel A.H. Kamal Attia, were landed by sea and air on the night
of October 7/6 on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez
on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez in the areas of Shratib, Abu Rudeis and
Abu Znaima (about
50 kilometers) to destroy the enemy's vital targets in these areas, cut its
lines of communication, disrupt its reserves, and secure the straits.
its reserves and secure the straits. The primary objective of the Thunderbolt
operations was to pave the way
for the advance of the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was commanded by
Brigadier General Salah Zaki, so that
so that it could successfully accomplish its immediate mission of capturing
Abordis. But this
This joint operation with long-range objectives failed from the beginning due to
errors in planning and execution.
the result was that the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was unable to advance
beyond the Oyoum Moussa area.
to advance beyond the Ayoun Moussa area (about 10 kilometers south of Al-Shat),
and the

only four companies were landed on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez. The operation was canceled due to the impossibility of naval landings and was limited to aerial landings by helicopters. The mission assigned to the Thunderbolt forces in South Sinai was based on their own capability. Sinai was based on their own ability to remain in the positions they were assigned to occupy for occupation for only 48 to 27 hours, which is the period allowed by their armament and the. Their armament and supplies allow them to hold their positions until they are joined by the following, according to the plan -the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade, otherwise the force risked annihilation or capture. With the 1st Brigade halted in the Oyoum Moussa area, the Thunderbolt Force in the south was faced with the most difficult situation one of the most difficult situations, as the operations organization did not have a planned exchange plan in place to pick them up if the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was unable to reach them. The 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade was unable to reach them, so that they could be returned to their bases on the western side of the Gulf. In this situation, the Thunderbolt Force in South Sinai was severely jeopardized, with the enemy exterminating and capturing

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Some of them were wiped out, while others failed to reach the Third Army's bridgehead after being forced to walk on foot in the to march on foot northward for more than 120 kilometers, amidst very difficult terrain and the Shah Mountains very rugged terrain and high mountains, while being careful to hide during the day and move during the night at night for fear of being detected by enemy air reconnaissance. A third group led by Captain Abdel Hamid Khalifa and Lieutenant Magdy Shehata had to merge with the local and lived with them for about six months until they were able to rejoin our forces. back into our forces.

Lessons learned from the naval landing operation. The maritime insertion operation was canceled, which called for the insertion of a thunderbolt company from the area of Ras Ruhmi and 3 thunderbolt companies from Ras Thalmat marina on the night of October 7/6, after it became clear that the number of usable boats was no more than five out of 33 security boats (Zodiacs and DLKs) that had been earmarked for the landings. Following a rapid assessment of the situation, the Red Sea Operations Group proposed replacing the to be replaced by helicopter airlift, which was endorsed by the Area Commander and the Operations Authority. The proposal was endorsed by the Area Commander and the Operations Authority. This required modifying the original landing sites to accommodate the airlift, as well as. The loading schedules and positioning of thunderbolt units were also modified. The inspection of the technical committee formed by the Red Sea Naval Base Command after the ceasefire that the boats were designed to operate in a sea no larger than 02 and that all the malfunctions that occurred were the result of seawater mixing with gasoline, which led to. This often happens when the seas are stronger than sea level 2, as the water covers the back of the boat. In this case, the entire back of the boat. There is no doubt that it was a serious mistake from the beginning.

that the Operations Authority planned to use such inflatable boats for landing operations in the Gulf of Suez for distances ranging from 25 to 04 kilometers, as they are not suitable. due to their high rate of fuel consumption. For short distances, and at a sea level of no more than These technical inspections should have been carried out to find out the truth about their properties and capabilities before their participation in actual operations, so as not to disrupt the naval landings when they start
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as it did, which resulted in the cancellation of the sea-launching operation that was to be carried out by 4 thunderbolt companies would eventually be airlifted. This added new burdens on the helicopters, which had previously been used to airlift two Thunderbolt companies by air. As a result, the airdrop of sapper forces on the on the eastern coast of the Gulf was limited to four companies instead of six, which was the maximum that those responsible for the airdrop were able to carry out in the difficult conditions they were facing at the time. due to the loss of aircraft on the one hand, and after the operation was exposed to the enemy and took countermeasures to thwart it on the other hand countermeasures to thwart it.

It turned out that the enemy was also using Zodiac rubber boats to carry out some of its offensive operations on the Egyptian coast (the western coast of the Gulf), but he was using a method that ensured success: loading these boats onto small landing craft or medium boats as far away as possible as far as possible from the target and out of range of our forces, so that the boats and personnel are landed in the water to carry out The boats and personnel would be lowered into the water to carry out their missions, and after completing the execution, the boats would return back to the ships and boats that landed them. to the ships and boats that dropped them off. This method achieved the preservation of combat efficiency of the personnel and their continued activity by not sailing long distances (sometimes up to 40 kilometers) in small rubber boats in small rubber boats, exposed to the extreme vagaries of the sea, while at the same time minimize the sailing distance for boats to prevent breakdowns

One of the important things to consider in maritime evacuation operations is the need for Self-protection of ships and boats used in these operations against any enemy interference whether from the sea or the air, while they are sailing away from our shores, provided that This should be done effectively and with weapons that can counter enemy attacks, as without this protection, the elimination of the naval landing force while it is still en route becomes a certainty. The plan for operations on the other shore would collapse. It has been proven that once the enemy realized that the Red Sea region was ready for naval landings, its naval activity increased through the use of the Hornet-class armed gunboats, and it has been proven that as soon as the enemy discovered the readiness of the Red Sea region for naval landings.

It is also imperative to obtain accurate information before carrying out a landing operation about the situation of the enemy's status, size and activity in the landing area, as inadequate information about the enemy may lead to may lead to enemy intervention to thwart the landings before or during the operation, or to expose the area being

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the area in which the operation is conducted shortly after it is carried out, and thus has the opportunity to eliminate it. There have been Real-life examples illustrating the importance of this matter occurred in both Abu Rudeis and Abu Znaima, as the enemy hastened to mobilize its forces on the eastern coast.

The enemy hastened to mobilize its forces on the eastern coast of the Gulf in these areas as soon as it discovered Our preparations for the naval landing. If this landing had not been canceled at the last moment due to the breakdown of the boats, it would not have coincided with our preparations.

it would not have been successful, and the Thunderbolts would have encountered fierce resistance

from the enemy, who was ready to meet them right on the beach. Luck played its part

The failure of the boats meant that the landing force survived an unknown fate and an enemy that was waiting on the beach to finish them off waiting on the beach to finish them off.

Lessons learned from the airborne operation

The success of the airdrops, which were able to drop 4 thunderbolt companies in the areas

on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez on the night of October 7/6 and the evening of October 8.

Abu Rudeis, Shatib, Abu Znaima, and Jebel Lajiya. The success of the airdrop is due to the following factors

is due to the following factors:

1- The breadth of the confrontation (about 51 kilometers), which helped to choose the appropriate places to complete the operations and the selection of safe approach routes.

2- The thunderbolt personnel, while being transported by helicopter, were not subjected to the psychological and physical pressures and physical stress that those who are evacuated by sea are subjected to using small rubber boats, who travel distances between 25 and 40 kilometers across the Gulf in the midst of extreme sea fluctuations and rough waves.

3- Successful execution of missions on time due to the low chance of the enemy to intervene against the helicopters Helicopters that were flying in the hours of darkness and at altitudes close to the surface of the sea the sea.

-4. The enemy concentrated most of its ground forces on the eastern shore of the Gulf in anticipation of naval landings which gave the helicopters the opportunity to drop their cargo at the chosen locations in depth safely.

5 The courage and high level of training of the helicopter pilots, who, despite the dangers they in their first flights due to the enemy's attempts to intercept them and due to the nature of the Sinai, which is full of high peaks, were able to repeat their flights several times with persistence and determination. The crash of two of their planes did not prevent them from continuing to fulfill their mission.

Despite the limited size of the 136th Thunderbolt Group's forces in South Sinai which did not number more than 500 officers and soldiers, the presence of this

in that area had a great impact in disturbing the enemy and lowering the morale of its soldiers. It was

The Southern Sinai Command was assigned to General Isaiah Hogavish, who was called up from the reserves at the start of the war on October 6.

He is one of Israel's leading commanders, having commanded the Southern Command during the June '67 war.

Southern Command during the June '67 war and whose forces occupied the entire Sinai Peninsula

the entire Sinai Peninsula.

When he assumed his new command in South Sinai in October '73, he had only a parachute brigade under his command

only a parachute brigade commanded by Colonel Uzi Meiri, an armored battalion, and some artillery and rocket-propelled grenade units

artillery and anti-tank rocket-propelled grenade units. Israel's reliance on repelling

Egyptian operations in the southern Sinai centered on the Israeli air force, as they could not

withdraw any significant forces from the main battlefield in North Sinai

Despite their small size and limited armaments, the Egyptian Thunderbolts

their courage and high level of training, they carried out most of the operations they were assigned to carry out.

destroying vital enemy targets, ambushing enemy forces, and laying mines on advance routes.

to advance. As a result of the activity of the Thunderbolt operations and the deployment of its members on a wide front between valleys and mountains

and mountains, it became difficult for the enemy to find most of them. The Israeli command in South Sinai

The Israeli command in South Sinai, fearing large-scale Egyptian landings, took the following precautions

The following precautionary measures:

1. Moving a large number of fighter-bomber planes to Ras Nasrani airport, and using the airports of

Abu Rudis and Al-Tur airports to land French-made Nur Atlas transport planes. These planes

These planes transported some reserve forces from North Sinai to South Sinai to reinforce the Israeli forces there.

2 A helicopter landing operation for an Israeli force at the entrance to Wadi Firan, east of Abu Rudis.
Abu Rudis .

3- Securing the eastern coast of the Gulf of Suez against Egyptian naval landings by

Several naval patrols with Hornet boats and Bertram boats to carry out reconnaissance work

Naval reconnaissance .

4 Attempting to eliminate the airdropped Thunderbolt forces by moving groups of tanks with helicopters flying over them to guide them to their places, and at the same time

Sending Israeli patrols to search places where the presence of Egyptian troops is suspected

and ambushes on potential approach routes.

5 Israeli aircraft conduct reconnaissance on a continuous basis to detect any new landings by sea or air.

new landings by sea or air and to identify places where Egyptian troops have already landed

previously landed Egyptian troops.

Despite all these comprehensive measures taken by the enemy to resist any operations carried out by the

by the Thunderbolts, they were able to carry out several successful operations against the enemy.

several successful operations against the enemy, the most important of which was the destruction of an Israeli armored unit

while moving on the Al-Tur-Ras Sidr road, and they also managed to destroy a bus carrying a number of military personnel, including

carrying a number of military personnel, including a group of pilots and boys on their way to an airbase.

The Thunderbolt operations forced the Israeli command to illuminate the eastern coast of the Gulf for most of the night.

the eastern coast of the Gulf for most of the night with flares dropped by airplanes.

The Israeli command resorted to supplying its units stationed on the eastern coast of the Gulf with

to avoid moving administrative convoys on land roads for fear of being ambushed or exposed to the danger of landmines.

ambushes or the risk of mines.

First Mechanized Infantry Brigade operation

Despite what Moshe Dayan said at his press conference on the evening of October 9

in Tel Aviv that the road was open for the Egyptians to South Sinai, the 1st Brigade

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Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was tasked with advancing to Abu Rudeis as a direct mission in preparation for

to take control of the entire eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez, was unable to advance beyond the

Oyoun Moussa area (10 kilometers from the shore). The failure of this operation was due to

due to mistakes, some related to planning, for which the Operations Authority is responsible, and others related to battle management, for which the

the management of the battle, for which the 1st Brigade command is responsible.

We will summarize below the most important factors that led to the failure of

the operation
that led to the failure of the operation:

First: Placing the 1st Brigade under three successive commands in a single operation within a short period of time in accordance with the plan that was supposed to be implemented - the command of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division (its original formation) during the preparatory phase of the operation, then leading the Third Army once it crossed the Suez Canal the Suez Canal until the capture of Ras Masla-Jebel Jurdi, and finally commanding the Red Sea Military Zone from the the Red Sea Military Zone from the line (01 kilometers south of Ras Masla) in the direction of Ras Sidr until The realization of his direct mission to seize Abordis caused the spread of responsibility and the lack of that none of the commands felt their real responsibility towards this brigade. The brigade's assignment to cooperate that the brigade commander had to organize cooperation with seven different agencies before The brigade commander had to organize cooperation with seven different agencies before the operation could be carried out, which is a dispersion of effort and should not be followed for a formation at this level at this level.

Secondly: When the 1st Brigade's schedule was delayed by bridges of the 19th Infantry Division on which it was scheduled to cross should have been delayed by 48 hours. The General Command's operations organization should have made substantial amendments to the plan to suit the new situation the new situation, both in terms of when and how the 1st Brigade would be pushed into the engagement, as well as the timing of of the landing of the 136th Thunderbolt Group on the eastern shore of the Gulf of Suez. The dates were all specified in the plan as a joint and coordinated operation between the 1st Brigade and the thunderbolt units 1st Brigade and Thunderbolt units. The process of organizing cooperation between them had already been carried out on this basis How could it be possible to allow the Thunderbolt units to land on time, when it was not possible to get the First Brigade to engage until after to engage the 1st Brigade until about 48 hours later than originally planned? This mistake cost the As we have already explained, this mistake cost the Thunderbolt units dearly.

Third: When an independent task force is assigned a combat mission on a separate axis.
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it is obligatory to provide this force with all the combat capabilities to ensure its success, and therefore It was a grave error in the planning by the Operations Authority to assign an infantry brigade group to move more than 140 kilometers (from Shatt to Abu Rudeis) in open terrain It is vulnerable to being hunted in the open by modern enemy aircraft equipped with the best equipment without providing this brigade with the elements that ensure its protection from the air while on the move, through an effective air defense system involving sufficient units of SAM 6 missiles SAM 6 surface-to-air missiles, with flights allocated by the General Command at times that coincide with the movements of this brigade brigade groups after calculating the time and distance factor. As for relying on air defense

In a situation like this brigade's, relying on the conventional cannons that the brigade was equipped with, from 37m caliber and 57m double-barreled (self-propelled) guns, this is completely useless and has already

Indeed, the 1st Brigade came to a standstill and was unable to move once it was out of range of the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile network west of the Canal. Egyptian anti-aircraft missiles west of the canal.

Fourth: It is difficult to realize until now the secret of this bizarre planning by the

which was to place the 1st Brigade under the command of the Red Sea Area the Red Sea Area as soon as it was pushed to engage from south of Ras Masla.

There is no doubt that this decision was for the following reasons:

1 The water separation between the 1st Brigade's line of advance and the Red Sea Command Center in

Hurghada is more than 300 kilometers, which is the entire length of the Gulf of Suez, so how can anyone be convinced of the feasibility of placing the brigade could anyone be convinced of the feasibility of placing the brigade under this command?

2- The Red Sea Region had no previous relationship with the First Brigade.

Neither did it supervise

training it to carry out its mission, nor did it contribute to preparing and equipping it for battle in the preparatory phase

How can it assume command of it efficiently when it does not know anything about it?

3- The key to placing a unit or formation under a higher command in an offensive operation is that

The higher command has the capabilities to command and control on the one hand, and on the other hand

On the other hand, it is more important to have at its disposal a reserve that it can push into the battle if the

to be able to mobilize the situation and successfully develop the offensive operation. If we apply this

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to the Red Sea Command, we find that for the brigade's situation in Ras Masla, it lacked both
lacked both.

4 The means used to overcome the complete disconnect between the Red Sea Command and the

and the first brigade when it was placed under its command, was a method that had nothing to do with logic or

tactical methods, namely sending a small group of officers led by Brig. Gen. A.H. Ibrahim Rashid, equipped with some radios under the name of the Red Sea Operations Group

Red Sea Region to manage the brigade's operations. Brig. Gen. Rashid arrived at the command of the

on the afternoon of October 10 in a jeep alone and accompanied by one of the group's officers

due to the congested crossings on the canal, to take over command and control of the 1st Brigade, alone and without any command and control equipment

to assume command responsibility over the First Brigade Command, which was a full command with all its branches and apparatus.

which, of course, made his command a formality, a kind of bureaucracy, and an additional, meaningless communication link between the brigade's command

an additional and meaningless communication link between the First Brigade Command and the Third Army Command.

5-An indication of how inaccurate the original planning for the conduct of the battle was

placing the 1st Brigade under the Red Sea Area Command, the 10th Corps was

alerted at the last minute to this error.

at the last minute, Lt. Gen. Shazly telephoned Brig. Gen. Rashid at 4:00 a.m. on October 10 at the

at 4 a.m. on October 10 at the Third Army headquarters to inform him that Col. Hassan al-Zayyat (delegate of the Operations Authority) was on his way with instructions for the mission of the First Brigade .

When Colonel El-Zayyat arrived, he informed the Red Sea Operations Group Commander that his group had been placed under the command of the Third Army.

that his group had been placed under the command of the Third Army. This change was undoubtedly a step

to correct the previous faulty planning. But the unanswered question remains.

namely: Why was the 1st Brigade placed under the command of the Red Sea Operations Group, which in turn was placed under the command of the Third Army?

under the command of the Third Army? Why was this brigade not placed under the command of the Third Army directly or under the command of an operational staff from the Third Army until the First Brigade achieves at least its immediate mission, the capture of Abordis, which was supposed to force a

a mobilization pause?

Fifth: The commander of the First Brigade made several tactical mistakes, as he almost lost command and control of some of his smaller sub-units

and control over some of his smaller sub-units on the night of October 10/9, due to the turmoil that

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which led to the straying of some of them due to the return of some armored vehicles from the brigade's forward detachment and administrative affairs vehicles to the rear, nor did he attempt to take advantage of the hours of darkness to adjust the positions of the brigade's subunits

to adjust the positions of the brigade's sub-units so that they could face any threat from the enemy.

There is no doubt that his decision to postpone the advance for 48 hours on the pretext of raising the efficiency of the forces following the air bombardment was unsuccessful

The fact that his forces remained in their positions and were exposed for two consecutive days

to two consecutive days of aerial bombardment by enemy planes was counterproductive.

of course, their casualties increased and morale among their members was further lowered.

Having his forces as close as possible to enemy forces would have minimized the intensity of the aerial bombardment against his forces because in this case, enemy planes would have feared that they would hit their own forces as well.

This proximity to enemy forces was the most accurate and fastest way to obtain information about the enemy

information about the enemy. Since the brigade commander was complaining that he did not have any information

about the enemy on the brigade's axis of attack before it was pushed into engagement from any command, it was his duty to cover

this deficiency, which severely affected the course of the battle, by sending

reconnaissance patrols from the brigade's units
reconnaissance patrols from the brigade's units to provide him with the correct
information about the enemy. In addition, it proved
that the brigade's losses were accurately accounted for and that the morale
impact of Israeli air strikes on the brigade's
on the brigade's units far outweighed the physical impact.

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Chapter Thirteen R

Glorious Egyptian Commando Incidents during the October War

Commando units in all armies of the world are of a special nature
The tasks assigned to them require high competencies and skills. Due to their
light armor
and unlimited firepower, the success of their operations depends mainly on the
competence of the human element
The success of their operations depends mainly on the competence of the human
element. Thunderbolts are not often used in relation to their
for their characteristics - except in operations of an offensive nature, as they
do not have the ability to occupy defensive positions for a long time
defensive positions for a long time, and they are the most efficient units in
terms of their ability to operate on all types of terrain and in the most
difficult
in all types of terrain and in the most difficult conditions, and they can be
easily landed by sea or air
or air.
The 1st Thunderbolt Forces were formed in the area of 1 Abu Ajila near the
eastern Egyptian border in Sinai
in Sinai. The first test of its capabilities was during the Tripartite
Aggression against Egypt in 1956
1956, as the men made their way across Lake Manzala in small fishing boats
to reach the heart of the valiant Port Said to play their role alongside its
people in defeating the aggression.
Following the end of the June 1967 war, the enemy was able to occupy the entire
Sinai Peninsula, except for a small area of land east and south of the city
except for a small area of land east and south of the city of Port Fouad, where
a company of
of the 43rd Thunderbolt Battalion, which was commanded at the time by Major Al-
Sayed Al-Sharqawi.
Al-Sharqawi. On July 1, 1967, the enemy tried to advance from Qantara East to
Port Fouad
Fouad to the north on the road parallel to the canal with a tank company
supported by a force of infantry and engineers.
With the help of a squadron of fighter-bomber aircraft, the thunderbolt force
stationed at Ras al-Ash clashed with it
Al-Ash in the area of kilometer 14 east of the canal. This was the first
confrontation between Israeli and Egyptian forces
Israeli and Egyptian forces since the battles of June 1967

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The enemy was forced to stop for six hours in front of the site and was unable
to storm it.

Three tanks and three semi-trailer vehicles were destroyed, in addition to the
loss of men. The enemy did not

After that, the enemy did not dare to try to remove this position, which, thanks
to the steadfastness of its fighters, became the only foot of Egypt in the Sinai
Egypt's only foot in the Sinai, and as a result of the battle of Ras al-Ash,

morale rose throughout the armed forces.
of the entire Armed Forces.

The Thunderbolt Forces, commanded by Brigadier General Nabil Shoukry, carried out many successful operations in the October 1973 war. in the October 1973 war, and its men recorded outstanding heroism, some of which we have already mentioned in previous chapters in previous chapters, so in this chapter we will limit ourselves to highlighting three major operations carried out by the Thunderbolts during this war Thunderbolt during this war: The first in the Second Army sector, the second in the Third Army sector Third Army Sector, and the third in the South Sinai region

Thunderbolt ambushes encircle Kantara Sharq

The city of Kantara Sharq is located on a flat area of fixed sand, and is bordered to the north bordered on the north by the Tina Plain, a water-filled marshy lowland, and on the south by a flat sandy area that extends south A flat sandy area extending south for a distance of up to 10 kilometers, which is suitable for all types of vehicles It is bordered to the west by the Suez Canal and to the east by an open desert area with small sandy plateaus. This area controls a confluence of roads, the most important of which is the northern road The coastal road from Kantara East to Al-Arish, and the road parallel to the Suez Canal from Kantara East to Port Fouad. This area was very important to Israel, as it controlled the the entrance to the northern tactical direction and as one of the main cities in the Sinai region. Therefore It established 4 strong points on the Suez Canal to the west of it to protect it (Fortresses Doria Ketuba, Milano, and Mavericket from the Bar-Lev Line forts), and the enemy had strong armored tactical reserves outside the city strong armored tactical reserves outside the city, 5-85 kilometers away from the strongpoints kilometers, to launch counterattacks to reinforce these points in case they were threatened and reinforced with some artillery batteries to fire on any attacking forces.

According to the plan, the 256th Thunderbolt Battalion (excluding Sanriya) of the 129th Thunderbolt Group was assigned to the 256th Thunderbolt Battalion (excluding Sanriya).

129th Thunderbolt Battalion, commanded by Colonel A.H. Ali Heikal and placed under the command of the Second Army was assigned the task of storming the Suez Canal from two sectors north and south of Qantara East at the hour of 0600 on October 6, with the aim of besieging the city and preventing its reserves. October 6, with the aim of besieging the city and preventing enemy reserves from intervening in the battle of the 90th Brigade.

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Infantry of the 18th Infantry Division when attacking the strong points and capturing the city of Kantara East . The Thunderbolt Battalion was to prevent the enemy forces stationed in the city from withdrawing. and participate in clearing the city after completing the ambush mission. The decision made by the Thunderbolt Battalion commander was for a company of the battalion to cross the Suez Canal on the left side of the 90th Brigade. Suez on the left flank of the 90th Infantry Brigade, advancing on foot at the maximum rate where it would organize a cutting ambush at the intersection of the northern

road and Ezbet al-Safih, and that the second company, along with the battalion command, would

The second company, with the battalion command, crosses the canal on the right flank of the 90th Infantry Brigade and advances on foot at maximum rate, organizing cut-off ambushes at the southern intersection and on the and on the parallel road outside the city. At 2:05 p.m. on October 6 As soon as the artillery fire began, the two companies crossed the canal north and south of the city of Kantara East. At 2:30 p.m., the thunderbolt ambushes were ready to engage as planned. Five minutes later, the company north of the noticed an Israeli armored force advancing from the tactical reserves stationed outside the city, with the aim of to support the strong points that were being attacked at the time by detachments from the 09th Infantry Brigade. At 2:00 a.m. the thunderbolt ambush clashed with the enemy reserve as soon as it arrived in its area of operation Within minutes, the ambush force managed to destroy 4 tanks and a semi-armored vehicle

The ambush force was able to destroy four tanks and a semi-armored vehicle. At last light on October 6, the Under heavy artillery fire, the enemy tried to push its tactical reserves to rescue its strong points on the canal shore. on the canal shore, but the Thunderbolt Company in the north and the 90th Infantry Brigade's tank-hunting crews Infantry Brigade held their positions. As a result of our artillery counter-bombardment, the enemy counter-attack was halted

The Thunderbolt Company spent the night of October 7/6 improving their positions and increasing engineering work in their their positions. At first light on October 7, an enemy tank escaping from a strongpoint attempted to tried to pass on the northern road next to the Thunderbolt ambush, but the ambush soon destroyed it. As a result of the 90th Infantry Brigade's success in storming the two northern strongpoints and forcing the enemy to flee, the Thunderbolt Company was tasked on October 7 to advance in battle groups to clear Ezbet al-Safih from the enemy. When some enemy soldiers tried to take refuge in buildings, the Thunderbolt soldiers chased them and cleared the area completely.

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The Thunderbolt Company, which was stationed at the southern intersection of the city, continued its ambushes in their shops until it was ordered by the 18th Infantry Division's command at 5:30 p.m. on October 6

On October 6, at 5:30 p.m., two platoons were ordered to attack strongpoint No. 3 from the rear as it had not yet fallen.

At 6:00 p.m., the two platoons rushed toward the strongpoint and attacked it from behind. This forced the Israeli force to change the face of the defense, and accordingly the infantry forces attacking it from the front were able to quickly storm the strongpoint, occupy it, and destroy the the enemy force. Following the fall of the strongpoints, enemy remnants attempted to flee from the city of Qantara East. At 9 p.m. on October 6, the Thunderbolt Company was tasked with organizing several ambushes to trap enemy forces and prevent their withdrawal. On the night of October 6/7, a group of

On the night of October 7, a group of enemy forces, numbering about 30 individuals, were trying to infiltrate the city on foot, and when they approached the ambush. When they approached the ambush, he opened fire on them, killing 6 people, and the rest fled to the nearby Al-Mabati area. nearby.

At first light on October 7, the Thunderbolt Company raided the area of the buildings and managed to destroy the enemy force and capture 8 men. At first light on October 8, the forces of the 18 Infantry Division, supported by the men of the 256th Thunderbolt Battalion, were able to take full control of the city of Qantara East. and completed the capture of the four enemy strongpoints. There is no doubt that the use of Thunderbolt units in organizing ambushes on the main roads to prevent enemy reserves from reaching strong points and fortified positions of the enemy is a correct use of the Thunderbolt forces, and therefore The 256th Thunderbolt Battalion was very successful in achieving the mission assigned to it.

Storming the Port Tawfiq tongue fortress

The Port Tawfiq tongue, which extends from the eastern shore of the canal, is an isthmus within the Gulf of Suez. Surrounded by water on three sides, it is two kilometers long and between 55 and 300 meters wide between 55 and 300 meters. The tongue's rocky nature makes it difficult for rubber boats to dock on it. The tongue is dominated by the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, which is about 300 to 400 meters wide. It is about 300 to 400 meters wide, which is the maximum width of the canal, and the tongue overlooks the Gulf of Suez in the south to the south overlooks the Gulf of Suez.

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The Israelis erected an impregnable fortress of the Bar-Lev line in the middle of the tongue in front of Port Tawfiq. They called it Fort Kwai, and they exploited it due to its honorable location to manage the fire of field artillery and artillery to direct the fire of field artillery and long-range artillery to shell vital Egyptian areas on the west bank of the canal, namely the areas of Port Tawfiq on the west bank of the canal, namely Port Tawfiq, Suez, the oil refineries in Zaytiyah, and the naval base in the port of Adabiya in the port of Adabiya, and to supervise by observation a distant area extending from the Gulf of Suez to the Sadat area. Sadat area, especially using visual means.

The enemy had allocated to the defense of the Port Tawfiq tongue site about a company of paratroopers, supported by a tank platoon stationed outside the strong point, in addition to two platoons of tanks. Tanks were stationed outside the tongue as a tactical reserve for the site. Stacks of ammunition, food, and water inside the strongpoint were sufficient for the position to fight for more than 15 days under siege conditions.

According to the plan, the 43rd Thunderbolt Battalion of the 127th Thunderbolt

Group

placed under the command of the Third Army and commanded by Colonel Fouad Bassiouni.

was assigned the task of raiding and occupying the Port Tawfiq tongue, with the aim of supporting the combat actions of the

of the 19th Infantry Division, which was operating on the right flank of the Third Field Army. At 2:05 p.m. on

2:05 p.m. on October 6, 1973, artillery fire began, and the tongue site was not bombed as planned

the tongue position was not bombed as planned, but the direct fire weapons began to fire

and two gaps were opened in the enemy position. When the shelling began, the enemy pushed five tanks from its

from its tactical reserve outside the site into the tongue, and the direct hit weapons were unable to hit them

on the West Bank were unable to hit them due to their movement behind the berm, and at the same time

At the same time, enemy artillery shelled Port Tawfiq. At around 6:30 p.m. on October 6

on October 6, under cover of artillery fire and direct hit weapons, ambush groups from the 43rd Battalion

ambush groups from the 43rd Thunderbolt Battalion began crossing the canal with 9 rubber boats, and despite heavy enemy fire

heavy enemy fire, these groups managed to reach the berm and hit two tanks

Despite heavy enemy fire, these groups managed to reach the berm and hit two tanks.

tanks to prevent entry and exit from the tongue.

At 6:40 p.m. on October 6, the commander of the 43rd Battalion

Thunderbolt Company assigned to attack the main strongpoint, and despite the concentrated fire that

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that rained down on it while crossing the canal, resulting in the martyrdom of the company commander and some of its members, the company managed to reach the berm

The company managed to reach the berm and one of its platoons succeeded in attacking and occupying the southern part of the strongpoint

and occupy the southern part of the strong point and destroy the enemy. The enemy launched a counterattack

on this platoon twice. One at first light and the second at last light on October 7.

Both attempts failed and the platoon held its position. The commander of the tried to capitalize on the platoon's success and sent two platoons to reinforce it. At 7:00 p.m. in the evening

At 7:00 p.m. on October 7, the three platoons attacked the main strongpoint from the south

the main strongpoint from the south, but they were unable to break through and the battalion commander decided to withdraw them to the West Bank to regroup.

to the West Bank to regroup.

At midnight on October 7, the 43rd Thunderbolt Battalion commander decided to carry out the attack again

with a new company force, complete with support units. The thunderbolt company crossed the canal

with its boats in silence, taking advantage of the hours of darkness and without any cover from artillery fire, and as soon as it reached the eastern shore

it reached the eastern shore and rushed to attack the strong point, but due to the strength of its fortification, it could not

was unable to storm it. The battalion commander ordered the battalion commander to establish a perimeter around the position and isolate it from the outside

world.

from the outside world and decided not to relaunch attacks against it in order to preserve his weapons and the lives of his soldiers.

After such a tight siege, the garrison would have no choice but to surrender. Attempts to break the siege

Enemy planes tried to break the siege, and some Phantom planes at 10:00 p.m. and midnight on October 9

At 10:00 p.m. and midnight on October 9, some Phantom aircraft launched fierce air attacks on the cutter ambushes at the entrance to the tongue at the entrance to the tongue, to force them to abandon their positions so that reinforcements could be sent

However, the cutter groups held their positions despite the losses they suffered.

The commander of the Israeli fortress, Lieutenant Shlomo Ardinst, realized from the first night

that the fort was surrounded on all sides, but he had no doubt that the would quickly come to the rescue and lift the Egyptian siege. But after a few days

The situation inside the fort became awkward: ammunition was running low, morphine, serums and bandages were running out and bandages, and the wounded were writhing in pain. On the fifth day, a radio message arrived at the fort

A radio message from Israel's Southern Command read: 1If within 24 hours we cannot

to send reinforcements to you, you can surrender.â There were 42 soldiers inside the fort, including 5 dead and 02 wounded, one of them seriously wounded. At half past eleven in the morning

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on October 13, the position was surrendered by the International Red Cross and the Malayan flag was raised

37 men, including 5 officers, were taken prisoner.

The raid on the Israeli fortress â @1Kwaiâ on the Port Tawfiq tongue was one of the most spectacular operations was one of the most spectacular operations carried out by the Thunderbolt units during the October War

1973, despite the heavy losses suffered by the 43rd Thunderbolt Battalion.

Undoubtedly, one of the most important

lessons that can be drawn from this operation. When planning the use of Thunderbolt units must take into account their potential and their unlimited firepower, and they should not be tasked with raiding the enemy's strong points to raid enemy strong points and fortified positions, such as the mission assigned to the 43rd Battalion

Thunderbolt Battalion, but should be limited to assisting infantry forces in capturing them by organizing

ambushes at the entrances and exits of these points to prevent enemy reserves from advancing to them

to come to their aid, and to prevent the members of these points after their fall from infiltrating and withdrawing from them, thereby eliminating the opportunities for infantry forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them. opportunities for infantry forces to carry out the tasks assigned to them in capturing these fortified points.

Thunderbolt ambushes to obstruct the advance of enemy reserves

At 4:40 p.m. on October 61, the 183rd Thunderbolt Battalion

(excluding a company) of the 139th Thunderbolt Group, which was commanded by Colonel Osama Ibrahim

loaded with 12 Mi-8 helicopters took off from Abu Sawir Airport with the mission

of obstructing the advance of the enemy reserves stationed in Abu Sawir.
enemy reserves stationed in the Melliz area towards the Suez Canal. The plan was
The plan was for the planes to advance through the designated air corridor in a
single flight formation
until the middle of the Great Bitter Lake, and then disperse into two groups,
each group
consisting of a thunderbolt company supported by elements of anti-tank rocket-
propelled grenades
(Malotka) and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (SAM 7) at the designated
dispersal point.
The formation split into two groups of six helicopters each. It was only
five minutes before the helicopters were attacked by enemy interceptors.
As a result of this attack, six aircraft from the two groups made an emergency
landing about
12 kilometers east of the Bitter Lakes and two planes returned to our forces
again. They were unable to.
Only 4 airplanes were able to land safely in the designated landing area, and a
large number of
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Thunderbolt personnel who were in the planes that made the emergency landing
were severely burned, and the survivors returned
The survivors returned individually to the Bitter Lakes region where they joined
our forces.

The personnel in the four planes that landed safely were able to fulfill their
mission
were able to fulfill their mission successfully, resisting the advance of the
enemy reserve forces for eight hours, and the four planes that carried them were
unable to return
The four planes that carried them were unable to return to their base. The total
losses of the
The total losses of the two companies were about 150 martyrs, including 15
officers, in addition to 10 helicopters. It was
The reason for the heavy losses suffered by this battalion was due to the fact
that the airdrop operation took place
during the day without providing air protection for the helicopters either
during the approach to the
or during the landing. The rate of helicopter losses in the
helicopter losses in daytime airdrops are about three times higher than in
nighttime airdrops.
the loss rate in the case of night evacuation

The remaining reinforced company of the 183rd Thunderbolt Battalion, commanded
by Capt. Hamdi Shalaby
was tasked with disrupting the Israeli reserve advance on the northern axis for
three to four hours
4 hours until the Second Field Army's crossings were established, 6 helicopters
(Mi 8) helicopters loaded this company and took off from Abusweir Airport at
6:00 p.m.
It was able to land safely in the Tel al-Farma area on the northern axis, and
the company
After disembarking, the company advanced to the work area designated for
ambushes in the area of the Rummana Strait, on one line and on one side of the
road
One line and one side of the road facing about 3 kilometers. At midnight
At midnight, the company commander ordered the placement of anti-tank mines on
the paths leading to the
The company commander ordered anti-tank mines to be placed on the paths leading
to the northern saltmars and to distribute the groups, and made a patrol base in
the rear to retreat to after the mission
The spirit of the personnel was very strong. At 6:00 a.m., enemy tanks began
enemy tanks began advancing on the northern road towards the Suez Canal. When

the enemy column entered the
When the main enemy column entered the ambush area, consisting of tanks, armored vehicles, half-tracks, and personnel carriers, the company commander gave the order to engage. During this time, a large
a large bus from the Mexican side of the canal to Al-Arish, the bus was hit and all of its passengers were wounded
all its passengers. As a result of the clash with the enemy column heading towards the canal, the Thunderbolt Company destroyed
18 Israeli tanks, 2 semi-armored vehicles, 4 transport vehicles, a winch, and a jeep

The intense fighting with the enemy led to the complete closure of the northern axis for five hours.

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However, the Israeli leadership soon took measures to annihilate the Malasrai Thunderbolt Company.

It airdropped an infantry company in 4 helicopters behind the company's position, and sent

Field Marshal Nitka, whose armored brigade had halted the advance of the Thunderbolt Company, sent 20 tanks led by one of his battalion commanders (Assaf Yagouri), encircled the Egyptian thunderbolt force from all sides, and some Israeli tanks rushed to march the funeral procession.

Some Israeli tanks rushed to march their tanks over the thunderbolts. In a rare act of heroism

clashed with the Israeli tanks and some of them jumped on top of their towers, where they threw their anti-tank bombs

Their anti-tank bombs caused some of them to explode, while others exploded as they passed over mines

some of them exploded, while others exploded due to the mines they had planted.

After the martyrdom of the Thunderbolts

the enemy focused its attention on clearing the road in order to prevent the disruption of its reserve forces, which were advancing on the northern axis.

that were advancing on the northern axis, so he brought some cranes to lift the destroyed tanks and vehicles

Some helicopters landed and transported the wounded after the Israelis realized that the thunderbolt company had been wiped out. The Thunderbolt commander led the few surviving members

toward the canal, taking advantage of the hours of darkness and taking care to walk his group through the

through the marshes of the Tina plain, until they reached the Ras al-Ash area in the morning, where they joined

to our forces. The Israelis recognized that the Egyptian commandos who attacked them on the northern axis had fought a heroic battle

fought a heroic battle, and that their attacks were suicide attacks.

Thunderbolt ambushes in the Wadi Sidr Gorge

The Wadi Sidr Gorge is one of the main straits crossing the western wall of Sinai and is located

south of the Matla Gorge. Its importance is due to the fact that its eastern entrance at Ain Sidr is where three roads meet

Three roads coming from Nakhla and Al-Tamad from central Sinai, and from Bather Al-Tamada from North Sinai, from where they reach South Sinai.

access through the strait to South Sinai, via the coastal axis of Al-Tur.

According to the plan

the 143rd Battalion of the 145th Thunderbolt Group (from the General Headquarters Reserve) was assigned

General Staff) which was commanded by Colonel A.H. El-Sayed El-Sharkawy, was tasked with organizing ambushes

in the Wadi Sidr Gorge as of last light on October 6, 1973.

The battalion's execution of its mission would achieve the following objectives:

1) Preventing the enemy from pushing any forces trying to rescue vital targets on the coast of the

Gulf of Suez.

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2 Supporting the 1st Mechanized Infantry Brigade as it realizes its direct mission to advance

on the coastal road to Abu Rudeis by securing its left flank.

3) Protecting the right flank of the Third Army and relieving pressure on the Egyptian bridgeheads

east of the canal by drawing enemy reserves south in a previously unplanned direction, thereby

their efforts are dispersed in a rugged mountainous area that is one of the most favorable areas for combat operations

for sapper units

On October 5, the 143rd Thunderbolt Battalion moved by vehicle from its position in the Central Military Zone

The battalion was supported by a platoon of anti-tank guided rocket launchers (Malotka) anti-tank guided missiles. At 5 p.m. on October 6

the battalion was loaded into 18 Mi-8 helicopters and the planes took off from the takeoff area in a

The formation consisted of two groups according to the battalion commander's decision, which included the following:

-Battalion excluding a company (the main group) to be landed at the western entrance to the Wadi Sidr Strait

Sidr.

B - A company of the battalion (the company group) is landed in the area of Al-Guindi Castle on the eastern entrance of the strait.

on the eastern entrance to the strait, and the battalion organizes multiple disruptive quantities along the strait

to prevent enemy armored forces from crossing the strait. No sooner had the helicopters crossed the

Gulf of Suez until an Israeli air formation consisting of Phantom jets attacked the Mirages. The enemy concentrated its attack on the aircraft of the main group, while the aircraft of the

The company's 6 planes were not intercepted by any Israeli planes and continued on their way until they were able to land the thunderbolt company

to land the Thunderbolt Company safely in the previously planned landing area (Al-Jundi Castle). The planes of the main group

The aircraft of the main group, which consisted of 12 helicopters, tried to avoid

the enemy air attack, but the Israeli air formation managed to shoot down 4 helicopters

helicopters, and at the last light on October 6, 8 helicopters were landed in different areas

scattered . - Due to the injury of the battalion's commander and chief of operations, one of the Saraba commanders took over the command of the battalion.

of the battalion, and was able to assemble and control the force and drive it to the specific area where the ambushes were to be organized

where ambushes would be organized in preparation for the execution of the missions assigned to it. Since 9 1d

pilots and navigators from the wounded airplane crews were escorted with the Thunderbolt Force to this area

The regrouping and control of the force took all night.

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The force was unable to move on October 7 during the day due to increased enemy reconnaissance activity
However, after last light on October 7, the force moved at night to take up positions in ambushes. Earlier, the company tasked with organizing ambushes east of the Sidr Gorge, after landing in the area of Qal'at al-Guindy was able to take ambush positions and was ready to carry out its assigned mission at last light on October 6. Since the enemy did not make any movements in the direction of the strait during the period from October 7 to 10 October 7-10, the company used this period to improve its position and fortify its position
After last light on October 10, the company was instructed to about 12 kilometers east of the battalion's main group was instructed to join the rest of the force.
The separation between the two groups was only about 3 kilometers.

At first light on October 11, Israeli armored units began to move across the while securing their movement with a helicopter flying over them on the same route, but the helicopter
The helicopter was unable to detect the thunderbolt elements that were deployed near the western entrance to the strait due to their good use of the terrain. At 7:00 a.m. on October 11, the
The enemy's advanced armored elements arrived, and when they were facing the ambush area, they were attacked a barrage of scout fire, which led to the destruction of 8 tanks, 7 armored semi-trailer vehicles and a jeep. The following force was forced to halt and the Israeli tanks and armored vehicles began to retreat.
Israeli tanks and armored vehicles began to retreat eastward. After the battle was over regrouping, treating the wounded, and redistributing ammunition. From 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. on October 11 until 4:30 p.m. on October 11, enemy aircraft carried out retaliatory raids on the ambush area, but they did not cause any casualties to the Thunderbolt elements due to their good utilization of the terrain of the terrain, which created good places to hide from aerial bombardment.

The situation with food, water and ammunition was worrying as there was no way to replace them
The Acting Battalion Commander was forced to reduce the rate at which the
The acting battalion commander was forced to reduce the rate at which ambushes were conducted, as well as food and water rations, and to economize on ammunition
ammunition.

Despite these harsh conditions, the complexity of the food and water situation, and the high rate of casualties in personnel and weapons, the men of the 143rd Thunderbolt Battalion bravely and heroically insisted on holding on to the strait and denying the enemy
the men of the 143rd Thunderbolt Battalion insisted on holding on to the strait and preventing the enemy from crossing it at any cost.

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their survival by eating grass and reptiles as their main food, until some light supplies began to arrive on
light supplies began arriving on October 17 on camels, 11 days later
. On October 20, the commander of the 143rd Thunderbolt Battalion was ordered to get rid of
on foot due to the unavailability of helicopters in the area.

increasing air aggression.

The battalion began the return journey on foot through the rugged mountainous terrain: Despite the losses, and despite running out of food and water, the 1433rd Thunderbolt Battalion managed to cover a distance of about 60 kilometers in two days of hard marching, and rejoin our forces.

The task of organizing ambushes to obstruct the enemy in mountainous areas is one of the most successful tasks assigned to thunderbolt units. was one of the most successful missions assigned to the Thunderbolt units during the October War, demonstrating the ability of Thunderbolt units to The ability of Thunderbolt units to appear suddenly to influence the enemy, then disappear and get rid of the battle.

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Chapter Fourteen

Plan 1 Comprehensive, to clear the gap west of the Suez Canal

The remarkable success achieved by the Egyptian forces on October 6, 1973, in storming the Suez Canal and overrun the fortifications of the Bar-Lev Line, and then managed to establish five major headlands on the eastern bank of the canal on the eastern bank of the canal at a depth of 12-10 kilometers, and the destruction of three Israeli armored brigades and almost completely destroyed three Israeli armored brigades, had a tremendous impact in undermining the reputation of the Israeli army, which had reputation as an invincible army, and the Israeli people were severely traumatized. Some military commanders and analysts described it with the famous phrase "an earthquake in Israel".

American officials in Washington were certain when the Egyptian offensive began, according to Israeli assurances, and the experiences of previous wars, that within only 48 hours and after the mobilization of the reserve forces, the main counterattack would begin, which would liquidate the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the canal. the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the canal and drive the Egyptians back across the canal to the western shore. The Egyptians will be driven back across the canal to the western shore, thus teaching the Egyptian leadership a lesson they will never forget. to use its military power against Israel again.

But the Israeli leadership's dreams were soon dashed. The main counterattack launched by its armored forces on October 8 and 9 with the aim of penetrating Egyptian positions and crossing the canal to the west on some Egyptian bridges. The Israeli forces were unable to penetrate Egyptian positions, especially in the northern sector. to penetrate Egyptian positions, especially in the northern sector of the front, where the Second Army. On the contrary, the formations of this army succeeded in crushing the attacking forces and inflicted heavy losses on them.

Israeli military officials were forced to tell the public the harsh realities of the

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that they had initially withheld from them. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan admitted in a conference he held to newspaper editors on the afternoon of October 9 that the fortified Bar-Lev line had been evacuated and abandoned evacuated and abandoned, and that Israeli forces in Sinai had been forced to take a defensive line to contain the Malassian offensive, and admitted for the first time that the Israelis are not stronger than the Egyptians Egyptians .

On the evening of the same day, General Aharon Yariv, who had been called out of retirement to take charge of military information, appeared on television out of retirement to take charge of military information, and showed viewers the situation on the Sinai and Golan fronts on the Sinai and Golan fronts and said: "The situation is not easy or simple and the war will prolonged. The Israeli army is in a difficult situation and has been forced to withdraw from the in the Golan and Sinai." This was the first time the public heard that this war is not a continuation of the Six-Day War of 1967, nor is it a blitzkrieg 1967 and not a blitzkrieg. The masses remembered how they had been deceived by Moshe Dayan's statements on the evening of October 6, when he told reporters, "We will turn the area into a great graveyard for them," as well as General Datis Eliezer, Chief of the General Staff, when he enthusiastically stated in a press conference on October 8 press conference on October 8 amid applause that the IDF would continue to hit the enemy and break its bones. The Israeli people realized that for the first time for the first time since its creation, a life-and-death battle.

What did the Israelis think about crossing the Canal?

After the strategic surprise that befell the Israeli army on the Sinai and Golan fronts which resulted in the Israeli leadership's inability to execute the abortive strike on which it had relied to crush any Arab attack before it took place. to crush any Arab attack before it happened, and after the failure of the main counterattack on which Israel hoped to repel the Egyptian attack on which Israel had hoped to turn back the Egyptian attack and restore the situation to what it was before On the afternoon of October 6, 73, the Israeli leadership was determined to radically change the the strategic situation on the Egyptian front, before the pending decision of the Security Council a ceasefire in the midst of a devastating defeat of the Israeli forces and at the height of an overwhelming Egyptian victory. This is something that Israel cannot accept, nor can it be accepted by any of its sincere friends. and none of its good friends in the White House in Washington, led by Secretary of State 728

The success achieved by the Israeli leadership on the Syrian front in the Golan Heights after on the Syrian front in the Golan Heights a few days after the start of the war, by forcing Syrian forces to complete their withdrawal from the Golan on October 10 and

return to the 1967 ceasefire line
the 1967 ceasefire line from which the attack began on October 6, followed by
the Israeli general mobilization
deep into Syria from October 11 to threaten the Syrian capital, Damascus. This
was what
The Israeli leadership was motivated by the need to restore the situation on the
Egyptian front in Sinai.
Therefore, the thinking of its officials was that a quick and unexpected
operation should be carried out in order to
to regain the advantage they had lost since the beginning of the war, and to
restore the confidence of the Israeli forces in their leadership and the
confidence of the Israeli people in their army.
the confidence of the Israeli forces in their leadership and the Israeli people
in their invincible army.

The only way to accomplish this was for Israeli forces to cross the Suez Canal
from east to west
from east to west and work on the rear of the Second and Third Armies, to be
done in a quick and sudden operation before the intervention of the great powers
before the expected intervention of the superpowers and the imposition of a
ceasefire.

The strategic objectives of the Israeli leadership in crossing its forces to the
west of the canal were
west of the canal were summarized as follows:

- 1- Disrupting the strategic balance of Egyptian forces east and west of the
canal
- 2- Trapping and destroying the main concentration of Egyptian forces inside the
bridgeheads east of the canal
To restore the situation to what it was before noon on October 6.
- 3) To achieve political and media gains at the international level when it is
broadcast to the world that Israeli forces are fighting west of the Suez Canal.
Israeli forces are fighting west of the Suez Canal.

. Impose a siege on the Second and Third Armies or one of them by cutting off
their lines of transportation to the west of the canal.

their lines of communication to the west of the canal.
5 Achieve a huge military and political victory by capturing the city of
Ismailia or
Suez or both.

Despite Israel's fear of getting involved in a military adventure west of the
canal and the
risks of being stretched too far beyond the capacity of the Israeli army and
entering the densely populated
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Egyptian population density, facing defeat and the consequent collapse of the
Israeli army and regime
Israel was forced to endure this adventure at all costs, especially since a
cease-fire was about to be issued.
A ceasefire was about to be issued, which would ensure the safety of its forces
crossing to the west of the canal.
The widespread American support for Israel was an important factor that
encouraged its military leadership to undertake this adventure
its military leadership to embark on this adventure. Israel received a de facto
de facto American airlift disguised as Israeli jumbo jets

El Al from October 7, and US President Nixon issued a decree to compensate Israel for all its losses in the war. On October 13, the U.S. the American airlift that transported to Israel - until the end of the war - about 28,000 tons

of all modern advanced weapons and equipment, and US spy planes over the battlefield provided spy planes over the front provided the most detailed information about the Egyptian forces to Israeli intelligence.

Although the idea of Israeli forces crossing to the west of the canal was not a sudden idea

in the minds of officials in the Israeli leadership during the war, it was a key element of Israeli military planning of Israeli military planning that had been in place since 1968 to defend Sinai against a large-scale Egyptian attack

Sinai against a large-scale Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal. Despite the the urgent strategic necessity that made it imperative for Israel to to cross its forces to the west of the canal, General Chaim Bar-Lev, who was in command, was surprised that the plan he presented played was surprised that the plan he presented to cross his forces to the west was met with strong opposition from at a meeting of the War Cabinet chaired by Prime Minister Golda Meir on Friday evening.

Prime Minister Meir on the evening of Friday, October 12, in Tel Aviv. The main reason

opposition to Israel's westward invasion plan was due to the presence of a huge concentration of

of more than 400 Egyptian tanks on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

two armored divisions and two mechanized infantry divisions (the tactical reserve of the two armies), which

made an Israeli crossing to the west of the canal a risky and uncertain operation

risky and uncertain. The Israeli leadership almost decided to postpone the implementation of the plan until a more favorable time in the future

to a more favorable time in the future, and General Bar-Lev was about to gather his papers and leave the council in frustration

in frustration, had it not been for the exciting news relayed to the War Council by an officer of the

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Operations, which turned all estimates upside down: the start of the crossing of the Egyptian armored forces to the east of the canal

Egyptian armored forces to the east of the canal. Accordingly, it was agreed to postpone the Israeli crossing to the west until the Southern Command could repel the expected Egyptian attack.

What changed the situation on the Egyptian front was the dangerous decision made by the late President Sadat

Sadat ordered the military command to develop the offensive eastward on the morning of October 13

October 13 to relieve the pressure on Syria. The date was pushed back 24 hours so that the attack could take place

on the morning of October 14, despite the opposition of General Saad Al-Shazly, the Egyptian Chief of Staff, as well as

General Saad Mamoun, commander of the Second Army, and General Abdel Moneim Wasel, commander of the Third Army, opposed this

the decision, which was well-timed, the Commander-in-Chief General Ahmed Ismail insisted that it should be implemented in response to the political leadership's decision.

General Ahmed Ismail insisted that it should be implemented in response to the political leadership's decision.

The Israeli leadership took advantage of the poor strategic position of the Egyptian forces after the crossing of the Egyptian armored forces to the east, which represented the tactical reserve of the second and third armies of the Second and Third Armies in order to carry out the Israeli crossing operation to the west of the Canal West of the Canal with complete success, aided by the failure of the development of the Egyptian offensive on October 14 on October 14 failed miserably, and after the Egyptian armored forces suffered a heavy loss about 250 tanks in a few hours without achieving any objective, and the commanders of the Second and Third Armies were unable to launch any counterattack were unable to launch any major counterattack against the Israeli forces that had crossed west of the canal as a result of their tactical reserves crossing to the east of the canal to develop the attack failed.

The objective of the plan is comprehensive.

In this area, we will not repeat or reiterate what we have already stated in chapters five through nine to IX) of this book with regard to explaining and clarifying the full details of the operations that took place west of the canal west of the canal. But since it is necessary to relate the events from October 15 October 15 (73 days after the failure of the Egyptian development of the eastward offensive) to the cessation of the actual cease-fire as of 11:00 a.m. on October 28 732

1973, so we believe that this period can be divided in terms of the military operations that took place during it

can be divided into three main phases as follows:

The first phase: From October 15 to 17), in which the following took place:

1 The completion of the mobilization of the Israeli forces to cross west in the area of Al-Dafraswar.

2 Limited units of these forces crossed the Suez Canal to the west of the crossing area Al-Defreswar, north of the Great Bitter Lake on the night of October 15/16

3Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's announcement to the Knesset at 4:00 p.m. on October 16

October 16 that Israeli forces are now fighting east and west of the canal.

Phase II: From October 18 to October 22, the following took place:

1 The main Israeli forces assigned to the operation crossed the Suez Canal through the bridges that had been constructed bridges, repelling Egyptian counterattacks and establishing an Israeli bridgehead west of the canal in an initially limited area.

The failure of General Ariel Sharon's forces to reach the city of Ismailia 2

3- The issuance of Security Council Resolution No. 338 to cease fire as of six o'clock and fifty-two minutes on

and fifty-two minutes on October 22, 1973.

The third phase: October 23-28), in which the following took place:

1 Israeli forces west of the Canal developed their offensive under the cover of the ceasefire and push south and west.

2 The Battle of Suez and the failure of Israeli forces to occupy the city.

3-The completion of the siege of the city of Suez and the siege of the 7th and 91st Infantry Divisions of the Third Army
Army's siege of two fields east of the canal.

1973 October 28 Effective ceasefire before noon on October 4

In light of the new military situation that did not favor our forces, and after this

serious shift in the balance of military power between our forces and the enemy forces east and west of the canal, the

The General Command of the Egyptian Armed Forces implemented the following measures in two phases:

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The first stage:

From October 29 until the formulation of the comprehensive offensive plan to achieve the following objectives:

1 Ensuring the ability of our forces in the bridgehead areas east of the Canal to repel any major attacks directed against them.

2- Mobilizing all that could be mobilized from the Egyptian Armed Forces and what could be reinforced with manpower, weapons and equipment from some countries.

manpower, weapons and equipment from some Arab and friendly countries to contain and stabilize

Israeli forces in the positions they have reached west of the canal, and then develop a defense plan

to prevent any possibility of Israel taking advantage of the presence of its forces west of the canal to try to advance in the Delta or Cairo.

Delta or Cairo.

The second phase:

Developing, ratifying, and preparing to execute a comprehensive offensive plan

1, which is the plan to liquidate the Israeli pocket west of the canal

Liquidate the Israeli pocket west of the canal.

During the period of mobilization of Egyptian forces west of the canal to contain and stabilize the enemy and during the development of the

the offensive plan to liquidate the Israeli enclave, and despite the Security Council's

ceasefire, the Egyptian General Command decided not to allow the Israeli forces west of the canal

any period of calm or rest, denying them the ability to stabilize their defenses or engineering fortifications, and tightening the stranglehold on them.

in close cooperation between all surrounding forces. The active defense work of our forces has developed

to such an extent that some called this phase the "second war of attrition the second war of attrition.

The objectives of the Lusitanian command in this phase were as follows:

1 Causing the greatest losses in enemy forces, weapons and equipment

-2 Conducting operations to annoy the enemy on the widest possible scale so that his stay west of the canal becomes

to make its stay west of the Canal unbearable.

13- Forcing Israel to continue mobilizing its reserve forces, which burdens its national economy and threaten public life with complete paralysis.
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. Preventing the enemy from improving and fortifying its positions east and west of Canal 4

During this period, about 1,500 firefights took place, including about 439 operations were announced. These clashes resulted in the following losses to the Israeli forces

according to official reports:

- 1- Destroying 11 aircraft, 14 tanks, 1 armored vehicle and 1 heavy machine gun.
- B - Destroying 36 (bulldozers), engineering equipment and a passenger vehicle.
- C - The Israeli oil tanker (Serena) was severely damaged.
- D - Sinking a naval landing craft.
- E- Killing 187 Israeli personnel and wounding hundreds of wounded

After the threat to the Egyptian military situation west of the Canal was removed, the

The initial thinking of the Malassian leadership at the beginning of the development of the plan was to allocate appropriate forces with the objective of was to allocate appropriate forces whose objective was to forcefully open the way through the Israeli enclave

to connect with the forces of the 7th and 91st Divisions of the Third Army east of the canal and end the blockade

around them by Israeli forces. However, after careful consideration and making a proper assessment of the situation, it was found that the best course of action was to assemble all the allocated Egyptian Egyptian forces west of the canal and to place them under the command of a recognized commander

to report directly to the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and to be

responsible for achieving the goal that has been set, which is to destroy all Israeli forces on Egyptian territory west of the canal

on Egyptian territory west of the canal and restore the situation to what it was before the Israeli enclave west of the canal

west of the canal. The Egyptian plan was code-named

Shamil4. The Malasian commander chosen by the Egyptian political leadership to liquidate and destroy the Israeli enclave was

and completely destroy the Israeli enclave was Major General A.H. Saad Maamoun.

Why Saad Maamoun was chosen

At the start of the October War, Major General Saad Maamoun was in command of the largest Egyptian field army.

Second Army, which included three infantry divisions (18 6 2) and an armored division (21 Division).

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an independent armored brigade (15th Brigade), a mechanized infantry division (23rd Division), and the 10th Mechanized Infantry Brigade Mechanized Infantry Brigade, which was brought in from the General Headquarters reserve, as well as the 30th Independent Infantry Brigade and 351st Independent Infantry in the Port Said sector. Second Army forces were able to execute the plan to

the plan to storm the Suez Canal and build bridges on which tanks, weapons and heavy equipment crossed to the eastern shore of the canal

to the eastern shore of the canal in perfect execution, overran the Bar-Lev line

and created three
on the eastern bank of the canal and repelled all local counterattacks by the
armored units of Gen.
General Albert Mandler's armored units. During October 8 and 9, the
Second Army forces along the frontline from Kantara to Fardan to Ismailia East.
the Israeli armored forces that carried out the tactical counterattack launched
by the Southern Command.
which aimed to destroy the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the canal and cross over
the Egyptian bridges
Egyptian bridges in the Fardan area to the west bank of the canal.

When the decision was made on October 12 to develop the Egyptian offensive
eastward, Saad Maamoun
with the chief of staff and the commander of the Third Army to strongly oppose
this decision. In a conference
headed by General Ahmed Ismail, Saad Mamoun offered to resign if the attack
failed.
Mamoun offered to tender his resignation if the attack was canceled in this
manner and at this time, as it was expected to
would inflict heavy losses on the attacking armored forces, and the withdrawal
of these forces - which represent the tactical reserve of the two armies
the tactical reserve of the Second and Third Armies from the west to the east of
the canal would
allow the Israeli leadership to achieve its goal of crossing to the west of the
canal. The military leadership did not accept
Saad Maamoun's resignation was not accepted by the military leadership, and he
was forced to implement the decision to develop the attack on the morning of
October 14, even though he was convinced that it was the wrong decision because
he was obliged as a military commander to carry out the instructions of his
of his higher command. At 8:30 a.m. on October 14, before the outcome of the
battle was clear
General Saad Maamoun suffered a heart attack and was taken to Gadasin Hospital
and then to Maadi Hospital.
Maadi Hospital . After his release from the hospital, he was appointed Assistant
Minister of War.
Following his appointment on December 13, 73 as commander of the forces to clear
the breach west of the canal
West of the Canal, he received directives to implement the plan from the late
President Sadat and then from
General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, since the eyes of Egypt and the
Arab countries were following
this operation with great interest and focus due to the Israeli media's
exploitation of the Israeli enclave west of the canal to make propaganda
of the Israeli enclave west of the canal for widespread political propaganda.
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Upon assuming command, Major General Saad Maamoun inspected the forces assigned
to the operation
and thoroughly reviewed the plan and made any amendments he deemed necessary.
On December 18, he presented it to General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief,
for approval
for ratification. On December 24, the Commander-in-Chief presented the plan in
its final form to
the late President Sadat at the Qanater al-Khairiya rest house in the presence
of the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the main branches of the Armed
Forces.
and General Saad Maamoun. The President approved the plan and instructed that
to be ready for implementation at any time as of the same day (December 24).

The general position of the forces on both sides on December 24, 1972
The general position of the forces of the two opposing sides on this day was as

follows:

I. For the Egyptian forces:

1 The Israeli military threat west of the Canal in the direction of Cairo and the Delta was completely eliminated, after Egyptian formations were mobilized west of the Canal.

Egyptian formations were mobilized west of the canal, and the strategic balance of Egyptian forces was restored east and west of the canal.

2 While Israel west of the canal had three armored divisions (Ariel Sharon's division, Abraham Adan and Kalman Magen Divisions) and these divisions included 7 armored brigades (3) brigades in the Adan Division Adan Division and two brigades each in the Sharon and Magen Divisions.) In addition to a parachute infantry brigade in the and a mechanized infantry brigade in the Magen Division, the Egyptian forces assigned to the to clear the gap consisted of two armored divisions (4th and 21st Divisions) and three mechanized infantry divisions mechanized infantry divisions (23, 6, and 3 divisions) and units of thunderbolts and paratroopers, as well as Ad hoc forces from the General Headquarters reserve ready to be mobilized to engage and join the to join the forces to clear the breach by decision of the General Commander.

It is clear from the comparison of forces that the situation was in favor of the Egyptian forces, and that the overall superiority ratio was 2 to 1.

3- The Egyptian forces west of the canal launched a war of attrition against the Israeli forces only two days after the ceasefire. The total number of operations directed against Israeli forces amounted to 439 military operations, which had a bad effect on the wind

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morale of its personnel. As a result of the poor military situation, the Israeli forces to protect their positions by digging anti-tank trenches on most of the 6 to 7 meters wide and 5 meters deep, as well as laying about 750,000 mines for tanks and personnel mines for tanks and personnel.

4 While the morale of the Israeli forces was low, the morale of the morale of the Egyptian forces was high, and the slogan repeated by commanders in front of their soldiers was that if Egyptian forces had stormed the Suez Canal on October 6, despite it being one of the most difficult water obstacles in the world and more than 180 meters wide, the tank obstacle in front of the Egyptian forces in the Israeli enclave in front of the Egyptian forces in the Israeli enclave is a simple obstacle that can be easily overcome. General Saad Maamoun used to repeat to his troops that before October 6, we only had the flag. Now, after the battles of the war, we have knowledge and experience.

5 The Egyptian forces were fully secured from the threat of Israeli air attack, as they were Within the scope of the Egyptian air defense network after this network recovered its capabilities and efficiency

and its efficiency to the fullest.

6- The Egyptian bridgeheads built by the Third Army east of the Canal remained firm and strong, and never thought of withdrawing to the west of the Canal. never considered withdrawing to the west of the canal or surrendering despite the Israeli siege
siege around them. This is due to the high morale of their personnel and the fact that they did not face any administrative issues despite the interruption of its lines of communication with the West Canal due to the sufficient volume of administrative needs and stockpiles. Secondly, as for the Israeli forces.

1- The Israeli forces that crossed to the west of the Canal were unable to eliminate the
the tactical reserves of the Second and Third Armies, as well as the strategic reserve
These forces were able to besiege and contain the Israeli forces and prevent them from spreading to the west.
their spread to the west

2 The Israeli forces west of the canal were forced to take defensive positions and did not attempt to
to use the advantage of the initiative. In addition to the artificial anti-tank trench
in front of their positions and the thousands of mines they placed all around them, the

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of Israeli guns were always pointing upward, indicating that their personnel were not ready to start firing
It was also rare for them to return Egyptian fire (it was customary for them to one shot for every ten Egyptian shots).

-3 During the military operations west of the Canal, Israeli forces failed to capture any of the major cities in the Canal
General Sharon's attack on Ismailia was repulsed, and General Adan's forces failed to storm Suez.
General Adan's forces failed to storm Suez despite repeated attacks.

4 The Israeli presence west of the canal became a military stalemate and a dangerous situation for the Israeli forces
Israel's strategic balance of forces east and west of the canal has been disrupted. The enclave
The Israeli enclave west of the canal became separated from the main bases in Sinai, connected to it only by a narrow corridor about 10 kilometers wide
only a narrow corridor about 10 kilometers wide that could be easily cut off by Egyptian forces
Egyptian forces that surrounded it on all sides, and the Israeli forces inside the pocket
west of the canal was held hostage by the besieging Egyptian forces.

5 As a result of Israel's need to continuously reinforce its forces after the operations of its forces extended east and west of the Canal
and west of the Canal, it was forced to maintain a high degree of mobilization of its reserve forces
for a long period of time, which was contrary to its usual policy of reserve mobilization.
This threatened to paralyze its national economy.

6- The Israeli leadership was forced to transfer all administrative needs to its

forces located west of the canal, which increased its administrative burdens and exposed its long transportation lines of more than 300 kilometers at risk of being attacked by land and air.

1- It proved that the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal was not a major strategic operation that could change the course of the war, and was in fact only a tactical operation⁸ that Israel exploited to the fullest extent politically and in the media, despite its low military value

The general planning of Plan 1 Shamil.

Plan Shamil was built on sound tactical foundations, and was intended to ensure the optimal utilization of the forces allocated to clear the breach of the forces allocated to clear the breach and emphasize the importance of cooperation between these forces.

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Air Force and Air Defense Forces and taking into account the proper use of armored forces by making the best use of their characteristics, taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy forces inside the Israeli pocket. of the enemy forces inside the Israeli pocket.

The forces allocated to the implementation of "Plan Ishmael" have carried out training projects that are fully consistent with the tasks assigned to them in the real plan. the tasks assigned to them in the real plan and on similar terrain, and the process of organizing Cooperation between these forces and the Air Force and Air Defense Forces under the direct supervision of General Saad Maamoun

The plan to destroy the enemy inside the Israeli pocket was to attack this pocket from 5 Main directions:

The first direction is a strike from the direction of the 16th Infantry Division's bridgehead east of the canal to close a gap Penetration from upstream at Al-Defreswar (east of the canal).

The second direction is a strike on the axis of the Abu Sultan road in the direction of Al Dafreswar (west of the canal) and the Bitter Lakes area.

The third direction is a strike on the Geneva Road axis in the direction of the Lesser Bitter Lakes.

Fourth direction: A strike on the Suez Road axis in the direction of Suez City to reach the city as quickly as possible as quickly as possible to the city and the besieging Badr forces (the 7th and 91st Infantry Divisions of the Third Army

east of the canal).

Fifth direction: a strike parallel to the Gulf of Suez from south to north in the direction of the port of Adabiya

The aim of the attack in these directions was to close the corridor linking the Israeli enclave to its main bases in

between the Israthili enclave and its main bases in the Sinai was to reach as quickly as possible the city of Suez, the port of Adabiya and the eastern shores of the sea
the Adabiya port, the eastern shores of the Lesser and Great Bitter Lakes, and the
the honor of the canal and to dismember the Israeli enclave and turn it into isolated parts to be destroyed piece by piece
part by part.

The "comprehensive" plan was not destined to be implemented in practice, and at 9:00 p.m. on January 17, 74, Cairo time
January 74, Cairo time, the separation of forces agreement between Egypt and Israel was broadcast under the supervision of Mother
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United Nations, and this agreement was put into effect as of 12:00 p.m. on January 25
January, Israel began withdrawing its forces from the agreed areas, and the work of disengagement proceeded in accordance with the agreement
in accordance with the agreement. With the end of the political conflict at this stage, the political leadership was ordered to freeze Plan Shamil.
The political leadership was ordered to freeze the plan.

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Appendix 1
Letter from Al-Dariq Saad Ma'mun to Jamal Hammad

Mr. Jamal Hammad

Appreciating your effort in preparing the history of the October War in such an accurate and honorable manner, and respecting your opinions and analysis of many political, strategic and tactical positions.
for your opinions and analysis of many of the political, strategic and tactical positions that accompanied this war
War.

Although I held very important and sensitive positions, both in preparing for and executing the October War
and its implementation from 1969 onwards, as well as other military positions and responsibilities.
I was and still am one of the few commanders who did not publish their memoirs despite the completion of
because in my opinion, and I may be wrong about it, the time to publish it is not yet ripe.
time has not yet come. Perhaps it will be after I meet my Lord, with His permission. . Its purpose is not to
not to glorify or belittle others, but to be a military historical reference in the first place.

However, I deviate from this point of view on two issues that you mentioned in your articles about this war
this war:

1- The extent of the right of the military leadership to oppose the political decision.

2-Differing statements about the real cause of General Saad Maamoun's illness on October 14.

Regarding the first topic:

I don't think any Egyptian commander has the courage to resign at the height of his victory on October 12

October 12 to assure his senior military leadership, not the political leadership, that I am accountable to the leadership.

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that the decision to develop the attack on October 13, which was amended to October 14

October 14 was a completely wrong and unsound decision, and I will not recount it, as you have taken care of it.

as a military historian, scholar and scrutinizer to explain this from your point of view, and it is clear that we

We are in agreement on this subject in most of its elements.

I exposed myself with this resignation at that time and thereafter to risks that no one can estimate

that no one can estimate. Despite my full knowledge of these risks, I did not hesitate at all to resign in an attempt to

to spare the country the dire consequences of this tick, which I explained its dimensions and expected consequences at the conference of the General Command of the Armed Forces in Cairo on the evening of

the General Command of the Armed Forces conference in Cairo on the evening of October 12, emphasizing and insisting that

If the attack is developed in this manner and at this time against the two armies, it will result in the destruction of a very high percentage of these forces

a very high percentage of these forces would be destroyed, and the fighting would end with the Israeli forces crossing the Canal

because I was sure, as a field commander, that my assessment of the situation was correct, especially in light of my

my experience of the fighting and its results for the Egyptian and Israeli sides, which took place from

from the start of the war on October 6 until sunset on October 13.

Of course, all of this is undeniable, it is recorded in the records of the war, and I don't want to

- I don't want to boast about these opinions and their validity, as you have sufficiently provided me with some of your opinions and analysis of this decision.

and your analysis of this decision, in addition to what events proved afterward

I also want to emphasize that I am convinced of the strength of my conviction and my concern for the course of the ruins.

that I went so far as to decide in front of those present at the October 12 conference that if the

the development of the attack does not result in the destruction of the Egyptian forces and the crossing of the Suez Canal by Israeli forces.

of the Suez Canal in the light of my field experience of the fighting up to that day, I am prepared

to be court-martialed. However, I asked those present and those who disagreed with my opinion seriously, not sarcastically

If what I envisioned happened - the destruction of the troops and the Israelis crossing the canal - what would be the attitude of those behind this military decision?

what would be the attitude of those behind this decision militarily? The answer was that what I envisioned and estimated would never happen

would never happen. Unfortunately, it happened, as I estimated, 100 percent, on

October 16, 48 hours after I was hospitalized.

48 hours after I was hospitalized and left the command of the Second Army, as if I was reading an open book.

As for the second topic:

The different statements about the real cause of the patients at 8:30 a.m. on October 14.

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October 14, I hope we return to the following facts from the official and medical reports, which is the only decisive factor in this matter
The only decisive factor in this matter:

When I had a heart attack at 8:30 a.m. on October 14, the situation on the front of the two armies was not yet clear

The situation on the front of the two armies had not yet become clear, and no one could decide at that hour that the attack had failed

It had only been two hours since the fighting started, and there were units that had stopped.

Some units had advanced several kilometers. In any case, the command of the The Second Army Command had not been informed of the extent of the losses, and of course they were not significant until that hour.

Please refer to your explanation of the development of the attack in the Second Army sector

as well as the records of the war, and therefore it is not possible to accept General Shazly's view that
that the magnitude of the losses was the cause of this heart attack.

Everyone can refer to the medical reports, both the reports of the Second Army's attending physician

then the doctor who was sent by Maadi Hospital's cardiology department to the front to examine him on the same day.

on the same day, then to the specialized doctors at Qasasin Hospital, then to the head of the cardiology department at Maadi Hospital

of the Maadi Hospital to which I was transferred, and then to the Director of Medical Services of the Armed Forces at the time.

one of the most renowned and competent cardiologists at the time, Lieutenant General Dr. Rifai Kamel, who was assigned by Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail to examine me.

Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail was assigned to examine me at Maadi Hospital.

all of these doctors presented their medical reports during the period from October 14 to the end of the year in this regard.

I think you agree with me that if there is a one-in-a-million doubt about the causes of my heart attack

of my heart attack, the late President Anwar Sadat and Marshal Ahmed Ismail would have

Another attitude towards me is the least conceivable - to be court-martialed and defamed

and my competence after I objected so strongly to this misguided decision to the extent that it led me to submit my resignation in

that led me to submit my resignation at the height of the success of the Egyptian forces. The next few days proved

that my intuition was correct in front of the Muskarian high command at the time, as the Israeli forces crossed the canal on October 16, i.e. after

crossed the canal on October 16, 48 hours after I was hospitalized and left the command of the Second Army on October 14.

Second Army on October 14.

On the contrary, if there was any doubt or concern about my position at that

time

and after the doctors' reports, is it logically possible that at the end of October 73, I was promoted to the position of

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Assistant Minister of War, and then both President Sadat and Marshal Ahmed Ismail chose me from among out of all the commanders older and newer than me - as the commander of the breach forces. It was the most dangerous position I held at the time At the time, all of Egypt was looking with great concern at the Israeli enclave west of the canal and hoping, of course, to destroy it. to destroy it?

God knows what they said to me at the time of this choice, both President Sadat and Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail . Because both men are no longer with us, I will only mention two statements that are confirmed by events rather than words confirmed by events, not words:

I wish we had listened to your words and taken your point of view regarding the development of the offense.

We appointed you to this position to make sure your judgment was sound . and our absolute confidence in your The Second Field Army's achievements under your command, whether in crossing operations or destroying Israeli forces during the the crossing operations, the destruction of Israeli forces during the attack, or the destruction of all its counterattacks. until your illness2 .

There will come a day when I will share with you many detailed documents and information confirming much of your analysis of the October War and add many dimensions to it.

And my hope, as long as you are a military auditor with this degree of honesty. And I presented your point of view Your point of view. You put the facts that I have explained to you in this response in its proper place ... and the final arbiter In this regard, the reports and records of the war, not personal opinions.

I would be grateful if this reply could be published in your book on the October War, as my primary interest is to inform you and your readers of these facts, above all for the sake of history. to inform you and your readers of these facts, above all for history.

General Saad Maamoun

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2Qahlam 6

The true story of the siege of Sulphur

In January 1972, while discussing the proposed plans for crossing the Suez Canal, the the General Command's decision to establish the 130th Brigade, which was initially called the Fleet Infantry. Shortly before the October War, it was decided to change its name to the 130th Mechanized Infantry Brigade

Amphibious Brigade bisnmm. Its purpose was to create a mechanized infantry force with the ability to move its amphibious vehicles both across land and across limited bodies of water, such as lakes limited bodies of water, such as the lakes on the Suez Canal (Lake Crocodile and the Great and Lesser Bitter Lakes). Great and Lesser Bitter Lakes) or the Gulf of Suez, with the purpose of surprising the enemy in the depth of its defenses to paralyze its command centers and disrupt the progress of its tactical reserves

In the early months of 1972, the 130th Amphibious Brigade was formed in The 130th Amphibious Brigade was formed in the Amiriya area in Alexandria after Colonel A.H. Mahmoud Shuaib was chosen to lead it, and it consisted of Two mechanized infantry battalions, whose members were selected from the Thunderbolt Forces, and were called Battalion 602 Battalion and was commanded by Lt. Col. H. Mahmoud Salem, and Battalion 603, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel-Tawab, in addition to the rest of the brigade's support units, the most important of which were A battalion of T-76 amphibious tanks, a battalion of anti-tank guided missiles (Malotka), an anti-aircraft battalion, and a 120mm mortar battalion. Each infantry battalion was equipped with Each mechanized infantry battalion was equipped with 40 Topaz amphibious armored vehicles to transport the battalion's personnel.

In late September 1973, the 301st Brigade was transferred from Amiriya to the Canal Zone It was stationed at Camp Habiballah, northwest of Suez. The 602nd and 036th Battalions and 036, each reinforced with 10 T76 amphibious tanks from the brigade's tank battalion, were assigned the task of
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Crossing the Lesser Bitter Lake on October 6, 1973, as soon as artillery fire began from A crossing point about 2 kilometers south of Kabrit, with the 260th Battalion to push on the Battalion 603 on the road leading to the Gadi Gorge, and Battalion 603 on the road leading to the Matla Gorge. Matla, with the intention of capturing the western entrances of the two straits, thereby delaying the arrival of the enemy's tactical reserve until the morning. the arrival of the enemy's tactical reserve until the morning of October 7, i.e., after ensuring that the the bridges and ferries on the canal and the armored brigades have crossed to join the infantry divisions attached to them. The five infantry divisions will be ready to repel any enemy tactical counterattack enemy tactical counterattack.

At the appointed time, the 602nd Battalion crossed the Bitter Lake, followed by the 603rd Battalion 603 Battalion, but both battalions lost some of their strength during the crossing, as some of the T 76 tanks, Topaz armored vehicles and some Bardam vehicles sank to the bottom of the lake. The crossing turned out to be shallow and muddy, with gelatinous soil, causing the armored vehicles and tanks to armored vehicles and tanks on their tracks across the lake, except for the original Suez Canal navigation corridor in the in the center of the lake. A group of engineers from the 130th Brigade opened a

gap in the minefield
discovered on the eastern shore of the lake. After a brief firefight with the enemy from the
Fort Sulphur East (the Israeli Potzer Fort of the Bar-Lev Line), Battalion 602nd Battalion advanced to the road leading to the Jahdi Gorge according to plan, and no sooner had it traveled 15 kilometers of the road and the last light was already gone when it collided with an Israeli armored battalion coming from the
from Colonel Dan Shimron's brigade, which was in charge of the southern sector. A fierce
A fierce and unequal battle took place in the darkness, in which Israeli tanks used
48, 255 beams of light and 105mm cannon fire, and the 602nd Battalion was incapacitated
with its 76mm tank guns, Malotka rockets, which are difficult to aim in the dark, and its lightly armored vehicles
lightly armored vehicles were no match for this overwhelmingly superior armored force.
The battle, which was poorly planned by the 10th Operations Center, ended - as expected - with the destruction of all tanks and vehicles
predictably ended with the destruction of all the tanks and armored vehicles of the 602nd Battalion despite the valiant resistance
of the battalion. The surviving battalion members returned from the battle on foot and in batches
for three days to where they had joined the 7th Infantry Division's bridgehead. to regroup the battalion at Camp Habiballah.

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603rd Battalion's occupation of the Sulphur position

The 603rd Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Tawab, did not have the opportunity to advance
on the Shatt-Matla road in accordance with the mission assigned to it, as no sooner had it crossed the Bitter Lake behind
Battalion 602 and reached the eastern shore at around 4:30 p.m. and assembled outside the minefield.
no sooner had it crossed the bitter lake behind the 602nd Battalion and reached the eastern shore at around 4:30 p.m.
The battalion was assisted by a Malotka missile company from the 7th Infantry Division
from the 7th Infantry Division, which had opened on the eastern shore of the lake, destroying
two enemy tanks and three anti-tank missile vehicles, and the armored company withdrew
in an easterly direction. The 603rd Battalion was instructed to remain in position and defend
the beachhead it occupies, as its mission to capture the western entrance to the Strait of Metla was canceled.
the western entrance to the Matla Strait, after those in charge of operations at BAMC 10 realized the reality of the tragedy that had befallen the 603rd Battalion
realized the tragedy that had befallen the 602nd Battalion as a result of their error of judgment and miscalculation, which made them assign
to a mechanized infantry battalion this mission, which was impossible for it to carry out and resulted in nothing but the destruction of the battalion
only resulted in the destruction of the battalion.

At around 9:00 a.m. on October 9, the 603rd Battalion began moving north along the
along the shore of the Lesser Bitter Lake to carry out the new mission assigned

to it after it was reinforced by a company of tanks from the 25th Armored Brigade.
tanks from the 25th Armored Brigade, namely the capture of the Israeli fortress Potzer Sulphur East). The fort had been evacuated by its Israeli garrison on the evening of October 8, after Colonel Dan Shimron, commander of the Southern Sector Armored Brigade, received confirmation from his superior General Abraham Mandler (Albert) to evacuate some of the Bar-Lev Line forts in his sector, including Butzer. At 1:45 p.m., the 603rd Battalion occupied Fort Butzer without a fight without a fight, but after a tank and an armored vehicle exploded because they were entangled in the minefield that surrounded the site. The Malayan flag was raised on the fort. Two individuals were captured in the vicinity of the who turned out to be members of the International Monitoring Body and were released. The battalion found large quantities of ammunition inside the large quantities of ammunition and preserved canned goods that the Israeli garrison did not have time to the Israeli garrison did not have time to take them with them or destroy them. Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Tawab took the initiative to order large quantities of large quantities of supplies, water and ammunition from the brigade's administrative area at Camp Habiballah, which was located on the west bank of the sea. which was located on the west bank of the lake about 8 kilometers from the shore and facing

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Sulphur site. The regular means of communication between the Chthon administrative area in the west and the Sulphur site in the east was to use carts to the western shore of the lake and then cross it using rubber boats (Zodiacs). Lt. Col. Ibrahim Abdel Tawab also ordered a large quantity of of mines and ordered an unspecified outer perimeter of mines around the Israeli mine perimeter that surrounded the site. This minefield, which was about 300 meters deep, was was of great benefit, as it turned out.

At 1 p.m. on October 13, General Abdel Moneim Wasel, the commander of the Third Army Third Army commander ordered the 130th Mechanized Amphibious Brigade, which had been in headquarters since the start of operations on October 6, to join the 603rd Battalion's position at the Sulphur position and to remove the 130th Amphibious Mechanized Infantry Brigade from the Third Army's command to be placed under the command of Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi, commander of the 7th Infantry Division, and to withdraw from the Kabrit site 10 Topaz armored vehicles with their drivers to join the 7th Infantry Division, and the remnants of the 602nd Battalion under the command of Lt. 602nd Battalion under the command of Lt. Col. Mahmoud Salem from Camp Habiballah to Kabrit Airport (West Beheira), and that this battalion would be assigned the task of defending the Kabrit airfield. On October 14 October 14, Colonel A.H. Mahmoud Shuaib, the brigade commander, and his commanding officers were moved to the Kabrit position. The signal chief of the 7th Infantry Division sent a radio vehicle to the site

to enter the 130th Brigade's command on the division's radio network.
on the division's radio network. On the same day, from the brigade's camp in Amiriya, Alexandria
The 120m Mortar Battalion and the Engineers Company joined the Kabrit position.
The brigade commander ordered
The brigade commander ordered the mortar battalion to occupy a position west of the lake to support the Kabrit defenses with fire after he had retained a company in the front defenses of the Kabrit position.

On the afternoon of October 16, while Colonel Mahmoud Shuaib was at the 7th Infantry Division headquarters
October 16, he overheard a telephone conversation in which General Abdel Moneim Wasel, the commander of the Third Army, informed
Brig. Gen. Ahmed Badawi that Israeli forces had crossed to the West Bank of the Canal, and asked him to
to take care of securing the division's left flank, which is also the left flank of the Third Army
Third Army. On October 17, the independent formation of the 25th Armored Brigade passed in front of the Kabrit position
in a huge whirlwind of dust, having been pushed in the morning from the 7th Division's bridgehead
to move north along the Great Bitter Lake, with the task of clearing the Israeli penetration gap from the east
to the east, an unfortunate mission that was poorly planned in Åÿ 10

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which led to the brigade's destruction a few hours later in an Israeli ambush.
in an Israeli ambush.

After the destruction of the brigade, 10 T26 tanks, 7 armored vehicles (and 180 officers and soldiers from the Mechanized Infantry Battalion of this ill-fated brigade.
The arrival of these dispersed fragments in the position had a bad effect on the morale of the personnel of the Kabrit position.
of the Sulphur position. At about 1:00 p.m. on October 19, General Mustafa Shahin, Chief of Staff of the Third Army
General Mustafa Shahin, Chief of Staff of the Third Army, who ordered the return of all the personnel and equipment of the
and equipment of the 25th Armored Brigade that had taken refuge in the site to their original units in Ras Kobri
7 Infantry Division, but withdrew the tank company that had reinforced the 103rd Battalion on October 9
October 9, leaving in its place the ten tanks that had taken refuge in the position after the battle due to their poor condition
The tanks were in poor condition and some of their tracks were unable to move. These tanks were therefore used in the position as
as anti-tank guns, especially since their guns were 115 mm caliber to take advantage of their firepower and long range.
firepower and long range. Moreover, General Shaheen ordered the withdrawal of 3 amphibious tanks (T
76 and 01 Topaz armored vehicles to join the 602nd Battalion's force at Kabrit airfield to reinforce it after its equipment was destroyed
whose equipment had been destroyed in the battle of Tariq al-Jadi, as mentioned above.

Laying siege to the Kibret force

The actual siege of the Kibret position began on the morning of October 22, 1973. It is worth noting
worth noting is that the Israeli siege of the site began at the same time that

the Security Council issued Resolution 338, the Security Council's first ceasefire resolution, meaning that this siege was carried out in the shadow of three consecutive resolutions issued by the Security Council to cease and confirm the ceasefire. Resolutions 338 on October 2, 339 on October 23, and 340 on October 25 October. Although the six-point agreement signed on November 11, 1973 between the between the Egyptian and Israeli sides in the Kilometer 101 talks, the fourth paragraph stipulates 7 not to impede non-military supplies to the eastern bank of the Canal, the Israeli blockade continued The Israeli siege around the Sulphur position remained very tight, and the supplies of taham and water, which are of course non-military supplies and water, which are, of course, non-military supplies, continued to reach the site with almost unimaginable adventures. It seems that Israel's southern command was hoping to pay the price of starvation.

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or to use the siege of its forces, which had been cut off from the outside world, as a tool isolated from the outside world, as a bargaining tool and a means of pressure on the Egyptian delegation during the Kilometer 101 talks between the Egyptian and Israeli sides. Kilometer 101 talks between the Egyptian and Israeli sides. When the second phase of the Kilometer 101 talks ended with the signing of the Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 1973. remained under siege. The Kibret garrison did not leave its position until after Israel implemented the third phase of its troop withdrawal in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement, which stipulated the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the area south of the lakes to the Gedi area east of the Canal within eight days, ending on February 12.⁷⁴ With the completion of this phase, the siege was considered to have been definitively lifted the siege was considered to have been lifted. Thus, the exact duration of the siege began on October 22, 1973 and ended on February 12, 1973, i.e., it lasted 114 days Therefore, for the sake of historical integrity, the duration of the siege should be corrected, which was erroneously recorded in all newspapers, books and references as 134 days.

The Sulphur site shop as a former Israeli fortification of the Bar-Lev Line, which includes A strong point that was located in the southwest of the site, close to the lake. This strong point consisted of several floors that penetrate into the ground and rise to the top of the embankment. It included several strong bunkers and shelters for sleeping, and each bunker was equipped with several openings towards the west for the use of several openings to the west for the use of striking weapons against an Egyptian attack, (an attack was attack was expected on this side) All the dugouts are connected to each other by trenches Deep communication trenches lined with steel sheeting and sandbars, and designed to withstand heavy air or ground bombardment heavy air or ground bombardment up to 1,000-pound bombs. The brigade commander, Col. Shuaib had allocated the main bunker at this strong point to house the brigade's

command, and
some of the subsidiary bunkers as warehouses for reserve food and water
supplies, and ordered one of the shelters inside the strongpoint to be converted
into a medical point
shelters inside the strongpoint into a medical station to house the sick and
wounded who were being treated by the battalion's doctor.
Battalion doctor was supervising their treatment. To the east of the position
were several small bunkers that the Israelis had prepared
prepared by the Israelis when the fortress was built, to be used to repel any
Egyptian attack from the east
by any infiltrators from that direction. The 6103rd Battalion took advantage of
these pillboxes, and
occupied them with its three companies to repel any expected Israeli attack from
the east. To the north of the
of the site, there were continuous deep communication trenches, to which the ten
tanks attached to
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25th Armored Brigade were used to conceal their hulls and remove gun turrets so
that they could strike
from this fortified position.

On October 22 (the first day of the siege) and October 32, Israeli aircraft
Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft carried out concentrated air attacks that lasted
most of the daylight hours until
sunset. The planes dropped 1,000-pound bombs on the strongpoint's defenses
with such intensity that they were determined to demolish them and undermine
their foundations.

During these two days, the most serious events in the history of the siege took
place, the most important of which were
The following:

A company of enemy tanks attempted to penetrate the front defenses of the
Sulphur position from the
A company of enemy tanks tried to penetrate the front defenses of the Sulphur
site from the east.
(Malotka) managed to destroy some of them at a great distance from the site.
When the
Israeli tanks prepared to storm the site, they became entangled in the external
minefield set up by the
Battalion 603, which the Israelis were unaware of, and three tanks exploded
inside the field near the Egyptian defenses.
near the Egyptian defenses, and the remaining tanks withdrew to the
East

The right company in the forward defenses, which Captain Shawty al-Jawhari was
leading, was surprised by an Israeli jeep
was surprised by an Israeli jeep crossing the frontline from right to left near
the Egyptian defenses.
He ordered the company commander to open fire on it, and when the vehicle
stopped and the soldiers approached it
They found one of its four occupants dead, and captured the other three, one of
whom turned out to be
an officer's sergeant. When questioned by Major Suleiman, head of the brigade's
reconnaissance, they reported that they were working in the
in the Moral Guidance Department and that they had lost their way. Colonel
Shuaib, the brigade commander, ordered
Colonel Shuaib ordered the head of reconnaissance to take them under guard to
the 7th Division headquarters to hand them over to the head of the division's
reconnaissance.
Division reconnaissance . In accordance with the procedure for moving between

the Sulphur position in the north and the bridgehead of the
of the 7th Division in the south, the brigade's reconnaissance chief planned to
cross the lake to its
its western shore by one of the Zodiac rubber boats and then board one of the
brigade's vehicles
waiting as instructed at the crossing point to take them south to the 7th
Division's crossings.
The prisoners crossed the Suez Canal from west to east to reach the head of the
bridge

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of the 7th Infantry Division. This lengthy method of transportation was used due
to the unsuitability of the
The land road to the east of the lake was not suitable for vehicular traffic due
to its soft, loose sand. However
It was unwise to send the prisoners in this way, and it was more prudent and
prudent to send them under escort via the
to send them under guard across the land road on foot, as the brigade commander
had known
since October 16 of the news of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal.
The predictable happened.
the vehicle was fired upon, and when it stopped, the three prisoners jumped out
and returned
back to their troops, while the head of reconnaissance sneaked back to his
original unit headquarters in Alexandria, after seeing the Israeli

Alexandria, having seen Israelis ahead of him on the West Bank.
The horrific Israeli air strike caused several painful incidents that had the
worst consequences.

The impact on the brave men of Sulphur is as follows:

1 While the young lieutenant commanding the 120 mm mortar platoon was praying to
the enemy facing him with his fire
in courage and heroism, indifferent to the air attacks that shake the site, if a
direct bomb of 10 00 lbs.
A direct 10,000-pound bomb fell on the platoon's position, destroying it
completely, and the commander and his heroic men were all martyred under the
rubble.
and his heroic men were all martyred under the rubble.

2- While the unit's doctor was in the medical point assigned to him in the
was engaged in treating the wounded and alleviating their pain, if a direct bomb
of 1,000 pounds penetrates
A direct 1000-pound bomb penetrates the roof of the shelter and turns the doctor
and the wounded into a pile of
Body parts and blood.

3- When Colonel Shuaib, the brigade commander, felt that the main dugout in
which the officers and soldiers of the brigade command were staying
and soldiers of the brigade command began to shake and crack under the weight of
the aerial bombardment, he ordered everyone to quickly evacuate it and move to
everyone to quickly evacuate it and move to the barrel pits scattered around the
strong point.
When the brigade commander discovered that Major Nouredine Abdelnabi, the chief
signal officer, had left his
When the brigade commander discovered that Major Nouredine Abdelnabi, the
signal chief, had left his radios and some of his soldiers inside the main
dugout
Lt. Col. Mohammed Amin Mokled, the brigade's chief of operations, insisted on

accompanying him into the dugout to make sure the soldiers were evacuated. insisted on accompanying him into the dugout to make sure everyone was evacuated. A few minutes after the two officers returned to the A 1000-pound direct hit bomb landed on top of it, crushing it to the ground. The two heroes were martyred while performing their duty until the last minute, and all the soldiers inside were martyred with them the soldiers inside, and all the radios were destroyed.

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4 It turned out that the two dugouts in which all the spare food and water supplies had been stored had been turned into deep pits by airplane bombs. aircraft bombs had turned them into deep craters, and piles of sand had fallen on top of them, burying the rations and water underground

5 The radio vehicle that had been sent by the 7th Division's signal chief to conduct radio communications between the site command and the 7th Infantry Command, thus making the Sulphur site completely cut off from the outside world

6 Colonel Shuaib, the brigade commander, was hit by a shrapnel fragment in his hand from the cluster bombs Captain Nasr, commander of the brigade's reconnaissance company, pulled the shrapnel out of his hand with his teeth. brigade. As the rubber boats in the east were damaged by shrapnel, Capt. Nasr volunteered to cross the sea. Captain Nasr volunteered to swim across the lake to the western shore to bring a boat from there to evacuate the brigade commander to the to evacuate the brigade commander to the division's medical point. The brigade commander made the same mistake for the second time, and did not learn from the previous lesson, and so no sooner had Captain Nasr seen the Israelis on the West Bank the Israelis on the West Bank, he repeated the same tactic as his colleague Major Suleiman, and he too sneaked back to Alexandria. Thus, the 130th Brigade lost its entire reconnaissance without any reason or justification.

How did the heroes of Sulphur overcome the ordeal of the siege?

Restrictions had to be placed on food, water, and ammunition consumption in order for the position to last as long as possible. the position to last as long as possible. The allocation of food per person was every four days. The most complicated issue was water, as there were no sources, but a qualified soldier who had graduated from the Faculty of Science showed his colleagues a practical way to turn the by evaporating the salty water and then condensing the rising vapor into fresh water. inside the pots into fresh water. They used wood from telephone poles and railroad ties for the vaporization process, and they also brought copper pipes from some of the destroyed tanks and armored vehicles and destroyed armored vehicles to deliver water vapor from the evaporation vessels to the condensation vessels. The soldiers soon mastered The soldiers soon mastered this process and completely eliminated the water shortage. Col. Shuaib felt it necessary to re-establish contact with the 7th Division command to ask them to push the supplies

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which was vital for the sustenance of the garrison, so on October 25th he sent a small patrol

On October 25, he sent a small patrol of two officers across the land road by the lake on foot, and when their return was delayed two days later, he sent a combat patrol of three officers and eleven soldiers, accompanied by a number of The patrol was accompanied by a number of wounded men who were able to walk, but whose wounds were causing them great pain.

October 28 was an unforgettable day for Kabrit's men, as the two patrols returned accompanied by a doctor who carried with him his medical equipment and medicines to treat the wounded, as well as the members of the with as much water, food and cigarettes as they could carry, raising everyone's spirits. morale .

On October 30, Colonel Mahmoud Shuaib handed over the command of the site to Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim On October 30, Colonel Shuaib handed over the command of the post to Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Tawab and walked with one of the patrols heading to the 7th Infantry Division through the The land road that became the permanent communication route between the post and the division's bridgehead. After Colonel Shuaib received the necessary treatment at the division's medical point, he then stayed for about ten for about ten days on the left flank of the 7th Division to supervise the transportation of supplies. On November 11 November 11, he was transferred with the Suez wounded to Cairo in accordance with the six-point agreement, where he was admitted to Maadi Hospital .

In order to organize the delivery of supplies to the Sulphur position, Brig. Gen. Badawi, commander of the 7th Division, assigned this operation to Brigadier General Fouad Saleh Zaki, commander of the 8th Brigade and Colonel A.H. Hassan al-Akhras, Chief of Staff of the 8th Brigade, which was the division's left flank. They carried out this operation perfectly. The movement of patrols carrying patrols carrying supplies on the land route had become a dangerous adventure, as their number had swelled to sometimes as many as 40 men. The enemy's attention had begun to turn toward them. Three young three young officers from the brave heroes of Kabrit continued to carry out this dangerous mission in turns, without hesitation or fear Lieutenants Osama Abdullah, Ibrahim al-Ajami, and Abdullah Ashour, until the enemy finally managed to close the land road. The enemy finally managed to close the land road, and its armored elements reached near the beach.

Following the closure of the land route, those in charge of supply had to resort to another solution to save the situation to salvage the situation, which was to use the sea route across the lake. towing ten wooden boats tightly tied together to be filled with water and food. and food, and the most favorable time was midnight on the dark nights when it was still dark.

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moon. As soon as the convoy arrived at the unloading point in the lake at

Kabrit, the rope connecting the boats to the launch was cut. that connects the boats to the launcher so that the launcher can immediately return to the loading point in the canal in the brigade's sector while Kabrit's men began unloading the ample supplies carried by the ten boats. The convoys were commanded by three young officers from the brigade, despite the dangers that arose after the enemy intervened with their boats Three young officers from the 130th Permati Brigade, who demonstrated extraordinary heroism and courage Captain Essam Abdel Hay and Lieutenants Saber Kassah and Sayed Harb.

Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Tawab, commander of the 603rd Battalion, who took command of the Kabrit position, as described by his officers and soldiers He was described by his officers and soldiers as a brave and faithful commander, and he set an example for his men in all his actions. He was the least food and drink, the least sleep, and the most prayerful, worshipful, and reciting the Quran. He used to lead his men in prayers and gave the Friday sermon. He was an ascetic, austere and pious person, the kind of person God chooses for martyrdom

On the afternoon of January 17, while he was at the forward observation post, the enemy fired some artillery and mortar rounds on the site, and the commander discovered the Israeli observation post that was directing the strike that was directing the strike. As he was directing the fire of the 120mm mortar company next to him next to its commander, an Israeli 120mm mortar bomb fell directly on the observation post, destroying it Lieutenant Colonel Ibrahim Abdel Tawab was martyred with his right hand holding the newspapers and his left hand holding the field glasses. The commander of the mortar company was martyred with him. The men buried them both in the Martyrs' Cemetery behind the 6th Company's position Sixth Company . The Sulphur site was filled with a silence that spoke louder than any words of lamentation. words of lamentation.

The very next morning, January 18, the Egyptian and Israeli sides signed a disengagement agreement at Kilometer 101 signed the disengagement agreement, and Major Saad Dsoni took command of the Kabrit post Chief of Operations of the 603rd Battalion, and following the completion of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from south of the lakes to the Gedi area on January 12. Lakes to the Gedi area on February 12, in implementation of the third phase of the disengagement agreement The siege was lifted. On February 13, the heroes of Kabrit handed over the site to a force from the 7th Infantry Division and moved to Al-Rubaiki camp on the Suez-Cairo road where they stayed for three days. On February 17, they traveled by special train from Al-Rubaiki to Alexandria's Misr Station Misr Station in Alexandria, where officials had prepared an official and popular reception for them.

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the governor of Alexandria handed the city's flag to their commander as an expression of the people's appreciation for their heroism and struggle. The men of the Sulphur Garrison have truly set the most magnificent examples of heroism, faithfulness and redemption.

It is true for them that the Almighty Almighty says: "The men of the garrison

of Sulphur have done what they have promised to God, and some of them are those who have been killed.

5

Some of them are waiting, and some of them are waiting, and they did not give up (Al-Ahzab: Verse 233

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Appendix 3A

The first letter from Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazli to Gamal Hammad

Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazli, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces during the October War

73 in an extensive letter that included his response to the question we had previously asked him under the title

âQuestion to Al-Shazly : Where are the armored brigades that were withdrawn to the west?'⁴ There is no doubt that

Chadli's letter, in addition to its importance for readers due to his senior leadership position

that he held during the October War, it has a special significance for me, as Saad al-Shazly

Shazly, in addition to our fellowship in arms, was also my colleague in a prestigious military study that lasted a year when we were together

that lasted more than a year when we were both on a study mission to the War College in the Soviet Union.

In this mission, we were accompanied by the prominent commanders of the October War, Lieutenant General Saad Maamoun

Commander of the Second Army and General Kamal Hassan Ali, Director of the Armored Corps.

With this response from Lieutenant General Shazly, readers in Egypt and abroad have the opportunity to

to see two different points of view on one of the most important issues raised in the last phase of the October War, following the

in the final phase of the October War, following the breach at Deverswar and the crossing

1 Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16,³⁷

which is the issue of withdrawing armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west to confront the Israeli threat

from the east of the canal to the west to confront the Israeli threat, a view held by Lt. Gen.

Shazly, which sparked a sharp disagreement at the 10th position on the evening of October 20. We have already explained

the details of this dispute in Chapter 10 of the book, in which we explained the reasons for the disagreement

between Al-Shazly and the late President Anwar Sadat.

as readers will see, centered on two main issues:

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First, when was Shazly's return from the Second Army and when was the conference held under the presidency of the late President

Sadat at Center 210

Second - the position of the armored brigades east of the canal on the evening of October 20, and why Al-Shazly believed

that all of them should be withdrawn to the west of the canal?

As readers will see in his response, Brother Saad Al-Shazly resolved the first issue. He admitted with admirable moral courage that the correct date of his return from Ismailia and the date of the commanders' conference headed by Sadat at Center 10 is the date we have already recorded, i.e. the evening of October 20 we have recorded, i.e. the evening of October 20, not October 19 as Sadat stated in his book *Search for Self*, and as Shazly himself recorded in his memoirs. He gave us four reasons to justify his mistake in order to prove that it was unintentional, citing the aphorism which says: "Whoever doesn't make a mistake"

With this confession, we have achieved a great historical gain, as we were able, more than 15 years after the October War, to advise 15 years after the October War, we were able to correct the history of one of the important events that took place during this war which was wrongly recorded even in official records and references.

The second issue relates to the opinion expressed by Al-Shazly on the evening of October 2 that to withdraw the armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west. In his response, he recorded his reasons for adopting this opinion his reasons for adopting that opinion and his criticism of the viewpoint we expressed in Chapter 10 of this book which contradicts his view. The following is General Shazly's letter in its entirety and we will discuss it next.

Lieutenant General Chadli's letter

I read with great interest what Brother Gamal Hammad wrote about the glorious October War and published it as The title of the battles on the Egyptian front. It was my intention to comment on the contents of these articles after finishing the publication of the latest episodes of these articles. But Jamal Hammad asked me a direct question His title was : "Question to Al-Shazly: Where are the armored brigades that can be withdrawn? Despite this this question, I preferred to postpone commenting on everything that Jamal Hammad wrote until he had finished
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to publish everything he has to say. But some friends and readers asked me to respond to this question, which is is still hot. In response to their wishes, I offer readers my answer to this question today.

President's Conference Center 10

But before answering this question, we must first agree on the date on which on the basis of which the general situation on the Egyptian front is assessed and the position of the Egyptian and Israeli armored brigades is evaluated and Israeli armored brigades on that date. Was it October 20 or was it October 19?

So when was Shazly's return from the second army? When was the conference held under Sadat's chairmanship at Center 10?

What I can say with certainty is that the date of my return from the Second Army was the same as the date of the conference at Center 10

I was the one who demanded that the conference be held after my return from the front.

If this conference was held on the evening of the 20th, I left the Second Army on the afternoon of the 20th

If it was held on the evening of the 20th, I left the Second Army on the afternoon of the 19th.

I am now inclined to believe that the date is October 20. But how did this error come about?

Is it an intentional mistake, or is it a mistake without malice?

Anyone who deliberately changes the date must have a specific goal to achieve behind this deliberate mistake. Either it is to achieve a gain, or it is to avoid

responsibility . Since recording my return from the Second Army as the 19th and not the 20th

no gain for me and no fault for me, the willfulness in this case ceases to exist and becomes an ordinary mistake

An ordinary mistake .

Jamal Hammad wonders: How could Shazly make a mistake on this date, when he is known for his accuracy

He is known for his accuracy and recording events as they happened: "Yes, who does not make mistakes. However, there are four

There are four reasons for this error: The first is that I didn't take my notebook with me

when I left Post 10, so I didn't have it with me when I was in the Second Army. The second reason is that I didn't record events in this notebook as they happened.

I recorded them during periods of calm. Since my time in the Second Army and afterward until

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the ceasefire was a difficult period, so I only recorded the events of this period on

October 25. The third reason is that the difference between being in a place for 24 hours and

44 hours, is that in the first case the individual sleeps one night, and in the second case he sleeps two nights

sleeps two nights. However, if the period is extended, there is no difference between day and night, and the individual only sleeps

sitting for an hour or two, then this is fatigue and exhaustion, because in this case he loses his sense of time

sense of time. The fourth reason is that the official announced date of the conference held at

Center 10 is October 19, 1973. Sadat mentioned this date 13 years ago, and no one who attended this conference disputed it.

No one who attended this conference disputed the correctness of this date. Sadat then announced that he had dismissed me

from my position on October 19 after I returned from the front. In the museum set up by the Armed Forces

The Armed Forces Museum of the October War, records and announcements stated that General Shazly was

removed from his post on October 19. This means that the General Command of the Armed Forces recognizes that the

that the conference held at Center 10 under Sadat's presidency was held on October 19, and therefore the return from the Second Army must have taken place on

The return from the Second Army must have taken place on October 19.

this mistake in good faith. Was this also the attitude of those who kept silent about this mistake all these years?

years?

I had to settle this issue before I could examine the situation on the Egyptian front to see if it was possible to withdraw four armored brigades

whether four armored brigades could be withdrawn from east of the canal to face the Israeli armored threat against our forces stationed west of the canal. I would conduct this research on the basis of the situation on the evening of October 2, 1973.

Armored brigades east of the canal

The first thing I did after returning from command of the Second Army on October 20 was to familiarize myself with the important events that had occurred during my absence from Post 10. General Abdel Ghani El-Gamsi, Chief of the Operations Staff, explained the situation in the Third Army sector, as well as the position of the air force, navy, and air defense Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense. What concerns us in this area is the position of our armored forces armored. El-Gamsi informed me that you have withdrawn the 3rd Armored Brigade from the east in the sector of the Third Army sector to join its parent division, the 4th Armored Division, thus making the division
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Fourth Armored Division is now fully formed and stationed west of the canal, south of the Ismailia Canal. Ismailia. Since I was aware that the independent 15th Armored Brigade had been withdrawn from the from the east in the Second Army sector. This meant that by the evening of October 20 we had three armored brigades west of the canal. Two of them were in the 4th Armored Division, which was stationed south of the Ismailia Canal. The third, the independent 15th Armored Brigade, was stationed north of the Ismailia Terrace.

East of the canal we still had five more brigades. Three of them were in the Second Army sector are: The 1st and 41st Armored Brigades of the 21st Armored Division and the 24th Armored Brigade of the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division. 23 Mechanized Infantry Division. In the Third Army sector, two armored brigades were stationed: Brigade 25 Independent Armored Brigade and 22 Armored Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division. Whereas The 25th Independent Armored Brigade had been almost completely destroyed on October 17 as a result of the insane mission the insane mission to which it had been assigned, and for which the first violent public clash between Sadat, who was in favor of the mission, and Shazly, who who was in favor of the mission and Shazly who was against it, we must drop the 25th Armored Brigade from our calculation. As a result, the armored brigades that we had left east of the canal on realistically on the evening of October 20 were the 22nd, 24th, 14th, and 1st brigades, and these are the four brigades the four brigades that I wanted to withdraw, Brother Jamal. I would like to clarify that when I mentioned in my book about the October War that I demanded the withdrawal of four armored brigades, I meant to withdraw from the east all armored formations and units that do not fall within the organization of infantry divisions.

To say that the strength of the 1st Brigade and the 14th Armored Brigade was

reduced to
30 tanks is an exaggeration of the position of these two brigades. In general,
the situation reports for
for armored units change every day and sometimes every hour.

This depends on the activity of combat operations and repair operations. An
armored brigade's
of an armored brigade after a battle that the number of its tanks has been
reduced to 20
tanks. But a few hours later, or 24 hours later, another position report states
that the number of tanks
that the number of operational tanks has increased to 45 or 50, as a result of
repairs
on tanks that had suffered minor malfunctions. In addition, although tanks are
the
the main weapon in armored units, the armored brigade includes within its
organization units

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many other combat units. Perhaps you know, Jamal, that within the organization
of the armored brigade is a reconnaissance company.
an engineer company, a mechanized infantry battalion, a field artillery
battalion and an anti-aircraft artillery battalion
With these units are 12 vehicles carrying anti-tank guided missiles.
21 field guns, 42 anti-aircraft guns, and more than 60 short-range anti-tank
launchers
short-range. These units use about 250 vehicles, more than half of which are
armored vehicles.
There is no doubt that these units have also suffered some losses, but it is
certain that
their losses were less than those of the tanks. It would be wrong to omit them
from our calculation.
In addition, the Israeli armored brigades also suffered losses
heavy losses. Jamal Hammad himself admitted that the number of tanks in the two
armored brigades
Magen Division were down to 50 tanks before he rushed them south on October 23
October, occupying the port of Adabiya and completing the siege of the Third
Army and the city of Suez.

Regarding the 24th Armored Brigade, Hammad gives two reasons why it could not be
withdrawn from
16th Infantry Division sector: The first reason is the weak possibility of the
16th Infantry Division's bridgehead
if the 24th Armored Brigade is withdrawn. The second reason is that there are no
bridges erected south of
Crocodile Lake. As for the first reason, this is a moot point to be decided on
the basis of
a comparison between the weapons the 16th Infantry Division possessed on the
evening of October 20
October 20, and the weapons the enemy had against it at the same time. But Jamal
Hammad only mentioned the weakness of the forces at Ras al-Kobri without
mentioning the weakness of the forces
in the east after the enemy moved most of its armored forces to the west of the
canal. I have forgotten
Jamal Hammad quoted the Almighty saying in Surat al-Nisa (Surat al-Nisa):210 47
Khamma Qalamud and Qazgon, God is not in favor of us, as God is all-knowing.
Very simply and succinctly
I wonder: 1If the 182nd Egyptian Parachute Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ismail
Azmy was able to confront Sharon's division, which consisted of two armored
brigades and an Israeli paratrooper brigade.

Israeli paratrooper brigade. and fought this brigade west of the canal for four days before the ceasefire.
How could the 16th Infantry Division, which, despite its losses, had had three times as many weapons as the paratrooper brigade, and the enemy facing it or waiting to attack was far smaller in size and weaponry than Sharon's force, which was attacking
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182nd Parachute Brigade west of the canal? I hope that the fact-finding committee that we call for the formation of a fact-finding committee.

As for Jamal Hammad's claim that the lack of bridges south of Lake Crocodile is another reason why the 24th Armored Brigade could not be withdrawn another reason why the 24th Armored Brigade could not be withdrawn, the response is that the withdrawal of the three armored brigades from the east in the Second Army sector were to be withdrawn across the bridges that existed north of Lake Alligator in the sector of the 2nd Infantry Division and the 18th Infantry Division so that they would be away from enemy interference. Even if we assume that the bridges of the 16th Division were still in place south of Lake Alligator Lake, it would not make tactical sense to pull our armored brigades across these bridges, which the enemy was operating near them.

For all these reasons, we believe that Jamal Hammad was unfair when he exaggerated the weakness the capabilities of the 14 and 1 armored brigades and the weakness of the 16th Infantry Division. He should have should have compared the size and quality of the weapons that were in the hands of these formations the size and quality of the weaponry in the hands of these formations, and the size and quality of the weaponry in the hands of the enemy facing them. at the time and place where the battle was expected to take place. His justification for not being able to that the 24th Armored Brigade could not be withdrawn on the basis of the lack of seniority south of Crocodile Lake is not

justified.
The position of the 22nd Armored Brigade

The 22nd Armored Brigade, which was stationed in the Third Army sector, was the least armored brigades to suffer losses, so Hammad did not dispute its combat capabilities, but came up with an unacceptable reason for why it could not be withdrawn from the east. He said he was serving as a reserve in the hands of the Third Army commander. We say to him: Reserve against whom? What was the enemy force was facing the Third Army in the east of the canal? Indeed, what were all the enemy forces that were facing the against the five Egyptian infantry divisions on the evening of October 20, and did these enemy forces pose any threat to our positions in the east? What were the enemy armored forces west of the canal? Would our forces west of the canal have been able to withstand enemy armored attacks west of the canal if we had not withdrawn these four armored brigades from the west? will determine the validity of the decision to withdraw these armored brigades

from the east to
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west or not. Why, Brother Jamal, did you not make a comparison between our forces and the enemy forces east west of the canal? To convince the reader of the invalidity of the decision not to withdraw these four armored brigades?
four armored brigades?

Comparison of forces

Each of the five Egyptian infantry divisions that crossed the canal on October 6 not counting the armored brigades and other units that supported them, either during or after the crossing or after, had the following main weapons in its organization:

- . Tank 124

35 MB40 armored tank-sniping vehicles

- . Malotka 36 anti-tank guided rocket launcher

- . 58mm anti-tank gun 36

- . Anti-Tank 11 Cannon 54

- . 10 anti-tank guns 36

B563 anti-tank rocket launchers (RPG 7).

- . Field gun 72

M120 Noah 36.

M(82). 58 mortars

No matter how many losses the infantry division suffers, half this size of weaponry is enough to repel an enemy armored attack with two fully armed armored brigades. How big were the Israeli Israeli armored brigades that were in front of each division? in front of the second and third armies east of the canal? The maximum the enemy could mobilize in front of the Egyptian front Egyptian front was nine armored brigades. The information available to us on the evening of October 20

was that the enemy had five armored brigades west of the canal, and the only thing left for them to mobilize towards the front
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Egyptian front after relieving its forces on the Syrian front is only four armored brigades. Under these circumstances the enemy had two options: The first option was to cross on the night of 20/21 or 21/22 with two additional armored brigades, so that he would have seven armored brigades in the west and retain two armored brigades in the east in the east. The second option is to maintain the status quo with regard to the distribution of his forces 5 armored brigades in the west and 4 armored brigades in the east.

Whether the enemy takes the first option or the second option, there is no danger to our defense positions east of the canal
our defensive positions east of the canal. As for the west, unless we quickly withdraw our armored brigades from the
the enemy will have the advantage whether he takes the first option or takes the second option.
The first option would give him overwhelming superiority in the west.

We had to keep the 15th Armored Brigade in the Second Army's reserve north of the Taraa
Ismailia to thwart any attempt to encircle the Second Army. Thus, on the evening of October 20
October, we had only the 4th Armored Division as a strategic reserve to repel any armored attack in the direction of Cairo
Cairo and prevent the encirclement of the Third Army. It had to do so against five armored brigades
if the enemy followed the second option, and against 7 Israeli armored brigades if the enemy followed the
first option. Thus, under our conditions on the night of October 20/21 - if we do not act quickly to modify them
these conditions, the expected battles west of the Canal in the following days will be decided
in favor of the enemy.

To conclude this matter, I decide that the best solution for dealing with the breach is
my proposal that I made on October 61, which was the cause of my first clash with Sadat. My proposal on that day was to assemble the 4th Armored Division and the independent 25th Armored Brigade and strike a crushing blow against the enemy in the Afraswar area at dawn
on October 17.

My proposal to withdraw the four brigades on October 20 was the only option the only correct one. Anyone who criticizes this option should present a better alternative for discussion. I do not
I do not claim that these four armored brigades were enough to destroy the breach, especially after the
The enemy crossed on the night of 21/20 with two more armored brigades to the ruins and had three armored divisions
with 7 armored brigades.

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But there is no doubt that by withdrawing these four brigades, along with the command of the 21st Armored Division and the rest of its
units (which must accompany its two armored brigades 14 and 1 as they are withdrawn from the east), we would have
west of the canal, south of the Ismailia Canal, we will have two armored divisions (the 21st Armored Division
4th Armored Division), a mechanized infantry division, the 6th Division, and the 24th Medea Brigade
of the 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division. Together, these formations comprised six armored brigades that
had to face three armored divisions with 7 armored brigades if the enemy followed the first option, or 5
armored brigades if the enemy followed the second option. I admit that this size of forces and the result of the
losses were not enough to eliminate the breach. But it is certain that these forces
could have prevented the enemy's deployment west of the canal and deprived him

of any hope of
to encircle and besiege either the Second or Third Armies. If this proposal had
been followed, the enemy would not have dared to violate the cease-fire on
the enemy would not have dared to violate the ceasefire decision on October 23,
and would not have been able in any way to
to encircle the city of Suez and the Third Army and reach the port of
literature!

A final word . This is my opinion. The fact-finding committee will have the
final say. Do you accept
the parties that criticize this opinion accept the verdict of the fact-finding
committee?

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Appendix 4

Jamal Hammad's response to Lt. Gen. Saad Al-Shazly's first letter

In Annex 3, we presented the letter sent to us by Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces during the October 1973 war. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces during the October 1973 war, which included his response to the question we asked him in Chapter 10 under the title "Question to Al-Shazly. Where are the games
Where are the armored divisions that he was pulling to the west?" It is undoubtedly useful for readers to have
between General Chadli and myself, a scientific dialog and objective discussion, free from the use of hyperbole and nonsense, on one of the most important issues that have emerged
on one of the most important issues that emerged during the last phase of the October War, which
that sparked intense debate among military personnel both in Egypt and abroad about Al-Shazly's proposal
to withdraw all armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west to confront the Israeli threat west of the canal.
which was rejected by both the political and military leadership at the time. The result of this dialog will undoubtedly be a new addition
will undoubtedly add to the comprehensive historical study we are conducting on the
the October 1973 war, from which we hope readers, whether military or civilian, will emerge
with fruitful results and the required lessons learned.

Sarsamat Al-Shazly at the Commanders' Conference on October 20

As readers may have noticed in the response they read, Shazly defended with all his
that the idea of withdrawing the armored brigades from the east was the right thing to do.
This was his personal opinion, which he had already expressed to General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief
at 10) on the evening of October 20 after his return from Ismailia, which was rejected by Ahmed
Ismail at the time.

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No one can blame Shazly for defending his point of view with such strength and fervor, as it is the right of every human being to defend what he believes. It is the right of every human being to defend what he believes to be right and true, and to use all the evidence and proofs in his possession
to convince others, but we blame Shazly since the issue of withdrawing troops to

the West
troops to the West was discussed - and we even fault him for being the second in command of the
in the General Command and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, he failed to express his opinion and defend his point of view
his opinion and defense of his point of view, which he believed to be the right one, in front of the late President Sadat during the historic meeting held at Center 10 on the evening of
the historic meeting that took place at Center 10 on the evening of October 20. We will recount
Shazly's position in this meeting as recorded by Shazly himself in his memoirs, so that no one may doubt the veracity of our account
to doubt the veracity of what we recount, leaving the readers to make their own judgment

Al-Shazly's account, which appears on page 267 of his memoirs, summarizes that after he
failed to convince Ahmed Ismail of his point of view, and fearing a catastrophe if he did not
to withdraw part of our forces from the east to the west, he decided that Sadat should be summoned to
Center 10 to explain the situation to him and to make him face his historical responsibility. Accordingly
He went to Ahmed Ismail in his room and told him: "The situation is serious, and the president must be present
to listen to the leaders' point of view." When Ahmed Ismail tried to dissuade him on the grounds that
that it was too late and that there was no need to disturb the president, Shazly insisted that the president should come
to Center 10 immediately.

At around 10:30 p.m. on October 20, President Sadat arrived at Center 10 accompanied by Engineer Abdel Fattah Abdallah, Minister of Presidential Affairs and immediately went to Ahmed Ismail's room, where he stayed with him for nearly an hour.
At the time, Shazly was meeting with five senior commanders who had agreed with Ahmed
to attend the meeting in the conference room adjacent to the operations room. They exchanged views on the situation and waited for the president to arrive. These commanders were
Generals: Mohamed Ali Fahmy, commander of Air Defense, Hosni Mubarak, commander of the Air Force.
Abdel Ghani al-Gamsi, head of the operations center, Saeed al-Mahi, director of the artillery corps, and Fouad
Nassar, Director of Military Intelligence.

Eventually, the president entered the meeting, accompanied by Ahmed Ismail and Engineer Abdel Fattah

Abdullah, the president asked for the floor one by one, and each of them explained
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the position of the troops with complete honesty. After listening to all of them, he did not ask Shazly for the floor.
He commented: We are not withdrawing any soldiers from the East.

From this context as recorded by Al-Shazly in his memoirs, it is clear that there is a missing link that Al-Shazly deliberately failed to clarify. Shadhli deliberately neglected to clarify it, despite its extreme importance to the case he is narrating.

namely: What were the views of the five commanders that they presented to Sadat regarding Shadhli's proposal to withdraw all brigades
Shazly's proposal to withdraw all armored brigades from east of the canal to the west?
was the primary purpose of Sadat's summoning to Center 10 at this time, late at night.
late at night.

The correct conclusion to draw from the course of events is that the opinions of the five commanders
were against Shazly's proposal and in favor of the opinion that Generalissimo Ahmed Ismail had already expressed to the president. No troops should be withdrawn from east of the canal to the west
at this stage. It is clear that this was the reason why the president did not ask Shazly for the floor like the other commanders
Shazly like the other commanders, because he was well aware of the truth of his opinion, and he was made aware of it during his meeting with Ahmed Ismail in his room
meeting with Ahmed Ismail in his room at Center 10 before his meeting with the commanders, a meeting that lasted nearly an hour
The meeting lasted nearly an hour, as recounted by Shazly.

This conclusion is supported by the fact that Sadat, as a representative of the political leadership, could not
to disregard the opinion of all the warlords if they supported Shazly in the need to withdraw some forces from the east to the west
from the east to the west, and he could not be held solely responsible for the military decision he made not to withdraw any troops from the east
for his decision not to withdraw any troops from the east.

In order to clarify for readers the true picture of Shazly's position after Sadat made his decision, we
the text of what he recorded on page 267 of his memoirs on this subject
"I did not speak or comment . Engineer Abdel Fattah Abdullah winked at me and whispered in my ear - say something -
But I ignored his advice. What can I say when the president has made the decision and doesn't want to hear me?
I want to withdraw four armored brigades from the east, and he is against withdrawing one soldier. He didn't make this decision
not out of ignorance but out of full knowledge of the situation, and he can't claim afterward that he thought
that the enemy had 7 tanks in the west. He knows all the facts about the situation and this is his decision!

The explanation for Shazly's silence and refraining from commenting in this situation can only be explained by one of

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There are two possibilities: Either - and this is the first possibility - that the opinions of the five leaders presented during the meeting and the evidence they presented
during the meeting and the evidence they presented convinced him, and he changed his mind and became convinced of their point of view.
The decision Sadat made at the end of the meeting was not his alone, but the decision of the
the decision of the military leadership represented by the warlords who attended the meeting, including Shazly
In this case, we deplore him for coming seven years after the end of the war to attack

In his 1980 memoirs, he attacks the decision made on the evening of October 20, 1973 in Center 10) and holds Sadat solely responsible for its issuance, without mentioning that this decision was the opinion of all the Muskarian leaders who attended the meeting. the opinion of all the Muskarian leaders who attended the meeting, and without taking into account the fact that Sadat's silence on the comment at the time, whatever the motive for it, meant that he agreed with the tick.

Or - and this is the second possibility - he chose to remain silent out of concern for safety even though he was not convinced by the opinions of his fellow warlords of his fellow warlords, and despite his certainty that his proposal was the only viable option for the as he stated in the reply he sent to us - in which case, we fault him for this his negative attitude, which is inconsistent with the moral courage expected of a commander holding such a high command position at the head of the armed forces. such a high leadership position at the head of the armed forces. It was your duty, Brother Saad, if you to stand in front of the president and in front of your colleagues present to state the opinion that you believed at the time to be that you believed at the time to be right and true, whatever the consequences, to satisfy your conscience and clear your conscience in front of your country, and in front of the before your country and the judgment of history. It was you yourself who organized this meeting. You are the one who insisted on inviting the president to attend it despite the late hour, believing in the gravity of the situation and fearing a catastrophe whose extent is known only to God - and this is the text of your words - so how can you then refrain from explaining the dangerous situation west of the canal and your proposal to save it under the pretext that the president does not want to hear it? The issue, Brother Saad, did not concern Sadat, Ahmed Ismail, Ahmed Ismail, Saad Al-Shazly or the other commanders Saad Al-Shazly or the other commanders who attended the meeting with you, but it was the issue of Egypt and its honor, the reputation and dignity of the Egyptian army, the future of the country, and the fate of future generations. It was the cause of the entire Arab nation.

The position of the independent 15th Armored Brigade

In his response, Saad al-Shazly stated the following: "Since I was aware that the 15th Independent Armored Brigade Independent Armored Brigade had been withdrawn from the east in the Second Army sector, this means that
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By the evening of October 20 we had three armored brigades west of the canal, two of them in the 4th Armored Division, which was positioned south of the Ismailia Terrace, and the third, the 15th Independent Armored Brigade was stationed north of the Ismailia Canal. What is certain is that Shazly commanded the Second Army between October 18 and October 02, and should have been fully aware of the situation of the army's formations and units, so that when he returned from commanding the Second Army on October 20, when he wanted to

command of the Second Army on October 20, when he wanted to inform the Imam of the important events that took place on the front during his absence from the center on the front during his absence from Center 210), Major General Abdel Ghani El-Gamsi, head of the explained to him the situation in the Third Army sector, as well as the position of the air force, navy, and air defense. Air Force, Navy, and Air Defense, and did not mention any situations or events related to the Second Army. events related to the Second Army, as the last information the Operations Authority had about the situation of this army was from General Shazly himself when he was present during the last two days at the Second Army's command center the last two days at the Second Army's command center in Ismailia. It is therefore surprising that Shazly's response records that the 15th Armored Brigade had been withdrawn from the east, and that on the evening of October 20 it was stationed north of the Ismailia Terrace. I have already mentioned in my commentary that the decision issued by Major General A.H. Abdel Moneim Khalil, commander of the of the Second Army on October 17 to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade from the bridgehead of the 18th Infantry Division in Qantara East to the west of the canal, and to be stationed north of Abu Sawir Airport to serve as a reserve in the hands of the the Second Army commander north of the Ismailia Canal was not carried out, even though it was a tactical decision General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, telephoned General Abdel Moneim and informed him of his cancelation of this decision, and gave him unequivocal instructions not to withdraw any troops from the east to the west in accordance with the president's orders. to the west in accordance with the president's orders. In this explanation, I wanted to correct Shazly's misinformation, which he published in his memoirs in a way that did not hurt his feelings. in his memoirs in a way that did not hurt his feelings, so I said that it seems that General Shazly did not know that the decision to withdraw the 15th Armored Brigade had been canceled the withdrawal of the 15th Armored Brigade and thought it was west of the canal. On page 265 of his memoirs while describing the position of the 2nd Army on the evening of October 19 as follows: "In the west and north of the Ismailia Canal was the 2nd Armored Brigade, and I was confident that Brother Saad a clever and intelligent man, would be enough for this clear indication to be correct in his memoirs about this armored brigade. But I was surprised that he still insisted on repeating the same error that

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He recorded in his reply, as we read, that the 15th Armored Brigade was withdrawn from the east. and was stationed north of the Ismailia Terrace. I can only emphasize to him for the second time that The 15th Armored Brigade, which was commanded by Colonel A.H. Tahsin Shannan, was stationed from the crossing of the Suez Canal on October 7 until the ceasefire. the Suez Canal on October 7 until the ceasefire at the head of the bridge of the 18th Infantry Division, in the Qantara East sector (i.e. east of the canal). Kantara East (i.e., east of the canal), and was never withdrawn to the west. If he has any doubt of my words, I advise him to contact Major General A.H. Tahsin Shannan, the current governor of Suez in order to confirm the truth and accuracy of the information I have given him, and to correct the errors in his memoirs regarding the status of this brigade

errors in his memoirs regarding the status of this brigade

Position of the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades

The armored brigades in the Second Army's sector east of the Canal, as we have already explained, consisted of four armored brigades: the independent 15th Armored Brigade, the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades (from the 21st Armored Division) and the 24th Armored Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division).

After we finish discussing Shazly's response about the independent 15th Armored Brigade, we will discuss the position of the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades, and then move on to the position of the 24th Armored Brigade.
the position of the 24th Armored Brigade.

In his response on the position of the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades, Al-Shazly stated the following:

âœTo say that the 1st Brigade and the 14th Armored Brigade have been reduced to 30 tanks is an exaggeration of the position of the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades.

is an exaggeration of the position of these two brigades. In general, the position reports for of armored units change every day and sometimes every hour. It depends on the activity of depending on campaign and repair activity, an armored brigade may receive a position report after a after a battle that the number of tanks has been reduced to 20, but a few hours or 24 hours later another position report comes in stating that the number of operational tanks has increased to 40 or 50 tanks, as a result of repairs to tanks with minor breakdowns.

that had suffered minor malfunctions². I would like to make it clear to Shazly that I did not exaggerate the situation because the number of tanks I mentioned was not a personal judgment on my part, but rather

It was based on official records, as Lieutenant General Al-Shazly, once he arrived at the Second Army Command in Ismailia on the afternoon of October 18 Ismailia on the afternoon of October 18, when he assumed command, he asked all the commanders

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formations and auxiliary weapons to report on the status of their units. From the records

records, the report that Brigadier General A.H. Ibrahim al-Orabi, commander of the 21st Armored Division, submitted to General Shazly personally on the evening of October 18 recorded that the number of tanks of the 21st Armored Division

Armored Division is 34 tanks according to the following breakdown: 1st Armored Brigade 16 tanks - 14th Armored Brigade

14 tanksThe armored battalion of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade 4 tanks. The reason for the

The low number of tanks in the 21st Armored Division is due to many factors that have already been explained

in detail before, and the space does not allow us to list them again, so as not to deviate from our

from our main line of response to Shazly.

As for Shazly's statement that the position of the armored brigades changes every day, and sometimes every hour, as a result of of tank repairs, while theoretically true, this statement was not

did not apply in practice to what was going on in the Egyptian armored brigades,

as the
the repair of damaged tanks was not carried out at the high level mentioned by
Al-Shazly in his reply
for reasons related to the availability of spare parts and the technical
competence of the repair and recovery units
and rescue units from a technical point of view, as well as a very important
factor, especially for the tanks of the
the tanks of the 21st Armored Division in particular, the difficulty of
repairing
tanks during periods of engagement with the enemy, and under the weight of enemy
artillery shelling (both field and long-range
and long-range artillery, tank fire, and anti-tank curtains, especially after
the arrival of the lethal American
65673% lethal American 65673% missiles via the American airlift, in addition to
the enemy's devastating air raids
in addition to the enemy's devastating air raids day and night.
From the records of the war, it is clear that the narrow unified bridgehead east
of the canal, which
where the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions were stationed, the enemy did
not stop concentrating its fierce attacks on it by land and air
since dawn on October 15, the day immediately following the failure of the
development of the frontal offensive with the aim of carrying out its planned
crossing of the
his forces to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16 from the
Dafraswar area, and then attempt to widen the penetration gap east of the canal
to the north
east of the canal as far north as possible to secure the crossing to Kharb.
Thus, the 21st Armored Division, under the weight of these fierce and continuous
clashes day and night
with the enemy, was unable to carry out the regrouping it was supposed to do
after the losses it suffered
during the development of the attack eastward to al-Tassa on October 14, which
was scheduled for
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October 15, according to the instructions of the Second Army Command, and from
that day on, the graph of the number of
of the division's tanks began to decline gradually, while the number of tanks of
the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades on the morning of October 15 was
on the morning of October 15 was 120 tanks according to official references, we
find that this number fell on the evening of
on October 18 to 30 tanks, a drop of a quarter in less than four days. While the
number of
tanks of the armored battalion of the 18th Mechanized Infantry Brigade were 31
tanks. In the same period of time
to 4 tanks, down to one-eighth. This can only mean that the 21st Armored
Division, when analyzing its
its position on the evening of October 20, it should have been considered to
have lost its combat efficiency due to the
due to the heavy losses of tanks. How could it have been pushed to the west of
the canal
to face Sharon's armored division, which was stationed west of the canal south
of Ismailia, and which
consisted of two armored brigades and a parachute infantry brigade, and its
tanks had not engaged in any large-scale tank battles south of Ismailia.
any large-scale tank battles south of the Ismailia Canal, as there were no
armored units of the Second Army south of the canal.
Second Army armored units south of the canal after General Abraham Adan's
division succeeded in destroying the 23rd Armored Brigade (of the 3rd Division).
The 23rd Armored Brigade (from the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division and the
strategic reserve of the
General Staff) on the morning of October 18, making Sharon's division several

times the number of tanks
the number of tanks of the 21st Armored Division, as well as the enemy's
overwhelming air superiority south of the
Ismailia due to the enemy's success in destroying most of the Malassian SAM
battalions in this area
in this area.

If Shazly wants a more obvious example, he should recall what happened to the
independent 25th Armored Brigade
independent armored brigade that pushed east of the canal on the morning of
October 17 from the bridgehead of the 7th Infantry Division
in the Third Army sector in the south with the mission of clearing the Dufreswar
breach in the north, a mission that Shadley called
mission, which Shazly in his response called "Crazy Mission 2," and for
which there were no tanks left after the battle south of the line.
only 21 tanks of this brigade remained after the battle south of the Abyssinian
Dune line.
After the battle, the brigade remained static until the end of the war - that
is, for more than a week without increasing a single tank
If this is the case with these three armored brigades that we have discussed,
then where are the reforms to increase the number of tanks?
then where are the reforms that increase the number of tanks of an armored
brigade from 20 tanks to 40 or 50 tanks
tanks 24 hours after the battle? We hope that Shazly will give us just one
example of any brigade

. Among them was a tank company in the Sulphur position that did not participate
in the battle 1(
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Canal Honor Armor at the level of the entire front engaged in a battle and
suffered heavy losses.
and then, thanks to reforms, was able to increase the number of its tanks from
20 to 50 or
This ratio more than doubled, as in the example he gave us.

How to measure the strength of an armored brigade
In estimating the strength of an armored brigade, Shazly followed a special
criterion that is not consistent with the standards
In his response on this subject, he stated the following: Add
In addition, although tanks are the main weapon in armored units, the
The armored brigade includes many other combat units within its organization.
Perhaps you know, Jamal, that
Within the organization of the armored brigade is a reconnaissance company, an
engineer company, a mechanized infantry battalion
a mechanized infantry battalion, a field artillery battalion, an anti-aircraft
artillery battalion, and with these units
12 vehicles carrying anti-tank guided missiles, 21 field guns, 42
anti-aircraft guns and more than 60 short-range anti-tank launchers.
about 250 vehicles, more than half of which are armored vehicles. There is no
doubt that these
have also suffered some losses, but their losses have certainly been less than
those of the tanks.
than tanks, so it would be wrong to omit them from our calculations. I was
surprised that
this statement from Lieutenant General Saad al-Shazly, given my confidence in
his wealth of military information and his abundance of evasion
The first tactical principles that should be taken into account when calculating
the strength of armored brigades during
while conducting a headquarters operation: The first tactical principle to be
taken into account when calculating the strength of armored brigades

In the case of offensive operations, only tanks should be included in the calculation, i.e., the tank vs. the tank as the main element of the attack. In the case of defensive operations, we should add to the number of tanks the number of anti-tank weapons as a blocking capability - and this is done. This is done according to a certain mathematical table in which the number of pieces of each anti-tank weapon counted as a tank is recorded to be counted as a tank, the criterion being the caliber and effective range of these weapons. And do not We may not include in our calculation, whether in offensive or defensive operations, sub-units that are included in the organization of the armored brigade, such as the engineer company, reconnaissance, artillery battalion, anti-aircraft battalion, etc. Anti-aircraft battalion and so on, as Shazly mentioned. Brother Saad seems to have betrayed his memory. Regarding the numbers of some weapons and vehicles in the units of the armored brigade. The armored brigade
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(whether independent or affiliated with the armored division) has only 6 missile-carrying vehicles. Only 12 vehicles are found in armored brigades of mechanized infantry divisions, and the The anti-aircraft artillery battalion has only 8 anti-aircraft guns (mounted on tank chassis) and one SAM7 (Strela). Thus, it does not have 24 anti-aircraft guns as Shazly mentioned, as the machine guns mounted on vehicles cannot be counted. 127mm and 514mm Lowari vehicles cannot be counted as anti-aircraft guns, as they were used merely for local defense against swooping aircraft. They were, of course, useless against sophisticated Phantom, Mirage and Skyhawk jets.

Also not included in the armored brigade's armament are more than 60 short-range anti-tank missiles. As Shazly mentioned, these short-range anti-tank weapons are only armed only the armored brigade's mechanized infantry battalion, which has 27 RPG-7 launchers (an average of one launcher per squad) and 10 B10 and B11 guns, making a total of only 37, not more than 60 as we read in the reply. Shazly also exaggerated the number of vehicles of the armored brigade when he stated that it was 250 vehicles, and the exaggeration reached its peak when he said that More than half of them are armored vehicles, meaning that the armored brigade has more than 125 armored vehicles. The truth is that all the armored vehicles in the armored brigade are no more than 45 armored vehicles. armored vehicles (this number includes the tracked armored vehicles of the Mechanized Infantry Battalion and the wheeled armored vehicles in some empty units, as well as command center vehicles). Also, we cannot Shazly's assertions that the losses of sub-units in armored brigades were less than tank losses, since as long as an armored brigade is engaged in battle, the ratio of losses is roughly balanced whether in tank battalions, mechanized infantry battalions, or other sub-units of the brigade. and other sub-units of the brigade. This is because the battle formation in which the armored brigade in which the armored brigade moves and then engages in battle is not separated from the rest of the sub-units.

sub-units, as all the combat elements in the armored brigade are distributed and integrated are distributed and integrated into this combat formation, and thus all are subjected to the same battle conditions. and suffer the same percentage of losses.

Sometimes some sub-units bear a heavier percentage of losses due to their light armor and their lack of mobility and maneuverability compared to tanks on the one hand, and on the other hand.

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Because enemy aircraft usually focus their air attacks on some of these units, such as the anti-aircraft battalion and the field artillery battalion. anti-aircraft battalion and field artillery battalion, to deprive the armored brigade of their support during the main battle As happened during the 3rd Armored Brigade's advance towards Matla in the development of the eastward attack on October 14, and as happened during the 3rd Armored Brigade's advance towards Matla attack eastward on October 14, and as the independent 25th Armored Brigade advanced northward in the direction of Dafraswar on October 17. Brother Shazly may recall that the position reports given to him by the submitted to him on the evening of October 18 at his request when he took command of the Second Army on the evening of October 18 for the armored units under their command, recorded only the number of tanks only the number of tanks of these units, and no other sub-units were mentioned in these reports. We did not hear that he raised any objection to this.

How did Israel compensate for its tank losses? In the first section of his letter, Al-Shazly raises an important topic that deserves to be explained in detail the means by which Israeli armored brigades were replacing their losses in tanks in the last phase of the war, i.e. tanks in the last phase of the war, i.e. after the Israeli crossing on the night of 16/51 October to the West Bank of the Canal. In his response, he states that I stated that the number of tanks of the two armored brigades armored brigades of General Kalman Magen's division had been reduced to 50 tanks before he to push south on October 23, occupy the port of Adbiyeh and complete the siege of the Third Army. It is important to note that despite the heavy losses suffered by the Israeli armored brigades of the Adan Division and the Magen Division) as they rushed south on the on the western side of the canal to tighten the siege around Suez and the Third Army. were soon restored to close to their full organizational size, thanks not only to the Israeli repair and rescue units that repaired damaged tanks despite the high technical level they had displayed in the first phase of the war, or thanks to the influx of American tanks via the airlift, whose planes began arriving at Lod Airport in Israel as early as October 14, 1973. The US-made 608 tanks were transported from US air bases on giant Galaxy 5 transport planes and, after landing at Lod Airport, were transported

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by Hercules transport planes to El-Arish airport, and after being labeled at El-Arish

with IDF markings, the new tanks, on their treads, head straight to the battlefield. To complete the transportation of the tanks from Lod Airport to El-Arish Airport

12 American Hercules airplanes were loaned to the IDF. As a result of this endless stream of

of new American tanks, Israeli armored brigades are not only were not only replacing their losses, but they were also being equipped with a newer model of tanks that were newer in terms of production and better in terms of features

in terms of production and better features and advanced equipment than its older tanks that were destroyed or malfunctioned.

or damaged, and so it continued to pursue its offensive operations with great speed and efficiency.

high speed and efficiency. An inspection of some of the Israeli tanks that fell into the hands of Egyptian forces west of the canal proved that

that the odometers on most of them did not register more than 200 kilometers, equivalent to a distance of

kilometers, roughly the distance between El-Arish and the west bank of the Suez Canal. And this was

This was happening at a time when Egyptian armored units did not have a chance to

Egyptian armored units did not have a chance to recover their tank losses after the fierce battles they had fought to get back to

back to close to their organizational size so that they could regain their combat efficiency, as the Armed Forces warehouses did not

did not have spare tanks, and the Soviet Union did not support Egypt during the war

the Soviet Union did not provide Egypt with any tanks to replace its losses. In fact, all of the

tanks sent from the Black Sea port of Odessa were destined for the Syrian port of Latakia

to the Syrian port of Latakia, due to the heavy losses suffered by Syrian forces in the Golan battles. This situation was a reason why the late President Sadat

attacked the Soviet Union after the end of the war
Soviet Union after the war ended.

Could the 24th Armored Brigade have been withdrawn?

None of the five armored infantry divisions that crossed the canal on October 6 faced a

that the 16th Infantry Division has faced since the Israeli crossing began on the night of

October 15/16/73 to the west of the canal, the Israeli penetration gap at Dufreswar

on its immediate right flank made it the target of fierce Israeli attacks, both on the ground and in the air.

The Israeli plan to secure the Israeli crossing to the west was to

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to expand the penetration gap northward to about 5 kilometers at first, in order to ensure that the

exposure to small arms and mortar fire.

Before the Israeli crossing to the west began, the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division

In addition to the units of this division, the 21st Armored Division was also within it. After the

the failure of the development of the eastward attack on October 14, the General

Command was ordered to keep the 21st Armored Division
21 Armored Division in the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division, which
became known as the
Unified.

As a result of concentrated Israeli pressure on the 16th Infantry Division's
front flank to widen the

The right brigade of the 16th Infantry Brigade was forced to evacuate its
positions on the night of October 17/18

October, and the units of the 21st Armored Division that were involved in
repelling the enemy's armored attacks

armored units on the right flank of the bridgehead had to retreat north to take
up defensive positions

north of the main feeder after the enemy succeeded in capturing the village of
Al Jalaa (Chinese Farm).

As a result of the new situation, the 21st Armored Division was assigned the
task of protecting the right flank of the

16 Infantry Division, as well as the task of preventing the enemy from expanding
its penetration gap to the north.

Despite repeated attempts by the General Headquarters (10) and the Second Army
Command

to liquidate the penetration gap in Dafraswar east of the canal and recapture
the village of Al-Jalaa, by

units of the 21st Armored Division carried out counterattacks on enemy
positions.

all these attempts failed due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemy's
armored forces and air force.

and air force, resulting in heavy losses for the 21st Armored Division. It ended
up

The division's units ended up occupying a strong defensive position on the
Sarabium line (about 5 kilometers

north of Al-Defreswar) But the Israeli penetration gap east of the canal soon
widened

for an unforeseen reason. Following the withdrawal of the 182nd Parachute
Brigade west of the canal under pressure

from its positions at Sarabium to Tosun to the north on October 19, General
Shazli - then in command of the Second Army - issued a

then in command of the Second Army, ordered Brigadier General al-Orabi,
commander of the 21st Armored Division

who had previously been assigned responsibility for the unified bridgehead
command, to retreat northward from the Sarabium line to the Tosun line.

to the Tosun line to align his positions east of the canal with those of the
Parachute Brigade on the canal's west bank.

west of the canal. As a result, the breach gap on the honor of the canal widened
to 10 kilometers.

The unified bridgehead was seriously reduced, and the 16th Infantry and 12th
Armored Divisions

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were squeezed into a narrow bridgehead, exposed to al-Adar's fire from all sides
and to his air strikes

The losses of the two divisions in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment
increased accordingly. From

Situation reports that General Shazly received from formation commanders at
around 5:00 p.m. on October 18 after arriving at Army Headquarters

on October 18 after his arrival at the Second Army Command, he found that the
number of tanks of the 21st Armored Division

Armored Division had been reduced to 34 tanks, and that the 16th Infantry
Division had been reduced to

its organic formation to 37 tanks.

Major General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army, as a result
of the deterioration of the situation at Ras

and the high rate of tank losses, on October 17, he ordered an armored battalion from the brigade
 an armored battalion from the 24th Armored Brigade, which had been stationed in the 2nd Infantry Division's sector
 which had been stationed in the sector of the 2nd Infantry Division since the beginning of the war. On October 18, he ordered
 General Abdel Moneim to move the rest of the 24th Armored Brigade to the area northwest of Taliyah inside Ras al-Kobri
 The bridgehead. The mission received by Colonel A.H. Niazi al-Shimi, commander of the 24th Armored Brigade
 (67 Thebes) was to prepare for a counterattack to destroy the enemy in case they tried to penetrate
 Despite the presence of three armored brigades inside the unified bridgehead armored brigades inside the unified bridgehead (1, 24, 14), the real reliance in repelling the
 of the breach at this stage was the 24th Armored Brigade.
 -As a result of the loss of combat efficiency of the 1st and 41st Armored Brigades, the Second Army Command began to gradually send their personnel without tanks) to the west of the canal to join the command of the 21st Armored Division, which was ordered on October 21
 which was ordered on October 21 to be stationed west of the canal in the Osman Ahmed Osman intersection area, to carry out
 to regroup and rearm the division with new tanks and equipment to restore its combat efficiency.
 Although the enemy had moved most of its armored forces to the west of the canal, the Southern Command
 was determined to capture the positions of the 16th Infantry Division Infantry Division (codenamed Missouri) in order to widen the penetration gap northward to reach the center road (Ismailia Road).
 to reach the center road (the Ismailia Road east of Tassa) on the right flank of the 2nd Division
 For this purpose, the Israeli command ordered the retention of two armored brigades from Sharon's division
 in front of the 16th Infantry Division (Colonel Amnon's brigade and Colonel Tuvia's brigade), but Sharon, who
 eager to capture Ismailia, urged his command to provide him with Amnon's brigade on the grounds that
 Missouri's position was too weak for a single armored brigade to penetrate, so
 General
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Bar-Lev to cross Amnon's brigade to the west, leaving an armored battalion from Loatha in the east to join
 to Tuvia's brigade when it attacked the Egyptian position.
 Surprisingly, General Saad al-Shazly, although of course he was aware of all these facts as a result of his position as commander of the Egyptian army as Chief of Staff, he still insisted that his proposal on the evening of October 20
 His proposal on the evening of October 20 to withdraw the three armored brigades 24, 14, and 1 from Ras Kobri
 of the 16th Infantry Division was correct. For the sake of argument, I will assume that
 that the General Command took Shazly's suggestion and ordered the withdrawal of the three armored brigades
 from the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division. In light of this new situation, I address the following three questions to Brother Saad
 the following three questions:
 1- Was it possible for the 16th Infantry Division, which consisted of only two brigades (one infantry
 and the second mechanized infantry) with only 37 tanks, the number of which was reduced

of course, since the evening of October 18 to 30 tanks at best, was it able to repel an armored attack
an armored attack by the Israeli force in front of it, which consisted of a Medea brigade
and an armored battalion with at least 120 tanks, a 4:1 superiority ratio in favor of the enemy?

2- Didn't it happen while you were in the Second Army Command in Ismailia from October 18

to October 20, you had a phone conversation with General El-Gamsi, the head of the Operations Mission
in Cairo at 7:00 p.m. on October 18, when you told him
during which you said: "We want to prevent Abd Rabbo's position - meaning the 16th Infantry Division - from collapsing.

In another phone conversation that took place between the two of you at around 5:00 p.m. on October 19, you told him

at 5:00 p.m. on October 19, as follows: 1) To know Orabi's position

The number of tanks at the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry and 12th Armored Divisions is 80 tanks.

He can hold on to the bridgehead ?

In other words, you know in the first phone conversation that the tactical situation of the 16th Infantry Division is so bad

to the point where you fear its collapse. In the second phone conversation, you admit

that 80 tanks is the minimum number of tanks to hold the bridgehead, which means that if

less than this number, the bridgehead is at risk of collapse.

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3) On the afternoon of October 21, the enemy attacked the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division

with two battalions of tanks, despite the presence of the three armored brigades and the tanks of the 16th Infantry Division

tanks, all of which numbered at least 130, the enemy tanks were able to penetrate the bridgehead and capture the heart of the defensive position at Taliyah, where the

The presence of this large Egyptian armored force inside Ras al-Kobri made it possible to

inside the bridgehead, it was possible to launch a strong counterattack, which led to the retaking of Taliyah.

If this attack had been carried out on the 16th Infantry Division

Infantry alone without the presence of the tanks of the three armored brigades 24, 14 and 1, would you have

any doubt, Brother Saad, that the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division would have fallen like ripe fruit

in the hands of the enemy?

The position of the 22nd Armored Brigade

In his response, Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly addressed the withdrawal of the 22nd Armored Brigade from the Third Army sector

Third Army sector, he said: 1) Jamal Hammad came up with an unacceptable reason to justify why he could not

that it could not be withdrawn from the east. He said that he was working as a reserve in the hands of the Third Army commander.

We say to him: Reserve against whom? What was the enemy force facing the Third Army

in the east of the canal, or indeed all the enemy forces facing the five Malayan infantry divisions

on the evening of October 20, and did these enemy forces pose any danger to our the positions of our forces in the east ?

Although Brother Al-Shazly crafted these phrases so brilliantly that they appear

to the non-specialized reader
to the non-specialized reader as indisputable facts, they actually represent a clear violation of basic tactical principles
of basic tactical principles. The general rule that every commander must know is It is not permissible to carry out any war operation, whether defensive or offensive, without allocating
A reserve, which has the ability to intervene at the right time and place in order to restore
the situation in the case of defense and to exploit success in the case of attack. One of the first lessons
students at the Command and Staff College when they study the proper way to make an estimate
is not to assume that the enemy will follow one of the three solutions they have devised.
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that have traditionally been categorized as open-ended solutions for the enemy, since the experience of warfare has
warfare has proven that the enemy often follows the fourth solution. In other words: The enemy will not adopt
one of the three logical solutions that they worked so hard to devise, but will follow another solution that did not occur to them
perhaps because it is too strange and illogical for them, and perhaps because their thinking is not able to find it.
to it. This shows that no commander, no matter how brilliant he is, can know in advance
the plan that the enemy will follow, so the only way to cope with
unforeseen possibilities and unforeseen situations is to have sufficient reserves on hand at all stages of the battle.
in the hands of the commander at all stages of the battle.

I was shocked by the phrase that Al-Shazly mentioned in his reply, "1 Reserve against whom?"
I thought that Al-Shazly would be the last person to say this phrase after he himself lived through the bitter experience of the
of the tragedy that our forces were subjected to in the last phase of the October War, following the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on the night of
The Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16, which was the main factor in its success
was due to the absence of the West Bank in the Second Army's sector south of the Ismailia Canal.
of the Second Army's sector south of the Ismailia Terrace was devoid of any reserves, after the 21st Armored Division was pushed
Armored Division, the Second Army's tactical reserve, was pushed east of the canal to carry out the operation that brought
the most disastrous blow to our forces, the development of the eastward offensive on October 14.

The fatal mistake made by the General Command and its operations organization was that it did not take the initiative to form
a new strong reserve on the West Bank to replace the 21st Armored Division and entrust it with the same
tasks that were assigned to it once the division was pushed eastward.

The reason for this was a misconception on the part of command officials that the enemy, after the successful crossing of our forces and the breaking of the the success of our forces crossing the Bar-Lev line and retreating to the east, the enemy could not plan to cross the canal to the west
to the west. The movement of the 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade (from the 23rd Mechanized Infantry Division) from
north of the Ismailia Canal to the Othman Ahmed Othman intersection south of the canal is not

cannot be considered a true filling of the void left by the 21st Armored Division west of the canal, nor can it be considered. The 116th Mechanized Infantry Brigade did not have the strength nor the capabilities nor the knowledge of the terrain on which it would operate or the tasks assigned to it. Therefore, the inevitable result was that it was unable to stop the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal.

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even in its first phase, when the Israeli forces that crossed were at their weakest.

On the contrary, the Mechanized Brigade fell into several ambushes and suffered heavy losses, which losing its combat efficiency.

The question raised by Brother Al-Shazly in his response about the enemy force facing the Third Army of the Third Army, which had a tone of sarcasm in it when he said: "1. What are all the enemy forces that were facing the five Egyptian infantry divisions on the evening of October 20?" is a clear indication that the lesson of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal, as harsh as it was, did not come to fruition. How can the enemy's strength east of the canal be so underestimated just because it pushed three armored divisions west of the canal? The enemy's strength east of the canal was not as weak as Shazly envisioned. We will explain this later when we make a comparison between our forces east and west of the canal and enemy forces east and west of the canal.

On this occasion, I would like to draw Shazly's attention to an important matter that may have escaped his attention.

The idea that he was proposing to implement on the evening of October 20 by withdrawing armored brigades from the east to the west from east to west could also have been considered by the enemy, but in the opposite direction

of course, that is, he might consider withdrawing some of his armored units from west of the canal to the east, which would double the size of his forces east of the canal

doubling the size of his forces east of the canal in a short period of time.

His air force dominates the battlefield and his three bridges across the canal at

The three bridges across the canal at Al-Defreswar are in place day and night, and there is no need for him to dismantle them during the day and hide them as we did thanks to his air superiority. air superiority.

The facts proved that General Junin, the commander of the Southern Command, wanted to implement this idea

On the morning of October 21, he ordered General Sharon to halt his advance in the west towards Ismailia

towards Ismailia and move an armored force from his division to the east of the canal to support the forces attacking the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division.

the bridgehead of the 16th Infantry Division. This has already been explained in detail at the end of Chapter 10

X.

How, then, could this possibility have been ruled out, especially if the enemy knew - as a result of its reconnaissance - that the east bank had

reconnaissance that the east bank was devoid of Egyptian armored brigades?
-to underestimate the strength of the enemy anywhere on the front, or to
consider that
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that the enemy's apparent situation is the final and unchanging situation. And I
have
Our forces have paid a heavy price, Brother Saad, as a result of the
misconception in the General Command that the border positions
east of the Egyptian bridgeheads were the final and unchangeable positions. The
tragedy was
when you suddenly discovered, without warning, that the enemy forces you thought
were far away in the east had crossed the canal to the west
had crossed the Canal to the west, and were even present and deployed in the
midst of our positions.

Comparison of forces

The terms in which Brother Shazly described the position of the enemy forces
east of the canal suggest to those who read them that
that the five Egyptian infantry divisions on the evening of October 20 were not
facing an enemy of any value or combat capability
of any value or combat capability, so the question that might be asked of Shazly
as chief of staff at the time is
Chief of Staff at the time: Why didn't he take advantage of the opportunity to
order the 5th Infantry Division?
still supported by their armored brigades, to develop their attack eastward to
reach road
about 30 km east of the canal, thereby cutting off Israel's three armored
divisions west of the canal
the three Israeli armored divisions west of the canal, cutting off their land
supply routes and completely isolating them from their
from their bases in the east. Reaching crossroad 3 was the objective of the
development of the
on October 14, and one of the main reasons for the failure of the operation was
the strength of the enemy's defenses
that were facing the Egyptian assault forces at the time, but now that the
situation has changed and the
the road was clear and the danger to our positions was eliminated, as Shazly's
interrogative statement
why didn't he think to try again?
We then return to discuss Shazly's proposal to withdraw all armored brigades
from the east to the west
to the west in terms of time and distance. It will become clear to us how
difficult this process will be
if we visualize the movements, procedures, and preparations required to carry
out this operation, as it actually involves three complex and overlapping phases
actually involves three complex and overlapping phases: The first is the
movement east
and west of the canal, and the second is the regrouping phase west of the canal
to reorganize units and supply them with weapons and equipment to restore their
efficiency
with weapons and equipment to restore their combat efficiency. As for the third
phase, it is the phase of
Organizing the battle before engaging the enemy. I do not find it appropriate to
go into the details of these three phases
the three phases, as they require mentioning many technical details that readers
do not need, but from
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it is necessary to mention that these stages, with all their sequential steps, will all take place under under hostile air superiority and under the threat of the presence of three armored divisions on the west bank of the canal. Such a massive operation could not be carried out only after a special command was established to command all Egyptian forces on the West Bank, which that would be involved in clearing the breach, similar to the command that was subsequently established after the ceasefire which was commanded by Major General A.H. Saad Maamoun on December 13, 1973. The plan to clear the breach was called Plan Shamil, and it took Maj. Gen. Maamoun needed five full days to review the plan, scrutinize it, and make the necessary adjustments on it. It was not until December 18, 73, that General Ahmed Ismail, the commander-in-chief, ratified Plan Shamil on December 18, 1973.

From this brief illness, it is clear to us that adopting Brother Shazly's proposal to withdraw all armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west, required arduous efforts, time-consuming procedures, careful calculations, and a long period of time. careful calculations and a long period of time of at least five days at best, which would have in addition to its other shortcomings, this proposal would have been a major risk without without a quick and decisive result in practice, because it was not possible to predict the countermeasures that the enemy would take to thwart the withdrawal of the armored brigades on the one hand on the one hand, and on the other hand, to take advantage of the opportunity to free the East Bank from these armored brigades.

The correct information obtained from reliable sources and the facts and events have proven that that the enemy was able to mobilize 10 armored brigades in front of the Egyptian front. In the east of the canal, he had two mixed divisions, each with an armored brigade, which occupied the front from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the Shatt in the south, in front of the Egyptian bridgeheads

Since Sharon's division consisted of 3 armored brigades, he was attached to it before crossing to the west a parachute brigade commanded by Colonel Danny Mat, Sharon left an armored brigade armored brigade under Colonel Tuvia in front of the 16th Infantry Division in accordance with the instructions of the Southern Command. Thus, on the east bank of the canal, Israel has three armored brigades in addition to other brigades mixed infantry and mechanized infantry. At the same time, Israel west of the canal had 7 brigades 3 armored brigades (3 in the Adan Division and 2 each in the Sharon and Magen Divisions) as well as an infantry brigade parachute brigade in the Sharon Division and a mechanized infantry brigade in the Magen Division.

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How was the Thokrat al-Dersuwar mishandled?

In his response, Lt. Gen. Saad al-Shazly stated that the information available to the General Command on the evening of October 20 was that the enemy had five armored brigades west of the canal, and that what was left for him to mobilize towards the Egyptian front after relieving its forces on the Syrian front is only 4 armored brigades, considering that the maximum the enemy can mobilize considering that the maximum the enemy can mobilize in front of the Egyptian front is 9 armored brigades. He continued The enemy had two options: The first option is to cross the night of 20/21 or the night of 21/22 October with two armored brigades, leaving him with seven armored brigades in the west and retaining two armored brigades in the east in the east. The second option is to keep the situation as it is with regard to the distribution of his armored forces, i.e., 5 armored brigades in the west and 4 in the east. 5 armored brigades in the west and 4 armored brigades in the east.

In fact, Shazly's information about the enemy's size and position east and west of the canal on the evening of October 2 on the evening of October 2 is inaccurate, and may not be the fault of Shadhli as much as as much as the sources that relayed this information to him when he was in the center 10 at the time after returning to Cairo from Ismailia

According to credible sources and proven by the course of events themselves that Israel was able to mobilize 10 armored brigades in front of the Egyptian front.

within the two mixed divisions that occupied the front from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to the in front of the Egyptian bridgeheads, while the third brigade was the armored brigade commanded by Colonel Tuvia (from Sharon's division formation), which the Southern Command ordered to remain east of the canal in front of the

in front of the 16th Infantry Division West of the canal, the enemy had 7 armored brigades on the evening of October 20, not 5 armored brigades as Shadley mentioned, and thus had no choice but to take the two options he spoke of. At this time the matter had been decided, and the seven armored brigades had completed their crossing and settled on the west bank of the canal West Bank of the Canal. The crossing from Deverswar to the west of the canal began on the night of October 15/16 Sharon's Parachute Brigade crossed the Suez Canal to the western shore by rubber boats rubber boats. Muskarian engineers succeeded in erecting the first Israeli bridge of pontoon ferries across the canal at 4:00 p.m. pontoon ferry across the canal at 4 p.m. on October 17, followed by the construction of the 801

Installation 185NAACN5552 at midnight on October 18 at a location just 200 meters north of the pontoon ferry bridge. meters north of the pontoon ferry bridge. On October 19, a third bridge was erected from the pontoon ferry bridge north of the second bridge, all three bridges were erected in a longitudinal area of about 500 meters of the canal. Israeli armored brigades continued to cross the bridges

across the canal as of the night of October 17/18. On October 19, Israel had three armored divisions west of the three armored divisions (Sharon's, Adan's and Magen's). These divisions consisted of 7 armored brigades (3 brigades in the Adan Division and 2 brigades each in the Sharon and Magen Divisions) as well as a parachute infantry brigade in the Sharon Division and a mechanized infantry brigade in the Magen Division.

Could the infantry divisions have done without the armored brigades attached to them?

In his response, Lieutenant General Shazly gave us a breakdown of the number of main weapons that were within the organization of each of the five Egyptian infantry divisions that crossed the canal on October 6 October, and commented on this statement by saying: "No matter how many losses an infantry division suffers, half This size of weapon is enough to repel an enemy armored attack with the strength of two full brigades

4. There is no doubt that Brother Al-Shazly intended this statement to show that his proposal to withdraw all armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west was

The real danger of withdrawing these brigades from the bridgeheads was that they might fall into the hands of the

was the possibility of them falling into the hands of the Mido, so as long as Brother Saad assures us that half of the of the weaponry that goes into the organization of the infantry division - not counting any external support - is enough for it to repel any to repel any armored attack directed against it with the strength of two fully armed Israeli armored brigades, what is the reason to criticize this decision? Why was this decision criticized and why did the political and military leadership object to it on the evening of October 20?

On the evening of October 20, Shazly was concerned with stipulating that half of the weaponry in the division's possession was enough to repel the two Israeli armored brigades.

He wanted to preemptively answer those who would argue that the infantry divisions east of the canal

Infantry divisions east of the canal did not have more than 50 percent of their armor due to the losses they had sustained during the heavy fighting they had fought for 15 consecutive days. But this statement, which Shazly recorded as a fact

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without any scientific support or logical evidence, raised a number of questions for us.

We thought we should address them to him in the belief that we need to find the truth, which we do not doubt that he aims to reach as we do that he aims to reach it as much as we do:

First, if you, Brother Saad, are confident that half of the weapons that enter the organization of the

Infantry Division and without any external support is enough to repel two Israeli armored brigades

As you mentioned, and since you were the Chief of Staff and participated with your operations, why did you agree to reinforce each of the five infantry divisions with a

each of the five infantry divisions with an armored brigade placed under its command?

armored brigades were placed with the infantry divisions in the first phase of the war for the purposes of

crossing, and so that the infantry divisions could construct the bridgeheads without interference from
Why didn't you order their withdrawal after the end of this phase on October 9? October to return to their original formations, which had lost a large part of their striking forces
due to the withdrawal of these armored brigades, which affected the results of its battles with the enemy when
assigned to counter the Israeli advance west of the canal?
Secondly, as long as these five infantry divisions have this huge intrinsic ability to repel the Israeli advance west of the Canal.
Why, Brother Saad, did you agree to withdraw the two battalions of rocket-propelled grenade launchers
0 anti-tank (Malotka) battalions from two of the western divisions, and ordered their companies to be distributed
to reinforce the infantry divisions east of the canal?
when the two divisions from which the Malotka missiles were withdrawn needed this
to counter Israeli armored vehicles west of the canal after the Israeli crossing after the Israeli crossing to the west after their blocking capabilities were reduced. As a result of your sense of
sense of responsibility and to clear your name, you had to work on withdrawing the
without notifying the late President Sadat and Generalissimo Ahmed Ismail because they were opposed to withdrawing any weapons from the East.
Although you succeeded in
to withdraw some of these missile companies, the best of them continued to remain in their positions with
with some divisions in the east because their commanders insisted that they should remain in place.
Third, the defensive conditions of the Egyptian infantry divisions east of the canal, as you know, were not
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were not suitable conditions for any infantry division in defense to be able to rely on
its own ability to repel. Each division east of the canal occupied a bridgehead in a
semicircle with its base on the eastern shore of the canal, doubling the Division confrontation. Instead of the usual confrontation of about 12 kilometers based on
two infantry brigades in the first formation and a mechanized infantry brigade in the second formation.
the front became 24 kilometers, and this widening of the front meant that the commander of each
to occupy his defensive positions inside the bridgehead with three infantry brigades in the first echelon
and to place the armored brigade that supported the division in reserve. And damn
the armored brigade was tasked with participating with the division's units and reserves
anti-tank units and reserves in the operation to repel the breakthrough, and it was assigned the duty to carry out the counterattack
to destroy the enemy force in case it succeeds in penetrating the bridgehead and restoring
the situation back to the way it was. As a result of this defensive system, the armored brigade
became a key pillar in stabilizing the bridgehead, and its withdrawal led to reduce and even shake and disrupt it.

Fourth - You know very well, Brother Saad, because of your studies and experiences, that there is no line of defense that is not

penetrable, and the experiences of wars have proven this. This means that the repulsion phase that will be carried out by the weapons of the infantry division is a temporary phase, and must be followed by the enemy's attack on a narrow front with superior armored force must be followed by a phase of penetration and penetration of enemy armor in the direction of depth, so I ask you: Where is it in the absence of the brigade is the counterattack force in the infantry division that will destroy the enemy's armored force that succeeded in breaking through? The close cooperation tanks that are part of the division's organization which numbered no more than 50 percent of its organizational size at the time - would be most of them will be deployed to the battalions and companies of the first echelon to participate with Bai's anti-tank weapons anti-tank weapons in the repulsion plan in order to cover the vast Ras al-Kobri front 42 kilometers, leaving only a small number of tanks in reserve in the rear. With the anti-tank reserves, it will not be able to defend against enemy tanks, especially if he succeeds in penetrating as expected in more than one direction by attacking with two armored brigades.

What solution do you propose, Brother Saad, to face this situation? destroy the enemy tanks that have penetrated deep into the defenses?

V. Is it possible to imagine the serious moral impact that will be felt by the members of the of the infantry east of the canal when all the armored brigades are withdrawn from the heads of the bridges bridges and cross them to the west? I do not claim that the withdrawal of armored brigades to the west will turn into a panicked withdrawal of infantry units, and they will follow the tanks to the west of the canal, although in the circumstances that existed at the time cannot be excluded from our estimates. I have already mentioned that the withdrawal of the 3rd Armored Brigade (from the 4th Armored Division) to the west was done without any morale impact on the Third Army forces, but there is a big difference between the withdrawal of between the withdrawal of one brigade and the withdrawal of all armored brigades at once, especially since the The 3rd Armored Brigade was not assigned from the start of the crossing like other armored brigades to support an infantry division. one of the infantry divisions, it was moved to the east bank to carry out a special operation, namely to develop the eastern attack on October 14, and when the operation failed, it was ordered to stay at the head of the division's bridgehead. ordered to remain at the 19th Infantry Division's bridgehead. The 22nd Armored Brigade, which supported the 19th Infantry Division which had supported the 19th Infantry Division since the start of the crossing was still stationed inside the division's bridgehead bridgehead of this division. Do you have any doubt, Brother Saad, that the withdrawal of all armored brigades from east of the canal - if it does not lead to a panicked withdrawal - will will definitely lead to a serious crack in morale among all the forces

on the east bank?

The Wrong Handling of the Dahreswar Gap

In my response to Shazly's letter, I discussed the arguments and proofs he used to demonstrate

the correctness of his proposal on the evening of October 20 to withdraw all armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west

east of the canal to the west, and I pointed out with conclusive evidence the grave dangers that would have been expected

would have occurred if the General Command had taken this view. My reply was in fact as follows

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an objective discussion of Shazly's viewpoint, in which I adhered to the scientific aspect and logical method

without being influenced by any personal factors on the part of those who supported or opposed Shadhli's opinion.

In the light of this study that I tried, I decide with full conviction and for the sake of truth and history that this

although not contrary to any tactical principles, it was dangerous to implement it from the point of view of realism

in reality because of the disastrous tactical conditions that existed and existed along the battlefield.

There is no doubt that I disagree with the view expressed by Shazly in his response that his proposal was the only correct option for the command

while recognizing the deterioration of the military situation west of the Canal as a result of the crossing of three Israeli armored divisions into the Kharbia Bank, the adoption of Shazly's proposal

in view of the serious problems in implementing it would not, as I have already explained, have led to

an effective and rapid change in the situation on the West Bank, while we can be sure that the withdrawal of the brigades

brigades from the east would undoubtedly have been followed by a complete deterioration in the condition of the Egyptian bridgeheads

east of the canal. It was inevitable that some of them would fall into the hands of the enemy.

If Shazly's proposal had been implemented, the Egyptian forces would have suffered an absolute catastrophe

both on the east bank and on the west bank at the same time.

I, Brother Saad, cannot claim that I can offer a better alternative to the solution that

The tactical situation in WATNA, thanks to the mistakes of

of some of those responsible at Center 10 - has reached an impasse that makes it difficult for any human being, no matter how brilliant

to come up with a sound military solution, as any proposed solution would be full of flaws and loopholes.

Therefore, the best solution in my opinion - despite recognizing its serious flaws - was to maintain the status quo.

was to keep the situation on the east bank of the canal as it was so that the the bridgeheads remain strong and intact, and to try to contain the Israeli

armored forces west of the canal

with all the regular and irregular forces that could be mobilized to prevent the enemy from expanding the breach westward.

As long as we, Brother Saad, have dealt with the issue of the breach, I will try to briefly explain to the readers

some of the mistakes that were made in dealing with it, so that our brothers and sons in the

Armed Forces with lessons learned:

1 There was a major and unforgivable failure for which the leadership of the

Second Army and the command of the 16th Infantry Division are responsible.

The two commands allowed the abandonment of two of the Bar-Lev Line's largest forts (on the right flank

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of the 16th Infantry Division) unoccupied by our troops, despite the fact that the forces of the 16th Infantry Division 16 Infantry Division after crossing the canal, namely, Fort Mtsmed (Deverswar) and Fort La Kikan (Tel Salam). The result was that the enemy was able to capture them secretly on the night of October 15/16 without fighting, and crossed to the West Bank that night from Al-Defreswar unnoticed, and then used the Dafraswar fortress as an arena for crossing its forces, as well as He used the Tel Salam fortress to secure his left flank during the crossing operations.

2 On the morning of October 16, the Second Army's command erred in failing to communicate the the correct information about the crossing of Israeli forces to General Headquarters Center 10 in Cairo. misinformed the General Command by reporting that the Israeli forces that crossed were that only seven tanks had crossed, and that the Lahl command would destroy them immediately . Al-Shazly also made a grave error in withholding this information, which he had received before noon on October 16 from General Commander Ahmed Ismail and the President of the Republic on the afternoon of October 16 Sadat gave his speech to the People's Assembly at noon, completely unaware of the truth of the matter the truth of the matter. Sadat was so surprised when he returned to the Tahira Palace He learned, via foreign radio, that Golda Meir, the Prime Minister of Israel, had announced in her speech to the Knesset in her speech to the Israeli Knesset at 4 p.m. on October 16 that Israeli forces were fighting east and west of the canal. When Sadat asked Ahmed Ismail about the validity of the news, he gave the same answer, which was far from the truth All that had crossed to the west were seven tanks that were being destroyed.

3- The military situation in the Second Army's sector west of the canal and south of the Ismailia Canal provided the enemy with an ideal opportunity to cross to the west, following the pushing of the 21st Armored Division - the the tactical reserve of the Second Army to the east of the canal to carry out the development of the attack to the east on October 14, the General Command and its operational heath made the mistake of not forming a new tactical reserve to replace the 21st Armored Division. Although the Dafraswar, where the Suez Canal meets the Great Bitter Lake, was recognized by was recognized by all commanders as the most dangerous area of the front, and that in the event of an Israthili crossing to the west Israthili to the west, it would be the first area through which the enemy might cross.

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All pre-war projects to train command centers assumed an Israeli crossing from Dafraswar, so it is surprising that the task of guarding the surprisingly, the task of guarding this area and the Bitter Lakes shoreline to its south to the weakest forces in the front (the Kuwaiti battalion in the north and the Palestinian brigade in the south). and the Palestinian Brigade in the south), which are poorly trained and unarmed except for personal weapons and some light weapons personal weapons and some light weapons. Their elements were spread out over a wide front that did not allow any real defense to be organized. The Israeli Israeli paratroopers who were the first to cross on the night of October 15/16 in rubber boats was landed on the western shore of the canal at Dafraswar without being seen or shot at or fired a single bullet at them.

4 - The General Command and its operations organization did not pay the attention that should have been paid to the speedy destruction of the Israeli force that crossed west of the canal The Israeli force that crossed to the west of the canal, which was initially easy to annihilate or capture This was due to the constant underestimation of its strength and size, and helped to solidify this unrealistic belief the misinformation that was reaching the Second Army's command and and Center 10 in Cairo, which was reassuring and underestimating the Israeli force that had crossed west of the canal which clearly revealed the extent of the inadequacies of the information gathering and reconnaissance of information gathering and reconnaissance at all levels, whether in military intelligence or in the reconnaissance branches or in the reconnaissance branches of the Second Army or in its field formations.

5- Despite the small size and weak size of the enemy forces that crossed to the west of the canal in the area of which consisted of an infantry brigade of paratroopers not exceeding 2,000 men 30 tanks and some half-track armored vehicles, all of which were part of Sharon's division. Sharon, and its elimination was easy at first, as the Israeli force west of the canal remained isolated from its bases. isolated from its bases east of the canal for about 40 hours and without any 0 additional reinforcements to its force as instructed by General Chabem Bar-Lev, pending the construction of the fixed bridges across the canal. Given the force's poor tactical position, some responsible Israeli commanders considered several times withdrawing it and sending it back to the East Bank East Bank for fear of being annihilated or captured. Although the General Command had allocated

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for the counterattack on the Israeli bridgehead, Egyptian forces were clearly outnumbered in terms of size and armaments, the operation to clear the breach was unsuccessful because the method used to liquidate it violated sound tactical principles, as Egyptian units were The Egyptian units were pushed forward in a distributed 1D4 attack. P:558 No No attempt was made to assemble a huge force to attack simultaneously to crush the enemy.

6- Although two major attempts were made to clear the breach by attacking it each time with a full armored brigade a full armored brigade, unfortunately, the two armored brigades were not assembled into a single attack. On the side where success could have been hoped for, west of the canal, the independent 25th Armored Brigade was pushed on the morning of October 17. 25 independent armored brigade on the morning of October 17 from the Third Army sector in the south, to advance east of the Bitter Lakes to clear the gap at Deverswar east of the canal, a mission which Al-Shazly in his response called a crazy mission. On October 18, the 23rd Armored Brigade from the Osman Ahmed Osman intersection to the east to clear the gap at Al-Defreswar west of the canal. Surprisingly, a single Israeli division, namely General Abraham Adan's division was tasked with destroying the two armored brigades in two consecutive days, taking advantage of its exploiting its great superiority in the number of tanks for each brigade separately. On October 17 Adan's division destroyed the independent 25th Armored Brigade east of the canal south of Deverswar, and on the night of October 17/18, Adan Division crossed the canal to the west on the first Israeli bridge to be built over it. The crossing was completed before dawn. On the morning of October 18, Adan's division destroyed the 23rd Brigade Armored Brigade west of Deverswar. Sadat's rejection of Shazly's proposal on October 16 to push the an independent 25th Armored Brigade from west of the canal instead of east of it, sparked the first sharp disagreement between the two men between the two men.

7- Before the Israeli crossing, the General Command and its operations organization distributed and dispersed tactical reserve units east and west of the canal. This action by the General Command, in addition to distribution of most of the strategic reserve units stationed at Cairo. which is supposed to be ready to carry out the MaB Asnah counterstrike in case the main counterattack fails. The failure of the main counterattack as Ma'aam 2 Asnah Nah. At the level of the armies, this is clear evidence that the GHQ's operations organization never expected the enemy to penetrate the Egyptian defenses east of the canal and then to penetrate the Egyptian defenses east of the canal and then cross to the west to establish

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bridgeheads on the West Bank, and the dispersal of the Second and Third Armies' tactical reserves

and Third Armies were unable to launch any major counterattack against the enemy, and the

The dispersion of the strategic reserve was a reason for the General Command's inability to carry out the expected counterstrike

This led to the Israeli penetration gap widening and worsening west of the Canal to an unimaginable degree

to a degree that no Israeli commander could have imagined, even in his most optimistic dreams

optimistic dreams.

This reckless Israeli adventure succeeded so spectacularly because of the the wrong way the breach was handled. There is no doubt that those responsible for the breach for the breach at Deverswar and the wrong handling of it is shared by a large number of commanders at different levels at various levels, foremost among them are undoubtedly those in charge of the Operations Department at the Center 010, as well as the command of the Second Field Army and the command of the 16th Infantry Division. This is in addition to the political leadership The political leadership represented by the late President Sadat due to his constant interference in the most serious military decisions despite the fact that this was not his specialty, nor did he have the credentials to make such decisions to make such decisions

We conclude with the constructive dialog we had with General Shazly on one of the most important issues raised during the one of the most important issues that arose during the last phase of the October War, which sparked controversy among military personnel both in Egypt and abroad, namely Shazly's proposal to withdraw all armored brigades from east of the canal all armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west to face the Israeli threat. We had the opportunity to present each of us with our full point of view, and each of us presented our each of us had the opportunity to present our arguments in full. We hope that readers have benefited from this serious discussion, which took place in a scientific manner, in an objective manner, and away from any and away from any insults or insults. I take this opportunity to thank Brother Saad Al-Shazli for his letter that that allowed us to have this useful dialog.

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Appendix A

The second letter from Saad Al-Shazli to Jamal Hammad
Jamal Hammad's response to the second letter

The topic on which the dialog between me and Jamal Hammad is taking place can be presented in the form of two questions : The first question is: Which was better from the Egyptian tactical point of view on the evening of October 20, 1973, to withdraw the Egyptian brigades Nos. 1, 14, 24, and 22 from east of the canal to be deployed in the following days in the following days in the battle that was going against us west of the canal in the area of Or should these brigades remain in place until the end of the war? 2. The second question is: Who proposed the withdrawal of these four armored brigades, and who opposed their withdrawal?

To answer the first question, we must make a comparison between the Egyptian and Israeli forces on the evening of October 20, both east and west of the canal. And to make another comparison between our forces and the enemy's forces based on the possibilities that the enemy may take during the next three or four days. To answer the second question, it is necessary to refer to the records of the war and the testimony of those who attended the military conference held at 10 p.m. on October 20

on October 20.

As we will see, Jamal Hammad made a general comparison that confirms the enemy's superiority west of the Canal. But he did not make a precise comparison showing the ability of our forces east of the canal to repel any attack by the enemy by the enemy. Therefore, he drew wrong conclusions. He also did not use the rigor to reveal what took place at the command conference on October 2. But before I address those analysis and conclusions, I will comment on the positive and negative attitudes that Jamal Hammad by Jamal Hammad.

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The importance of forming a reserve

Gamal Hammad's statement about the importance of keeping a tactical reserve and a strategic reserve under the General Command of the Armed Forces. And that when any part of this reserve is deployed in battle in battle, another reserve is formed to replace it. It is an axiom that is known by commanders at all levels. But I would like to make it clear to the reader that we as a third world country third world country that does not manufacture advanced weapons but imports them from other countries, we start the war and after mobilizing After mobilizing our reserve forces, we do not have a reserve of advanced weapons that can be used to compensate for losses or form new units. filling losses or forming new units.

Even if we assume the availability of this weapon in the warehouses, the formation of new units to replace the tactical and logistical reserves. to replace the tactical and strategic reserves that are consumed in combat would require time The nature of the short wars between us and Israel does not allow for this. Hence, the The General Command of the Armed Forces must be very careful in utilizing its tactical and strategic reserves tactical and strategic reserves, and resort to the method of maneuvering forces when it wants to create to create new reserves instead of reserves that have to be thrown into battle. By maneuver, I mean maneuvering here means withdrawing some of our units from unexposed directions in order to form new reserves instead of those that have been deployed or used in other directions. Just like as chess players do. If a player concentrates his attack in a certain direction, his opponent has to have to withdraw a number of their pieces from non-threatening directions and mobilize them in the threatening directions threatened directions.

If we really want to benefit from our mistakes in the October War, and not waste the precious blood that were martyred in that glorious war, we must admit that the General Command of the Egyptian Armed Forces of the Egyptian Armed Forces has made serious mistakes regarding the distribution and utilization of its its tactical and strategic reserves, and that it never tried to use the method

of maneuvering to create new reserves instead of those that it scattered or destroyed as a result of its misuse. utilization.

We started the October War with nine armored brigades, all of which were supposed to remain in tactical and strategic reserves, according to the High Minarets plan before it evolved into the Badr plan. Badr. I was convinced that the infantry divisions with their tanks (within the organization of the infantry division

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4 tank battalions) and anti-tank means were able to carry out the tasks assigned to them within the plan without the need to reinforce them with an armored brigade. However, Sadat asked Ahmed Ismail to capture Qantara as soon as possible so that he could take advantage of it. Ahmed Ismail ordered the division tasked with capturing Qantara to be reinforced with an armored brigade. Sadat then repeated the same request for Ismailia and Suez. He wanted the two cities to be out of range of enemy artillery as soon as possible. Ahmed Ismail ordered the two divisions in whose sectors the two cities fall to be reinforced with an armored brigade. The commanders of the two remaining divisions complained and demanded equality with the other three divisions. Ahmed Ismail ordered each of them to be reinforced with an armored brigade. This meant that we had scattered 5 armored brigades out of a total of 9 brigades, which was all that was left from the first moment of the battle. And this was the first mistake. I did not strongly oppose this action, as I knew the psychological conditions that led Sadat and Ahmed Ismail to this approach that led Sadat and Ahmed Ismail to this approach, in the hope that these five armored brigades would be withdrawn from the five armored brigades to tactical and strategic reserves as soon as the infantry divisions finished reinforcing their positions east of the canal

had finished reinforcing their positions east of the canal. Had we returned these five armored brigades to the tactical and strategic reserves and strategic reserves as was assumed, the error would have been eliminated, and the decision to reinforce each infantry division with an armored brigade is overly cautious. The fault, then, lies in the General Command's failure to withdraw these brigades as of October 11 and 21, and in addition to this obvious error, the General Command began to consider pushing other armored brigades to the east as of October 11. Two armored brigades were actually pushed east on October 12 and 13, at the expense of tactical reserves. at the expense of tactical and strategic reserves, which were reduced to two armored brigades

as of dawn on October 14. Although the General Command should have anticipated that the absence of troops in the area west of the canal would encourage the enemy to cross to the west after the failure of our attack on October 14.

and therefore should have preceded this by withdrawing a number of armored brigades from the east, it did not do so
did not do so. Even after the Dafraswar Gap, the General Command was opposed to the withdrawal of any armored brigade from the east under the false slogan of not withdrawing a single rifle or soldier
let alone a single tank from east to west.
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did not withdraw any armored forces from east of the canal to counter the armored hordes
armored brigades that were increasing day by day west of the canal, until they reached 7 armored brigades
against two Egyptian armored brigades. These anomalous actions by the General Command
was a source of serious disagreement between Lieutenant General Shazly on one side and Sadat and Ahmed
Ismail on the other side, resulting in intense confrontations, the most tumultuous of which was the
the confrontation between Shazly and Sadat on October 16, when Shazly wanted to withdraw
the 25th Independent Armored Brigade and the rest of the 4th Armored Division units from east of the canal and throw them into a battle against enemy forces in a battle against enemy forces in the Dafraswar area, while Sadat refused to withdraw any troops from east of the canal
soldiers from east of the canal. On the evening of October 20, Shazly made another proposal
to withdraw four armored brigades from the east, saying that this was the last chance, and that if we did not
we don't make this decision now, there will be a catastrophe of God knows what proportions. But this proposal
was aborted like all the others before it. The catastrophe took place as Shazly had predicted, and three days later
three days later, the Third Army and the city of Suez were surrounded, and the enemy seized the port of Adabiya on the Gulf of Suez
on the Gulf of Suez!

When I read what Gamal Hammad writes, I sometimes feel as if I am in front of a meticulous researcher and a military man
A well-informed and educated man. Other times I feel as if I am reading the pleadings of a lawyer who devoted himself to the defense of
Sadat in a case that all evidence indicates is a lost cause. What really saddens me is that
The arguments of Gamal Hammad, a lawyer, often spoil the bright side of Gamal Hammad, a researcher and military analyst
and military analyst.

Gamal Hammad acknowledged that Shazly, Saad Maamoun and Abdel Moneim Wasel opposed the decision to develop the attack towards the straits.
the decision to develop the attack towards the straits. He admitted that the development of the attack on October 14 was
wrong decision. His analysis of this operation included the following:

1 The decision to develop the attack towards the straits on October 14 was a wrong emotional decision. As a result of
of this wrong decision, the Egyptian offensive failed and the armed forces suffered heavy losses.
The morale of our forces was shaken while the morale of the enemy forces rose. The attack did not achieve
did not achieve its goals. Israel did not withdraw any part of its forces from the Syrian front to the Egyptian front
Egyptian front . As a result, Israeli forces were able to take the initiative

away from Egyptian forces

4. However, Gamal Hammad, a lawyer, added after
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that: "The urgent Syrian pressure on the Egyptian leadership to advance to the Straits to relieve the pressure on Syria was the reason for Sadat's decision, which was well-timed was overdue as a result of the unjustified tactical pause of five days from October 9 to 13 October." In the midst of defending Sadat's erroneous decision, Hammad did not address the reasons that led to this tactical pause. Those reasons, which I mentioned in detail in my in my memoirs of the October War, which I have no doubt Gamal Hammad has read, yet he never never discussed them.

The plan to eliminate the breach on the 17th

Gamal Hammad criticized the plan of the General Command of the Armed Forces to eliminate the breach on October 17. Analyzing this plan, he said the following:

10 This plan met with strong opposition and created a sharp division among the commanders within the center 1 to express his opinion 10 to the extent that President Sadat was invited to come himself to the center When he arrived a few hours later, he quickly supported the General Commander and revolted. . An armored brigade to the west to push him from that direction 25 violently in the face of the commanders who requested the crossing of the brigade He ordered that no troops be withdrawn from the east to the west or that this idea be discussed at all at all." However, Jamal Hammad, the lawyer, was careful not to refer to the plan Shazly's 25th Armored and 25th Batty plan to eliminate the breach. This plan, which included the withdrawal of the brigade 17/16 units of the 4th Armored Division attached to the infantry divisions east of the canal during the night of October 17, and launch an armored strike against the breach at dawn.

This was the plan for which Sadat revolted against Shazly on the afternoon of October 16.

Jamal Hammad, the researcher, admitted that Shazly went to the Second Army on the evening of October 18, and that he He returned to position 10 on the afternoon of October 20 after an absence of about 44 hours. Sadat has stated on more than one occasion that Shazly went to the Second Army on October 16. that he could have eliminated the breach as soon as he arrived, but that he wasted 24 hours to establish a a command to compete with Ahmed Ismail's command, and that he prevented the Thunderbolt forces sent by Sadat

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from engaging the enemy in the Dafraswar area, and that he returned from the front on the 19th to recommend that all our forces should be withdrawn from the east.

Jamal Hammad, a researcher, wrote down all these allegations, and acknowledged that when Shazly returned to 10 on October 20, he recommended that part of the forces (armored forces) should be withdrawn from the east from the east to deal with the enemy in the west. On this particular issue, the character of Jamal Hammad, the researcher Jamal Hammad's personality as a researcher overcame the personality of Jamal Hammad, a lawyer. He bravely said that Sadat had claimed all this on Al-Shazly in order to hold him solely responsible for the Deverswar Gap. I record for him this courageous position that has not been publicly issued by any writer, journalist, or politician in Egypt for the past thirteen years. or Egyptian politician over the past thirteen years, despite the dozens of books and articles published in Egypt in which Sadat's claims were recorded.

Where was the 15th Brigade stationed?

I mentioned in my previous article that the 15th Armored Brigade was not among the armored brigades that I wanted to to be withdrawn on the night of October 21/20 to participate in the battle against the breach, as this brigade should have been kept in the Second Army's reserve west of the canal and north of the Ismailia Canal. I had mentioned in my book on the October War that General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army had informed me on the evening of October 18, when I arrived at his command center, that he had decided to withdraw the 15th Brigade Armored Brigade from east of the canal to be in the army's reserve north of the Ismailia Canal.

I told him: Well done, because this is the correct use of the armored forces, and I did not care I didn't pay attention to this issue because all my attention was directed to what was going on in the Deverswar area. Since I knew that Sadat and Ahmed Ismail were opposed to withdrawing any unit from the east I did not raise this issue with Ahmed Ismail when I returned to Center 10 on the evening of the 20th on the 20th and assumed that the 15th Armored Brigade was still west of the canal, north of the Ismailia Canal, as General Abdel Moneim Khalil informed me. But Gamal Hammad created an issue about where the 15th Armored Brigade was stationed Armored Brigade on October 20, insisting that this brigade was not withdrawn from east of the canal until after the the ceasefire. In his own words: "If Shazly has any doubts about my words. I would advise him to contact Major General Tahsin Shannan, the current governor of Suez, to find out for himself.

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the truth and accuracy of the information I mentioned. Although this issue is minor and does not affect or far from the subject of the dialog, as long as it receives this attention from Gamal Hammad, I advise him to re-read what I have been saying I advise him to re-read what he himself wrote in his study when he was talking about comparing the Egyptian and Israeli armored forces on October 20

Egyptian and Israeli armored forces on October 20. He said: 1 The enemy had west of the 7 armored brigades (3 in Adan's division, 2 in Sharon's division, 2 in Magen's division) While Egyptian forces had only 3 armored brigades, 2 in the 4th Armored Division, in addition to the 15 independent armored brigade in the Second Army sector north of the Ismailia Canal.) Comparing the forces it is clear that the enemy outnumbered our forces west of the canal by a ratio of 7 to 3, more than double double4 . Gamal Hammad, the researcher, has previously written the following: 10Our main purpose in conducting this study is to answer in a scientific way and in an objective manner to the important question that has remained unanswered until now, which is: Can we realistically realistically implement the proposal made by Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shazly, Chief of Staff, to General Ahmed Ismail, the Commander-in-Chief, on the evening of October 20 at the General Headquarters at 10 after his return from Ismailia, namely the withdrawal of three armored brigades from the Second Army and one armored brigade from the Third Army from east of the Canal. armored brigade from the Third Army from the east of the canal to the west to hit the breach?

The topic is very simple and requires any researcher to answer the following question: â Which was better for the Egyptian Armed Forces on the evening of October 20 to withdraw those armored brigades from the east to deal with the breach in the west, or to remain in place east of the canal until the end of the war. 4. However, Gamal Hammad relied on two main points in his defense of Sadat two main points :

The first point is that the four brigades could not be withdrawn. The second point is that all military commanders who attended the command conference on the evening of October 20 opposed the withdrawal of these four brigades from the east four brigades from the east. He imagined that by doing so he could find a way out for Sadat and involve all military commanders to be responsible for the decision not to withdraw the armored brigades from the east East .

As for the first point, in order for the defense to be convincing, a comparison must be made between our forces and the enemy forces east and west of the canal on the evening of and enemy forces east and west of the canal on the evening of October 20, showing the number of tanks on each side But Jamal Hammad, the lawyer, began to argue the position of our armored brigades on the evening of 18

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October, two days before the time of the command conference at the center.10 I personally I cannot provide today a combat diary showing how many tanks were in each armored brigade on the evening of on October 2, but at the same time I categorically reject the figures presented by Gamal Hammad about the position of our armored forces on October 18. If these figures are

correct, it means that Egypt had lost 85 percent of its armored forces only until October 18. While the combat diaries showing the number of tanks in the four armored brigades on October 25, i.e. after the after the cease-fire and after another week of fighting, our losses in tanks were much, much lower much, much, much less. I will not specify the total number of tanks lost in that war so as not to be accused of not to be accused of divulging military secrets, but I refer to what Sadat himself announced in a speech published in Al-Ahram newspaper on 1/10/1976, in which he said that our total losses in tanks was 500 tanks. This is less than 30 percent of the number of tanks we entered the war with. Of course You will say that the percentage of losses in an armored brigade may differ from the percentage of losses in another brigade or in a tank battalion that is part of an infantry organization. And this is true. You may challenge the credibility of Sadat's credibility, but that would weaken the position you are defending. Therefore, in order to to know the truth, I propose the formation of a fact-finding committee to determine the number of tanks that were in each armored brigade and tank battalion on the evening of October 20, and the committee will also estimate the enemy's tanks east and west of the canal at the same time. Without an agreement on this, we will enter into Byzantine discussions that will get us nowhere. Will Jamal Hammad, a lawyer, accept the decision of this committee? committee?

Jamal Hammad says in his study: 1The established matter, according to reliable references. and proven by the course of events themselves, that Israel was able to mobilize in front of the Egyptian front 10 armored brigades against the Egyptian front, not 9 armored brigades. Note that Hammad is speaking on the basis of information available 13 years after the end of the war. I, on the other hand, am speaking on the basis of on the basis of the information that was available to us on the evening of October 2, and our reference at that time was the Military Intelligence Department, Reconnaissance Branch. However, even if we assume that the data provided by Gamal Hammad and that the enemy on the evening of October 2, 73 had 7 armored brigades west of the canal and 3 armored brigades east of the canal, this would not change the validity of the

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Shazly to withdraw the four armored brigades on the night of October 21/20. On the contrary, the opposite is true. It makes the proposal to withdraw the four armored brigades even more urgent.

This is in terms of comparison in the West. As for a comparison showing the ability of our formations in the in the east to repel an enemy armored attack with the three armored brigades it has in the East, Jamal Hammad skipped right over it by asking Shazly: â Was the 16th Infantry Division able to repel an armored attack by an armored brigade of 120 tanks?â I tell him without hesitation: Yes, without hesitation. The key is to calculate the number of

tanks and anti-tank pieces that the 16th Infantry Division had on the evening of October 20
October 20.

In addition to this question, Jamal Hammad raised a very important point, namely the possibility that the
that the enemy may have withdrawn some of its armored brigades from west to east of the canal, when he said:

â On this occasion, I would like to draw Shazly's attention to an important matter that may have escaped his attention.
that the idea he was proposing to implement on the evening of October 20 by withdrawing armored brigades from the east to the west
to the west could also have been contemplated by the enemy, but in the opposite direction of course. That is

He might consider withdrawing some of his armored units from west of the canal to the east, thereby doubling the size of his forces east of the canal.

doubling the size of its forces east of the canal in a short period of time.â To which I say: I didn't miss it.

I was hoping it would happen. If the enemy does this, it means that we have taken the initiative away from him. Making
movements by our units and formations that result in forcing the enemy to act according to our will

is the pinnacle of success at the tactical and strategic level. If the enemy had withdrawn his

seven armored brigades to the east of the canal, we will have achieved multiple gains, which I summarize as follows:

One: Clearing the gap in the Dafraswar area. Two: Return to our original plans, which are based on

based on draining the enemy's manpower and prolonging the war, the two main weaknesses of the enemy

the enemy's two main weaknesses. In addition, there is no fear for our positions east of the

Canal. It is not plausible that 10 Israeli armored brigades can overcome 5 infantry divisions. Maybe

The enemy can concentrate his armored attack on one of the infantry divisions.

He might succeed in destroying the

the 16th Division, but he would have paid too high a price to continue fighting.

The war would be prolonged and the enemy's manpower would continue to be depleted, which is the basis of the plan with which we entered

the October War.

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The attitude of the commanders to Shazly's proposal

The second point made by Gamal Hammad to justify Sadat's decision to to reject Shazly's proposal to withdraw the armored brigades from the east on October 20, is his belief that

that Sadat would not have rejected the proposal if the Meskarbian commanders had supported it. He therefore

makes an unsubstantiated inference that the Muskarian commanders opposed Shazly's proposal and supported Sadat's decision

Shazly's proposal and supported Sadat's decision. Jamal Hammad's goal is clear. He wants to

that Sadat's decision was a collective one. And even if it is proven

that it was a wrong decision, the responsibility for the mistake does not fall on Sadat alone or extends to all those who supported this decision.

who supported this decision.

In my published memoirs of the October War, I mentioned the names of the commanders who attended the command conference on the evening of October 20.
command conference on the evening of October 20, but I did not mention the

details of what took place in this conference out of respect for the rights of fellowship

the rights of fellowship, and to allow each of them to clarify their own position. Eight men attended this conference

eight men other than me, three of whom have died so far, namely: Sadat, Ahmed Ismail, and Abdel Fattah

Abdullah. Five are still alive, the generals according to their rank at the time:

Mohamed Ali Fahmy, commander of air defense, Hosni Mubarak, commander of the air force, Abdel Ghany

Fouad Nassar, director of intelligence, and Said El-Mahy, director of artillery Instead of Gamal Hammad, the researcher, going to these commanders to ask them

what was discussed at the conference, Gamal Hammad

Jamal Hammad declared in his defense that the only conclusion that Shazly did not mention the details of

is that these commanders must have opposed his proposal to withdraw these armored brigades

Therefore, Sadat's rejection of Shazly's proposal was supported by all the commanders

Muskarian! I don't know how Jamal Hammad accepts this conclusion without research

Isn't there any other possibility? Shouldn't Gamal Hammad, who is interviewing me while I am 3,000 kilometers away?

who is interviewing me while I am 3000 kilometers away from him, should not have sought a meeting with these leaders

who all live in Cairo, just steps away from him, to listen to their testimony before

I won't go any further on this subject today, but I'm awaiting the publication of this article.

but I am waiting for what Gamal Hammad publishes after his meeting with these five leaders.

I have already said that the proposal to withdraw the armored brigades on the evening of October 20 was

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the best solution available to us on the evening of October 20. I asked those who oppose this proposal to

present an alternative. I have already said that the best plan to eliminate the breach was the one I proposed on October 16, but it was not implemented.

October 16, but it was not implemented. But Jamal Hammad concluded his analysis by saying: 1Brother

Saad, I cannot claim that I can offer the best alternative to the solution you proposed

On the evening of October 20, the tactical situation of our forces, thanks to the mistakes of the officials in

(Center 10) has reached an impasse that makes it difficult for any human being, no matter how brilliant he is, to find a

any proposed solution will be full of flaws. Therefore, the best solution in my opinion

in my opinion, despite my recognition of its serious flaws, was to keep the situation on the east bank of the canal as it was

on the eastern bank of the canal as it was, so that the bridgeheads remain strong, and to try to

contain the Israeli armored forces west of the canal with all the regular or even irregular forces that can be mobilized to prevent the enemy from expanding to prevent the enemy from widening the breach to the west.

You are free, Brother Jamal Hammad, to give your opinion that you are convinced of. But I disagree with you

fundamentally disagree with this conclusion. It is enough to know that this decision taken by

Sadat, which you support today, led to the siege of the Third Army and the city of Suez.

Do you think that following my suggestion would have led to something worse? It should be the subject of studies and debates. It should be the subject of studies and debates involving

It should be the subject of studies and debates involving the largest number of military and politicians. Whatever our differences of opinion, you will always be credited for being the first to open this file.

the credit for being the first to open this important file. Before I end this conversation, I would like to apologize in advance

for any harsh words or expressions that may have come out of my mouth. You, Brother Jamal, are practicing writing

as a researcher and as a defender of the actions of Sadat, the founder of the National Democratic Party

of which you are supposed to be a member. As for me, I am practicing defending myself against accusations

accusations and slanders. The Almighty has said in verse 148 of Surat al-Nisa. â Allah does not like to speak out

I am practicing self-defense against accusations and slanders. Please accept my criticism with patience.

Gamal Hammad to General Saad Shazly

Yes, the military commanders opposed your proposal.

Before discussing the comments in Brother Saad's letter, I would like to note that space constraints will not allow me to

I will not have the opportunity to comment on all the comments in his letter, so I will limit myself for the benefit of

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readers by focusing on the essential points that I believe will be of interest to them. I have

I noticed, on the other hand, that General Chadli also neglected to respond to many of the observations

in my previous responses to his first letter, and it seems that the reason for this is also due to the same reason he mentioned

the same reason I mentioned, i.e. lack of space.

Strengthening infantry divisions with armored brigades

Al-Shazly mentioned in his letter commenting on the importance of maintaining a tactical reserve

and strategic reserves under the General Command of the Armed Forces: 5If we really want

to learn from our mistakes in the October War, and not to waste the precious blood that was martyred in that glorious war

in that glorious war, we must recognize that the General Command of the Egyptian Armed Forces

made serious mistakes regarding the distribution and utilization of its tactical and strategic reserves

and strategic reserves, and that it did not try to use the method of maneuvering to create new reserves, instead of

instead of those that it has dispersed or destroyed as a result of misuse.â

I have already recorded in several places in my study the serious mistakes made by the

The scattering and dispersal of the tactical reserves of the Second and Third Armies

and Third Armies, which led to the inability of their commanders to launch any major counterattack against the enemy after it crossed the West Bank

crossing into the West Bank, as well as dispersing the General Command's strategic reserves, making it unable to carry out the counterstrike that it was obliged to carry out after the Israeli penetration gap widened. the Israeli penetration gap in the Dafraswar was widened and worsened to the degree that it reached in the last phase of the war. in the final phase of the war.

I could not have hoped for a greater endorsement of my opinion than the full acknowledgment by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in the October '73 war.

But the question we have the right to ask Brother Shazly after he made this confession ... Does he consider himself, as Chief of Staff at the time, to be beyond the scope of of responsibility for these grave mistakes made by the General Command? he was the second-in-command of the General Command and the Operations Authority was directly subordinate to him. his accusation against the General Command becomes an accusation against himself personally?
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Should we consider this admission of his mistakes as a moral courage for which he should be recognized by us? or is it an attempt by him to avoid responsibility for the mistakes made by the General Command on the grounds that his opinions and views were not taken into account due to the differences between him and the General Ahmed Ismail, but does Shazly believe that, assuming this is true? absolves him of historical responsibility?

In his response to our discussion about the reinforcement of the five infantry divisions that crossed to the east of the canal with armored brigades: I was convinced that the infantry divisions, with their with their tanks and anti-tank means, were able to carry out the tasks assigned to them within the without the need to reinforce them with an armored brigade. But Sadat asked Ahmed Ismail to to capture Kantara as soon as possible so that he could use it as a propaganda tool. Ahmed Ismail ordered the division tasked with capturing Qantara to be reinforced with an armored brigade armored brigade . Sadat then repeated the same request for Ismailia and Suez. the two cities to be out of range of enemy artillery as soon as possible. Ismail ordered that the two divisions entering the two cities in their respective sectors be reinforced with an armored brigade. The commanders of the two remaining divisions complained and demanded equality with the other three divisions Ahmed Ismail ordered each of them to be reinforced with an armored brigade, which meant that we scattered five brigades out of a total of 9 brigades, which was all we had from the first moment of the battle, and this was the first mistake I did not strongly oppose this action, as I knew the psychological conditions that drove Sadat and Ahmed Ismail to this outburst. Sadat and Ahmed Ismail to this outburst?

It seems that Shazly wanted to get out of the predicament I had put him in in my previous response when I asked him about the secret of his acceptance, as Chief of Staff, of the

Operations Authority.

to reinforce each of the five infantry divisions that crossed the canal with an armored brigade, since he had assured us in his in his first letter that half the size of the weaponry involved in the organization of an infantry division and without any was enough to repel two armored brigades, i.e., he was responsible for scattering five armored brigades five armored brigades unnecessarily, although they were part of the tactical and strategic reserves. However Chadli's justification to convince us of the reasons for reinforcing the infantry divisions with armored brigades with armored brigades is not credible, for the following reasons:
1 - If this justification is true, it means that Ansazat, who represents the political leadership

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who has nothing to do with operations, was controlling his opinions and directives in the most delicate affairs related to war plans and operations plans and operations, and that those in Center 10 were eager to meet his demands and respond to his wishes. his demands and wishes, whether they were tactically correct or not. Otherwise, what is the meaning of allocating three armored brigades to reinforce three infantry divisions just to taking into account his psychological conditions?

2-Is it plausible that the offensive plan that was prepared for the Sixth of October War, which which was the most successful planned and executed in the armed forces of our time, was planned and executed in such a way planned in such a way that contradicts all sound principles and principles? Can we believe that three infantry divisions are unnecessarily supported by three armored brigades at the knee of the president? and then the remaining two infantry divisions are supported with two armored brigades just because the commanders of the two divisions complained and demanded equality with the other three divisions? And how does this happen despite the fact that that the Chief of Staff, who was primarily responsible for preparing the offensive plan in conjunction with the was fully convinced of the error of this action, and admitted that it was a scattering of the five armored brigades In his response, he recorded that this was the first mistake made by the General Command.

Al-Shazly was careful to make it clear in his response that he did not strongly oppose this action in order to avoid the embarrassment he expected to face to avoid the embarrassment he expected to face when we asked him why he did not record in his published memoirs, despite the fact that he was very keen to record to record all the objections he took during the war, whether in the face of Ahmed Ismail or Sadat.

Researcher and defense lawyer

In his letter, Al-Shazly stated the following: "When I read what Gamal Hammad writes, I sometimes feel as if I am in front of a meticulous researcher and a knowledgeable and educated military man. Other times I feel like I'm reading the arguments of a lawyer who devoted himself to the defense of Sadat in a case that all evidence indicates is a lost cause. And what really saddens me is that the arguments of Jamal Hammad, the lawyer,

often spoil the bright side of Jamal Hammad, the scholar and researcher
Gamal Hammad is a researcher and military analyst. I do not doubt that the
surprise that
that I was shocked by this unjust accusation has affected many readers who read
the same as you, brother
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Saad, what I have already written in this study, in which I dealt with the
objective study and careful analysis of the story of the dispute that arose
The story of the dispute that arose between you and the late President Sadat
during the last phase of the war, which ended
during the last phase of the war, which ended with your removal from your
position and the appointment of El-Gamsi in your place.
It is a study in which I publicly and conclusively explained the extent of the
unjust slanders that Sadat had inflicted on you and the soundness of your
position.
Sadat had inflicted on you and the soundness of your position to the extent that
some people accused me of being biased in your favor
on your side. God knows that I have never been biased except on the side of
truth. So it was a startling surprise that
that you personally accused me of the most vile charge that can be leveled
against a historian, namely that I devoted myself not to
to the defense of the truth, as all my readers can attest, but to the defense of
Sadat. Is there
any reasonable justification that could convince people of this false slander
that you have leveled against me? What benefits will I reap, Brother Saad?
I will gain, Brother Saad, by dedicating myself to the defense of Sadat, which
means
and my articles, as I mentioned, will become a lawyer's argument in his defense,
which means that I will agree with him at the expense of the truth
I did not try to conciliate Sadat when he was alive and had the levers of power,
influence, and authority
He had the reins of power, influence and authority, and it was possible through
this means to reap rewards and fruits and obtain gains and benefits
as many others have done, but what is the motive that tempts me today to
Today, I am tempted to spend money on him now that he has passed on to the mercy
of God and is no longer useful or harmful to me.
harm?
It is strange that you conclude your letter by saying that I am defending
Sadat's actions because he is the
the founder of the National Party, of which I am supposed to be a member. I
would like to make it clear to you, Mr.
Brother Saad, with all my respect and appreciation for the National Party, which
is the ruling party in the country, you
I have never been one of its members because ever since I became a military man,
I have maintained
Since then, I have maintained the army's traditions and regulations that
prohibit its officers from belonging to organizations and parties
and engage in politics. Although I left the military service long ago, I still
adhere to these traditions
I have never joined an organization or a party, except, of course, the Free
Officers Organization
The Free Officers Organization, which I aimed to participate with my brothers
and colleagues
to save Egypt from its plight, when we made the revolution on the night of July
23, 1952.
no sooner had the army movement ended successfully than I returned to the ranks
of the army as a working and disciplined officer
I did not indulge in politics like other revolutionary officers, or try to gain
any advantage or gain for the important role I played
for the important role I had played on the night of the revolution.

Many readers, Brother Saad, are fascinated by the dialog between us because of its objectivity and seriousness.
 objectivity and seriousness, as well as its focus on scientific and tactical aspects and the fundamentals of
 Why on earth would you want to spoil this dialog, which you yourself testified to in your last letter?
 that you yourself testified in your last letter that it is an enjoyable dialog, and what do you accept that the
 The issue we are discussing is a military-technical issue related to the proposal I made
 is a technical military issue related to the proposal you made on the evening of October 20, 73 to the Generalissimo
 to withdraw four armored brigades from east of the canal to the west to face the Israeli threat west of the canal
 Canal. Each of us expressed our views on this technical military issue, and each of us endeavored to
 to present all the arguments and logical arguments to prove the correctness of his opinion. The discussion was
 The discussion was interesting, the dialog was enjoyable, the nerves were calm, and the readers were following this scientific conversation with passion and interest
 And if you surprise everyone by going out of order and striking a blow below the belt

Perhaps what surprised everyone the most is the strange contradiction that you have shown in your last letter.
 in your last letter. While you accuse me in places of being a lawyer who devoted himself to the defense of
 Sadat, while in another place you praise me for my courage in refuting Sadat's allegations against you.
 Sadat against you. You may recall that you said: 1 Gamal Hammad, the researcher, has disbelieved all
 Sadat's allegations against Al-Shazly and acknowledged that when Al-Shazly returned to Post 10 on October 20
 he recommended the need to withdraw part of the forces from the east to deal with them against the enemy in the west.
 He bravely said that Sadat had made all these allegations against Al-Shazly in order to hold him solely responsible for the
 I record this courageous position, which has not been publicly issued by any Egyptian writer, journalist, or politician.
 Egyptian writer, journalist or politician over the past thirteen years, despite dozens of books and hundreds of articles
 and hundreds of articles published in Egypt recording Sadat's claims.â And I don't know
 Brother Saad, after reading this, how can I have the ability to play the role of Sadat's lawyer
 and the prosecutor against him at the same time. There is no explanation for this contradiction and inconsistency in your
 your assessment of my writings, which everyone can attest to their honesty and uniqueness, except for one explanation, which is related to your
 It has to do with your own psychological state and mood when you read what I write. If what I say coincides with satisfaction
 If what I say meets with your satisfaction and satisfaction because the words are on your side, then I am in your eyes and then Jamal Hammad, the researcher and scrutinizer
 and a well-educated and knowledgeable military man and a courageous writer who could not match him in his courage
 His courage has not been matched by any writer, journalist or politician since the end of the October '73 war until

today. If what I say resonates with you because the point of view I have written contradicts your point of view or is not on your side, you will quickly take away all the good qualities you gave me before and become, in your eyes, just a lawyer who devoted himself to defending Sadat. My enjoyable writings turn into desperate arguments in a lost cause. Brother Saad, I cannot
 I cannot devote my pen to writing on your side, rightly or wrongly, to gain your favor.
 but I write what I am convinced is right, no matter how much trouble it costs me.
 no matter how much trouble it may cost me.

I supported your position when I found that Sadat had unfairly victimized you, and I opposed your proposal to withdraw the armored brigades
 your proposal to withdraw the armored brigades to the west to defend Sadat's decision and not to prejudice you.
 personal motives never interfere in my writings, but because I am convinced that your proposal was not realistically feasible
 could not realistically be implemented, even though it was tactically sound.
 I have explained my viewpoint in detail on this subject before, based on scientific and tactical evidence.
 I have not tried to resort to the helpless tactic of leaving the original topic of discussion
 the original topic of discussion and abandon the civilized style of debate in order to throw false accusations at my interlocutor.
 with false accusations and false claims in order to gain a cheap victory, a tactic that has unfortunately spread in recent times.
 that has unfortunately spread in recent times and has brought the language of dialog between some writers to the
 nadir. Had it not been for the fact that I recognize your signature, I would have immediately thought that one of your
 has planted your letter to offend you and tarnish your image in front of the readers.

The attitude of the Muskarian pagans towards Al-Shazali's proposal
 Al-Shazli mentioned the following in his letter: In my published memoirs of the October War, I mentioned the names of the commanders who attended the command conference on the day of the October War.
 The names of the commanders who attended the command conference on October 20, but I did not mention the details of what took place in this conference

out of respect for the rights of colleagues and to allow each of them the honor of explaining their position.
 Instead of going to these commanders to ask them what was discussed at the conference, Jamal Hammad, a researcher, announced
 Jamal Hammad, the lawyer, declared in his defense that the only conclusion of Shazly's failure to mention
 is that these commanders must have opposed his proposal to withdraw these armored brigades
 armored brigades. I don't know how Jamal Hammad, a researcher, accepts this conclusion without research
 Shouldn't Jamal Hammad, who is interviewing me at a distance of 3,000 kilometers?

away from him to seek a meeting with these commanders, who all live in Cairo, just a few to listen to their testimony before making such a hasty conclusion? I'm waiting to see what he publishes after his meeting with these leaders.
waiting for what he publishes after his meeting with these five leaders.

My response to these statements recorded by Shazly in his letter is summarized in the following points:

I don't think any historian or researcher can agree with Shazly's statement that that he did not mention the details of what took place at the leadership conference on the evening of October 20 for these two reasons which cannot be accepted rationally or logically, because how can history be recorded if historians and researchers fail to record how can history be recorded if historians and researchers do not record the serious events that take place under the pretext of respecting fellowship on the one hand, and in order to allow On the other hand, the men who contributed to the events have the honor of explaining their position The October War is now almost 14 years old, Brother Saad, and none of the of those you mentioned has not tried to clarify his position himself, as you saw, and you do not want to to mention the details of what took place at the conference out of respect for the rights of fellowship. is this the proper way to record the correct history, or is it in fact a creative way to avoid recording The two reasons you invoked, Brother Saad, to get rid of the embarrassment you are facing No one, not even a child, would believe them.

While you, Brother Saad, were keen to explain the details of your proposal to withdraw the armored brigades armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west in your memoirs and to clarify the position of both Sadat and Ahmed Ismail at position 10, both before and after the commanders' conference on the evening of October 20. While on page 267 of your diary you did not fail to record the wink that the late the late Engineer Abdel Fattah Abdullah, Minister of Presidential Affairs, and the whisper he whispered in your ear when whispered in your ear when he said: "Say something after the late President Sadat issued his decision at the end of the conference not to withdraw any troops from the East, you were suspiciously keen to omit the views expressed by the five leaders during the conference, while your memoirs are full of while your diary is full of meetings, talks and conferences in which you recorded the text of the statements and the most accurate details from the time you were appointed Chief of Staff until you were removed from the position. There is no real reason for this behavior, in my opinion, except your desire not to publish the truth of the opinions of these leaders at the conference made by these leaders at the conference because they were not in favor of your proposal.

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If what I have recorded in the previous two items is a conclusion, although it

is based on facts

I will mention in the following actual facts that go beyond the circle of inference and move us to the circle of evidence and proof to the circle of evidence and proofs:

First, I have already met with two of these five leaders who attended the conference.

I fully trust their honesty and the strength of their memory, following the publication of my first response to Al-Shazly. He assured me during the meeting that the conclusion I reached and published is completely correct, and that the five leaders were all against Shazly's proposal to withdraw the armored brigades from the east of the canal to the west, and that This was the real reason for Shazly's failure to express his opinion at the conference, even though the conference was not convened and Sadat did not attend was not convened and was only attended by Sadat at his request. None of the five commanders none of them denied what I had previously published about their position during the conference and that they all opposed Shazly's proposal.

The first session of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces after the October War was held on March 4, 75, chaired by the late President Sadat and attended by 19 commanders representing the leadership of the Armed Forces at the time Among the attendees were three of the five commanders who had previously attended the the October 20 conference, namely General Abdel Ghany El Gamsi (after his appointment as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces following the death of Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail), General Muhammad Ali Fahmy (after his appointment as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces), and General Fouad Nassar, Director of Military Intelligence . The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the lessons learned from the October 73, the current position of the Armed Forces and future prospects. After a minute's silence in memory of Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail, and after General El-Gamsi gave a speech on the strategic goal of the armed forces of the Armed Forces, President Sadat spoke at length about some of the important events that took place during the war and the political and military situation at the time.

From the documents related to this meeting, we can summarize the information Sadat gave

Sadat's statements regarding what happened on the evening of October 20 at Station 10 can be summarized as follows (noting that

1) The two commanders in question are Lieutenant General Muhammad Ali Fahmy and Lieutenant General Saeed al-Mahi.

for the sake of truth and history, and in the interest of the readers.

for the benefit of readers.

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Sadat made the same mistake that he made in the book "Searching for the Self", which I have already discovered and corrected. discovered and corrected, namely that some of the events he recounts occurred on

October 2 and not on

October 19):

1 Sadat talked about being summoned at midnight to come to Center 10 by Field Marshal Ahmed Ismail.

-2 Sadat explained how Shazly came back from the front and that he said, trembling: 1 â €œThere must be a solution
A political solution must be found, and the troops must be withdrawn to the west.

3 Sadat named four commanders in particular that he said were not shaken by the Al Thaghra operation.
Their opinion was the same as his, which was to stabilize the troops in the east and deal with the enemy in the west.
These commanders were: Ahmed Ismail, Hosni Mubarak, Abdel Ghany al-Ghamsi, Mohamed Ali Fahmy 0

-4 Sadat mentioned that Generals Hosni Mubarak, the commander of aviation, and Mohamed Ali Fahmy, the commander of defense came to him at dawn the day after the conference at his residence at the Tahira Palace.
They encouraged him for his steadfastness and his decision not to withdraw troops from east to west of the canal and asked him not to be disturbed.
not to be alarmed.

5 Sadat emphasized that the breach operation was not the reason he accepted the ceasefire decision
and that the violent tremor that occurred in the leadership was the first reason
In addition to America, which stood against us for 12 days and entered with its weight.

6 Sadat explained that after the conference he dismissed Shazly and appointed Gamsi as chief of staff without
without announcing it
I am not here to discuss Sadat's statements, but what I am interested in is to clarify that at the meeting of the Supreme Council

meeting of the Supreme Council, Sadat explained the position of the commanders who attended the conference at Center 10 on

October 20, and three of them were present at the Supreme Council meeting, namely Al-Gamsi, Mohamed Ali Fahmy, and Fad Nassar

Ali Fahmy and Fouad Nassar.

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Appendix 6a

How the police united with the army and the people in the October War

Throughout our modern history, the police have proven in all national situations that they are loyal sons
During the battles of the popular struggle against British colonialism, they stood by the people.
They did not hesitate to redeem their homeland with their lives and blood. When the 1919 revolution broke out
The people rushed behind their immortal leader Saad Zaghloul and his heroic comrades, demanding that they, the unarmed people

The most powerful empire on the face of the earth at that time, Great Britain, to end its protection and evacuate its armies as to end its protection and evacuate its armies so that Egypt can regain its freedom and independence, the police contributed to the national struggle movement

in the national struggle among the people. Some police heroes opened their weapons stores to the freedom fighters.

their weapons stores to the militants and revolutionaries, and the police provided righteous martyrs, foremost among them was

The martyr, Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Kamel Muhammad of Assiut, who was convicted by a British military court

on charges of enabling people to obtain weapons from the police warehouse in Assiut, and he was sentenced to death.

He was sentenced to death, and the sentence was carried out on June 10, 1919.

The Battle of Ismailia Governorate on January 25, 1952

On Monday, October 8, 1951, Mustafa al-Nahhas, leader of the Wafd and head of the

and head of the government at the time, Mustafa al-Nahhas delivered his historic statement in front of the parliament (the House of Representatives and the Senate), in which he announced the cancellation of the

The 1936 treaty and the agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899 on the administration of Sudan were canceled. And so it began

From that day on, a great phase of the armed popular struggle against the enemy and occupier began

University students, Egyptian workers and patriots formed several battalions of guerrillas

formed several battalions of guerrillas that began attacking the barracks and installations inside the huge British base that

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that stretched along the Suez Canal from Port Said in the north to Suez in the south. And it took place

fierce battles between the Fedayeen forces and the occupation forces, in which the British lost material losses

and a large number of Egyptians were martyred and injured.

The fact that the police joined the popular forces in their national struggle and responded

despite their weak weapons to the attacks of the British forces on the people, the British leadership was enraged

The British leadership was determined to take revenge on the police and get rid of their presence in the canal cities.

The British leadership was determined to retaliate against the police and eliminate their presence in the canal cities. In

At dawn on Friday, January 25, 52, a huge British force estimated at seven thousand fighters moved

from their camps to the streets of Ismailia, and included dozens of tanks, armored vehicles

tanks, armored vehicles, field guns and radio vehicles. This large military expedition headed for

The Ismailia Governorate House and the adjacent Nizam Block Barracks, both of which had no more than

with no more than 850 men, and laid a tight siege around them. The British commander, Lieutenant-General

Exham gave an ultimatum to the Egyptian liaison officer, Lt. Col.

Sherif al-Abd, demanding that all police forces and orderly blocks in Ismailia surrender their weapons

weapons and leave the Canal Zone on the same day in full force, and threatened

to use force
if his ultimatum was not heeded. Major General Ahmed Raif, the commander of the regime blocks
and Ali Helmy, the deputy governor, immediately contacted Interior Minister Fouad Serageldin at his home in Cairo
at his home in Cairo, ordering them to reject the British ultimatum and to push the force by force and resist until the last bullet and the last man
shot and the last man.

At seven o'clock in the morning, the brutal massacre began.
and tanks pounded the governorate building and the barracks of the regime blocks without pity or mercy. And after
walls crumbled and blood flowed in rivers, General Exham stopped the beating for a moment to
announce his ultimatum to the policemen trapped inside: surrender and come out with their hands up and without their weapons, or else his troops would resume the beating with full force:
The arrogant British commander was astonished when a young, low-ranking officer responded
Captain Mustafa Rifaat, who shouted at him with courage and steadfastness
âYou will not receive anything from us except a dead body.
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The British resumed the infamous massacre, the cannons roared, the tanks roared, and the bombs rained down on the buildings.
The bombs rained down on the buildings until they were reduced to rubble, while its corners were scattered with body parts
The ground was covered in blood. Despite this raging inferno, the police heroes remained steadfast in their
in their positions, resisting with their antique rifles for two hours, 25-pound field guns
Centurion tanks with a 100-meter cannon and the fire of the strongest British infantry divisions.
Cameroonians and Highlanders until they ran out of ammunition. On the field of honor in this battle
50 of the police soldiers were martyred and about 80 of them were wounded, and the British lost
13 dead and 21 wounded. The British captured the surviving officers and soldiers headed by their commander, General Ahmed Raif. They were not released until February 52.
General Exham could not hide his admiration for their bravery, saying to Lieutenant Colonel Sherif al-Abd, the liaison officer
Liaison officer: âThe Egyptian policemen fought with honor; they surrendered with honor, so it is our
It is our duty to respect all of them, officers and soldiers2.

Policemen in the Battle of Suez on October 24, 1973

As a result of the Israeli crossing to the west of the canal on the night of October 15/16 and the advance of the armored division
commanded by General Abraham Adan on October 19 towards Suez on the axis of the Treaty Road.
The city suddenly found itself on the front line with the enemy without prior preparation or warning.
The police force, headed by Major General Fahey Khafagy, the head of security, was faced with a situation that no police force in Egypt had ever
any police force in Egypt had ever faced before. It is enough that the city, which since the beginning of the
since the beginning of the War of Attrition in '68 was no more than 5,000 people, most of whom were from the government apparatus
police, civil defense, and employees and workers of the oil and fertilizer companies in Zaytiyah, its population increased

in just three days after the Israeli advance to the south, its population increased to more than twenty thousand people. This sudden increase occurred because thousands of people flocked to the city to the city, most of whom were military personnel from the administrative backlog as well as civilians from the rural areas of Ismailia and Suez governorates. They were forced to enter Suez after Israeli forces - despite the ceasefire being in effect - closed all roads leading to the north, west and south roads leading to the north, west and south. The sudden arrival of these large groups of citizens into Suez suddenly caused confusion for the city's officials, especially the

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police, as they found themselves required to find empty shelters for these arrivals while at the same time At the same time, they were very careful not to allow any group of them to break into the homes or shops of absent Suez residents out of necessity. or shops of the absent Suez residents who had been displaced abroad in 1968. the governorate, in cooperation with the police, was able to arrange for the expatriates to stay The governorate, in cooperation with the police, was able to arrange for them to live in vacant houses and provide them with means of subsistence, despite the scarcity of resources and supplies at the time. When officials in Suez learned on the evening of October 23 that Israeli tanks had reached the after passing through Suez from the outside and were on their way to the port of Adabiya the port of Adabiya, they began to prepare for the Israeli attack, which they estimated would inevitably begin the following day the next day

The security director instructed all police stations and units to be on alert and ready. The civil defense operations room in Arbaeen Square, which was run by Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim became the headquarters of the Popular Defense Command, and the fire and rescue services prepared to perform their duties during the airstrikes. air raids. When the security chief discovered that the volunteers who were volunteering to defend the city were in need of weapons, he ordered all police stores to be opened weapons, he ordered all police stores to be opened and weapons and ammunition to be handed over to those who were able to carry and use them. carry and use them.

After the enemy succeeded on October 23 in cutting off wire communications with Cairo, the police's radio network was cut off. The rescue police's radio network became the only communication link between Suez and Cairo. Suez and Cairo . Major Refaat Shatta was in charge of this radio unit, assisted by Lt. Abdel Rahman Ghanima and under his command were 18 non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

On the morning of October 24, Israeli tanks stormed the city of Suez on three axes When some heroes of the Sinai Organization fired RPG-7 shells at the tanks leading the armored column tanks leading the armored column that crossed Army Street and reached Arbaeen Square, the front tanks stopped in front of the Arbaeen police station.

The front tanks stopped in front of the Arbaeen police station after catching fire, and the soldiers jumped out. Israeli soldiers in the tank crews jumped out of the tanks and ran to neighboring buildings to try to take shelter inside them. An Israeli group of about 25 individuals managed to storm the police station. Al-Arbaeen police station and managed to take control of the station with a number of police officers and soldiers inside. police officers and soldiers. Two heroic attempts were made by the policemen to retrieve

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the station from the Israelis and save the officers and soldiers inside from the Israelis' clutches. The first attempt was led by Major Nabil Sharaf, and the second attempt was led by Captain Assem Hamouda. The first attempt was led by Major Nabil Sharaf and the second attempt was led by Captain Assem Hamouda. However, both attempts were unsuccessful and the two officers were martyred along with six non-commissioned officers and soldiers non-commissioned officers and soldiers.

Throughout the day, Major General Mohy Khafagy, the head of security, accompanied Badawi al-Kholy, the governor of Suez in all his movements and did not leave his side for a single moment. The governor and security director left the governorate's operations room at around 9:30 a.m., after learning that Israeli tanks were only 70-80 meters away from this room, and moved to some private places in the Arbaeen neighborhood, where the governor phoned some of the officials in charge of utilities and the hospital to check on the state of the city. When the governor and the security director learned that Israeli tanks had arrived at Arbaeen Square. When the governor and the security chief learned that Israeli tanks had reached Arbaeen Square, they bravely and steadfastly rushed to the square and joined the crowds that were filling every corner of it. All its corners. When the tanks were hit in front of the police station and burst into flames, the governor and the security director were overjoyed, and they joined the enthusiastic crowd in chanting "Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar. After the end of the battle and the withdrawal of the remaining tanks, the governor contacted the colonizers in Cairo via the police radio unit to deliver the news of the victory of the valiant Suez over the aggressive invaders, after the people and the army and police joined hands in the closest and united in the arena of jihad and honor. The day of October 25 was full of events; when the governor arrived in the morning, accompanied by the security director. When the governor arrived in the morning with the security director to the civil defense room, he received an alarm from an Israeli officer who spoke to him by phone from the Suez Petroleum Manufacturing Company. on the phone from the Suez Petroleum Manufacturing Company. The warning demanded that the governor surrender the city within half an hour, and that he, the security director and the military commander of Suez should come in a car with a white flag a car with a white flag and all the civilians in the city to the sports stadium, if this is not done within half an hour. if this was not done within half an hour, the city would be hit by airplanes and

all its inhabitants would be exterminated
exterminated. The governor telephoned Police Major Refaat Shatta, the commander
of the radio unit, and asked him to inform officials in Cairo
to inform officials in Cairo of the Israeli ultimatum to surrender the city.
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Shatta immediately relayed the message to Brigadier General Mohammed al-Nabawi
Ismail, director of the office of
the office of Mamdouh Salem, then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Interior. About 20 minutes later
minutes later, Major Shatta received Cairo's reply, which read: "No
extradition. . . . By the governor, the defense of Suez
Suez is defended, and the governor and security director must join the popular
resistance." And when
Major Shatta conveyed the text of Cairo's message to the governor, he replied
"Ikhlas, we will join the popular resistance
and die as martyrs. 2. When the security director learned the content of the
reply, he said: 1 Say: "We will only suffer what God has written for us.
What God has written for us" . Since the news of the Israelis contacting the
governor and giving him an ultimatum to surrender
had spread among many citizens and caused great confusion, the governor asked
Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim, head of the defense department
Police Lieutenant Colonel Fathi Ghoneim, head of the Civil Defense and Fire
Department, to drive around in a car in the streets of the city
and announce on a megaphone that the governor had rejected the Israeli ultimatum
to surrender
to surrender Suez and that the city would resist.

Radio communication between Suez and Cairo has been working accurately and
efficiently through the police radio unit
by the police radio unit since all telephone communication between Suez and the
outside world was cut off on October 23
Suez and abroad on October 23. However, this single means of communication was
cut off on October 26
October 26, the enemy managed to capture the unit's building, which was located
in an isolated location outside the city
and captured Major Refaat Shatta, Lieutenant Abdel Rahman Ghanima, and their
crew of non-commissioned officers and soldiers
and their crew of non-commissioned officers and soldiers after they performed
their duty with courage and honor.

Since the beginning of the October War, and during the siege imposed by the
enemy
During the 100-day siege imposed by the enemy on the city, the police force in
Suez performed all the tasks that were asked of it, despite the fact that many
of them were beyond its capacity.
Many of them were beyond its capacity and capabilities, and some of them were
not even within its competence.
The men realized their national duty and responded to their humanitarian and
fraternal feeling towards their fellow countrymen.
This ultimately led to the creation of close ties between the police, citizens,
and members of the armed forces.
and members of the armed forces.

The role of central security in the October War

During the glorious October '73, the Central Security Agency was assigned a
major responsibility.
Protecting the rear of the armed forces and securing their rear lines against
any infiltration or
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sabotage by the enemy. The Central Security Forces performed the enormous tasks with great efficiency and patriotism, and the Central Security Forces were assigned to perform these tasks which should have been assigned to military forces due to the distinguished military appearance of the Central Security Forces and the high level of discipline, training, and armament of its units. training and armament, which made these forces closer in appearance and formations to regular armies closer to regular armies

During the war, the Central Security Forces were assigned several vital tasks, the most important of which were
The most important and dangerous of them were the following:

First, securing Ismailia and Port Said:

A large group of Central Security Forces was formed under the command of Colonel Lotfi Abdel Fattah Abdel Fattah

Attia was formed to secure the Ismailia and Port Said areas, with a total force of 34 officers

and 1961 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. This force was hurriedly sent from Cairo

to the 2nd Al-Jahish sector on October 16, immediately after the Israeli forces crossed

from the Dufreswar breach to the West Bank of the Canal on the night of October 15/16. It was assigned

The tasks assigned to it were coordinated between its commander and General Abdel Moneim Khalil, the commander of the Second Army

Second Army, and due to the danger of the areas in which these forces were to be stationed

Due to their close proximity to the battlefields west of the Suez Canal

to deal with enemy forces and tanks, and thus its members were provided with

In addition to automatic rifles (personal armament), a number of 60mm mortars light machine guns, anti-tank Energa rifles, grenades, Molotov cocktails, and hand grenades.

hand grenades, Molotov cocktails, and anti-tank grenades (Husam type)

The tasks assigned to these forces were as follows:

1- Guarding and securing the Ismailia-Cairo agricultural road extending north of the Taraa

Ismailia, in the sector from the city of Ismailia in the east to Al-Tal Al-Kabir in the west

in the west, with a focus on some important points on the road, namely (Al-Baalwa -

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Al-Qasasin, Al-Lahsma, Abu Sawir, the upper bridge) and work to prevent any blasting or destruction operations by the enemy, through the work of ambushes and fixed guard posts
Fixed guard.

2- Guarding vital installations and targets in the cities of Ismailia and Qantara West
and the Abu Khalifa area.

3- Securing the secondary roads leading to the Cairo-Ismailia Agricultural Road as well as

villages located in agricultural lands.

0 Guarding and securing the ferries built on the Ismailia Canal and participating with the 4 Armed Forces in securing the bridges along the canal.

Second, securing the Cairo area:

A Central Security Group was formed under the command of Colonel Abdel Rahim al-Nahhas to secure the Cairo area.

to secure the Cairo area. The total force consisted of 50 officers, 005 non-commissioned officers

And a soldier. The task assigned to it was coordinated between its commander and the commander of the

Central Cairo. The basis of its work was the use of ambushes and fixed guard posts to carry out the following tasks

Fixed guarding to carry out the following tasks:

1- Guarding and securing the links of secondary roads with the Cairo-Ismailiya and Cairo-Ismailiya roads

Desert and agricultural roads.

2- Guarding and securing the branches of the Cairo-Suez road.

3- Guarding and securing the Katameya back road.

4- Guarding and securing the entrance to Helwan from the southern road coming from the

Gulf of Suez.

5- Guarding and securing the links of secondary roads from the direction of the canal area with the Cairo Road

Alexandria Agricultural Road .

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Third, the rescue of vital targets:

A Central Security group was formed under the command of Colonel Salah Bahgat, which was

consisting of 30 officers and 6 combat companies, and its main mission was to rescue facilities

and vital targets in the central region and destroy any forces that the enemy succeeded in landing them

from the air. This mission was previously assigned to units of the Armed Forces.

but it was decided to assign it to Central Security after it proved its worthiness in performing the military tasks

in order to free up military units for their combat missions at the front.

Method of performance: In order to ensure the proper performance of the Central Security Forces

Establishing protective shelters for personnel and firing positions overlooking important approach routes, such as the following

Occupying high heights that control the surrounding areas to facilitate snipers to deal with any infiltrators and saboteurs

snipers to deal with any infiltrators or saboteurs, and these positions were reinforced with anti-tank weapons.

The Central Security Forces remained in place despite the ceasefire decision on October 22

on October 22 and after the decision to establish the International Emergency

Force (IEF), and only left them in late January after the ceasefire took effect in late January after the first disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel

took effect on

January 25, 74 in the talks (kilometer 2101).

Central Security Apparatus appreciation: After the Central Security Forces

completed the tasks and responsibilities assigned to them during the war and returned to their barracks after having performed their national duty with merit and sincerity. Their national duty with merit and sincerity, they deserved from the military and political leaders thanks and appreciation. The General Command of the Armed Forces, the Central Command and the Second Army Command sent letters to the Ministry of Interior and the Central Security Command expressing The General Command of the Armed Forces, the Central Command and the Second Army Command sent letters to the Ministry of Interior and the Central Security Command. He also awarded the Central Security flag with the Order of Merit of the First Class. He praised The late President Sadat praised the role of Central Security, as he mentioned on page 277 of his of his book The Search for Self as follows: When the Israelis tried to capture the city of Ismailia, they could not even reach its outskirts. I had assigned Mamdouh Salem He was at that time in charge of the Supreme Council for Popular Defense, and he sent 1000 highly trained Central Security Forces with their weapons and equipment. They were fully prepared, along with the army and the people, to receive the Israelis.â

849

Fourth, securing and guarding Egypt's eastern borders:

850

In implementation of the provisions of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty concluded on March 26 79 and following the end of the last phase of the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai territories On April 25, 1982, Central Security forces armed with automatic rifles and light machine guns at 12:00 p.m. on the same day to Area C) where they were to be stationed. This area is bordered on the west by Area B, where Egyptian Border Guard units are stationed Egyptian Border Guard units, and is bordered on the east by the international border that runs from Rafah on the Mediterranean coast in the north from Rafah on the Mediterranean coast in the north to Taba on the Gulf of Aqaba, then along the Gulf to Sharm el-Sheikh in the south. Area C has an area of about 13,000 square kilometers.

The Central Security Forces in this area have been assigned the following permanent tasks:

- 1) occupying honorable points along the international border line.
 - 2 Carrying out the normal duties assigned to the police, namely maintaining security and order within the zone
 3. Preventing any attempts to penetrate the border and infiltration of all kinds, including combating smuggling
 - 4- Protecting the state's land and property and enforcing Egyptian laws and regulations on everyone.
- To perform these tasks efficiently, six locations along the border line have been prepared for stationing

The main force from which the front points are pushed, and these locations are:
Rafah - Qusayma
Ras al-Naqab, Nuweiba, Dahab and Sharm al-Sheikh.

Inspired by the crossing

Your falcons have become eagles
And your cavalcade of Umgurpurdashmala
You slept on the distant third, Terera
And we ate our food.
Ruwin Israel, your security is false

Poetry by Jamal Hammad
Tidetta, the atmosphere and all the ragamuffins
Aaba Olawatu is very strong and fierce
You're getting a Bragg and you're getting a Jink Dah
You have no name and no name.

And your illusions and yuk tam

68

I woke up to the sound of the crossing
5 years old and 5 years old
Your fearless crawl, then

Your landing on land is a delusional dream.
And your disgraceful flags on the shore

6

You're welcome, my lord, we're gone.
You've spent the last few years in despair.
Torn apart by despair and despair.
Is this Diane drinking or is this a forest?

36

â æYou see her hateful and the night is darkâ

Your deacon's suffering.
Waves of destruction rolled in.

The angels of the merciful have come to attack.
And your wings with the powerful Basen Shasratham.
To remove from Sinai a brutal invader.

We returned to our days and honors
Our dignity is withering and our pride is fading.
The most cruel of all defeats
Our honors fade and our honors fade.
and the wolf is devoured by the insects and the wolf is the culprit.

2.

875

Your grandfather's drinking army saved a nation
You made a nation out of nothing.

And you marched on the gods to save it.
You crossed a nation behind you.
You are the rightful uncle of every nation.

876

And she returned to her places and grievances

Saw the swords at the meeting.
We will never leave God's side.

â œ, 8

Bashagi Fa
And when the two and the Nasraddam's prayers are answered

1973 Rabotka (H1393 Ramadan)

Egyptian Command System

In the October 1973 war
5 General Command (Center)
Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces: General Ahmed Ismail Ali
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces: Lieutenant General Saad al-Din al-Shazly
Chief of Operations: General Mohamed Abdel Ghani El-Gamsy
Director of Military Intelligence: Major General Ibrahim Fouad Nassar
5 Force Commanders
Commander of the Air Force: Major General Mohamed Hosni Mubarak
Commander of the Navy: Rear Admiral Fouad Zekry
Commander of the Air Defense Forces: Major General Mohamed Ali Fahmy
5 combat arms commanders
Director of the Artillery Corps: Major General Mohamed Said al-Mahi
Director of the Armored Corps: Major General Kamal Hassan Ali
Director of the Engineers Corps: Brigadier General Engineer Jamal Mohamed Ali
Commander of the Thunderbolt Forces: Brigadier General Nabil Shoukry
Commander of the Parachute Forces: Brigadier General Mahmoud Abdallah
5 Red Sea Region
Commander of the region : Brigadier General Ibrahim Kamel Mohamed

877

Chief of Staff of the region:
Chief of Operations Branch:
5 Third Field Army
Army Commander :

Chief of Staff:
Assistant Army Commander:
Chief of Operations Division:
Commander of the 7th Infantry Division:
Commander of the 19th Infantry Division:
Commander of the 4th Armored Division:
Commander of the 6th Mechanized Infantry Division:
Commander of the Army Artillery:

5 Second Field Army
Army Commander :

Army Chief of Staff:

Assistant Army Commander:

Chief of Operations:

Commander of the 2nd Infantry Division:

Commander of the 16th Infantry Division:

Commander, 18th Infantry Division:

Commander of the 21st Armored Division:

Commander of the 233rd Mechanized Infantry Division:
878

Brigadier General Ibrahim Rashid

Brigadier General Abdel Fattah Rasmi

Brigadier General Abdelnoum Wasel

Brigadier General Mustafa Shahin

Brigadier General Ahmed Abdel Ghaffar Hegazy
Brigadier General Mohamed Nabih El Sayed

Brigadier General Ahmed Badawi Sayed Ahmed
Brigadier General Youssef Afifi

Brigadier General Mohamed Abdelhaziz Qabil
Brigadier General Mohamed Abul Fath Muharram
Brigadier General Mounir Shash

General Saad Maamoun suffered a heart attack on the morning of
October 14

Brigadier General Abdel Moneim Khalil took command of the army after
On the afternoon of October 16

Major General Tayseer al-Akkad

Major General Omar al-Moji

Brigadier General Farouk Salem

Brigadier General Hassan Abu Saada

Brigadier General Abd Rab al-Nabi Hafez

Brigadier General Fouad Aziz Ghali

Brigadier General Ibrahim Abdel Ghafour El Orabi

Brigadier General Ahmed Abboud al-Zamar

Commander of the army artillery: Brigadier General Mohamed Abdel Halim Abu
Ghazaleh

5 Port Said Sector

Sector Commander: Brigadier General Omar Khaled Hassan, relieved of command on
October 16

Major General Saad Eddin Sabri. . Assumed command on October 16
October 16.

Chief of Staff of the sector: Brigadier General Jaber Abdullah

Chief of Operations Branch: Brigadier General Farouk Mohamed El-Hafni

879

The Israeli command system

In the October 1973 war

5 General Command

Defense Minister: Moshe Dayan

Chief of General Staff: Lieutenant General David Eliezer (Dado)

Deputy Chief of Staff: Major General Yisrael Tal

Chief of Operations : Major General Avraham Tamir

Director of Military Intelligence: Major General Eliyahu Zaira

5 Southern Command

Personal representative of the Chief of General Staff:

Commander of the Southern Command:

Deputy Commander of the Southern Command:

252nd Operations Group 5

Armored Division Commander.

Armored Brigade Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander:

Mechanized Infantry Brigade Commander:

Lieutenant General Chaim Bar-Lev

Major General Shmuel Gonen (Gorodish)

Major General Uri Ben-Ari

(Regular Army)

Major General Abraham Mandler (Albert) was killed on

October 13

Maj. Gen. Kalman Magen took command on October 31

October

Col. Dan Shimron

Colonel Avraham Barum

Colonel Reuven Pinchas

8812

143 Operational Group 5

: Armored Division Commander

Deputy Division Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander:

Parachute Brigade Commander:

162nd Operations Group 5
: Armored Division Commander

Deputy Division Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander:

Armored Brigade Commander :

Armored Brigade Commander:

Commander of a lightly mobile mixed brigade:

% Defense Forces East of the Canal

Mixed Division Commander (Northern Sector)

Front):

Mixed Division Commander (Southern Sector)

- Front):

South Sinai Command
Command Commander:

882

(from the reserve army)

Major General Ariel Sharon (Arik)
Brigadier General Jacob Avin

Colonel Chaim Erez

Col. Amnon Reshev

Colonel Tuvia Raviv

Colonel Danny Mat

(from the reserve army)

Major General Abraham Adan (Bern)
Brigadier General Dovik Tamari

Colonel Gabi Amir

Colonel Nitka Param

Colonel Aryeh Karin

Brigadier General Dovik Tamari (deputy commander)

Division) Formed on October 21

Formed after the Israeli crossing to the
West (from the reserve army)

Brigadier Sasson

Brigadier General Granit Israel (on leave
after his son was killed in the Golan Heights)

Brigadier Menachem Piron took command of the division
after Granit

(from the reserve army)

Major General Isaiah Hogavish

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883

Hussein Tantawi

Saad al-Din al-Shazli
Salah al-Din al-Khadidi
Adel Malik

Abdel Sattar Tawila
Abdel Azim Ramadan
Abdul Karim Darwish

Abdullah al-Asadi

Eida Mubasher

Maher Abdul Hamid

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At noon

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Mohamed Abdelmajid Marei
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Mohamed Ali Nahmi

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Mahmoud Riad

Mahmoud Awad

Morsi Atallah

Musa Sabri

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Six

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- 2- Insight on the Middle East War
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- 3- Confrontation, the Middle East War and World Politics
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- 7- The yom Kippur War.
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8- The International Year Book of Foreign Policy Analysis - London Groom Helm Ltd 1975.
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Chapter One

How was the October 1973 War planned? ...

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The Great Crossing and the Breaking of the Bar-Lev Line.

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Chapter Three

The stage of building bridgeheads and repelling Israeli counterattacks.

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: Hammad.

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Lee to Jamal Hammad.

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The second message from the
The second from the Lieutenant General
Lieutenant General Saad Al-Shada
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The police coalesced
with the army and the people.
Yit Jiehnyen

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-7 Main axes of advance in Sinai

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24. plan to destroy enemy forces in the breach 741

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Biography of Maj. Gen.

Jamal Hammad

Military historian

I: Higher degrees obtained:

1 Master's degree in military science from the Cairo Military Staff College in 1950 (now the Command and Staff College).
and Staff College).

1959 Brigade Commanders Expedition from the Soviet Union War College in 2

Secondly: Medals and awards received:

1 Gold merit badge.

2 Long Service and Good Example Medal

3 Syrian Order of Merit.

4 Syrian Loyalty Medal.

5 Lebanese Cedar Medal.
6 - Jordanian Independence Medal.
7 - Iraqi Rafidain Medal.
8-The Medal of Science and Arts, first class.
9 State Encouragement Award for the book War Battles on the Egyptian Front
October War
21973
899

10 Award for the best book on the October 1973 war from the Department of Moral
Affairs of the Armed Forces on the occasion of the celebration of the silver
jubilee of the October War
On the occasion of the celebration of the silver jubilee of the October 1973
war, which was celebrated.

Third; Historical works:

1 The great battles of Islam

2 The Great Battle of Badr

223 July is the longest day in Egypt's history

4 The Hidden Government

5 From Sinai to Jakhoulan

6 Military battles on the Egyptian front
(October 1973 Tenth of Ramadan War)

7 Flags of the Companions

Fourth: Fictional works:

1 Sunset and Sunrise

2 The third of them is the devil

Publisher

Al-Nahda Bookstore

Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs
Dar Al-Hilal

Dar Al-Zahraa Arabic Media
Dar Al-Zahraa Arabic Media

Dar Al-Zahraa for Arabic Media
(First and second editions)

(Third edition by Dar Al-Shoroukak)
Modern Cairo for Printing

Dar Al-Qalam and was directed in a movie.
Dar Al-Hilal and was directed in a movie.

Fifth: Major military and civilian positions he held:

1 General Staff of the Infantry Corps (before the revolution of July 23, 1952).
2 Military Attaché to Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq)

. Chief Instructor of the Hukhrabiya College 4

. Director of the Egyptian-Syrian Joint Command in Damascus-3

. Infantry and commander of Al-Arish Military District 18 Brigade Commander 5
. Head of the Liaison Authority of the United Nations forces (Sinai and Gaza Strip) 6

7. Commander of the Infantry Institute.
900

8-Chief of the Experts Authority in Yemen.
-9 Governor of Kafr El-Sheikh .
10 Governor of Menoufia.

Sixth : The wars in which he participated:

1. The 1948 Palestine War (staff of the seventh infantry battalion).

2 Tripartite aggression in 1956 (Director of the Malasian-Syrian Joint Command in Damascus).

3% Yemen War (head of the Experts Committee).

Seventh: His role in the revolution of July 23, 1952

1 On December 31, 1951, the General Assembly of Officers elected him as a member of the Board of Directors of the Officers' Club for the infantry corps, which was headed by General Muhammad Naguib, who challenged the previous king until the decision to ban him was issued defied the former king until the decision to dissolve it on July 16, 1952, and the revolution took place one week after the dissolution of the board of directors.

1952 July 23 he was entrusted with one of the main roles on the night of 2

3 He wrote the first statement of the revolution, which was broadcast by the late President Anwar Sadat (a copy of the The original statement in his handwriting is currently on display at the War Museum).

4 His name was listed at the top of the list of free officers in Presidential Decree No. 1386 issued on November 20, 1972, which is the list engraved on the wall in the of the Revolution in the Military Museum.

5 Despite his role and efforts in the success of the revolution, he insisted on remaining in the military service as an ordinary officer He did not ask to be appointed to any civilian position, so he was one of the few revolutionary officers who He was surprised to find his appointment as governor of Kafr al-Sheikh published in newspapers without consulting him. At the time, he was a graduate student at the Nasser Academy and had to to drop out after spending a year at the academy as part of the first cohort taught by Soviet experts and consultants.

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6 The National Encyclopedia of Prominent Egyptian Figures, published by the State Information Service (SIS) in 1989
State Information Service (SIS) in 1989
Not included in the â Encyclopedia of Egyptian Notables in the Twentieth

Centuryâ published by the Middle East News Agency (MENA) in 1996
Middle East News Agency in 1996

Eighth: His contribution in the field of military education:

1 He delivered numerous lectures as a visiting professor at the Command and Staff College and the War College at the Nasser Higher Military Academy War College at the Nasser Higher Military Academy and the Infantry Institute on the Revolution of July 23, 1952, the War of October 1973 and the 1991 Kuwait Liberation War

2 He participated in several seminars organized by the Military Research Authority and the Moral Affairs Department of the Armed Forces on the Revolution of July 23, 1952, the October 1973 War and some other important military topics and other important military topics

3 October Magazine currently publishes a series of his articles every week on the battles of the Western Desert that took place in the early 1940s between the Axis Army that took place in the early 1940s between the Axis Army led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and the British Eighth Army, led by Field Marshal Montgomery, and the decisive battle of El Alamein which began on the night of October 24/23, 1942 and ended with the defeat of the Axis forces.

4 He supervised the historical accuracy of the videos produced by the General Department of Media and Relations at the Ministry of Interior on the role of the police on the heroic role of the Egyptian police in conjunction with the people in resisting British colonization in the with the people in resisting British colonization in the Suez Canal region, which ended the glorious battle of Ismailia Governorate on January 25, 1952, as well as the valiant resistance in 1956 against the triple aggression in Port Said and in repelling the attempt of Israeli forces to enter the city of Suez on January 24, 1952. the attempt by Israeli forces to enter the city of Suez on October 24, 1973.

IX: His literary and social activities.

1 Historian and writer famous for his impartiality and honesty and published dozens of articles in Egyptian magazines and newspapers And Egyptian newspapers.

2 One of the prominent writers of October magazine and writes a weekly article in the magazine on a regular basis since

902

Eighteen years ago, he was also one of the writers of Last Hour magazine for many years as well as one of the writers of Al-Shabab magazine, and has written many articles in military magazines (Defense, Al-Nasr, Military and Al-Wafaa magazines). Defense, Victory, Military Magazine and Loyalty to Veterans) issued by the Armed Forces Armed Forces .

3 A poet, he has published many poems and broadcasted national anthems from the Radio House that were co-composed by leading composers such as composed by leading composers such as Mr. Mohamed Abdel Wahab, Mahmoud Al-

Sharif, and Abdel Hamid
Abdel Rahman.

4 He assumed the presidency of the Egyptian-American Friendship Society from 1984 to 1990, succeeding Dr. Esmat Abdel Meguid
Dr. Esmat Abdel-Meguid after his appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was succeeded by Dr. Ibrahim Fawzy, Minister of Industry and Chairman of the Egyptian-American Friendship Society
He was succeeded by Dr. Ibrahim Fawzy, Minister of Industry and former head of the Investment Authority.

1973 and on the October War in 1952 and July 23, he gave many lectures on the revolution of 5
in many governorates of the Republic, university faculty clubs, Egyptian social clubs, and petroleum companies in Cairo and Khartoum
Egyptian social clubs and oil companies in Cairo and the Gulf of Suez.

6- He participated in several seminars, including the seminar he chaired at the Book Fair
on January 10, 1991, on 1Arab National Security? The members of the symposium were
Professors Lotfi al-Khouli, Ahmed Hamroush and Raji Enayat, and he also chaired a symposium at the International Book Fair on January 25, 2002
the International Book Fair on January 25, 2002 on â€œJuly Revolution and Arab National Securityâ€
On the occasion of the Golden Jubilee of the July Revolution, the members of the seminar were Prof. Dr. Mohamed
Odeh, Major General Dr. Jabr Ali Jabr and Professor Osama Ghaith

7- Appointed as a member of the Higher Committee for History formed in 1999 by a decision of the Minister of Education
to develop history curricula for preparatory and secondary school students, and he prepared
the special section on the Revolution of July 23, 1952 and the October 1973 War in the two history books that are currently taught to the students of the certificates of education.
which are currently being taught to preparatory and high school students.

8Member of the Writers Union

9Member of the Historical Committee of the Revolutionary Leaders Museum of the Ministry of Culture, which is the committee that will supervise the establishment of the museum
that will supervise the establishment of the museum in the Revolutionary Command Council building on the island.

10 Member of the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies.

903

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